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(8509.)

PART IV.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

AFFAIRS OF THIBET

July to September 1904.

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Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Thibet.

PART IV.

No. 1.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 169.)

My Lord,

Peking, May 14, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul-General at Chengtu, reporting on affairs in Szechuan and Thibet.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Consul-General Hosie to Sir E. Satow.

(No. 10.)

(Extract.)

Chengtu, April 9, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to report that Kuei Ling, the Assistant Imperial Resident for Thibet, who has been here since the 12th June, 1903, is in very bad health, and, although it is given out that he will soon start on his journey to Lhasa and take with him 600 soldiers to be stationed at Ch'amdo, it is doubtful whether he will be able to take up his post. The alleged preparations he is making are simply an excuse to gain time for the recovery of his health. Some days ago the Viceroy received a despatch from Yü Kang, who left Lhasa for China on the 23rd February, stating that the Prefect Ho Kuang-hsi, referred to in previous correspondence, had petitioned to be relieved of his duties on the Sikkim-Thibetan frontier, but that his application had been refused. The Viceroy received private letters at the same time, but their contents are kept secret.

In my despatch No. 1 of the 5th January, I quoted a letter from a Lama at Lhasa, stating that one of the Kalon had compassed the death of the Ti Mo Fo, a living Buddha, who ranked next to the Dalai Lama, and that he had made friends with the Russians to escape the consequences of his crime. The reason given for the murder was that the Kalon had borrowed from the Ti Mo Fo money which he was either unable or unwilling to repay. Another version of the occurrence was recently given to me by a Lama who lives in a small Lamasery to which the poorer Lamas from Thibet resort when visiting or passing through Chengtu. There is, according to my informant, who was educated in the Drébung Lamasery south-east of Lhasa, an Ecclesiastical Council composed of four living Buddhas, one of whom, the Ti Mo Fo, is the President. This Council, called Peu-gi Jyabo, occupies a place between the

Dalai Lama and the four Kalon, who are all laymen and military officials, and is not to be confounded with the Supreme or National Council which is made up of, amongst other members, the Fang Chang or K'an Pu of the three great Lamaseries of Drébung, Séra, and Gadän. The President of the Ecclesiastical Council is said to have been in favour of an understanding with the Government of India, and was, in consequence, accused by the Kalon of wishing to sell his country to the British. He was arrested and thrown into prison, where he was either murdered or starved to death.

His nephew is now cooped up in a cell through an opening in which he is daily served with three small pieces of Tsamba insufficient to sustain life for any length of time. It seems unlikely that the death of the Ti Mo Fo and the persecution of his relatives are due to the mere question of a debt, and it is possible that the account now given may be the correct one.

The latest report from Ta-chien-lu is that the Dalai Lama has thrown the four Kalon into prison and confiscated their property, owing to their mismanagement of affairs and for receiving bribes.

In my despatch No. 19 of the 28th November, 1903, I mentioned the report of the capture and murder of two men stated to belong to the escort of the British Commissioners when at Khamba. Copies of despatches forwarded to me by the Government of India leave little doubt that the report refers to the two Lachung traders who were seized at Shigatze and conveyed to Lhasa.

The official assurance given by the Russian Ambassador to Lord Lansdowne that "there was no Convention with Thibet, either with Thibet itself or with China, or with any one else, nor had the Russian Government any Agents in that country or any intention of sending Agents or Missions there," would, if the circumstantial but unofficial account which has reached me is to be credited, appear to be only half the truth. It is stated that a Convention was actually drawn up and submitted to the Imperial Resident for his approval. Instead of giving his sanction, he is reported to have torn up the document in the presence of the Thibetan officials by whom it was submitted. The account adds that one of the Articles of the Convention provided for an annual subsidy from Russia to Thibet of 100,000 taels.

No. 2.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 4.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of telegrams relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, July 4, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 2.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, July 1, 1904.

THIBET. Please telegraph latest information that you may have received as to negotiations in time for answer to a question in Parliament on Monday next.

Inclosure 2 in No. 2.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

July 2, 1904.

THIBET. Your telegram of yesterday's date.

Colonel Younghusband was shown, on the 1st instant, by the Tongsa Penlop, a letter from the Dalai Lama saying that he has appointed Shape, Ta Lama, the Grand Secretary, and representatives of the three great Monasteries, to carry on negotiations; and asking the Tongsa Penlop, as we are prepared to negotiate by given date, to assist in peaceful settlement, fighting being bad for both animals and men.

A present of silk has also arrived in camp as from Dalai Lama. Acceptance of the gift has, however, been refused by Younghusband, unless it is presented officially by the Dalai Lama, or accompanied by a letter. Younghusband also stated that British Government were willing to extend time limit, in spite of the fact that it had passed, if the Envoys then on their way could furnish proof of their own readiness and power to negotiate, and of the sincerity of the Thibetan Government.

On the afternoon of the 1st July, Ta Lama reached Gyantse, and Younghusband received him on the following morning, Tongsa Penlop and six Representatives of the three Lhasa monasteries being also present. They display no eagerness for settlement, and their only credentials are letters to Tongsa Penlop from Dalai Lama. They were told by Younghusband to come again on the 3rd July, after they had discussed matters with Tongsa Penlop, whom he has requested to explain to them the extremely serious position of affairs, and to impress upon them the necessity, if they wish the advance to Lhasa to be postponed, of furnishing satisfactory assurances as to the good faith of their Government, and the earnestness of their desire for negotiations.

I will telegraph any further information which reaches me.

(Repeated to Peking.)

Inclosure 3 in No. 2.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

July 3, 1904.

THIBET. Telegram No. 142 from His Majesty's Minister at Peking.

Chinese cannot be held to be free from liability for present situation, having signed the Agreements of 1890 and 1893. We explained this in despatch, copy of which has been sent to Peking by post. It seems likely that we shall find the claim to indemnity a useful instrument by which to make the Chinese consent to continue to allow us freedom of action, and to make a formal grant to us of the exclusive rights at which we aim, when the final settlement is arrived at.

(Repeated to Peking.)

Inclosure 4 in No. 2.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

July 3, 1904.

REPORT has been received from Ugyen Kazi that it is the Tongsa Penlop's belief that there is real anxiety on the part of Delegates to come to settlement, and to do so without consulting China.

A statement of our exact demands, embodied in writing should, he suggests, be given them by Younghusband.

(Repeated to Peking.)

No. 3.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 5.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 4th instant, relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, July 4, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 3.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

July 4, 1904.

THIBET. Colonel Younghusband received the Delegates in durbar yesterday at 4 p.m., though they arrived an hour and a-half late. It does not appear that any business was transacted, but, to prevent further risks of attack on Mission, Delegates

were informed by Younghusband that, if they really wished to negotiate, and so prevent military advance to Lhasa, Jong must be evacuated on the 5th instant before midday. Opinion of Younghusband is that Grand Secretary, who showed want of respect at Khamba Jong, is repeating his former obstructive tactics, but that a settlement is desired by the Ta Lama and the Dalai Lama.

(Repeated to Peking.)

No. 4.

India Office to Foreign Office.--(Received July 5.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 4th instant, relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, July 5, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 4.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, July 4, 1904.

THIBET. Negotiations.

It appears to us that terms suggested in your telegram of the 26th ultimo are excessive in certain particulars. As terms may be proposed at any moment to Colonel Younghusband by the Thibetan Envoys, it should be clearly explained to him that, without our sanction, no conditions should be named by him.

No. 5.

India Office to Foreign Office.--(Received July 5.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of telegrams relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, July 5, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 5.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, July 1, 1904.

THIBET. Please furnish a full statement, by telegraph, of Lord Kitchener's opinion on the considerations which, from a military point of view, render undesirable our occupation of Lhasa throughout the winter. Is it necessary that communications should be kept up throughout the winter, or would it be possible to provision force beforehand? Is it considered that the force would be hemmed in or insecure, so as to involve a rescue in the spring as a consequence?

Does Commander-in chief recommend that the force should retreat if there should be no Thibetan authority at Lhasa with whom to negotiate? In that case, would the force be withdrawn to India, or would it be stationed at some intervening point, and, if so, what place would you recommend? Please furnish also a statement of the views of General Macdonald.

Inclosure 2 in No. 5.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

July 4, 1904.

THIBET. Your Secret telegram of the 1st instant. Commander-in-chief's objections to the occupation of Lhasa during the winter are based on the following grounds:—

(a.) The drain on our resources would be serious; the transport left in India would be reduced to two mule corps only by the provision of the necessary transport.

(b.) Liability to disaster of a small force left at Lhasa in isolation for a long period. It would be necessary to keep open communications to some degree, and, for reasons of climate, this would involve great difficulty.

(c.) Return to Gyantse before winter has been constantly advocated by General Macdonald, who has pointed out that risk, and possibly disaster, attend occupation of Lhasa. In the circumstances, Commander-in-chief thinks return of force to Gyantse is desirable.

We shall have demonstrated that it is in our power to go to Lhasa, and, if Thibetans are still recalcitrant, they may be brought to reason by threat of our return next spring. In the event of negotiations being opened seriously at Lhasa, but not brought to a conclusion there, they can be completed at Gyantse. In the event of force remaining at Lhasa during winter, without negotiations being undertaken there, subsequent withdrawal will probably be attended by increased difficulties, whilst military resources will be subject to further drain. Unless question is decided at once, and the forwarding of supplies commenced immediately, force could not be provisioned beforehand. To defer decision until the arrival of the force at Lhasa would be too late, unless the [? country] proves capable of providing supplies in larger quantities than we are led to believe is probable.

Inclosure 3 in No. 5.

Government of India to Colonel Younghusband.

(Telegraphic.) P.

July 4, 1904.

THIBET. Your attitude towards the Delegates, and the conditions which, in order to satisfy yourself of their good faith, you have laid down, are fully approved. The Government of India entertain a strong hope that your efforts to initiate regular negotiations will prove successful. They leave it to your discretion to take the necessary measures if the Delegates pursue tactics of a purely dilatory nature.

(Repeated to Secretary of State.)

No. 6.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 6.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 16th June, relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, July 5, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 6.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ravenshaw to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Nepal Residency, May 28, 1904.

IN continuation of my letter, dated the 21st May, 1904, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a translation of two letters,

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dated respectively the 21st and 22nd April, 1904, from the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa to the Prime Minister.

2. The inclosed three papers in Thibetan are referred to in the Representative's letter, dated the 21st April, 1904, as the Memoranda from the Amban to the Potala Lama and Digarcha Lama, and the orders issued by the Thibetan Government to the different parts of their country. I beg that the Government of India will be so good as to have them translated and returned to me with two copies of the translation.

Inclosure 2 in No. 6.

Translation of a Letter from the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa.

WITH due respect I beg to lay before your Highness in the following lines the news that I have heard and been able to gather here for your Highness' information.

Inclosed herein I beg to forward to your Highness three papers written in Thibetan characters. These were brought to me by a clerk of Yamun, stating that the contents thereof gave the gist of the Amban's Memoranda addressed to the Potala Lama and the Lama of Digarcha, true copies of which he could not obtain.

The interpreter attached to the Teep Arsenal informs me that in accordance with an order received from the Kasyal office at the said arsenal to bring 100 rifles of Henry pattern and 9 Zanjals the very next day to Laprang outside the Kasyal office, those fire-arms were taken there, and the Laprang office were busy in packing them up and covering the cases with skin; that at present the Khendechhega, Mejun Kesang, and one other personal attendant of the Potala Lama, daily attended the said arsenal from early morning, and laying aside the work of manufacturing warlike stores as not of great importance for the present, were devoting the whole time in coining coins similar to those of Russia and having an impression of Chinese wall on the margin, inside it a flowery design, and in the middle the words "Gelden Photang" in Thibetan characters, being the same as are found in the new Thibetan mohars; that one of those three officers remained the whole day with the machine where silver was made into sheets, another where the sheets were punched or cut into circular pieces, and the third where the coins were stamped, in order to hurry on the work; that they took the daily outturn to the Potala Lama every day; and that the coins turned out were of three values, viz., that of a tak, a five-mohar piece, and a mohar piece.

On my asking "what says the Khendechhega now-a-days?" the said interpreter replied that he had overheard the Khendechhega talk calmly with Donger Kusyo to the effect that all what had happened was due to the cowardice of the Thibetan sepoys and officers, that nothing wrong would happen, and that it was written in the Bhabishya Purana of Gorakh Nath that lacs of people would collect at this place. I then asked whether the Khendechhega also mentioned the name of the country of which the said lac of men would collect. The interpreter replied that he did not mention the name of the country.

It is a common talk here that a monk of the Gelden Gumba undertook the full responsibility of checking the advance of the British further up from any station or pass in case fifty men as plucky or fearless as himself be given him with arms of his own selection.

Relying on his words, the Kasyal collected thirty monk warriors from the Gumbas, and adding twenty men more from outside and giving them the weapons he wanted, sent them towards Gyanchi.

I also beg to submit herewith copy of the orders issued by the Thibetan Government to the different parts of the country which also was brought to me by the said clerk of the Yamun. From what is written in it, and looking into the other procedures of the Thibetans, it appears that they are likely to make a rash night attack on the British.

It is said that the Thibetan sepoys and officers who have gone from here are at a place called Nagarchay Jong, near the bank of Paiti Lake. From yesterday the inhabitants here had been ordered to, and are engaged in offering prayers and perform worship and burn incense in the Temple of the Goddess Chhiaskamini and various other shrines.

Report says that the British, with 200 mounted men, came on reconnoitring to a place called Gopasay, below Ralam, and returned from there. The Phokhang Dhaba says that the British troops, composed of 800 footmen and 300 mounted sowars, having

planted their flags at Gyanchi Jong, which, being in a dilapidated condition, are encamped in a hillock about a mile off from Gyanchi in the middle of a plain; that the British mounted men came and made an inspection round about a house where some 3 lacs and odd "khâls" of wheat were collected from the Tenkelin side by the Thibetan Government; that the British officers issued a notice or Proclamation in the City of Gyanchi to the effect that the cultivators might go on cultivating their fields, traders with their trades, and others of different professions with their respective avocations fearlessly, assuring them that the British would not molest the people, but would only retaliate upon those who attacked them; that the people of that part of the country through which the British had passed were quite happy on account of their not having had to carry the Thibetan dâk, and also for their getting proper value for their articles taken by the British, and that all this information was given him by one of his men who had come from Gyanchi.

The Pujahari (worshipper in a temple) monk says that from the Nakchewkha side out of the 500 Horba horsemen the Thibetan Government have ordered for 300 to be sent to Lhasa, and that it was said that they would arrive here in a few days. Information received from the Khani of the Kasyal is to the effect that the Chhongdui Council could never arrive at any definite conclusion on any point; that the Kasyal Kazis, too, were at their wits' end as to how they should carry on the business, and that the other officials appeared to be quite puzzled. The Potala Lama, however, he adds, sends one of his attendants to the Kasyal office to see how work goes on there.

The people here say that the Thibetan Government have sent for Khambali sepoys, who are like bandits or robbers, in order to fight the British. They apprehend that should those sepoys come they would, instead of fighting the British, take to their old habits of looting and plundering their own country freely, and this would be especially hard in the face of the possibility of the British troops advancing from Gyanchi, for they, too, enraged at what the Thibetans did to them, would give no quarters; besides, in the event of the British intending to advance this side, the high people of this place would shift off from here, and as the authority of the Thibetans is never strong, and as those Khambali bandits and half the population of the City of Lhasa were men of such a stamp as would rejoice at the occurrence of such disturbances, they would, before the foreigners would do anything, very likely go on pillaging and plundering the people here. Even our merchants have taken a contagion to this fright and come to me to express their apprehension.

Should such a thing show signs of coming to a pass, I, having no sufficient accommodation for all our merchants at my Residency here, am thinking of notifying to the Kasyal office of the unruly conduct of their men, and informing my intention of keeping our merchants in Maru Gumba for their safety keep them there. This Gumba is strongly built like a fort, of which, if the main gate be closed, such rogues or bandits can have no access; besides, this Gumba is considered from a long time to belong to our Government in which every year we, at our Government expense, perform the ceremony of erecting the "Linga," i.e., a pole with cloth hanging on it.

According to the Phokhang Dheba, the British are talking of going to Rimpan Jong, lying about half a day's journey north of Gyantse, this being a place where the Thibetan Government military stores are kept, and that it would now be difficult for the Thibetan Government to provide sufficient provisions for their troops since Gyanchi, which was a store house of the Thibetan grain, had been lost.

The Nechang Dheba says that on the approach of the British at Gyanchi, Menkelimpa Dhaibun and Ramba Dhaibun, who were dispatched there by the Thibetan Government, having fled away from there, an order has been issued by the Potala Lama under his own signet seal dismissing the said Dhaibuns and making them put on the dress of an ordinary sepoy, to take them to fight on foot like an ordinary soldier, adding that he would consider afterwards what other punishment was to be meted out to them; and that it appeared that in the place of Mekelimpa Dhaibun, a junior officer named Tasi Limpu, of the same regiment, has been appointed.

Though the Amban has somehow or other been made to offer to go himself for the negotiation, the Thibetans are quite reluctant to send him, and are going on making military preparations, and thus are following a course which will bring on calamity to them all. I shall report to your Highness the views they might take hereafter on the matter.

Dated the 10th Baisakh, Thursday, 1961, corresponding with the 21st April, 1904.

Inclosure 3 in No. 6.

Translation of a Letter from the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa.

WITH due respect I beg to inform your Highness that the Thibetan Government have not yet moved against the Khendechhega, who is now hurrying on the work of making coins said to be like those of Russia. He is going to ruin the country by eluding the Potala Lama.

The man whom I had sent towards the north to gather informations has not as yet returned.

Sopu Lochawa, who has gone to Russia from the Thibetan Government, has also not yet come back. There is no news of any troops coming from the north.

Yesterday I sent words to the Kasyal through our interpreters saying that I would like to call there to inquire of the Kazis as to whether they had represented to the Potala Lama the matter written in your Highness' letter, and to ask what conclusion they had arrived at. The interpreter came back to me with a return message from the Kazis to the effect that they were of late very busy, and that they would ask to be excused for a few days; after which, when they have time, they would themselves send words to me.

One Chitung monk named Arka had gone, with 500 sepoys of the Dhoka side, to a place called Sogul Chhindu, which lies between two snow-clad mountains known as Kharula, further down from Nagarchay Jong and up from Ralung, and there had erected stone walls in the Chinese fashion. He had sent some of his men for the look out of the British. These men, seeing some British mounted sowars approaching, ran back with the news that the British were advancing, on which the raw levies which the said Arka had with him fled away in spite of his remonstrances and attempts to prevent them from flying with his drawn out chapsa (a Thibetan knife). Many disappeared, and now report says that he has only a small number of men with him. This information was brought to me by a servant of Satay.

It is said that fifty sepoys accompanied the Banda Kazi who has gone away from here, and that there are some 700 or 800 levies collected at the Nagarchay Jong and on the road to Rong.

The Khembus of the three Gumbas have, it is reported, been warned not to allow any monk of their respective Gumbas to leave the Gumba, as in case of eventualities they would have to be sent for fighting.

Rumour is current here of another engagement having taken place between the British and the Thibetans on Baisakh Sudi 5th.

Dated the 11th Baisakh, Friday, 1961, corresponding with the 22nd April, 1904.

Inclosure 4 in No. 6.

Mr. Walsh to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.)

Phari Jong, June 3, 1904.

HAVE had interview with Tongsa Penlop and Serkhangtulku this morning, and have informed Tongsa Penlop as directed in your telegram of the 26th May. Also informed him of the necessity for the Mission to magnify Thibetans having broken Treaty, both as regards boundary and trade, the Dalai Lama having refused to receive letters from the Viceroy whilst at the same time corresponded with Russia, and of the necessity for the advance owing to Thibetan Government having failed to send properly qualified representative. He admits unreasonableness and folly of Thibetan position which was due to bad advice of Thibetan Ministers. He said that the delay in sending qualified representative then to Khamba Jong and since was due to the mismanagement of the Ministers which had led to their dismissal, and that delay in appointing fresh Ministers is due to non-receipt of reply from the Emperor of China, to whom appointment has been referred. That until they are appointed, Thibetan Government cannot negotiate. He said nothing would be gained by Mission going to Lhasa, as Dalai Lama and Government will all leave before their arrival, and they will find no one there to negotiate with. He had written informing Dalai Lama the three points required by the British Government as stated by Colonel Younghusband to the Timpuk Jongpen at Thuna. He had now received reply from Dalai Lama that Sikkim boundary must be as it was; similar proposal, that no English may enter Thibet, that no trade mart may be

established, and that no communication from Indian Government can be received by Thibetan Government. He considers that negotiations on British terms are therefore impossible. He says that Mission will meet with determined resistance if advance Lhasa, and on arrival find Lhasa deserted by the Dalai Lama and Government. He had written letter to the Prime Minister, Nepal, proposing joint mediation of Bhutan and Nepal, and had shown me Nepal Prime Minister's reply which does not refer to mediation, but merely expresses hope that Thibetan Government will be wise and end the war. He says that Thibetans believe Bhutan to be helping British, and have arrested two messengers that he sent to Colonel Younghusband to Gyantse and imprisoned them at Shigatse. He says that rumour current in Bhutan that I was killed at Guru, Colonel Younghusband killed at Gyantse and his clothes and belongings taken to Lhasa, and latest accounts that Russians had landed at Mussoorie, defeated English, and set up five banners. I informed him Russians at present at war with Japan and Japanese are gaining a victory. Full report of interview follows by letter.

(Addressed Foreign; repeated Thibet.)

Inclosure 5 in No. 6.

Mr. Walsh to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.)

Chumbi, June 6, 1904.

TONGSA PENLOP had interview with General Macdonald to-day. He is now sending a letter to Dalai Lama by the Puna Jongpen and Lama Serkhangtulku, advising him to send properly qualified representative to Gyantse within nineteen days, namely, by the 25th June, as otherwise it will be war. He is also sending similar letter by the Dugye Jongpen to the Ta Lama who is head of the four Ministers, and who, he says, is at present at Shigatse, having been deputed with power to negotiate. Both messengers start to-morrow.

(Addressed to Thibet: repeated to Foreign.)

Inclosure 6 in No. 6.

Brigadier-General Macdonald to Adjutant-General in India.

(Telegraphic.)

Chumbi, June 6, 1904.

MAIL from Gyantse arrived all well. Palla village was attacked on 2nd. Attack easily repulsed without loss to us. Colonel Younghusband arrived Kangma en route to Phari. The Tongsa Penlop arrived Chumbi this morning and visited me this afternoon. He is very anxious to assist in any way, and privately sends messengers to-morrow to Lhasa and Shigatse, pointing out to Thibetans that, unless proper Delegates are sent to Gyantse by 24th, the situation for them will be very serious. He also entered into certain political questions, which, being outside my scope, I have referred him to Colonel Younghusband, whom he will meet in the course of the next few days. The Tongsa Penlop is very anxious to accompany the force to Gyantse or Lhasa if he could be of use, but this Colonel Younghusband must decide. He informs me there are no Russians in Lhasa, but several Russian Mongolian Lamas. Two sections, British Mountain Battery, arrived 4th, four 7-pounders 5th; and section native hospital to-day.

(Addressed Adjutant-General; repeated Quartermaster-General; Military; Quartermaster-General, Intelligence; Military Secretary, Viceroy; Military Secretary, Chief; Foreign; Political, Bengal; and Colonel Younghusband.)

Inclosure 7 in No. 6.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ravenshaw to Government of India.

Nepal, June 1, 1904.

IN continuation of my letter dated the 28th May, 1904, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a translation of two letters, dated the 26th April, 1904, from the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa to the Prime Minister.

2. The inclosed paper in Thibetan is referred to in the first of the Representative's letters as the Memorandum written by the Amban to the Potala Lama. I beg that the Government of India will be so good as to have it translated and returned to me with two copies of the translation.

Inclosure 8 in No. 6.

Translation of a Letter from the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa.

WITH due respect I beg to lay before your Highness in the following lines the news that I have heard and been able to gather here for your Highness' information.

The Dhuila of Nechang informs me as follows:—

"The Thibetans, while talking amongst themselves, express their apprehension that should negotiation be allowed to be carried on through the Chinese Amban on the pending frontier dispute with the British, he would slip the whole authority of the country into the hands of the British Government, because the fact of the utter helplessness displayed by the Chinese, even in their own vast Empire, which obliged them to surrender their own authority to the English [?], showed that any reliance placed upon them now would never have a good result for the administration of the country of Thibet, and consequently the Amban, &c., should not be placed in the front, as far as may be practicable, in the negotiation with the British."

A servant of Khembu says:—

"The Thibetan Government had deputed officers and men to raise levies of Dhaya, Chhyamdo, Sopando, and Khamba. A communication has been received at the Kasyal office from the principal Khambalis, or people of Khamba, to the effect that, for the sake of the tenets of their religion, it was their duty to go forward to fight the British, but taking into consideration the inability of the Thibetan Government to make proper arrangements to provide rations to the sepoys on a previous occasion, and also the fact that, in case of an advance of the English into Thibet through their (Khambalis) part of the territory, there would be nobody to check them during their absence to distant places, they would beg to be excused from leaving their homes to proceed towards Lhasa. To this a reply has been sent to the effect that all men on service will be suitably provided with rations, and that, since the English have not pressed forward on their portion of the territory, and the English infidels of Hindustan have, with great oppression and force, entered the country, going to cause thereby the decay or destruction of the tenets of the Buddhistic faith, they all should, with alacrity and zeal, send their men provided with arms and ammunition. These Khambali levies having, however, had to come from a distance of one or two months' journey, it would be long before they could arrive here. By that time the British of Hindustan might give a good blow here."

Babu Khachara, a mongrel whom I had sent towards Nakchewkha, has returned with the news that there were no foreigners or foreign troops on that side, nor was there any report of any coming there hereafter. The inhabitants of that part of the country having, however, heard that the English of Hindustan have killed a large number of Thibetan officers and sepoys, talk amongst themselves that should they, who were simple cattle-drivers, be compelled by the Thibetan Government to go to fight, for which they have no ability, they would leave the country and go away on pilgrimage.

I beg to submit herewith a paper, written in Thibetan characters, brought to me by a clerk of the Yamun, and said to be a copy of another Memorandum addressed by the Amban to the Potala Lama.

It is reported here that the British officers, who are at Gyanchi, intercept the Thibetan dāk which they come across, and, having minutely examined all the papers in it, capture and carry away the dāk-runners.

According to the Phokhang Dheba, the Thibetan Government have issued an order to construct a fortification at a place called Chhusur which lies at a distance of two days' journey from Lhasa.

Information brought by the Khani of Kasyal was to the effect that another letter has been received from Patopon Lotanso, Panlope of Bhutan, through a special courier, who arrived here the other day, which was to the effect that, as any recourse to hostile

measures instead of adopting the advisable course of arriving at an amicable settlement with the British would not have a beneficial result to Thibet, the Bhutanese, being followers of the same religion as the Thibetans, would do their best for the sake of Thibet in the matter if they could only know what the Thibetans wanted them to do; and that while foreboding that hostile measures would be calamitous to, or be a sure source of destruction of, many people without any chance of doing good to Thibet, they begged to be informed soon of what they could do and say on the matter, for the sake of Thibet. No reply to this letter has yet been sent.

Gelde Thrinbuchhay says that information has been received of the Lama of Digarcha having removed to a village two days' journey north of that place.

It is reported here that seven men belonging to the British have been killed by the fall of a house at Gyanchi Jong.

A clerk of Yamun says that the Amban, with a view to go towards Gyanchi, selected yesterday the Chinese officers and clerks who were to accompany him there; but the Thibetans have not as yet replied to the Memorandum of the Amban on the subject, and thus have so far shown indifference on the question of sending him to negotiate with the British.

The said Thrinbuchhay says that it is reported that the British at Gyanchi are engaged in finding out the quantity of wheat that can be procured from different parts, and are also collecting wheat sufficient for their own purpose, giving receipts to the people from whom the wheat was taken for the quantity received from each.

The new Dhaibun Rengemsay left for the Gyanchi side on the 14th Baisakh, and the new Phaibun Choketa will also leave in three or four days.

People here say that the Thibetan Government are collecting levies as much as possible and sending them towards Nagarchay Jong, but the people of the place lying on the way, as well as other people, are saying that there would be an end of their troubles, were any one to come forward to mediate and settle the matter amicably, or if the British moved forward and arrived at Lhasa.

The interpreter* says that the British have got their guns in position at Gyanchi Jong, and that there are patrols stationed at different places who examine all the travellers, and that while a large body of troops are in tents in a plain, detachments of cavalry often go out reconnoitring to find out the places where the Thibetan troops were located.

Dated the 15th Baisakh, Tuesday, 1961, corresponding with the 26th April, 1904.

Inclosure 9 in No. 6.

Translation of a Letter from the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa.

WITH due respect I beg to say that your Highness will be informed of other news from my letter under a separate cover. I called at the Kasyal office to-day, Tuesday, the 15th Baisakh, and spoke to Sejunsay, one of the new Kazis, as to whether they (the Kazis), after having thoroughly understood the contents of the letter of advice addressed to them by your Highness, have represented the matter to the Potala Lama, and whether or not, following the advice given therein, they have dispatched a reply to your Highness setting forth their future course of conduct on the question. He replied that, although all what was written in the said letter had been represented to the Potala Lama, who has instructed them to draft out a nice reply and produce the same before him, the Banda Kazi having had at that very time to be deputed to go towards Nagarchay, that event engrossed so much of their attention for a time that they have not been able to prepare the draft, but this they would now do soon, and when they have formed a definite opinion about it, would also talk over the matter with me. He added that the delay was simply due to the said Banda Kazi having had to go towards Nagarchay as well as to the illness of the Chharong Kazi, which left him alone to carry on the work of the office, but now he would give his early attention towards the dispatch of the reply in question.

I told him that I have already spoken to them in detail what I had to say on the matter, and again explained to him that your Highness, with an open and clear heart, had written to them words of advice for the good of Thibet, and consequently they, too, should, taking it in its proper light, and duly and in a proper manner representing the same to the Potala Lama, follow a course in accordance with

* Perhaps the one attached to the Teep arsenal.

the advice given, which would be to the good of the Government of Thibet and its people. I also draw their attention to the fact that delay in such a political crisis as that was not good or justifiable, and urged him (the Kazi) to send an early reply to your Highness' letter of advice stating in clear terms and in a sincere manner their views.

The Kazi said that he would do it soon.

On my inquiring whether they have arranged to send the Amban and their high officials to meet the British officers to settle the frontier dispute amicably, he replied that nothing definite has been settled on the question for the present, but as there was a talk of sending a reply to the Memorandum received from the Amban on the subject to the same effect as their previous replies, it would have to be seen how things turn out when the reply would be sent. On this I asked the reason why the Amban was not sent saying that if by sending him an amicable settlement could be arrived at, it would be good to all parties concerned, and that I could see no possible harm whatever by sending him out for the purpose.

The Kazi admitted that it was so, but said that no definite settlement has been arrived at on the point, as they all had to deliberate upon and to form a joint opinion on it. I then said that the Kasyal was a very high office of Thibet, and, as such, the Kazis should, with due deliberation, follow a line of policy which would neither be fraught with troubles to the people, nor bring on a ruin to the administration of the Thibetan Government. I then returned home.

The interpreter informs me that at present there are some 30 to 35 Soper (Mongol) monk pilgrims here at Lhasa, of whom there is none who appear to be a Russian.

Dated the 15th Baisakh, Tuesday, 1961, corresponding with the 26th April, 1904.

Inclosure 10 in No. 6.

Mr. Walsh to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.)

Chumbi, June 7, 1904.

TONGSA PENLOP has not sent Punakha Jongpen with letter for Lhasa, as his retinue is too large; so has sent Dugy Jongpen instead, and sent another official with letter for Shigatse. Both letters dispatched this morning. Addressed to Thibet; repeated to Foreign.

Inclosure 11 in No. 6.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.)

Kala Tso, June 7, 1904.

YOUR telegram No. 1809 E.-B.

Macdonald has communicated his views:—

“If Dalai Lama gives in, well and good; if he bolts, I do not consider prolonged occupation of Lhasa feasible. Would advocate in that case destruction of arsenal, &c., and return to Chumbi via Shigatse if necessary before winter, about end of November, with threats of renewing advance next year if peace not made, and that meanwhile every effort should be made to improve communications with India. With our present roads, it would be practically impossible to occupy Lhasa in force this winter, and maintain communications.”

My own view is that effort should be made to quarter troops at Lhasa for winter, for if we retire hastily to Chumbi in November, we risk loss of all result of present efforts. Thibetans would import and manufacture better arms and be still more obstructive. From what officers have seen of the Gyantse Valley and from what we heard of Lhasa, I should say that each valley could support 1,000 men, and I hope that, while the ample forces now being sent will break down opposition during summer, it will be found possible to keep in Lhasa garrison like that now at Gyantse capable of holding its own for whole winter in emergency. If it really is the case that troops cannot be maintained in Lhasa next winter, I had better not go to Lhasa at all, for there is little use in my commencing negotiations with two such obstructive people as the Thibetans and Chinese in any place where I cannot stay for full year if necessary. I have been eleven months trying to even begin negotiations. I should be quite unable to complete them in two or three months, especially if Chinese and Thibetans knew we intended to leave before winter.

Inclosure 12 in No. 6.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Gyantse, May 27, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to submit, for the consideration of the Government of India, a Memorandum I have drawn up on our future relations with Thibet.

Inclosure 13 in No. 6.

Memorandum on our Future Relations with Thibet.

THE complete and sudden change in the situation in Thibet which occurred in the first days of May was probably not realized by His Majesty's Government when they declared their intention to still maintain the policy enunciated in the telegram of the Secretary of State to the Viceroy, dated the 6th November, 1904. On our first arrival here the Thibetans were stunned by the two severe blows they had received at Guru and Dzam-tang. They submissively handed over the fort without firing a shot. The country-people set about ploughing and sowing their fields; and the town-people about trading with us. Reports came in that Thibetan Delegates—though of unknown rank—were on their way to negotiate. Even the Amban wrote that he was positively coming; that he was insisting on proper Thibetan Delegates accompanying him; and that the Dalai Lama at last realized our power.

2. But evidently when the Lhasa Government saw that we had no intention of going to Lhasa, that instead we were still talking of negotiating here; and that our General, and a number of our troops, including two guns, had returned to Chumbi, they plucked up courage again and, relying on the foreign and Lhasa-made rifles and assisted probably by foreign expert military advice, organized a general attack upon the Mission and upon the line of communications. We had good warning of the gathering storm and Colonel Brander was able by prompt measures to prevent its breaking with any serious ill-effects upon us. But from the moment the Mission was deliberately attacked, and from the time when the Thibetans began their bombardment of us from the fort and to send round to every village raising the whole country against us, the political situation was absolutely and entirely changed. The Thibetans had finally rejected our overtures to negotiate. They had definitely decided to fight.

3. When then His Majesty's Government say that they are not prepared to maintain a permanent Mission in Thibet; to occupy Thibetan territory; or permanently intervene in Thibetan affairs in any form, I think they may possibly have been unaware of the extent of the change which has recently occurred here, and as my experience of Asiatic people and Asiatic affairs and my study of this particular question on the spot lead me to believe that the interests of the Indian Empire would be best served by a directly opposite policy, viz., by the maintenance of a permanent British Agent in Thibet; by the occupation of the Chumbi Valley; and by a sustained intervention in Thibetan affairs, I think it my duty to lay my views before Government for their consideration before the present policy of His Majesty's Government is given practical effect to.

4. It is unnecessary to say at the start that it would be very much more convenient to us not to have to intervene in Thibetan affairs. There would be great advantages in being able to still preserve the policy we pursued all through last century of leaving the Thibetans alone. They would like to be left alone—at least, the priests would, and 999 Englishmen out of a 1,000 would prefer we should leave them alone. But when they occupy the geographical position they do upon our frontier, there are two essential conditions to the maintenance of this policy; firstly, that they should leave us alone, and, secondly, that they should have no connection with our rivals in Central Asia. Both these conditions have been broken. They invaded the territory of a British Feudatory in 1886 and while declining intercourse with us they sent repeated Missions to our rivals.

5. Intervention was therefore forced upon us. But we tried by every means to make that intervention as little uncongenial as possible to the Thibetans. For years we reasoned with them at Yatung. Mr. White and Captain LeMesurier, Political Officers in Sikkim, tried to settle with them there. Yet even then the Chinese Amban and Thibetan officials told our officers that the Thibetan Government were relying upon Russian support; and no result was attained. At Khamba Jong I stated our case in

what I studied to make a moderate speech before two minor Thibetan officials who came to meet me; but they declined to receive a translation of this speech for communication to their Government; they refused to report my words; they shut themselves up in the fort; they returned letters addressed to them; and put a stop to all further intercourse. In advancing into the Chumbi Valley I avoided any action which would bring about the actual outbreak of hostilities. At Tuna in January I made a special effort to effect a peaceful settlement. That the Thibetans might not think I was relying simply on our Maxims, rifles, and bayonets, I rode without escort to their camp at Guru, 10 miles away, and in an informal manner talked the situation over with the leading men; pointed out that for a century and-a-half, till they invaded the territory of a British Feudatory we had been on good terms with them, and never attempted to interfere in their affairs; that even after that invasion and when we had the Treaty right to station a British officer at Yatung, we had never exercised that right; but that when they repudiated the Treaty made by their suzerain with us and while returning letters from the Viceroy sent Missions to Russia, we were bound to look more strictly into our Treaty rights. We were still ready, however, I said, to negotiate with them in a conciliatory manner, and I would gladly see them whenever they liked to come to my camp. Nevertheless, they remained as obdurate as ever.

They refused point-blank to report my words to Lhasa and they returned a written communication which I subsequently made to them. Still intent upon effecting a peaceful settlement I gladly availed myself of the offer of the Bhutanese Envoy to mediate between us. But this effort likewise failed, the Thibetans declaring that they would have no negotiations anywhere but at Yatung, the place where for years they had consistently refused to make a settlement. When the further advance to Gyantse began I tried up to the very last moment, till our troops at Guru were actually fired on, to avoid a conflict. On arrival here, acting on my instructions, I continued to offer to negotiate. But four despatches to the Amban produced no effect. In one despatch the Amban did indeed say that the Dalai Lama at last realized our power, but this flash of wisdom soon died out when he also realized that we were not intending to move on Lhasa itself, that we were halting here and that our General and the guns had returned to Chumbi—instead of sending negotiates, he sent troops to attack me, and but for the bravery of our soldiers would undoubtedly have murdered the Representative of the British Government.

6. We have therefore been compelled to forcibly intervene in Thibetan affairs. It was wise of us to beware of entrance to a quarrel. But can any Englishman doubt that it is now our duty to bear it that the opposed may beware of us?

7. Our first business then is to break the power of the Lamas and influence of that Siberian Buriat, Dorjief, who has taught the Thibetans to rely as trustingly on Russian support as Dr. Leyds induced President Krüger to rely upon the Germans. All the evidence goes to show that the Thibetan people had no inherent animosity against us. At Khamba Jong we found the people there and of the villages round quite friendly. Even the soldiers grinned and laughed when our officers went amongst them. In Chumbi, as soon as the officials were prevented from interfering, the people readily came to sell their produce to us. Even after the Guru affair, the people did not leave their villages as we marched to Gyantse. As soon as we settled here scores of traders came to our camp and a regular daily bazaar was established. For a fortnight after the attack on the Mission, the dāk carried by a few mounted men has, too, passed through the country unmolested. Till the Lamas roused the people there was no sign of that fanatical hatred against us which those who have served on the north-west frontier are accustomed to; and prisoners and wounded Thibetans frequently said that they had no wish to fight against us, but were forced from their homes by the officials. And of the lay officials I doubt if many had any bad feeling against us. From what I have seen, and from what I learn from Captain O'Connor, who has had more opportunity than any other Englishman of judging them, most of them appear a colourless, placid, harmless lot. Some of them no doubt hated us. But the majority appeared to have little mind of their own, one way or the other, and to be entirely swayed by their superiors at Lhasa. The real power in Thibet, and the fountain head of all the animosity to us must be sought in the great monasteries at Lhasa. It is they and they only who have so consistently opposed us; who are responsible for the invasion of Sikkim; for the repudiation of the Treaty made with the Chinese; for the obstruction to our trade; for refusing to negotiate; for attacking my Mission; and for now raising the peaceful country people, poisoning their minds, and preaching what in Mahomedan countries would be called a jihad against us. It is these Lhasa Lamas, then, who should now be punished with a heavy hand. It is they who forced us into the quarrel, and it is they especially who should now be made to beware of us.

8. But if we simply negotiate here, as according to my present orders I am asked to do, or even if we proceed to Lhasa and then, after negotiations in either place, retire within our frontier again, will these Lamas ever really fear us? Will they cease to obstruct us when we again come into relations with them, as we must with more and more frequency in the future? Will they not rather, as soon as our backs are turned, still further poison the minds of the people against us and infuse into them a deadly race hatred? Will they not increase their armaments and appeal even more strongly and frequently than before to the Russians for aid? And may not the Russian be expected to act as we have evidence that they intended to act when we contemplated retiring from Chitral, and occupy the place which we had voluntarily retired from? All these are not only possible, but highly probable contingencies. We may convince ourselves that the Thibetans will be impressed by our advance to Lhasa and the evidence that gives of our power to strike at the seat of the priestly influence. And impressed they will be for a time. But for a time only, if we immediately afterwards retire right back to our own frontier. The impression will quickly wear off, and in its place will come the conviction that if they had only had as good weapons as we had they could have kept us out; they will proceed to equip themselves with such weapons and to seek that aid which we could hardly expect our rivals not to give them in some form or other—even if it is only in the form of permission to purchase arms in Russian territory, and permission to retired soldiers to assist them, as retired Cossacks assisted the Persians in the siege of Herat sixty years ago.

9. If then the present policy of His Majesty's Government is adhered to, if we withdraw as soon as reparation is obtained, if we occupy no part of Thibetan territory, and if we abstain from permanent intervention in Thibetan affairs we must expect that the rancour which our present fighting cannot but arouse in the feelings of even the mildest peasantry, will be fanned into a flame by the crafty priest; that these latter will redouble their obstruction, treble the number of the Lhasa-made rifles which Colonel Brander found so troublesome at Karo-la; import from China or Russia hundreds of European rifles, and permanently ally themselves with Russia. So that, unless we make up our minds that the presence of Russian influence and the establishment of a native Power growing in hostility and capacity for offence on our north-east frontier is of no consequence, we shall have to renew the operations of the present year under much more unfavourable circumstances in the future.

10. So convinced am I that this will be so, that I venture to make the following alternate proposals. I would, then, give up all talk of withdrawal, and from now onwards abandon all half measures. They have not proved successful in the past, and they are not likely to in the future. The moderate policy adopted at the close of the Sikkim campaign, when we would have been perfectly justified in occupying the Chumbi Valley or demanding an indemnity, did not lead to a settlement with the Thibetans or make them diminish their obstruction by one atom. The policy of sending the present Mission first to an obscure place on the frontier and then to the nearest town in Thibet, instead of straight to the capital, which is the obvious place for negotiations with such a country to be conducted, has not led the Thibetans to meet us in a conciliatory spirit. The time given them they have employed in increasing their armament, and the hesitation displayed has augmented their determination to resist. By a move straight to Lhasa, as originally recommended by the Government of India and which might have been completed a year ago, before the Thibetans had manufactured so many rifles or obtained so many munitions of war from outside, we should have compelled the Thibetans at once to make a settlement with us and impressed them in a way this step by step advance, so intelligible to reasonable human beings, so liable to be misunderstood by ignorant Asiatics, never will. So now that they have forced us to go to Lhasa I would remain there. Thus only, in my opinion, shall we ever bring the Lamas to reason.

11. For what sort of men are these Lamas? Probably many people in England think that these high ecclesiastics must be men of learning and refinement and knowledge, who set themselves apart from the world for spiritual objects and who can be treated with as reasonable and cultured men. I find them very different. I purposely visited the Guru camp in order to compel an interview with these Lhasa monks who so persistently refused to see me, and, by viewing them in their own surroundings, get the better idea of their true character. There was nothing cultured or refined or reasonable about them. They were ignorant, bigotted, bad-mannered, ill-bred, filled up with prejudice and conceit, and determined at every cost to keep us at a distance, and this not with an eye to the general good of the country, but in order to preserve their own selfish monopoly of power. The Abbot and leading monks of the monastery here had

not the same fanatical grit as these Lhasa monks had, and were even less estimable on that account; but they had the same ignorance, the same want of culture and refinement, and were sordid and very sensual-looking besides. These monks simply feed upon the country. They do nothing for its good. They have produced no intellectual treasures, nor have they even educated the people like the Buddhist monks of Burmah. They have sapped the strength of the people; they have stifled learning; and practised cruelties which terrorize the people. A regular Inquisition composed of Lamas examine political prisoners in secret by torture. The enlightened Minister who befriended Sarat Chandra Das and sought modern learning was cruelly tortured and thrown into a river, his household was confiscated, and many of his servants murdered. The astute Councillor who dissuaded the Dalai Lama from attacking our camp at Khamba Jong last year was thrown into prison with all his fellow-Councillors, one of whom, in fear of a worse fate, has already committed suicide.

12. People of this description cannot be enlightened in a flash nor made to change their entire attitude in a day. Besides striking them, we must keep our power in evidence before their eyes. To win them to our side we must exercise personal influence over a lengthened period. After we have struck our blow, we must keep a considerable number of troops for another year in Thibet. And Agents must be maintained at Lhasa and Gyantse to keep in constant personal touch with the Lamas. The very idea of opposing us must never be allowed to enter their heads again, and at the same time we should work incessantly to let them realize that for all practical purposes they are just as well off with us in the country as they were before we came.

13. We can see already that the spirit of the placid peasants is even now being ignited by the Lamas into a flame of hostility. That we shall have to beat down. But we must also keep watch over the smouldering embers and allow the Lamas no chance of fanning them into flame again. When we have the Lamas down we must not hastily make off back across the frontier and leave them to spring to their feet again with double their present animosity against us. By such a course all our present action will have been rendered worse than useless. We shall only have turned a comparatively weak and harmless State into a State incensed against us and more than ever ready to seek the support of our rivals. There was political danger enough in leaving right across our north-east border a weak impassive State who were more disposed to the Russians than to ourselves. The danger will be increased ten-fold if we leave an actively hostile and well-armed Power there whom the Russians might launch off upon the weakly defended plains of Bengal.

14. This result need never be feared, and we may, on the contrary, permanently secure this frontier by building up a friendly Power in the Lhasa oasis, and so keeping Russian influence well on the other side of the great deserts of Northern Thibet if we give out immediately after our arrival at Lhasa that we mean to stay there; if we keep for a time a sufficient number of troops in the country to see that opposition is useless; if we encourage the people to trade with us as they had commenced to with great keenness before the Lhasa monks launched them against us; and if we show every one that while we are prepared to hit hard when opposed, we have every wish to respect their customs and religion and to live with them on friendly and neighbourly terms.

15. My recommendations are then—

(1.) That at the earliest possible moment we should announce that we are going to keep a British Agent permanently at Lhasa, and both as a guarantee for his future safety, and as an indemnity for the past misdeeds of the Thibetans, permanently occupy the Chumbi Valley;

(2.) That in Chumbi and at Gyantse and Lhasa there should be kept up considerable garrison till as the country is more settled and as our communications are improved, the troops may be with safety gradually withdrawn;

(3.) That an Agent be temporarily established at Gyantse, who, in communication with the Agent at Lhasa, would support and encourage the trade between India and Thibet, and would also occasionally visit Shigatse and establish friendly relations with the Tashi Lama;

(4.) That we should dictate a Treaty regulating trade, travel and mining, defining boundaries, laying down the methods of official communication, especially stipulating for personal access to the Dalai Lama, definitely excluding the influence of any other Power except of ourselves and the Chinese from Thibet, prohibiting the importation of arms, and generally providing that the Thibetan Government should conform to the advice of the British Agent.

16. These measures will, it may be thought, while very costly to ourselves, and calculated to be viewed with dislike by both the Russian and Chinese Governments, only serve as a constant source of irritation to the Thibetans. But if at this cost we can safeguard nearly a thousand miles of frontier from Cashmere to Burmah, it surely cannot be thought considerable. The Russian Government can hardly complain when the reliance of the Thibetans on their support—unwarranted by definite assurances though it may have been—has brought upon us so great an amount of trouble. Nor can the Chinese raise objections when they were unable either to make the Thibetans observe the Treaty they had made with us on their behalf; or to induce them to negotiate a new one; or even to prevent our Mission being attacked. And my experience of Asiatics makes me think that the Thibetans are far less likely to preserve feelings of hostility to us if we show them that our presence is inevitable and irrevocable and our power unmistakable than they would be if left completely alone after having only been irritated. The inevitable, the irresistible, the Asiatic readily adapts himself to. The smallest shadow of a doubt he at once clutches at.

17. Let us, therefore, never again let the shadow of a doubt cross the mind of the Thibetans that we mean to predominate in Thibet. Let them see that our presence means at any rate *material* prosperity to the country, and that it means no interference with either their religion or customs; let them see by constant personal intercourse with our officers that we have entirely sympathetic feelings towards them; and I believe in a few years' time there will be as great a difference between the Thibet then and the Thibet of to-day as there is between the Hunza and Chitral of the present time and the Hunza and Chitral when I first visited them, when no man's life or property was secure; when no Englishman could travel there with safety; and when they were as much inclined to ally themselves with our rivals as with ourselves. Our northern frontier has been made reasonably secure not by leaving it alone, but by making our power felt and keeping up a permanent though mild control. It is only by similar measures that our north-east frontier will be likewise secured.

(Signed) F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND,
British Commissioner for Thibet Frontier Matters.

Gyantse, May 24, 1904.

Inclosure 14 in No. 6.

Mr. Walsh to Colonel Younghusband.

(Telegraphic.)

Chumbi, June 8, 1904.

PAID return visit to Tongsa Penlop yesterday. He says Thibetan Mongolian[s] and people of Gyarong and eastern Kingdoms will probably fight for the Thibetans; that no Russians at Lhasa or elsewhere; but probably Buriats assisting Thibetan force; that Dalai Lama will probably escape either to Kham or Thibetan Mongolia, or might possibly escape to Russian Mongolia with Cheni Khempo, who is in Lhasa, but does not think this probable, as he is displeased with Cheni Khempo for having intrigued with Russia and brought on present trouble. Full report follows by letter.

(Addressed Thibet; repeated Foreign.)

Inclosure 15 in No. 6.

Government of India to Government of the Punjab.

Simla, June 3, 1904.

I AM directed to invite your attention to Foreign Department letter dated the 12th April, 1904, forwarding copy of correspondence regarding certain dues levied by the Thibetans on the Bhutias of Byans and Chandans, in the Almora district, and inquiring whether any similar cases of exaction have come to the notice of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.

2. I am to request that the Government of India may, in particular, be informed whether any such dues are levied in Spiti.

Inclosure 16 in No. 6.

*Government of the United Provinces to Government of India.**Naini Tal, June 2, 1904.*

IN reply to Mr. Russell's letter dated the 12th April, 1904, on the subject of the dues levied or claimed by the Thibetans from the Bhutias of Byans and Chandans, in the Almora district, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a note, dated the 2nd instant, by Mr. H. K. Gracey, I.C.S., late Deputy Commissioner of Almora, on "a suitable site for the establishment of an open trade mart in Western Thibet," together with a copy of a sketch map showing the localities referred to therein.

2. I am to add that his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor agrees with the Government of India that it is very desirable to secure a trade mart in Western Thibet. Gartok appears to be the most suitable place, but the local traders are being consulted.

Inclosure 17 in No. 6.

Note on a suitable Site for the Establishment of an open Trade Mart in Western Thibet.

TRADE between Kumaun and Thibet is exclusively in the hands of the hill-men inhabiting the valleys and lower spurs of the great snowy ranges. Their life is one of constant migration. From November to March or April their homes are ice-bound, and left to look after themselves—the womenfolk, children, and a few of the men descending to some warm valley below the snow line, and the rest of the men touring through the hills, or making journeys backwards and forwards to the plains' marts in the Bhabar and Terai, with their caravans of laden sheep, goats, and sometimes ponies, bullocks, and yaks. As spring approaches, they gradually concentrate their accumulated stocks at some warehouse in the neighbourhood of their snow-covered homes, to which they start transporting as soon as winter finally lifts. When in another two months or so the passes to Thibet open, they begin again their daily tramp—going backwards and forwards to their Thibetan mart during the summer, just as they had done to their plains' mart throughout the winter.

2. The marts in Thibet that they frequent are as follows, beginning from the east :—

(1.) *Taklakot, alias Taklakhar.*—The head-quarters of Chiong-pun, literally fort-keeper, a sort of Thibetan Collector and Magistrate. This mart is situated a few miles from the junction where British, Nepalese, and Thibetan territories meet, and is reached by an easy pass, the Lippu Lek. It is frequented by the inhabitants of the Byans and Chandans pattiis—an important body of traders.

(2.) *Gyanina.*—A small mart, little more than a summer encampment. Is attended by the inhabitants of Durma patti, a set of semi-barbarians rumoured to be descended from the survivors of one of Tamerlane's garrisons, who cross by the difficult Langpya Lek Pass, some 30 miles from the mart.

(3.) *Daba.*—This mart, which is 20 miles almost due north of the Niti Pass, in Garhwal, stands on a different footing to the others. It was until comparatively modern times the head-quarters of a line of independent Chieftains, and it is to one of these—Bodh Chaigal, said to have lived a couple of centuries ago—that the establishment of hill Rajputs at Milam and in the Johar patti of Kumaun, to the exclusion or enslavement of the original Shoka inhabitants—the same race as the Byans and Chandans—is ascribed, together with conferment on them of special trade privileges, a title to free transport, and release from Custom dues, rights that they still in part enjoy under the Thibetan Chiong-pun, who has now replaced the old Chieftains. The traders of Johar and of Garhwal, travelling either by the Niti or Milam Passes, patronize this mart, though they also occasionally visit Gyanina.

3. Gyanina is some 50 or 60 miles from Taklakot,* and Daba is an even greater distance beyond Gyanina. To select any one of these places as a mart, ignoring the others, would do more harm than good. Each of them should be declared open to trade. In regard to Daba, such a declaration will be simply the proclamation of an established fact. The cases of Gyanina and Taklakot stand on a different footing, they having been

* 58 miles in straight line.

the subjects of the 1896-98 disputes. Briefly put, the gist of those disputes was that the Thibetan officials desired every year to come down into Darma, Byans, and Chandans to collect certain taxes before they would allow our traders to cross the passes, and we objected. The point they laid most stress upon was, not the amount to be collected, but their right to collect on the spot—it was not enough that the taxes should be sent to them, they must personally come into our territory to realize them.

The history of these three pattis—Byans, Chandans, and Darma—throws light upon this attitude. They had only been—and that in a loose sort of way—annexed from Thibet by the Nepalese some thirty years before we took them with Kumaun from Nepal. After my interviews with the Chiongpon and much questioning of local hillmen and traders, the conclusion I came to was that the three pattis' annexation, either by Nepal or our Government, has never been notified to Lhasa by the local Thibetan officials—out of fear for their heads—and so long as they can report that they have collected taxes on the spot they feel in no danger of the fraud being detected. It is, therefore, imperative that at the time the Gyanina and Taklakot marts are declared open, the fact of our absolute sovereignty over these three pattis should also cease to be misunderstood at Lhasa.

4. The three marts I have so far mentioned are at best local, but they represent the limits to which traders from the British side are permitted to penetrate. Further into the country, some 50 or 60 miles in a north-east direction from Daba, lies the capital of south-west Thibet, the head-quarters of the Garphan or Viceroy—Gartok, in direct connection with Lhasa by a posting-road that continues away on the west towards Leh. To throw Gartok open to our traders as a central mart, in addition to the existing local marts, would, I have little doubt, give a great stimulus to our trans-frontier trade. It is Gartok therefore that I would suggest as the main market, with Daba, Gyanina, and Taklakot as sub-markets.

(Signed) H. K. GRACEY.

May 2, 1904.

Inclosure 18 in No. 6.

Government of India to Mr. E. Stanford.

Simla, May 2, 1904.

PLEASE return this

[S. 1567]

Invoice when remitting.

	£	s.	d.
No. 1141 E.-B., 4 copies Stanford's new Map of Southern Thibet in sheets,			
@ 5 rupees	1	0	0
Roller and postage	0	0	9
Total	1	0	9

(A. G. M., by book post this day.)

Inclosure 19 in No. 6.

Government of India to Colonel Younghusband.

(Telegraphic.)

Simla, June 14, 1904.

YOUR telegram of the 7th June has been considered in Council.

The Government of India desire, of course, that you should express your opinions with the utmost freedom, but they find it necessary to remind you that any definite proposals which you make for their consideration should be, as far as possible, in conformity with the orders and present policy of His Majesty's Government. Those orders, as defined in the telegrams from Secretary of State, dated the 7th and 30th November, 1903, and 12th May, 1904, are that the advance to Lhasa should be made for the sole purpose of obtaining satisfaction, and that, as soon as reparation is obtained and a new Convention framed, a withdrawal should be effected. The policy of His

Majesty's Government, as recently explained by Lord Lansdowne, contemplates that the advance to Lhasa should not be allowed to lead to annexation or a Protectorate, or to permanent control over internal administration of Thibet.

It is possible that circumstances may alter in such a manner as to render a change of plans inevitable, but that contingency has not yet arisen. You must, of course, remember that the policy of His Majesty's Government is based on considerations of international relations wider than the mere relations between India and Thibet which are not only beyond your purview, but also beyond the purview of the Government of India. The Government of India, therefore, expect you to do your utmost to carry out the present plans until there is unquestionable proof that they are impracticable.

It is impossible to argue the political necessity for remaining at Lhasa during the winter until you have arrived there and gauged the situation. The military objections to a prolonged occupation of Lhasa are great and obvious.

If on arrival at Lhasa you find that the Dalai Lama has left, and the absence of any settled administration precludes the possibility of securing reparation, or of negotiating for a Convention, some revision of the present policy may be necessary, but in that case you must remember the serious objections that exist to a prolonged occupation of Lhasa, and frame your recommendations with full regard to this.

With reference to General Macdonald's suggestion that the arsenal, &c., should be destroyed, it is essential that you should bear in mind from the outset that there must be no needless damage at Lhasa. It will probably be necessary to confiscate arms and destroy machinery for making them, but there should be no other destruction of property which is not justified by military necessity. We must to the end endeavour to convince the Thibetans that we do not wish to injure them in their persons or property, and that, above all, we do not wish to interfere with their religion.

(Repeated to General Macdonald.)

No. 7.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 6.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 5th July, relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, July 6, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 7.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

July 5, 1904.

THIBET. We have received a telegram from Colonel Younghusband in which he reports that two messengers were sent to-day with warning to Thibetans that at noon a gun would be fired as signal, and that firing would commence at 12.30, if they had not surrendered the fort. Delegates were warned to leave the fort and to secure the removal of women and children; General Ma and Tongsa Penlop were also informed. Fire was opened at 12.38 on the fort, the Thibetans having taken no notice of the warning.

(Repeated to Peking.)

No. 8.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 7.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 6th instant, relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, July 6, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 8.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

July 6, 1904.

THIBET. The Tongsa Penlop is stated, in a Report, dated the 4th instant, from Colonel Younghusband, to have been asked by Delegates for time to consult the Lhasa Government before they evacuated Jong. His advice was that they should comply without delay. They were anxious to get assurance as to the sincerity of our desire for a settlement, and were afraid that we should still insist on advancing to Lhasa. Younghusband explained to the Penlop that a sufficient proof of the Mission being a peaceful one, and not a military expedition, was to be found in the fact that the control of our proceedings was still in his hands.

(Repeated to Peking.)

No. 9.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 8.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 6th July, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copy will be sent to the D.M.O.

India Office, July 7, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 9.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, July 6, 1904.

THIBET. Terms to be named to Thibetans by Younghusband should be as follows:—

Neither at Lhasa nor elsewhere is Resident to be demanded.

Thibetans and Chinese to be required to undertake that, without the previous consent of the British Government, there shall be no cession to any foreign Power of any portion of Thibetan territory, and that no intervention by any foreign Power in the affairs of Thibet shall be permitted.

The production of the two Lachung British subjects who were taken by the Thibetans should be asked for by Colonel Younghusband, and, in the event of their having been ill-treated, pecuniary reparation should be demanded.

In regard to the question of an indemnity, the sum to be demanded should not exceed an amount which it is believed it will be within the power of the Thibetans to pay, by instalments, if necessary, spread over three years. Colonel Younghusband will be guided by circumstances in this matter.

Fortifications to be demolished in all accessible positions between the frontier and the point which the Mission may have reached.

The establishment of a trade mart at Gyantse, in addition to that at Yatung. The provisions for regulating the new mart to be similar to those existing at Yatung. Free access to the mart at Gyantse to be insured for British and Thibetan subjects, and the road between it and the frontier to be kept clear of obstruction. There will be located at Gyantse, as at Yatung, an Agent of the Thibetan Government, who will receive any letters that may be sent to him by the British Agent, and who will be held responsible for the delivery of these letters to the Thibetan authorities, as well as to the Chinese, and for the transmission of their replies.

The Thibetans to be required to rebuild the boundary pillars which have been pulled down on the Sikkim frontier.

The Regulations as to trade and the levying of Customs duties to be on the general lines of those attached to the old Convention.

The occupation of the Chumbi Valley will be the security for the indemnity, and for the fulfilment of the conditions in regard to the trade marts to be opened. The

occupation will continue till the payment of the indemnity shall have been completed, or the marts opened effectively for the space of three years, whichever is the latest.

In the event of it becoming necessary to advance to Lhasa, the foregoing terms will be subject to alteration. Dilatory tactics on the part of the Thibetans are not to preclude the Mission from advancing.

No. 10.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 8.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 7th instant, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copy will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, July 7, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 10.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

July 7, 1904.

THIBET. Information has been received from Colonel Younghusband to the effect that on capture of Jong he at once requested the Tongsa Penlop, who had congratulated him on the event, to dispatch a messenger to Nagartse to tell the Ta Lama and Shape that he was still prepared to negotiate, but that advance would be made to Lhasa if they delayed coming.

(Repeated to Peking.)

No. 11.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 9.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 7th instant, relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, July 8, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 11.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

July 7, 1904.

THIBETANS having refused to evacuate Jong, MacDonald resumed operations at 1 P.M. on the 5th July, demonstrating only that day. On morning of the 6th July a portion of Gyantse town assaulted and our position made good; at 4 P.M. on the 6th July wall of Jong breached; Jong assaulted and captured by 6 P.M. Enemy's strength estimated at 5,000, their losses not known yet. Our casualties, full return not yet received. Killed: 32nd Sikh Pioneers, Lieutenant Gurdon; 8th Gurkha Rifles, three men. Wounded: 40th Pathans, Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, Captain Preston; 8th Gurkha Rifles, Lieutenant Grant; 23rd Sikh Pioneers, Lieutenant Mitchell; Royal Fusiliers 1st Battalion, three men; all slightly. About twenty native ranks.

No. 12.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 11.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 8th instant, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copy will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, July 9, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 12.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

July 8, 1904.

A TELEGRAM has been received from Colonel Younghusband, dated the 7th instant, in which he states that the Tongsa Penlop is sending messengers after Ta Lama, who has fled. Bhutanese appear highly pleased with the turn of events, and the Tongsa Penlop, who watched the fight on the 6th, was very much impressed. The Penlop is writing to Dalai Lama, who is said to be really anxious for settlement, to inform him that Younghusband is still prepared to negotiate.

(Repeated to Peking.)

No. 13.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 11.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 10th July, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copy will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, July 11, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 13.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

July 10, 1904.

THIBET. After full deliberation in Council on the 8th July it was decided that, in consequence of the Thibetans having failed to comply with the conditions precedent to negotiations at Gyantse, the advance to Lhasa was inevitable, and should not be delayed.

Our view was that Shape and Ta Lama evidently had neither authority to negotiate nor any intention of doing so; that a settlement, unless signed by the Dalai Lama himself, would admittedly not be binding; and that to avoid misconception in the future, it was essential that our power to advance to Lhasa should be demonstrated.

A communication in the above sense was made to Younghusband, who was at the same time instructed that he should shape his action with a view to returning to Gyantse before the winter. We had on the previous day, the 7th instant, telegraphed to Younghusband asking for his views on the question of advancing to Lhasa, but our orders, as detailed above, were sent to him before receipt of his reply to our telegram of the 7th. His reply, subsequently received, was to the following effect:—

“Military objections to remaining in Lhasa for such length of time as may be required for conduct of negotiations are, I understand, overwhelming. I am informed by General Macdonald that the risks even of a temporary advance are greater than has been supposed. It is not the wish of His Majesty's Government that I should demand of the Thibetans a Resident either here or at Lhasa.

"In these circumstances, therefore, the military risks being represented as so great, the demands to be made of the Thibetans being so small, and the punishment already inflicted upon them being so severe, it does not seem either necessary or desirable that the Mission should proceed to Lhasa until it has been conclusively shown that the Thibetans will not negotiate here, at Gyantse.

"Should that prove to be the case, more severe terms will presumably be demanded by His Majesty's Government, and in that event I would recommend the advance of the Mission to Lhasa itself, provided that the military authorities are prepared to maintain the Mission there for such time as may be required for the negotiation of these more severe terms. But if Thibetan negotiators present themselves while we are on the way, negotiations might be commenced *en route*."

My military advisers represent that the 10th July is the latest date on which the advance should begin. I have, therefore, answered Younghusband's telegram by confirming the instructions previously sent to him, adding that should Thibetan Delegates appear after he has started, he is to explain our terms to them, to warn them that a less favourable settlement will be the result of further resistance, and to invite them to accompany the advance of the Mission.

(Repeated to Peking.)

No. 14.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 12.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 23rd ultimo, relative to Thibet affairs.

(Copies will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.)

India Office, July 11, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 14.

Mr. Walsh to Colonel Younghusband.

Camp Phari, June 3, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to submit the following Report of the interview which the Tongsa Penlop had with me this morning. A summary of the more important points of the interview have been already reported in my telegram of to-day's date.

2. The Tongsa Penlop, who was accompanied by Lama Serkhang Tulku and a retinue of 200 followers, dressed in bright yellow, red, green, and purple clothes, arrived at 11.15. The interview was held, as on the previous interviews with the Trimpuk Jongpen, in a tent which I had pitched for the purpose on the plain. A company of the 23rd Pioneers, with the regimental bugle band, formed the guard of honour. The interview lasted for two and a-half hours.

3. After exchange of compliments the Tongsa Penlop said that he was sorry he had been prevented by illness from coming on the former occasion, when he had sent his cousin, the Trimpuk Jongpen, in his place, but had intended all along to come as soon as he was able. That he had now come as he wished to offer his services to mediate between the English and Thibetans, as he had been asked to do in the letter sent him last November by the Government of Bengal. He was particularly anxious to do so now, so as to avoid further bloodshed.

4. Lama Serkhang Tulku then asked leave to state that he had been specially deputed by the Dalai Lama with a letter to the Tongsa Penlop to ask him to mediate between the English and Thibetans. He stated that he was not a Government official, nor even now a resident of Gaden Monastery—to which he belongs—as he has lived the life of a hermit for the last thirty years, and spends most of his time in Bhutan with the Tongsa Penlop, whose family lama he is; but that he has been for the last year at Lhasa, and the Dalai Lama, knowing his influence with the Tongsa Penlop, had deputed him with this message to him, and he hoped that the Tongsa Penlop's mediation would be accepted. He then asked permission to leave, and he would come back later on. I

asked whether he would not rather remain and hear what the Tongsa Penlop and I discussed, so that he could report what I said to the Dalai Lama. He said, however, that he would rather leave the Tongsa Penlop to do so, and that he had merely come to state that the Tongsa Penlop had been asked to do so by the Dalai Lama. This had evidently been prearranged, as, after he had left, the Tongsa Penlop stated that he could discuss matters more freely if Lama Serkhang Tulku were not present, and that he would inform Lama Serkhang Tulku of the result arrived at. Lama Serkhang Tulku returned towards the end of the interview.

5. I thanked the Tongsa Penlop for his wish to mediate and put an end to the hostilities that had unfortunately taken place, but would like first to tell him how they had arisen, and how it has always been the wish of the English to have friendly relations with the Thibetans; but they, on their part, will not allow it, and have broken the Treaty that was made and now refuse to negotiate.

6. I informed him how the present Mission had become necessary on account of the Thibetan Government having broken the Treaty, both as regards the boundary and as regards trade, and the Dalai Lama having refused to receive the letter sent him from the Viceroy on the ground that he could not receive communications from foreign Powers, while he was at the same time corresponding with Russia and had sent Missions to St. Petersburg. I also explained that the advance to Gyantse was necessary, owing to the Thibetan Government having failed to send properly qualified Representatives to negotiate, both to Khamba Jong, where Colonel Younghusband had waited several months for them, and also since at Chumbi and Thuna.

7. He admitted the unreasonableness and folly of the position which the Thibetan Government had all through maintained, which, he said, was due to the bad advice of the Thibetan Ministers, which had led to their dismissal, and that the delay in appointing fresh Ministers is due to the non-receipt of reply from the Emperor of China, to whom their appointment has been referred, and that until they are appointed the Thibetan Government cannot negotiate. He said that the Dalai Lama is wholly engaged in religion and could not approve of the fighting, which must be contrary to his orders, and that his officers cannot be keeping him informed of what has happened. I said that it seemed quite impossible that the Dalai Lama should not know what had happened.

8. I informed him that the Government of India thanked him for his offer of mediation, but were unable to accept him as a mediator, and they can only negotiate in the manner which they have repeatedly indicated to the Thibetan Government. That if he wishes to render his good services—which the Government of India would appreciate—he should impress on the Dalai Lama the folly and uselessness of resistance. He should also inform the Dalai Lama, in reply to his letter, that the British Government have no desire to injure the Thibetans or their country or to interfere with their religion, but that they insist on a settlement of the differences that have existed for so long. That the Dalai Lama has only to send properly accredited Representatives to Gyantse with the Chinese Amban in order to arrive at a peaceable settlement and avoid further disturbance and bloodshed. But the patience of the British Government is now nearly exhausted, and if the Dalai Lama fails to send Representatives to Gyantse before the day which has been notified to him by the British Government they will have to send further troops to protect their Mission, which will advance and compel negotiations at Lhasa.

9. He replied that nothing would be gained by the Mission going to Lhasa, as the Dalai Lama and the Thibetan Government will all leave before its arrival, and they will find no one there to negotiate with.

10. He said that he had written to the Dalai Lama informing him of the three points required by the British Government, as stated by Colonel Younghusband to the Trimpuk Jongpen at Thuna, and had now received a reply from the Dalai Lama, in which he stated that the Sikkim boundary must be as it was formerly; that no Englishman may enter Thibet; that no trade mart may be established; and that no communications from the Indian Government can be received by the Thibetan Government. In view of this reply he said that he considered negotiations on the British terms were therefore impossible.

11. He said that in offering to mediate he was not acting in the interest of the Thibetan Government—by whom Bhutan has been on several occasions misused in the past, and consequently has grievances—but in the interest of lamas and of the common religion of Bhutan and Thibet, and to prevent further bloodshed, especially of lamas.

12. I informed him again that the British Government has no wish to interfere with

the Buddhist religion, or with lamas who do not fight against us—which is contrary to their religion—or to take Thibet.

13. He said that the Mission will meet with determined resistance if it advances to Lhasa, and on arrival will find Lhasa deserted by the Dalai Lama and the Government.

14. He said that he had written a letter to the Prime Minister of Nepal proposing joint mediation by Nepal and Bhutan, and had lately received a reply, which, being in Hindi, he was unable to get read. He asked me to have the letter translated for him. I have since returned him the letter with a translation in Thibetan. The letter does not refer to the mediation proposed by the Tongsa Penlop, but merely expresses a hope that the Thibetan Government will be wise and end the war.

15. He said that the Thibetans believe Bhutan to be helping the English, and have arrested two messengers that he sent to Gyantse with a letter to Colonel Young-husband, and have taken them to Shigatse and imprisoned them there.

16. He says that the following rumours are current in Bhutan:—First, that I was killed at Guru; subsequently, that Colonel Younghusband had been killed at Gyantse, and all his clothes and personal belongings had been taken to Lhasa; and, recently, that the Russians had landed in Calcutta and had defeated the English and had set up five banners. He asked me if there was any foundation for this rumour. I replied that there was not, and that the Russians were at present at war with the Japanese, in which the Japanese are gaining victories. He expressed himself very pleased at hearing this.

17. At this point Lama Serkhang Tulku returned. I repeated to him what I had already said to the Tongsa Penlop that the British Government had no wish to interfere with the Buddhist religion or to take Thibet, and I asked him why the lamas of the three great monasteries were so hostile to us, and why they were sending delegates to lead the troops, and lamas were actually fighting against us, which was entirely contrary to their religion. He appeared somewhat embarrassed, but said that he had ceased to reside in Gaden Monastery for the last thirty years and was not aware of its Councils, but that he was sure that the monks must be being compelled to fight by the Government, as it is contrary to their religion, and they would not fight of themselves.

18. I thanked the Tongsa Penlop for the Bhutan Government having granted the permission to construct the road through Bhutan, and said that the amount to be paid would be settled after the alignment has been decided upon. He replied that there was no hurry whatever about it, and that the amount could be settled afterwards.

19. I also thanked him for having, in reply to my letter, passed orders to the traders of Paro and Ha to bring in supplies of barley and barley-flour for sale at Chumbi, but informed him that none had yet been brought in for sale. He said that last year's stock was now almost exhausted, but that, as soon as the present year's harvest was gathered, large supplies would be brought in according to his orders.

20. I then informed him that I had recently received a letter from the Commissioner of Rajshahi that, during the past year, a number of dakaitis have been committed by two gangs of robbers from Bhutan, one of them a gang of Bhutanese who are believed to include the Sepoys of the Kazi of Bala Duar, and the other a gang of Nepalese settlers in Bhutan. I told him that, in the case of two of the robbers, who had been identified, extradition would be applied for, and asked him to take measures to punish these gangs and to prevent the recurrence of such robberies. He said that he would take measures to do so, if I would give him particulars of the persons suspected. This will be done.

21. The Tongsa Penlop presented the following articles:—

- 1 Bhutanese sword.
- 1 steel helmet.
- 1 Bhutanese dagger.
- 3 cotton chadders of 3 pieces.
- 6 cotton waist-bands.
- 1 piece Bhutanese woollen cloth.
- 1 piece of red Chinese silk.
- 1 piece Bhutanese cotton cloth for bag.

Memorandum.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of India, "Foreign Department," for information.

(Signed) E. H. C. WALSH,
Assistant to the British Commissioner for Thibet Frontier Matters.

Camp Phari, June 3, 1904.

Inclosure 2 in No. 14.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.)

Chumbi, June 12, 1904.

YOUR No. 1860 E.-B.

I have discussed the question with Macdonald, who says that, if Mission is to be left at Lhasa for the winter, it should have escort of 1,400 fighting men with four guns, three Maxims, and six months' supplies, and ammunition, that is, to the end of April. Gyantse post should also have 800 men, two Maxims, and four months' supplies and ammunition. These two garrisons could be supplied locally with ordinary supplies but to supply them with ammunition and special necessities, Macdonald calculates that his present transport will have to be increased by 3 mule corps, 100 mule carts, 400 ekkas, 3,000 coolies, 200 pack-bullocks, 520 bullock carts. If above extra transport could be made available by the end of June, Lhasa and Gyantse posts could be supplied and the supporting force could be back in Chumbi by the middle of January. Above calculations allow one month for ordinary break-downs, but such a contingency as disease amongst men, wanderers (*sic*), animals, and specially heavy rain must also be thought of.

Macdonald thinks above garrisons at Lhasa and Gyantse could well hold their own, and that chief risk would be in break-down of transport. I think that, if Mission is to go to Lhasa at all, it should be prepared to stay there through the winter, the only alternative being a purely military expedition to Lhasa to compel Thibetans to negotiate with me at Gyantse, in which case I would remain at Gyantse. This alternative plan would be less costly in transport, but would be less effective, and might necessitate a second advance to Lhasa next year, and there is no certainty that even after expedition proper negotiators would be forthcoming. If we advance to Lhasa this summer, dealing Thibetans severe blow on the way, and if we leave there with the Mission a force even more capable than the present Gyantse garrison of not only holding its own but striking as well, we shall, I hope, be able to prevent idea of resuscitating (?) opposition entering heads of the Thibetans, as it probably would if we withdrew even to Gyantse.

My view is that negotiation must take place only in such place as I can stay through the winter, if necessary, and I would select Lhasa because only there can situation be properly gauged, leading men being influenced, and in event of flight of Dalai Lama due arrangements made in consultation with Amban for his successor and new Government. Moreover, it may only be by sitting at Lhasa that we shall ever be able to compel negotiations.

Inclosure 3 in No. 14.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Gyantse, June 3, 1904.

IN continuation of my telegram dated the 2nd June, I have the honour to forward copies of the letter addressed by me to his Excellency the Chinese Imperial Resident and his Holiness the Dalai Lama.

Inclosure 4 in No. 14.

*Colonel Younghusband to Mr. Yu Tai.**Gyantse, June 1, 1904.*

I AM directed by his Excellency the Viceroy to inform you that His Majesty's Government will insist on negotiations being carried on at Lhasa unless your Excellency, together with competent Thibetan negotiators appears at Gyantse by the 5th June.

Inclosure 5 in No. 14.

*Colonel Younghusband to the Dalai Lama.**Gyantse, June 1, 1904.*

I AM directed by his Excellency the Viceroy of India to inform your Holiness that His Majesty the Emperor will insist upon negotiations being carried on at Lhasa unless his Excellency the Amban, together with competent Thibetan negotiators, appointed by your Holiness, appears at Gyantse by the 25th June.

Inclosure 6 in No. 14.

*Deputy Commissioner Garrett to Government of Bengal.**Darjeeling, June 7, 1904.*

(Confidential.)

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith my Confidential Report for the week ending on Saturday, the 4th June, 1904

2. During the week I received two reports from entirely independent sources that Maharajah Chandra Shamsheer Jung Rana, the Prime Minister of Nepal, had been either killed or imprisoned; also that Colonel Harakh Jung Thapa of Ilam had met with the same fate, the reason in each case being that the gentleman concerned had assisted the British Government without the permission of the Maharajah. I consulted Inspector Rai Hai Das Pradhan on the subject, and he has informed me that he considers that both reports are entirely without foundation; for on the 3rd instant, he received a letter from the Colonel, and yesterday he received a telegram from the Prime Minister.

3. Rai Ugyen Gyatsho Bahadur has heard at Kalimpong that the Dalai Lama is personally opposed to offering armed resistance to the advance of the British Mission, but he has been overruled by the lamas, who have made up their minds to resist to the utmost. This report as to the personal feelings of the Dalai Lama perhaps receives some support from the fact that he has sent for the Tongsa Penlop, presumably with a view to mediate. The Rai Bahadur has also heard that the Shapas have been released and that Shape Sheda has been reinstated in his former post.

4. I have received a report to the effect that one Teling Kusho, who frequently visited the British camp at Khamba Jong, and was known to almost all the officers in the camp as the eldest son of the sister of the present Maharajah of Sikkim, is in command of a body of 1,500 or 2,000 Thibetans, having been appointed as the Depoti of "U," and that he showed great skill and bravery in the recent fighting at Gyantse.

5. It is reported that a force of 500 soldiers has been deputed from Khatmandu to guard the Nepal-Thibet frontier.

6. I have nothing further to report for this week.

Inclosure 7 in No. 14.

*Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.**Gyantse, May 28, 1904.*

(Confidential.)

WITH reference to my telegram, dated the 7th instant, I have the honour to inclose translation of letters, dated the 16th instant, from the Tongsa Penlop and the Trimpuk Jongpen, and of my reply, dated the 27th idem, to the former.

The Tongsa Penlop of Bhutan to Colonel Younghusband.

(Translation.)

(After salaams.)

[Received May 24, 1904.]

BY the blessing of God you remain in good health, and we, too, dwell here in mutual friendship. I came to Punakha in the 12th month in the hope of establishing friendship between England and Thibet. I was obliged to continue living there owing to the non-receipt of any reply from Thibet. We sent the Trimpuk Jongpen to Tuna to meet you on the 2nd of the 1st month (18th February) fearing that you would be inconvenienced by a long stay at that place. He met the Lheding-Depon and the Thibetan Delegates on the 3rd (19th February), but no hope of friendship was raised by the interview.

The Thibetans held out no expectation of effecting a settlement. We, therefore, sent a letter to the Dalai Lama, to which we received no reply. Then after waiting at Tuna, there was an engagement at Guru. And, again, we thought fit to send a letter to Lhasa regarding the questions outstanding between England and Thibet, and we begged for a reply stating clearly whether or no the Thibetans desired friendship between the two nations.

I proceeded from Punakha to Sang-nga-sah-dun with the intention of coming to pay you a visit, but I heard that the Kamba soldiers had stopped the road and would not let me pass, so I sent two men to find out whether this was the case or not. Now, the Dalai Lama has appointed and sent with a despatch from Lhasa the Incarnate Lama Ser-Kong to negotiate on this matter. In this letter the Dalai Lama says: "You Bhutanese say that you will make a settlement between England and Thibet, but you do not say definitely how you will do it."

The Thibetans and Bhutanese are of the same religion; and the English and Bhutanese are bound by a sincere friendship. It is on account of this friendship that I speak thus, and I have great hopes that trouble may not arise between England and Thibet.

In the hope to establishing friendship, I propose to start with a retinue of 200 persons on the 13th of the 4th month (27th May). There is a Monk Shape, who is empowered to effect a settlement. I have written so much for your information, and on meeting you, will communicate with you freely by word of mouth. The Ser-Kong Incarnate Lama, who was formerly a lama in Bhutan, is here with only one servant. He was ordered here from Lhasa with urgent instructions. He cannot now return to Lhasa owing to difficulties on the road, and I wish to learn whether it is your pleasure that I should bring him along with me. If you do not desire him to come I will not bring him.

I have sent my steward with this letter with proper instructions as to what he should say to the Sahebs. I inclose a scarf. From the Tongsa Penlop, dated the 1st day of the 4th month (16th May).

Note.—The Ser-Kong Incarnate Lama was a monk of the Gaden Monastery, who came to Tongsa, in Bhutan, a good many years ago. He was well received and honoured by the Tongsa Penlop; but during his residence in Bhutan he married, and has, therefore, lost all consideration due to him in Thibet. He is said to have visited Lhasa again last year, and may possibly have brought back some message from Lhasa to Bhutan. But it is most improbable that the Dalai Lama should have selected him as a Delegate to represent the Thibetan Government in any serious negotiations.

The Trimpuk Jongpen to Colonel Younghusband.

(Translation.)

(After salaams.)

[Received May 24, 1904.]

I AM glad to hear that you are in good health as before, and I, too, am well. I have heard some bad news from a distance, and on hearing it was distressed in mind. I sent two men with a letter expressing my feelings of friendship, but they were stopped on the road and returned here. I was vexed at not being able to send you a letter. Afterwards a merchant arrived here from Thibet, and on questioning him I learnt that you had won a victory and were established at Gyantse, and I was very pleased to hear this.

The Maharajah of Kuch Behar has sent word to say that we should try and establish friendship between England and Thibet. I have remained here in expectation of being able to proceed (to Gyantse).

[1762]

I

The Maharajah of Kuch Belar has gone to meet the Deputy Commissioner and the Lieutenant-Governor and has not yet returned, but I propose to go down to visit him on the 5th or 6th of the 4th month (20th or 21st May). When I reach there I will send a man to Gyantse. I inclose a scarf.

Dated Wood Dragon Year, 1st day of the 4th month (16th May, 1904).

Colonel Younghusband to Tongsa Penlop.

Gyantse, May 27, 1904.

I HAVE received your letter, dated the 16th May, and am glad to hear that you are in good health and have the intention of coming to see me. I shall be glad to see you here and to receive the lama from Lhassa, whom you wish to bring with you.

We have received reinforcements, and are daily driving the Thibetans back from the villages they occupied in order to surround us. By the time you arrive all will be quiet here.

Trusting you will continue in good health.

No. 15.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 12.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of three telegrams from the Viceroy, dated the 11th instant, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copies will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, July 12, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 15.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

July 11, 1904.

THIBET. We have received and understood the terms contained in your telegram of the 6th instant, which was at once communicated to Colonel Younghusband for his information and guidance.

There are certain points of minor importance as to which your telegram above cited is silent, owing possibly to the telegraphic abstract of our despatch not having been explicit enough. These points, which we now suggest for the consideration of His Majesty's Government, are as follows:—

Clause 2. In drawing up formal Convention, the conditions against cession of Thibetan territory should, it is presumed, be amplified in the usual manner; it would also be desirable to secure by express stipulation—

(a.) That no Representatives of any other foreign Powers, and no commercial or other agents of such Powers, should be admitted to Thibet;

(b.) That no grant of Concessions for roads, railways, or telegraphs, or for mining or other rights, should be made without the previous consent of the British Government; and

(c.) That without such consent no Thibetan revenues, whether in cash or in kind, should be pledged or assigned to any foreign Power, or to the subject of any foreign Power.

These provisions appear to be necessary in order to prevent the intervention of foreign Powers, and they cannot well be regarded as constituting interference on our part with the internal administration of Thibet. The Russian Government, at any rate, in view of their own action in the matter of railways in Persia, will not probably question these conditions.

As regards clause 4, provision should presumably be inserted prohibiting the erection at any future time of fortifications, by which free communication between the frontier and the point reached by the Mission may be impeded.

Many of the difficulties experienced in the past will be obviated by the provisions

for the transmission of correspondence through British and Thibetan agents at Gyantse, and by the establishment of trade mart there under the conditions now applicable to that at Yatung. We trust, however, that, for the reasons given in our despatch, the opening of subordinate mart at Gartok, in Western Thibet, may be agreed to.

There is also, we presume, no objection to present opportunity being taken to settle petty boundary cases in Kumaon. Question of securing the definition of the boundary of Thibet for the purpose of clause 2 is one which we desire to bring to your notice. Such definition should be secured at an early date, before the question is further complicated. All that would be required would be that a recognition of what these boundaries really are, at any rate upon the north, should be obtained in writing from the Chinese and Thibetan Governments. Our information on this point is inadequate, but Younghusband will probably be in a position to supplement it.

(Repeated to Peking.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 15.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

July 11, 1904.

FOLLOWING telegram, dated the 9th instant, Gyantse, has been received from Younghusband :—

"I should be enabled to effect settlement more quickly if I had information as to what modifications in the terms now authorized would be made in the following contingencies :—

"1. If I am met on the march by Delegates sent to negotiate, and if latter prevent further opposition being offered; and

"2. In the event of the advance being opposed.

"Is it possible to furnish me with information on these points?"

I have sent the following reply to Younghusband, and should be glad to know if it has your approval :—

"Following instructions may be acted on pending receipt of a reply from His Majesty's Government, to whom your inquiry has been referred :—

"Should Thibetan Delegates meet you, with a view to negotiating, on the march, and should they prevent further opposition, terms specified in the Secretary of State's telegram of the 6th instant are to be adhered to. Should the advance be opposed, the character and extent of the opposition must be ascertained before final orders can be given.

"You are, however, at liberty to make a reservation of the right of His Majesty's Government to establish additional trade marts in Eastern Thibet and at Shigatse and Gartok, and to demand an increase of the amount of the indemnity. These are the only means of enhancing our terms which do not involve a departure from the main principles of settlement desired by His Majesty's Government. If, however, unforeseen circumstances occur which appear to you to necessitate a change of policy, you will, of course, furnish a report of the facts and await instructions.

"Government of India hope that when you get into touch with the Lhasa authorities you will succeed without difficulty in securing the acceptance by them of the terms now proposed."

(Repeated to Peking.)

Inclosure 3 in No. 15.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

July 11, 1904.

FOLLOWING report from Younghusband :—

"It is believed by the Tongsa Penlop that the Dalai Lama, having found the Russians useless as protectors against us, is now anxious to make friends with us if we will protect him against the Russians.

"Tongsa Penlop, who mentioned this to me entirely of his own accord, suggested that, if any overtures in this sense were made by the Dalai Lama, an addition might be made to the second clause of the terms to the effect that in the event of an attempt on the part of any foreign Power to intervene in Thibet such steps will be taken by His Majesty's Government as they may consider necessary in order to assist the Thibetan Government in excluding such intervention."

Specific insertion in new Convention of conditions, which might prove a source of embarrassment to us in relation to China and to other foreign Powers, hardly seems necessary. A sufficient proof that Russian intervention in Thibet is to be energetically excluded should be found by the Thibetans in the intimation conveyed by Lord Lansdowne to the Russian Ambassador on the 11th February and the 18th February, 1903, and in the declaration subsequently made by the Ambassador after prolonged consultation with his Government, when read in the light of the terms which we now propose. This might be pointed out by Younghusband to the Thibetans, and he might also furnish them with a translation of such portions of the Blue Book as bear on the point.

(Repeated to Peking and Thibet.)

No. 16.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 14.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 13th instant, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copies will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, July 14, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 16.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

July 13, 1904.

TO-MORROW the Mission will commence advance to Lhasa. Colonel Young-husband is issuing Proclamation to the effect that our terms will be made more stringent should Mission meet with opposition during the advance. It is presumed that terms will also be made more stringent in the event of Thibetan delegates failing to come in till the last moment before arrival of Mission at Lhasa. We are authorizing Younghusband to secure the signature of the Dalai Lama and the Amban to Convention embodying terms finally approved, and to sign it himself, subject to ratification by His Majesty's Government.

I should be glad to be apprised of decision arrived at on the points raised in my telegrams of the 11th July, viz.: (1) The nature of the assurances to be given to the Dalai Lama as to protecting him against foreign aggression, and (2) the further terms to be demanded in the event of opposition being encountered.

We understand that full power is reserved by us to construct suitable communication at any time, of whatever class may be deemed necessary, through the Chumbi Valley. Younghusband asks that provision authorizing trade agent at Gyantse to proceed, when necessary, to Lhasa should be included in Convention. This, we suggest, might be made one of the more stringent terms to be exacted should the Mission be opposed.

(Repeated to Peking and to Colonel Younghusband.)

No. 17.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 15.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 13th instant, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copy will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, July 15, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 17.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

July 13, 1904.

YOUR three telegrams, dated the 11th July, regarding Thibet.

I shall communicate to you with the least possible delay the views of His Majesty's Government in regard to the modification of the terms laid down in my telegram of the 6th July. In the meantime, pending receipt of the orders of His Majesty's Government, no increased demands, save in respect of the amount of indemnity, are to be made by Younghusband. Subject to this exception, I approve the instructions to Younghusband as given in your telegram of the 9th July in reply to his telegram No. 517.

No. 18.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 16.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 16th July, relative to Thibet affairs.

(Copy will be sent to the Intelligence Division, War Office.)

India Office, July 16, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 18.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

July 16, 1904.

YOUNGHUSBAND telegraphs, under date the 13th July, as follows:—

"I have informed the Amban by letter that I am advancing to Lhasa, as neither properly empowered Thibetan Delegates nor he have come to Gyantse; that my purpose is still to negotiate, but that now negotiations can only be conducted in Lhasa. Tongsa Penlop has at my instance written a further letter to Ta Lama, stating that I shall be prepared to carry on negotiations *en route*, in order that settlement may be ready for signature at an early date at Lhasa. The Penlop has also written at my request to the Dalai Lama, giving an outline of the terms to be demanded, and adding that they will be enhanced if we encounter further opposition. Tongsa Penlop is sending a man with me to act as a means of communication with the Thibetans, he himself will rejoin any time I ask him to; at present he will remain here until he hears from the Thibetans that they still have need of him. A lama from Lhasa, who has arrived with a letter for the Tongsa Penlop from the Dalai Lama, states that latter is really anxious for a settlement to be effected. In his letter the Dalai Lama says it is a pity that there should be war in a religious country, and asks the Tongsa Penlop to assist the Councillors in their good work. Jongpen of Gyantse, whom I had confined in post here when we first heard of hostile gathering, just before the Mission was attacked, has now been released and reinstated; he will act as intermediary between the Officer Commanding here and the people. People are selling country produce to the soldiers, and a small bazaar has been started. Proclamation will be posted up everywhere to-morrow."

No. 19.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 19.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a letter from the Government of India, dated the 30th ultimo, relative to the conditions of the settlement of our relations with Thibet.

[1762]

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With reference to the last paragraph of the letter, neither the list of inclosures nor the inclosures themselves have yet been received.

(Copy has been sent to the Director of Military Operations.)

India Office, July 19, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 19.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Secret.)

Sir,

Simla, June 30, 1904.

WE have the honour to address you, in continuation of our Secret despatch, dated the 18th February, 1904, regarding the conditions of the settlement of our relations with Thibet.

2. Since the date of that letter events have occurred which have entirely changed the aspect of the questions to be considered. After a halt at Thuna, on the threshold of Thibet, of over two months, during which Colonel Younghusband's endeavours to open discussion with Thibetan officials met with no more success than his previous efforts at Khamba Jong, the Mission advanced on the 31st March, and on the 11th April arrived at Gyantse. The move was not effected without opposition, and, despite the endeavours made to avoid bloodshed, the Thibetan forces which essayed to block the progress of the Mission, first at Guru, and again in the Jamdan Gorge, outside Gyantse, sustained considerable losses. No sooner had the Thibetan forces been routed at Guru, than the countryside resumed its normal aspect, women and children returned to their villages, and supplies were brought in for the use of the Mission and its escort. At Gyantse itself the experience was the same. A few days after his arrival, Colonel Younghusband received a despatch from the Amban, announcing that he would arrive at Gyantse within the next three weeks, that the Thibetans had agreed to supply him with transport, and that he had insisted on competent and trustworthy Thibetan Representatives accompanying him. The Amban added that the Dalai Lama was now aroused to the sense of our power, and the Chinese official who brought the despatch reported that the Thibetans were entreating the Amban to intercede on their behalf; that the common people would not resent our appearance at Lhasa, and that there were but few troops between the town of Gyantse and the capital. It appeared that at length the situation was improving, and that the Thibetan Government and people had reached a more amenable frame of mind. This belief, however, was soon dispelled. On the 1st May it was reported that a force of 1,000 to 1,500 Thibetans had been located near the Karo La, on the road between Gyantse and Lhasa. By the time our troops had moved out to remove this menace to our position, the gathering had swelled, and it was only after a stubborn resistance that the Thibetan force was put to flight and their camp captured. In the meanwhile, the officials at Gyantse had taken advantage of the temporary absence of the column dispatched to the Karo La to make an assault upon the Mission and its diminished escort, and the Bhutia servants of Captain Parr, the local Chinese Delegate, and some servants of the Mission, who happened to be in the town, were brutally murdered. The attack was repulsed with heavy loss to the assailants; but hostilities had now commenced, and since the early part of May our camp at Gyantse and our line of communications with that place have been subjected to continuous attacks by the Thibetan forces. The complexion of affairs was thus entirely changed. It became impossible for the Mission to sit indefinitely at Gyantse, and on the 12th May His Majesty's Government sanctioned the continuance of the advance to Lhasa itself, unless by a fixed date the Amban should have arrived at Gyantse, accompanied by competent Thibetan Delegates, prepared to negotiate with our officers. This date has now been notified; our ultimatum was delivered to the Thibetan Commander at Gyantse on the 1st June; and unless by the 25th June the requisite Envoys have arrived at Gyantse, our troops will advance to the capital itself.

3. The time has now arrived for discussing the settlement which it is our object to effect, in order that we may be able to communicate instructions as to general principles to our Commission as soon as possible after the arrival of the Mission at Lhasa.

The most recent exposition of the views of His Majesty's Government of which we are in possession is that contained in the Memorandum handed by Lord Lansdowne to the Russian Ambassador in London on the 10th May last. In that document his Lordship explained that His Majesty's Government adhered to the policy stated in your telegram of the 6th November to the Government of India. We assume that the

conclusion of a Convention, as mentioned in your telegram of the 30th November was also contemplated. His Lordship went on to explain that this policy was not inalterable in any eventuality, and that the action of His Majesty's Government was to some extent dependent on the conduct of the Thibetans themselves. He added an emphatic declaration that, so long as no other Power endeavoured to intervene in the affairs of Thibet, no attempt would be made to annex it, to establish a Protectorate over it, or in any way to control its internal administration. With the policy involved in this latter declaration we desire entirely to associate ourselves; but we are unable to disguise the fact that recent developments may make it incumbent upon us to recommend a reconsideration of the opinion previously expressed in your telegram of the 6th November, 1903, in so far as concerns the establishment of a permanent Mission in the country. We do not as yet feel in a position to make our final recommendations, but we think it right, without further delay, to place before His Majesty's Government a statement of the case that may form the basis of further discussion, which it may possibly be necessary to conduct by telegraph after the arrival of the Mission at Lhasa, and when we are in possession of the fuller knowledge which we hope then to obtain. The arguments against the establishment of a British Representative at Lhasa are largely based on the declarations of His Majesty's Government, and on considerations of international policy which it is needless for us to reiterate, and which, moreover, are better known to you than they are to us. Apart from such considerations, we are deeply impressed with the grave responsibilities which the Indian Government must incur by posting a Resident Agent at the capital of Thibet. We feel it, however, to be our duty to lay before you the reasons which may make it necessary for us reluctantly to assume the burden of the measure.

4. It is evident that, if our objects are not to be frustrated from the outset, the trade arrangements at the marts which we propose to secure must be supervised by a British officer. Clause 1 of the Trade Regulations of 1893 permitted the posting of such an official at the place then selected, and we now regard it as a matter for regret that no use was ever made of this provision. But the need for such an appointment is based also on considerations of a wider nature. It is now more than a year since we received and reported circumstantial rumours of Russian Agreements with or about Thibet. We believe that these reports were by no means groundless; but when confronted with a demand for a categorical statement of their intentions, the Russian Government, unprepared at once to assert the position they desired, declared, after long delay and some hesitation, through their Ambassador, that there existed "no Convention about Thibet, either with Thibet itself, or with China, or with any one else, nor had the Russian Government any Agents in that country, or any intention of sending Agents or Missions there." Their policy, it was added, "ne viserait le Thibet en aucun cas." On the strength of these explicit disclaimers, His Majesty's Government announced, in May 1903, that they were unable to approve a suggestion that we should endeavour to arrange for the permanent location of a Political Agent in Thibet. "In the opinion of His Majesty's Government," it was explained, "the responsibilities and complications which such a political outpost might entail outweigh any advantage to be derived from it under the conditions now known to prevail, and the assurances recently received by the Foreign Office remove the apprehensions which were previously entertained of a development of political influence by Russia in that country."

We do not wish to belittle the practical and immediate value of these disclaimers. We are unable, however, to share the view of His Majesty's Government that Count Benckendorff's declaration removes all ground for apprehension of the development of Russian political influence in these regions. We will not here reiterate the proofs which we hold undoubtedly to exist of a steady endeavour on the part of Russia to cultivate political influence by unofficial means. To the evidence* collated by Colonel Younghusband we may add mention of the inquiry made in February 1903 by the Russian Embassy in London as to the truth of a rumoured British advance to Khamba Ovaleko. The significance of an inquiry, at first sight so entirely gratuitous, can only be found in the assumption that the Russian Government consider that they have interests in those quarters, interests which, for the present, they have been content to waive, but which we have no doubt that they will not fail even now to encourage, and in the future to turn to account on some more favourable occasion. A recent American traveller has given credible information of Russian intrigue with the lamas even in such remote places as Atentse and Wei Si. If further signs be needed, we would refer to the recently announced intention of founding in the University at Vladivostock a chair for the study of the Thibetan language, and to the outcry which has occurred in the leading Russian

* *Vide* his Memoranda of August 17 and October 7, 1903.

newspapers at the advance of the British Mission. These newspapers, at any rate, do not conceal their* view that the Missions of Dorjief to Russia were largely political, and that it was the intention of Russia to stand forth as the protector of the Tibetan Buddhist Church. As far back as 1899, the Chinese Resident at Lhasa informed our Political Officer in Sikkim that, in the event of our insisting on the Convention boundary, the Tibetans would fall back upon Russia who had already offered them assistance. A similar opinion prevails in the adjacent States of Nepal and Bhutan, and all the information that we have obtained from Lhasa tends to show that the Dalai Lama has given himself over entirely to the guidance of Dorjief, and that the desire and intention of the Tibetans to substitute Russian for Chinese support are almost openly expressed. The Tibetans have now gone so far as to prevent both the former and the present Chinese Ambans from proceeding to meet our Mission, while it is rumoured that the Dalai Lama is himself preparing to fly from Lhasa in order to place himself under Russian protection. We do not suppose that Russia has at present any immediate intention of occupying Tibet which fortunately it is not possible for her to do, as she is not yet limitrophe with that country, and the physical difficulties in the way of an advance from the north are serious. We are not convinced yet of the presence of Russian Regular soldiers in Tibet, but Russian arms and ammunition have reached Lhasa and have been used against our troops, and it is confidently stated that there are Russian Buriats aiding the Tibetans in their military arrangements. Nor do we believe that, in the face of the statement recently made to His Majesty's Government, she has any present intention of deputing to Lhasa an officially accredited Agent of the Czar. But interests may spring up and influence may be spread by less formal means, until at some future date they attain dimensions, which, as in the case of demands for direct relations with Afghanistan, may be held at St. Petersburg to furnish plausible grounds for maintaining that a new situation has been created by unforeseen events which render it necessary to reconsider the assurances of April 1903. That we are not alone in our views may be seen from the remarks† recently made to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg by the Chinese Minister at that Court, who naïvely observed, as a reason for British abstention from an active policy in Tibet, that Russia was pursuing in that country a policy which she had previously followed in China, and which, if persisted in, would have won to her "a preponderance in China with which no European nation would be able to compete." The Chinese Minister urged that we should strive to maintain an influence at Lhasa equal to that of Russia by imitating the Russian method of subsidising the Lamasteries and keeping up relations with the Lhasa Court by means of native Buddhists. These ingenuous observations, emanating as they do from the Minister of the Suzerain of Tibet accredited to the Court of our rival in Asia, lend a remarkable corroboration to our opinions. His Majesty's Government have already recognized the necessity of asserting the predominance of British influence in Tibet, and in his interview of the 8th April, 1903, Lord Lansdowne clearly apprised Count Benckendorff of our attitude in the matter. The British name in Tibet is now overshadowed by that of a rival Power, and we trust that effect may now be given to the intentions of His Majesty's Government and British influence firmly established in that country, a result which will be gladly welcomed not only by the present ruling authorities in Nepal, but also by the Bhutanese, whose Executive Chief, the Tongsa Penlop, on the arrival of the Mission at Gyantse, at once conveyed to Colonel Younghusband his congratulations and has since paid a special visit to our Commissioner at Phari Jong, and has expressed his willingness to advance with our troops to Lhasa.

5. How is this influence to be established? It is evident that we must now require something more practical than the nominal concessions acquired by the Treaty of 1890 as the fruits of our operations in 1888. The losses sustained by the Tibetans in opposing our advance to Gyantse, at the Karo La, and in the successive attacks upon our Mission and their lines of communication, have been considerable; but our experience of 1888 shows that we cannot trust to our military successes leaving any lasting impression. If on this occasion also, after protracted discussions and costly military operations in Tibetan territory, we retire, leaving no visible sign of our authority within their borders, and are content to secure a Convention which, like its predecessors, may be rendered nugatory by the non-existence of practical guarantees, then we shall only find ourselves, after heavy outlay, in a worse position than before, and the Tibetans will believe more firmly than ever that our failure to gain our ends is due to inability to enforce submission.

* Cf. the despatch from Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Lansdowne, dated December 19, 1903, which was forwarded with Political Secretary's letter, dated January 15, 1904.

† Vide Mr. Spring-Rice to the Marquess of Lansdowne, dated April 28, 1904.

6. The need for requiring practical guarantees has been recognized by His Majesty's Government, and we know of none so sure as that of leaving in the country an accredited Resident Agent, with a suitable military escort. It may be urged that the location of a British Representative in Thibet would at once be followed by a demand from Russia for a similar right. There is no apparent reason why the Russian Government should make any such pretension. She is not coterminous with Thibet, and she cannot object to our adopting a precedent which she herself set in the Treaty of Ili of 1881. In view, moreover, of the emphatic disclaimers of any interest in Thibet so recently offered by the Russian Government, we can hardly believe that they would demand such a concession at the present time; while in the future, provided we follow up the diplomatic success that has been gained for us by His Majesty's Government by the adoption of suitable measures on the spot, we believe that it will be realized at St. Petersburg that, in the face of firmly established British interests, it is futile to endeavour to assert a rival influence based on a military predominance in regions removed from the Thibetan capital by more than 1,000 miles of arid steppes. But if we neglect our opportunities now, we may be sure that Russia will not miss hers, and we fear lest, if we now stand aloof and leave behind us no tangible mark of British influence, we may hereafter find that we have to deal, not merely with a decrepit suzerain Power, and an amenable and unwarlike vassal people, but with a Russian predominance which no diplomatic representations at St. Petersburg can unmake, and which will remain a constant source of anxiety to the Indian Government.

7. It is difficult, therefore, to avoid the conclusion that the best guarantee for the due observance of the new Convention, and for the adequate protection of our rights as the only European Power limitrophe with Thibet, must be that, in addition to the appointment of officers to watch over our commercial interests at the marts to be established in Thibet, we should demand the acceptance of an accredited British Agent in Thibet. The place at which this Agent should reside is one on which opinions can easily differ, and we prefer to leave the question open until we are in possession of the fuller information that we shall acquire after the Mission has reached Lhasa. The arguments in favour of placing him at Lhasa are the following:—

Lhasa is the pivot of the religious and political life of Thibet. It is the seat of the Dalai Lama and his Council, with whom we have to establish official relations; and it is the focus of the priestly influence which we have to conciliate or overcome. It may be argued that it is undesirable to arouse the resentment of the Thibetans by requiring them to receive a Representative of a strange race and a strange religion in the home of their most sacred associations. But after the manner in which for the past fifteen years the Thibetans have repudiated their obligations, have derided the patience with which we have submitted to their insults, and have openly declared their reliance on a neighbour whose secret emissary they have admitted to the innermost precincts of the Potala, we believe that, even should such a feeling exist, it may be better to face it than to allow of the misconstruction which would be placed upon the location of an agent at any place outside Lhasa. We see, however, no reason why the presence of a Resident Agent at Lhasa should be a lasting source of irritation. For more than eighty years we have now had an Agent at Khatmandu, a capital, the isolation of which from foreign intrusion has been guarded hardly less jealously than that of Lhasa itself, and that by a people whose prowess has been proved in our own armies, and whose political unrest has led to a series of revolutions remarkable even in an oriental State.

The Treaty of Segowlie, which first gave us the right to post a permanent Resident at Khatmandu, was only ratified by the Nepalese after they had been defeated in two successive campaigns, in both of which the Gourkhas resisted with the utmost bravery, and in the second of which we were compelled to place in the field a force of no less than 33,000 men. The hostilities which preceded the first appointment of a British Minister at Peking under the Treaty of 1860 were also far more serious than any opposition which has so far been encountered, or, it may be safely asserted, is likely to be met on the way to Lhasa. We see then no reason to anticipate greater risk in placing a Resident at Lhasa than was incurred in sending a British Representative to Khatmandu or Peking. Despite the hostility which, under the influence and leadership of the monkish faction, they have displayed against us, we believe that the Thibetan people have no dislike for us as a race, and there is nothing in the tolerant Buddhist creed which counsels hostility to strangers of a different faith or encourages fanaticism. The exclusion of British subjects and Europeans is merely based on a concordat of the present dominant class in Thibet, and is not in any way a religious obligation. The monks are at present opposed to us, fearing the loss of their influence, but we believe that their antipathy is based on suspicion and ignorance, and that, with tact and patience, it may be eradicated; and we are

supported in this view by the friendly relations which Colonel Younghusband was able to establish at Khamba Jong with ecclesiastical envoys from the Tashi Lama of Shigatse. It must also always be borne in mind that subjects of all her other neighbours—China, Nepal, and Kashmir—are allowed freely to resort to, and trade in, Thibet, while China and Nepal have official Representatives at Lhasa. These rights were the direct consequences of successful military operations. As at Khatmandu, our Agent would, like the Nepal Representative at Lhasa, abstain from all interference with the internal administration of the country, and would confine himself to watching over our trade interests and in guarding against the introduction of foreign influences. His presence, therefore, at Lhasa would be in no sense a contravention of the policy now declared by His Majesty's Government. We have considered the idea of appointing an Indian, and preferably a Buddhist, Representative, but we are unable to recommend it. In the first place, it would be impossible to find a Buddhist of the same sect as the Thibetans of suitable position or one in whom we could place any reliance. Other Indians might of course be selected, but there would probably be almost as much objection to them on the part of the Thibetans as there may be to a British Agent, while the loss of prestige involved in such an appointment would be so serious as almost to cancel all advantages to be derived from the presence of an Agent at Lhasa.

8. It is believed that the hesitation of His Majesty's Government to allow the appointment of a Representative in Thibet was due partly to the supposed impossibility of keeping open communications with him, and partly to a desire not to accelerate political complications regarding the integrity of China. We believe that the first ground of objection was based upon a misapprehension, and that there is no real difficulty, except on the southern side of the watershed, to such free passage to and from Thibet as may be necessary for the adequate support of a British Representative either at Lhasa or Gyantse; and our recent operations have demonstrated—and the exceptional severity of the past winter makes the proof stronger—that, however great the physical difficulties of communication may be, they are not insuperable even at the worst time of the year. The difficulties on the Indian side of the Himalaya will be obviated by a road through Chumbi which we are now examining. We are unable to share the apprehensions arising from the second cause. No other European Power at present adjoins Thibet or has any interests there, and so far our arrangements have been made with the cordial co-operation of the Chinese officials deputed to meet our Mission, and we understand that they meet with the sympathy, if not with the avowed approval, of the Chinese Government, as, indeed, is clearly evidenced by the attitude of that Government as reported in Sir E. Satow's telegram, dated the 15th June last.

9. A further point in regard to which we desire to place you in possession of our present views is the question of retaining the Chumbi Valley. It is hardly necessary to explain that this valley lies to the south of the main watershed, and is Indian rather than Thibetan in character. Our Mission has been well received by the people, and the Political Agent whom we have located among them reports that they regard our presence with unmixed satisfaction, and that their only fear is lest we may evacuate the valley and expose them to the vengeance which the lamas would surely take upon them for having lived on terms of friendliness with us. The occupation of this region was recommended by all the local authorities as far back as 1888, was strongly urged by the Bengal Government in Mr. Cotton's letter dated the 22nd July, 1895, but was deferred owing to Chinese susceptibilities; though, as mentioned by Colonel Younghusband, the Marquess of Dufferin, in his instructions to Sir H. M. Durand on the 16th November, 1888, indicated the necessity for taking material guarantees for the good behaviour of the Thibetans if they again gave cause for complaint. Not only have they given such cause repeatedly, but the contumacious disregard of the Thibetans for their Treaty obligations and for the authority of their Suzerain has culminated in armed resistance to the passage of a friendly Mission dispatched by us with the full cognizance of that Suzerain and accompanied by Chinese Representatives throughout. It appears to us that recent events may make it necessary to take such material guarantees.

We have referred to a road through the Chumbi Valley as desirable in order to secure the position of our Representative in Thibet if such a one should be appointed. The route which is projected along the Amo Chu Valley will lead into the foot of the Chumbi Valley, and it is obviously desirable that it should continue under our control up to the point where it debouches on to the open plateau of Thibet beyond the Tang La. The opening up of such a route into Thibet proper must evidently be the precursor of any real development of trade, and, what is of far greater importance, it provides one of the surest guarantees for the predominance of our influence and the safety of our Agents in the country. There would be obvious grave objections to leaving in the hands of the

Thibetans the narrow gorges and defiles through which the main route up the Chumbi Valley passes, and at any of which it would be possible for an enemy of reasonable determination and resource to offer the most serious resistance to an advancing column. The present amenability of Bhutan is also attributable to our presence in the valley, and our evacuation of it would lose to us the advantage which we have gained in this quarter, lead us back to the old conditions under which no British official was able to enter Bhutanese territory, and remove the principal guarantee which there will be for their respecting the route which we hope to open up along the Amo Chu, to which the Bhutanese Government have given their full and free consent. The policy which at the close of the Bhutan war, 1864-66, led to the imposition of the condition that a strip of British territory should be introduced between Bhutan and Sikkim still holds good, and the retention of the Chumbi Valley under British influence with its formal severance from Thibet would serve the further useful purpose of isolating the native States which border on our northern frontier.

From the point of view of the Thibetans, or from an international standpoint, the proposal hardly requires special justification. It has recently been estimated that, if our forces have all left Thibet by October next, the cost of the expedition will be not less than 648,000*l.* The contingency of such an early withdrawal is remote, and it seems probable that the operations necessary to assert our Treaty rights and to exact reparation from the Thibetans will cost us not less than 1,000,000*l.*, and even this figure may be considerably exceeded.

When in 1881 the Russians evacuated Kuldja, they insisted on the payment of a sum of 9,000,000 roubles to cover the expenses incurred in the occupation of the country, and in addition retained a portion of the western frontier as a permanent annexation.

We are, therefore, of opinion that, as a guarantee for the fulfilment of the Convention, and as a security for the payment of the indemnity that we now propose to require, as well as in the interests of the people of the valley, themselves, the occupation of the Chumbi Valley for such period as may be necessary for the due protection of our Treaty rights and international interests will become inevitable.

This leads us to the question of an indemnity. Now that it has become necessary to send a regular military expedition to Lhasa, we would submit that we have a good claim to be recouped the expense to which we have been put. It is obvious that the retention of the Chumbi Valley will not, from a monetary point of view, be an adequate return for the outlay in which we have been involved, and it will be well to put forward a claim to compensation not only as against the Thibetans, but also as against the Chinese Government.

As the Suzerain Power, and as the signatories of the Agreements of 1890 and 1893, the Chinese Government cannot be absolved from responsibility for the present situation, and a claim for an indemnity may form a useful lever to induce them to agree to the exclusive rights which we desire to obtain in the final settlement, and will enable us in more ways than one to tighten our control over the country.

Further, we consider that having regard to the recent attacks upon our Mission at Gyantse, and as a measure calculated to increase the security of our Representative in Thibet, we should follow the precedent of the demands presented by the allied Powers to the Chinese Government after the events of 1900, and should insist on the razing of all fortified positions which might impede the course of free communication between our frontier and Lhasa, and on the prohibition of the importation of arms into Thibet or their manufacture within the country except with our special permission.

10. It remains to discuss what might be done if His Majesty's Government decline to agree to the appointment of a Representative at Lhasa. In that case we would urge that a resident Agent should be posted at Gyantse whose functions would primarily be to supervise and maintain the trading facilities which we must undoubtedly secure, and to which we shall presently allude. Although the duties of such an Agent would be mainly commercial, they would necessarily comprise that of seeing that the Convention or Treaty which we shall eventually conclude with the Thibetan Government is observed in all respects. The Agent should, therefore, have the right of proceeding to Lhasa, as occasion may require, to discuss matters with the Chinese Amban or with the high officials of the Dalai Lama.

In making the terms of his appointment, we consider that the grounds and conditions of our self-restraint in this matter should be clearly indicated to the Thibetans. It should be explained that His Majesty's Government consent to waive their claim to the appointment of a Resident Agent at Lhasa solely out of regard for the Thibetan desire to maintain their freedom from contact with European influence at the political and religious capital of their country; that they are prepared to forego this demand, so long as the Thibetan

Government preserves an attitude of isolation from external affairs and avoids all intercourse with other European Powers; but that, in the event of any departure by the Thibetans from this policy in the future, the British Government reserve to themselves the right to require the acceptance of an Agent at the capital itself. We cannot, however, conceal from ourselves that this alternative, the least which can be contemplated, is not calculated, in the same degree, to afford a guarantee of satisfactory results. An Agent at Gyantse, though possibly in greater personal security, will probably not be in so good a position to know what transpires in political circles at Lhasa, or to check, or report on, intrigues which may be set on foot by other European Powers.

But whether or not a British Agent is established in Thibet, we consider that recent events justify our requiring from the Thibetans and from the Chinese Government a formal recognition of our exclusive political influence in Thibet, and an engagement that they will not admit to Thibet the Representative of, that they will cede no portion of Thibetan territory to, and that they will enter into no relations regarding Thibet with, any other foreign Power, without the previous consent of the British Government. This stipulation would be in accordance with the declaration which Lord Lansdowne recently made to the Russian Ambassador, and it would form a political asset of some value, though, in view of past experience, it seems highly probable that the Thibetan Government would disregard it, unless they were under the direct observation of a British Representative.

11. We now turn to less contentious matter, namely, that of facilities for trade with Thibet, to secure which was the primary object of the Mission when it was originally dispatched on an errand which was then indubitably peaceful in character and intention. It is, of course, necessary to insist on access for purposes of trade to convenient centres in Thibet proper in the place of Yatung, which is beyond all question unsuitable for the object for which it was intended. In Central Thibet our present information leads us to believe that the town of Gyantse provides the site which is best fitted to our requirements. We trust that His Majesty's Government will authorize us to instruct Colonel Younghusband to arrange for the concession of proper trade facilities at this place. Had the Thibetans agreed to peaceful negotiations, it is probable that, so far as concerns this part of Thibet, we should not have thought it necessary to press for other marts than Gyantse.

In view, however, of recent developments, we think that it may be advisable to insist on the opening up to trade of the neighbouring town of Shigatse, the seat of the Tashi Lama—between whom and the Dalai Lama there is understood to exist a standing rivalry, though, for the present, they have combined against us—and also of Lhasa itself, if a British Resident should be posted to the capital.

12. Hitherto the negotiations with Thibet have been conducted through the agency of Bengal officers, and the question of facilitating our traffic with Western Thibet has not been fully considered. British India adjoins Western Thibet in Spiti and Garhwal, and a considerable amount of trade in wool and borax now finds its way across those frontiers as well as down the Hindustan-Thibet road made by Lord Dalhousie in the valley of the Sutlej. The figures for this trade for the past three years are as follows:—

				Imports.	Exports.	Total.
				Rupees.	Rupees.	Rupees.
1900-1901	8,99,248	3,91,266	12,90,514
1901-1902	10,45,094	4,26,256	14,71,350
1902-1903	10,27,667	3,92,510	14,20,177

These figures do not include the trade via Ladakh, of which part is Thibetan.

Already, notwithstanding the difficulties of communication, it amounts to half the total trade with Thibet, and it is capable of considerable development by an extension of the Hindustan-Thibet road to the frontier, a short distance of 25 miles. This, we have ascertained, can be done without much difficulty, and we consider that the present opportunity should be taken of completing the road to the frontier and of opening another market at Gartok as suggested by the Government of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh (*vide* Annexure 468 of this despatch), or some other convenient place in Western Thibet, which, with its rich gold-fields and its vicinity to Chinese Turkestan, may acquire considerable importance in the future.

13. We are also inclined to think that it may hereafter be advisable to insist on similar facilities in the extreme east of Thibet at some point in the neighbourhood of

Gartok (another place of the same name as that in Western Thibet) on the main line of trade between Thibet and China. This tract is attracting a good deal of attention from French and other explorers. We also understand that the question of concessions to prospect for gold in this corner of Thibet is already being discussed in business circles in London, and in the event of these schemes maturing, we think that their exploitation is likely to be facilitated by the existence in this locality of a recognized trade mart accessible from India by a route from Sadiya via Rima which may hereafter, we believe, provide facilities not only for the purpose of tapping Thibetan trade, but also for the furtherance of our commercial interests in Szechuan. For the present, however, we incline to think that it may be advisable, out of deference to Chinese susceptibilities, to refrain from express mention of any desire for a mart in the extreme east of Thibet, and that it would suffice to stipulate for the right of free passage and of access for commercial purposes to such points as may hereafter be found to afford facilities for Indian traders.

14. It would be useless at the present stage to enter into details of the draft Convention, of the trade regulations, of the terms as to Customs duty, of the arrangements in regard to mining rights and Concessions which appear to us to be necessary, and of the boundary settlements on the Sikkin and Garhwal frontiers which stand for decision. These questions must first be discussed by our Commissioner with the Representatives of the Thibetan Government, and we shall probably be obliged to consult you by telegraph only, if the Mission is to withdraw from Lhasa without undue delay.

All our present plans are being framed with a view to the retirement of the Mission from Lhasa early in October, but Colonel Younghusband, as you will have learnt from our telegrams and from the Memorandum which forms an annexure of this despatch, is strongly of opinion that nothing can be effected unless the Mission is prepared to remain at Lhasa throughout the winter. His view is that the Thibetans will persist in their obstinacy unless they are made to understand from the very outset that our military forces will occupy Lhasa so long as they refuse to come to terms. We have pointed out to Colonel Younghusband that his proposal is somewhat at variance with the spirit of the policy which His Majesty's Government desire to pursue, and that the military objections to wintering at Lhasa are well nigh overwhelming. The alternative to wintering the Mission at Lhasa would be a retirement to Gyantse with the threat of returning to Lhasa next spring if negotiations were not carried out meanwhile, but this again is a matter on which we are not prepared to express our opinions until the Mission has reached Lhasa and reported on the situation in that place.

15. There is a serious contingency which we have to contemplate in the probable flight of the Dalai Lama and the officials of the Thibetan Government concerning which we have received much circumstantial information. It is not unlikely that in those circumstances the Dalai Lama would meet with an untimely end before he had proceeded far, or even before he had got clear of the capital. It would be nothing new in the history of Thibet for the supreme Pontiff to die at an early age, and the present Dalai Lama has already outlived the ordinary span of his predecessors. We are, moreover, very credibly informed that there is a considerable faction in Lhasa who are bitterly opposed to his present policy of insulting the British Empire and coquetting with Russia, and consider that he has brought about the ruin of his country by listening to the bad advice of his present counsellors.

If these prognostications should prove to be correct, we should hope to be able, with the help or assent of the Chinese authorities to establish a new Government with whom we could negotiate, and to secure the co-operation of the Chinese Amban in the appointment of an amenable Regent, for the Dalai Lama would be reincarnated in the person of an infant who would necessarily, and in accordance with custom, be under such tutelage.

But if our Mission should find nobody who could assume authority and negotiate with us, we shall have to deal with a very perplexing situation. It is hardly possible to anticipate circumstances of that kind with any definite suggestions, especially as His Majesty's Government are averse to any permanent or even prolonged intervention in Thibetan affairs. The obvious and most effective course would, no doubt, be to leave a British Agent at Lhasa with a sufficient force at his back to enable him to establish a new Government. Failing this we can only suggest that we should endeavour, in the absence of a Government, to negotiate with the people, to explain our objects and intentions to them by means of proclamations and to invite their co-operation in the immediate establishment of the commercial marts and trade routes which would redound to their ultimate advantage. Lhasa might be left severely alone and the Mission might establish themselves at Gyantse and influence Southern Thibet from that place. This course, however, presupposes the cessation of hostilities on the part of the Thibetans, and

would undoubtedly commit us to a military occupation of Southern Thibet until the hostility of the monks had died out. In the last resort, in order to secure an early withdrawal of the force, it might be possible to conclude a fresh Convention with the Amban in Lhasa in the presence of as large and as representative an assembly of Thibetans as can be collected there, to whom the terms of the Treaty would be fully explained with an assurance that we would ourselves take steps to insure the fulfilment of the terms by the Thibetans in the event of any default.

16. We trust that we have said enough to prove that the location of a British Agent in Thibet is the best practical guarantee for the fulfilment of the terms which may finally be agreed upon and the only sure means of asserting British influence against the designs of a rival Power. If, however, His Majesty's Government are not prepared to modify their present policy, we fear that it may prove impossible for us to suggest any course of action which would insure the ultimate success of the Mission, but we observe that, in discussing the Thibetan question with the Russian Ambassador, Lord Lansdowne pointed out that, though His Majesty's Government still adhered to their declared policy, it was obvious that their action must to some extent depend upon the conduct of the Thibetans themselves, and that His Majesty's Government could not undertake that they would not depart in any eventuality from the policy which had commended itself to them. It is unnecessary for us to assure you that no efforts will be spared by ourselves and by our Agents in Thibet to give full effect to the views of His Majesty's Government, but we cannot be blind to the fact that the conduct of the Thibetans may render it impossible to carry out in its integrity the policy that has been laid down. It is in view of such a contingency, if, indeed, we are not justified in regarding the contingency as an already accomplished fact, that we have ventured to suggest possible alternatives. We are prepared to await the course of events, and persist in the present plan up to the last possible moment, but we have thought it right to lay our views before His Majesty's Government at the present time in order that they may be in a position to decide upon any new proposals which circumstances may force us to make at short notice.

17. We take the present opportunity to forward, for your information, the further correspondence relating to Thibetan affairs set out in the schedule annexed to this despatch.

We have, &c.
(Signed) AMPHILL.
KITCHENER.
E. FG. LAW.
E. R. ELLES.
A. T. ARUNDEL.
DENZIL IBBETSON.
H. ERLE RICHARDS.

No. 20.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 19.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 12th instant, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copy will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, July 19, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 20.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, July 12, 1904.

INSTRUCTIONS to Younghusband, reported in your telegram of the 10th instant, are approved by His Majesty's Government.

No. 21.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 19.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 18th July, relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, July 19, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 21.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

July 18, 1904.

TELEGRAPHIC report from Younghusband, dated the 16th July, states that letters from Dalai Lama, Yutok Shape, and Ta Lama have been received by Tongsa Penlop who has sent them on to him.

Dalai Lama in his letter asks Tongsa Penlop to use his influence with English and Thibetans, and says that negotiations [? for Treaty of friend(ship)] should be begun with all speed, as it will then be known which is in the right. With reference to the capture of Gyantse Jong, which Dalai Lama says has been reported to him by Ta Tama, he asks the Tongsa Penlop to request the English privately not to nibble up his country.

The letters from Yutok Shape and Ta Lama were dispatched from Nagartse and were to the effect that they were on the point of setting out for Gyantse. They came as far as Ralung, but left again on the 14th July, without making any communication.

Younghusband before making further diplomatic move, is awaiting definite advances on their part. They are aware what our terms are, and have been advised by Tonga Penlop not to fight but to effect a settlement. In any case, however, the Mission will not postpone its advance.

(Repeated to Peking.)

No. 22.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 20.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 30th June, relative to Thibet affairs.

(Copy will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.)

India Office, July 19, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 22.

Mr. Walsh to Colonel Younghusband.

(Confidential.)

Chumbi, June 8, 1904.

IN continuation of my telegram of to-day's date, in which I have given the main points of the interview which I had with the Tongsa Penlop, to whom I paid a return visit at Eusakha yesterday, I have the honour to submit the following full report of the interview. The interview was of an informal character, and none of his attendants were present at it.

2. He informed me that he had that morning dispatched a letter to the Dalai Lama by the Dugye Jongpen and Lama Serkhang Tulku, and another to the Ta Lama, who is Chief Minister of the Dalai Lama, and over the four Shapes, and who is at present at Shigatse, advising them to send the Chief Secretary (Chi-Khyab Khempo) and one of the Shapes to negotiate at Gyantse within nineteen days, which was the limit of time stated to him by General Macdonald.

3. He said that he thought the Thibetan Mongolians, and also the people of Gyarong and the other seventeen Eastern Kingdoms, would fight for the Thibetans, as, although these Kingdoms are under China, they owe spiritual allegiance to the Dalai Lama, and would fight for him.

4. He repeated what he said at the former interview, that the Dalai Lama and the Thibetan Government would escape from Lhasa before the Mission arrived there, and said that he thought the Dalai Lama would either escape to Thibetan Mongolia or to Kham. He might possibly be influenced by Tshan-nyid Khampo (Cheni Khempo) to escape to Russian Mongolia, but he did not think this probable, as he was very displeased with Tshan-nyid Khampo for having intrigued with Russia, and so brought on all the present troubles.

5. He said that, when the Dalai Lama received the presents which Tshan-nyid Khampo brought from Russia, he did not know that they were the presents of the Russian Government, or he would have refused to receive them, but supposed that they were the offerings of Buddhists in Russian Mongolia. I said that this seemed very unlikely, as the Dalai Lama had sent a return Mission to St. Petersburg, which he would certainly not have done if he had been unaware of the source of the presents, or if he had been unwilling to enter into relations with Russia.

6. He said that Tshan-nyid Khampo was a great friend of the Dalai Lama's tutor, Gya-ma Rin-po-chhe, and in that way was able to influence the Dalai Lama, and that Gya-ma Rin-po-chhe has died two or three years ago.

7. He said that he had inquired from Lama Serkhang Tulku, and that there were no Russians in Lhasa, or elsewhere in Thibet, but that it was probable that Russian Buriats were assisting the Thibetan forces.

8. He said that every monastery in Thibet had been ordered by the Government to furnish ten armed men, and that the monasteries would have to comply. This also applied to monasteries of the Bhutan sect of lamas in Thibet (the red-cap school), and he had asked General Macdonald that any lamas of that sect who had to fight against us might be treated considerately. I replied that the English had no wish to interfere with the Buddhist religion in any way, and that it was a great pity that lamas should take up arms, which was contrary to their religion, and that, if they did so, they must necessarily incur the risks of battle.

9. He gave me further particulars about the grounds of complaint which Bhutan has against the Thibetan Government, mentioned at his former interview, in paragraph 11 of my letter of the 3rd instant. These grounds are three, which are as follows:—

(1.) The first is of long standing, and dates back some 200 years. The Dharma Raja was then incarnated in the person of Düjom Dorje at Ralung, in Thibet, and the incarnation was accepted by the Bhutanese, and he was duly installed. The "De-sri" (Governor) of Tsang set up another incarnation in the person of Pasang Wang-po, who was born at Tsa-ri, and who was repudiated by the Bhutanese as an impostor. The "De-sri" of Tsang, to enforce the claims of his nominee, raised an army and invaded Bhutan. After nine battles, the Thibetans were driven back, and the Bhutanese were about to invade Thibet, but were prevented from doing so by the Dharma Raja, as Thibet was his native country, and also on account of the community of religion. The Regent of Thibet (Mi-wang so-nam Tob-gye) and the "De-sri" (Deb Raja) of Bhutan therefore concluded a Treaty terminating hostilities. The Dharma Raja has, however, never since corresponded officially with the Dalai Lama on account of this quarrel, and any official correspondence with the Thibetan Government is carried on by the Deb Raja.

(2.) The second ground of complaint is that twenty-two years ago Alo Dorje, who was the then Timpuk Jongpen, bribed a Nyer-pa to murder the present Tongsa Penlop. The Nyer-pa, however, informed the Tongsa Penlop, who went to war with the Timpuk Jongpen and defeated him. The Timpuk Jongpen escaped to Lhasa, and there got the support of the Thibetan Government, who sent an army to Phari with the Rampa Shape, and threatened to invade Bhutan if the Timpuk Jongpen was not received back. The Tongsa Penlop was then in his 25th year, and, according to Thibetan custom, could not, therefore, undertake any enterprise, so was unable to lead an army to oppose the Thibetans, and consequently had to send an Envoy to Phari, and terms were arranged, by which the Jongpens of Gasha, Lingshi, Gokhana, and Ha were appointed by Thibet, and the revenues of those four Jongs were appropriated to them, though the revenues of the districts under those Jongs continued to be paid to Bhutan. Alo Dorje was also not given up, but remained in Thibet and took up his residence at Chumbi, and was one of the Thibetan leaders against the English in the war of 1888.

He died at Chumbi last year. The revenues of the three Jongs, Gasha, Lingshi, and Gokhana, were shortly after restored to the Bhutan Government, though they had to retain the Jongpens appointed by the Thibetans, but that of Ha Jong has continued to be collected by the Ha Jongpen (or "Tongpa"), who considers himself to be a Thibetan official, and does not pay them to the Bhutan Government, but keeps them for himself.

(3.) The third ground of complaint is that twenty years ago the then Paro Penlop, who was the elder brother of the present Tongsa Penlop, went to bathe at the hot springs in the Khamba Valley. He was attacked by the Jongpens of Phari, but defeated them. Two Thibetans were killed in the encounter, and five Bhutanese. The matter was afterwards settled, and the Thibetans had to pay a sum of money to the Bhutanese for the excess of three men killed on their side. Notwithstanding that the matter had been settled, the Thibetan Government afterwards fined the then Paro Penlop's uncle (who was also the uncle of the present Tongsa Penlop), and who was the Abbot of Lha-lung Monastery, in Thibet, the sum of 24 "do-tses," or 6,000 rupees. This is considered by the Bhutanese as a breach of faith, and quite unjustifiable, as the Abbot of Lha-lung had nothing to do with the affair, and the matter had been settled. These matters are still considered by Bhutan as grievances against the Thibetan Government.

10. The Tongsa Penlop is 47 years of age. He is an intelligent man, with a straightforward manner which inspires confidence in what he says.

Inclosure 2 in No. 22.

Mr. Walsh to Colonel Younghusband.

(Confidential.)

Chumbi, June 12, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to submit, for your information, a translation of the letter sent by the Dalai Lama to the Tongsa Penlop by Lama Se-kong Tulku, referred to in paragraph 10 of my letter, dated the 3rd June, 1904, and also of a letter, dated the 19th January, 1904, sent to him by the Thibetan Council (Ka-sha). These two letters were given to me by the Tongsa Penlop to see. I have kept a copy of them and made the inclosed translations, and am now returning the originals to the Tongsa Penlop.

(Indorsed by Mr. Walsh.)

(Confidential.)

Copy, with copies of translations, forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, for information.

Chumbi, June 12, 1904.

(A.)

Letter from the Dalai Lama to the Tongsa Penlop, sent by Lama Se-kong Tulku, dated April 28, 1904.

To the most pure, virtuous youth in the firmament, enjoying the best skill of the bodily senses with the best skill of the wings of good works:

I am very pleased to receive your letters, with the supporting present, which have arrived safely. Here also my health is as before. I am protecting the religious kingdom without slackness for the immense benefit and happiness of the doctrine and of all human beings.

The subject.—Regarding the quarrel between the English and Thibetans. The Thibetans made no promise about the former Treaty, but the Chinese and English have settled a few matters; moreover, formerly they avoided bad intentions and only showed signs of purity; latterly they encroached upon our lands and have deceived us on many occasions by means of diplomacy. All the details of the reasons sent are remembered by the qualified representatives and all the monks and laymen.

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Now, you have also privately thought of carrying the burden of our Government many a time with an earnest desire of leading us to the good road without a mistake. This time also we are very pleased at your great reverence to the three holy ones and the lamas, and in giving your heart for the happiness of the doctrine and living creatures.

The subject of the letters respectively received during the former and current year is regarding the negotiation between the English and the Thibetans. Even in those letters your pure thoughts of belief are seen, and we have great boldness and hopes as to the end.

According to the order of the Great Emperor of China, we Thibetans have dealt with British officials in a good and agreeable manner. Regarding the boundary, it was thought that the former orders passed* by us will stand good, but they† have put on armour and worked to be victorious by diplomacy. If the arrangement would be virtuous in the present and future according to the result of discussion of the qualified officials and the general consent of the kingdoms in conformity with the main substance of the subject, with explanation noted above, then no harm will be done to living creatures, and the war, which deprives the parents of their children, and which adds burdens of grievous sins on both the parties, will cease. This is important, and, therefore, it is necessary to do the utmost to mediate. This time the letters ask for free access for traders, travellers, and letters, but my mind will not accept‡ this at all; in addition to this, the Assembly of Ministers have also given the same reply, and also regarding other matters. In brief, if there is a negotiation for peace to stop the war between us, it will be very good, and the particulars will be told you personally by Se-kong Tulku in detail. This time will you begin by holding the pulse of the sick one and do the best according to what you clearly think? Be assured that your thought is absolutely necessary to augment the merit of the present and the next life.

Now, again, I wish you, youth, increased prosperity and friendship between the Thibetans and the Bhutanese in the doctrine. May light pour forth and may you do all in order!

This is written from "Nor-ling-kyi-tshel," viz., "the Palace of Norbu-Linga," with the presents of an amulet, 10 precious crystals, and a cloth, on the 13th day of the 3rd moon in the Wood-dragon year.

(Seal of the Dalai Lama.)

(B.)

*Letter from the Thibetan Council ("Ka-sha"), to the Tongsa Penlop, dated
January 19, 1904.*

To his Excellency the noble Governor (Dsa-sa) possessed of good works:

We are very pleased that your virtuous deeds are spreading perfumes, and that the hundred leaves of youth are spreading in both the fountains.§ First of all, we are all enjoying good health as usual by the mercies of the Dispenser of Gifts, and are discharging our duties properly.

The reason of writing this letter is:—

On the whole, the Thibetans and the Bhutanese have got one common object, and, moreover, you have a great faith in the kingdom of the Buddhist religion. Regarding the present case between the English and the Thibetans, the information given by you with great virtuous wisdom about the conditions of diplomacy have been reported to the Dalai Lama. The news here is that, on receipt of the three kinds of goods sent by you as a present, we have offered them to the Dalai Lama, together with your letter. Regarding the boundary question to be settled by the chief officials of Thibet, the English have formerly raised a dispute and deceived us. This year also they have avoided peace, and to enrage us they have encroached upon our land on the Khamba side, and have assumed a threatening attitude. Now, the Commander of the English army has encroached upon our land of Drono and Phari also without measure. All the people of Thibet depend solely on the religious doctrine, and whatever be the result, whether good or bad, we are quite decided to be mild or angry according to the circumstances, and the Dalai Lama will abide by the orders which he has passed

* Literally, "lifted."
† Literally, "bear."

‡ Viz., the English.
§ Viz., secular and religious.

before and stamped with his own seal. If it is true that the Bhutanese have a good sincere mind towards the Thibetans as before, endeavour to do what is best. The English Commanders should go back to their own land. Then the officials of the three kingdoms, viz., China, Thibet, and English, may meet at Dromo Yatung and settle the boundary question, &c., according to the former orders passed by the Dalai Lama under his own seal, which will increase the virtue of the doctrine now and hereafter.

Again, protect yourself, youthful and virtuous one, and increase useful means for the prosperity of Bhutan.

This is sent on the 2nd of the 12th moon, with the present of one idol-cloth and another piece of cloth sufficient for one suit.

Inclosure 3 in No. 22.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Chumbi, June 13, 1904.

I HAVE the honour, in continuation of previous telegrams, to make the following Report on the conversation held between the Tongsa Penlop and myself during his visit to me and my return visit to him on the 9th and 10th June. Copies of letters to me from Mr. Walsh, describing his interviews with the Tongsa Penlop, have already been sent to you direct by Mr. Walsh.

2. The Tongsa Penlop is a straight, honest-looking, dignified man of about 47 years of age. He bore himself well; both he and his retinue were well dressed. His presents to me were numerous and costly, and altogether he showed himself a man of importance and authority.

3. He said he had been long wishing to visit me in accordance with the desire expressed in the letters he had received last autumn from the Bengal Government, but had been delayed, first, by sickness, and afterwards by the news of fighting. I told him I had been disappointed at not having seen him earlier, but was happy at last to make his acquaintance. He then said he was most anxious to effect a settlement between us and the Thibetans. The latter had been very obstinate and wrong-headed, but the Dalai Lama was a young man who needed good counsellors, and unfortunately there were bad men at Lhasa who acted in his name to the detriment of the country. General Macdonald had told him that we were prepared to receive negotiators up to the 25th June, and he (the Tongsa Penlop) had accordingly written urgently to the Thibetans to send a negotiator before that date. Would not I, therefore, show patience up to then?

4. I asked the Tongsa Penlop whether he himself would be inclined to be patient if he had been attacked four times at night after waiting eleven months for negotiators to come. He admitted that, for his part, he would, under those circumstances, like to go about killing people, but I was the Representative of a great Government and ought to be more patient. I told him that matters were now out of my hands, that I had reported everything to the Viceroy, and his Excellency had reported them to the Emperor. His Majesty's orders were now awaited. It was true I had on the 1st June sent letters to the Amban and Dalai Lama, saying I was still ready to receive negotiators by the 25th June, but those letters had been returned by the Thibetan Commander at Gyantse, who had that very night attacked my camp, and a few nights afterwards once more attacked me at Kangma on my way down. I could not answer for it, therefore, that I should still be authorized, after these additional insults, to receive negotiators. That was a point upon which His Majesty's order had not yet been conveyed to me. I could, however, assure the Tongsa Penlop that the Ruler of so great an Empire as ours had not the slightest wish to make war upon a miserable insignificant people like the Thibetans, unless he was absolutely compelled to.

5. No Englishman liked killing unfortunate villagers who were forced from their houses to fight us, but who had no chance against our modern arms. We knew they did not want to fight us, and we had no quarrel with them. But unfortunately it seemed impossible to get at the real instigators of the opposition to us except by fighting, in which the innocent peasant soldiers, and not the authors of the trouble, suffered most. If these latter would only lead their men I should be better pleased, for then they would appreciate what opposition to the British Government really meant. The Tongsa Penlop was much amused at the suggestion, but said the leaders always remained a march behind when any fighting was likely.

6. He frequently pressed me, however, during the two interviews to show patience, and said the Ta Lama, whom I understand to be a Minister over the four Councillors, had actually been on the way to negotiate with me, and had been waiting near Nagartse Jong, but had to fly in consequence of the Karo La fight. I told the Tongsa Penlop I also had waited at Gyantse for more than three weeks before the Karo La fight for negotiators, but none had appeared. And I could not believe that the Ta Lama had any intention of coming, for we happened to find letters at Karo La written from this very place, Nagartse, intimating the repeated dispatch of arms and ammunition to the Karo La, at which place reinforcements were arriving at the rate of 500 a-day immediately before the fight. When all these warlike preparations were being made, when the Ta Lama still remained at Nagartse and made no signs of coming to see me, and when the Amban wrote to say the Dalai Lama still showed no inclination to send a proper Delegate, I could only accept the Tongsa Penlop's statement that the Ta Lama was on the way to negotiate with me. The Tongsa Penlop then said that he had always mistrusted the Ta Lama and believed him to be at the bottom of all the mischief.

7. The Tongsa Penlop then took my hand, and in a very earnest and affectionate manner said he had been most anxious for my safety, and that it was only by God's mercy that I had been preserved from many dangers. I told him that I had never feared: I knew that I was working in a good cause and God would protect me.

8. I went on to say that, though I had little hope that any settlement would be arrived at without fighting, yet, fighting or no fighting, I had to make a settlement some time, and one that would last another 100 years. If the Thibetans had only been as sensible as the Bhutanese and come and talked matters over with me as he and the Timpuk Jongpen had, we could easily have arrived at an arrangement long ago. But I felt sure that all Thibetans could not be as stupid as those who now held power. I was convinced that before long there would be a great revulsion of feeling against the men who had brought ruin on their country: the sensible men would come to the front, and the Tongsa Penlop would be of great service to me if he would from time to time let me know of any such change in feeling, and who were the men upon whom I could rely in making a settlement which I hoped would eventually result in the Thibetans being as closely bound in friendship to British Government as the Bhutanese are.

9. I added that the monks had taken up arms against us, and many of the monasteries were also manned by soldiers. We could not, therefore, maintain our original intention of respecting these monasteries and treating the monks as men of peace. But when fighting was over, we would most strictly respect the religion of the Thibetans, and the more time the monks devoted to their religion and the less to politics and the war the better we would be pleased.

10. Before leaving I expressed to the Tonga Penlop the great pleasure this meeting with him had afforded me. He had impressed me with the conviction, which I would report to his Excellency the Viceroy, that the Bhutanese Government sincerely desired the friendship of the British Government. I congratulated him on their wisdom in adopting such a policy, and I assured him, on behalf of the Viceroy, that all we desired was to be on friendly and neighbourly terms with States like Bhutan and Thibet lying on our frontier. War, though it could have but one result, gave us a lot of trouble which we had no wish to unnecessarily incur. We therefore much preferred peace. I sent my best respects to the Dharma Rajah and the Timpuk Jongpen, and I asked the Tongsa Penlop to often write to me and give me advice regarding the settlement with Thibet.

11. The Tonga Penlop fervently assured me of the goodwill of the Bhutanese Government, and said they would never depart from their friendship with the British Government.

Inclosure 4 in No. 22.

Political Diary of the Thibet Frontier Commission.

(Confidential.)

INFORMATION was given by the Thibetan prisoner sent to the Jong with Colonel Younghusband's letters to the Dalai Lama and the Amban that the principal Depon had been recently killed in the Jong by a bullet from the camp. He also said that the Thibetan forces at Gyantse numbered 8,000 and were abundantly supplied with ammunition.

News has been received from a Chinese source that a detachment of Thibetan levies

deserted Gyantse on the 1st June and that a body of 500 gipsy beggars has been enlisted and armed at Gyantse. It is also stated that at the present time the Thibetans are not holding their former position at the Karo Pass or any points between there and Gyantse along the main road to Lhasa. A force of 3,000 to 4,000 monks is also said to have left Lhasa in the direction of Gyantse.

(For British Commissioner for Thibet
Frontier Matters),
(Signed) E. C. WILTON.

Gyantse, June 8, 1904.

Inclosure 5 in No. 22.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.)

Kala Tso, June 21, 1904.

STATEMENT in letter from Lhasa, dated the 24th April, just received from you that people are well contented with us on account of our liberal treatment is borne out by statements of officers in posts all along route from Gyantse to Chumbi. At each post officers spontaneously told me neighbouring villagers were thoroughly friendly, but only afraid of officials and lamas. Rawling, who travelled in Western Thibet last year, informs me of same. What people are now chiefly afraid of is our withdrawing and leaving them to vengeance of lamas, in which case people might become permanently estranged from us, while lamas, recovering from effects of blows we are now in position to give, and from loss of influence which our present good treatment of people will cause them, would be doubly antagonistic to us.

Inclosure 6 in No. 22.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ravenshaw to Government of India.

The Residency, Nepal, June 13, 1904.

IN continuation of my letter dated the 1st June, 1904, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, translations of four letters received by the Prime Minister from the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa.

Translation of a Letter from the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa.

With due respect I beg to lay before your Highness in the following lines the news that I have heard and been able to gather here for your Highness' information.

A servant of Chikhiap Khembu informs me as follows:—

"The lama of Patc Penlope of Bhutan was lately here at Lhasa. When here, he was, under instruction from the Potala Lama, invited to the house of the Chikhiap Khembu, and was told that Thibet and Bhutan being States professing the same religion, and as Pato Penlope was aware of the affliction caused by the infidels, the Potala Lama was quite ready to fight the British, come what might, for the sake of their common religion and that it would be better if Pato Penlope too were to attempt the destruction of the British in his part of the country. The said lama has been returned to Bhutan charged with the above message and with a request to personally convince Pato Penlope of the righteousness of their cause and arrange to bring about an understanding between them."

Gulam Muhamad has brought me an information that a report has been received here that at present the Jhompon of Gyanchi is obliged to present himself daily before the British officers; that as he had been asked to state in writing what rents and dues, &c., are imposed by the Thibetan Government and what the duties of a Jhompon are, he was engaged in preparing the paper; and that the British have issued an order granting remission of three years' rents and exemption from other dues for the said period to the people instructing them to lodge a complaint with the British if any one dared to disobey the order.

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Manila says that the British troops have advanced as far as Ralung, two days' journey away from Gyanchi, and as the Thibetan troops were stationed partly at Kharula and partly at Jara, but mostly at Nagarchay Jhong on the bank of Paiti Lake to check the advance of the British, the appearance of the British mounted troops in those direction indicated that there would be further fighting somewhere on the Jara and Nagarchay Jhong side.

Dheba says that since the arrival of the British at Gyanchi they have raised the price of grains such as rice, wheat, and flour, and have notified to the poor people of the place to till their fields, to enable to do which the British Government have offered to help them with seed grains when applied for. No Thibetans have, however, availed themselves of this offer for fear of retribution from their own Government. The British were saying that in Thibet some were very rich while others were too poor, so that they would see some arrangement made about the distribution of wealth. The Dheba says that he received the above information from a new comer from Gyanchi.

It is a general talk here that the granaries at Gyanchi in which the Thibetan Government had for the last twelve or thirteen years been storing wheat, have passed into the hands of the British, and as there are no other granaries belonging to the Thibetan Government, how would they be able to manage to maintain their troops.

The said Manila further informs me that the Amban had so far abstained from making a report to His Majesty the Emperor of China, of the insubordination of the Thibetan Government to China for fear lest he would be rebuked for his having made the Thibetan Government, which have all along shown their regards towards China during his predecessor's time, refractory, but now as matters have come to head causing the loss of lives and there appeared to be probability of the British advance even up to Lhassa, he has made a representation to His Majesty the Emperor of China informing him of the actual state of things and of the insubordination of the Thibetans towards China by refusing to let him go to meet the British officers for negotiation and forwarded it by the hands of his own attendant to Gnatung for transmission to Peking by wire three days ago.

Manila further says that he has been informed by the Fapoon that the Amban had two interviews with the Potala Lama during which the latter put to the former questions as to the customs and usages of China and other meaningless questions but when the Amban broached the pending frontier question with the British, the Potala Lama kept quiet.

The same informant further informs me that he understands that there has been some loss to the Thibetans in the fighting which they commenced with the British and that the British sepoy do not care a fig for the Thibetan sepoy, besides the former go out fearlessly alone to any village, no matter what the number of Thibetan in it might be, and quite regardless of their own lives, enforce their will upon the Thibetans by holding out their pistols if the latter dared to disobey them.

Further information brought to me by the said Manila is as follows :—

“With regard to the pending Anglo-Thibetan frontier dispute the Amban had from the very beginning received from the Thibetan Government various sorts of communications of an ambiguous nature. They had also sent a reply to the Amban to the effect that they would consider the Treaty as binding upon themselves only in case if it was attested by their seal and signature or if proofs were forthcoming of their having acknowledged it, failing which they considered the same as invalid and that in short the Amban should let them know whether he was capable of establishing the boundary demarcated by the Government of India in the 59th year of Chhaun and whether he could obtain redress for the loss of lives caused by the British by entering the Thibetan territory without any sufficient ground and other high-handed and oppressive conduct, since if he were incapable of these things, they would neither ask him to proceed to carry on the negotiation nor desist him from doing so.

“The Amban sent a rejoinder that he did not want to hear their jargons, nor were the British such as to be a tool in his hands, but what he wanted was to be told plainly and briefly as to whether or not the Thibetan Government wished him to go. To this the Thibetan Government replied to the effect that as the British would not listen to his words spoken, though they might be by his proceeding to Gyanchi, but as, on the contrary, it seemed that he would bring in more harm than good to Thibet, they did not consider that his going to Gyanchi would be attended with any good result; consequently they have resolved to do the needful, even though the British people were to advance up as far as Lhassa; and that as the Amban was deputed there by His Majesty the Emperor of China for the protection of Thibet and as it was by sayings and doings of the Chinese

themselves that the British troops have advanced so far, while now his going to Gyanchi would surely be attended with still greater harm to the country, what they would ask of him now was the assistance of sepoy collected from out of the levies raised from among the Babalis, Lithangays, and Chyaklalies residing in territories under Chinese control, obtaining the expenses required for their maintenance from His Majesty the Emperor through his recommendation and also they would ask to be informed at once as to whether or not horses and transport would be provided to the sepoy ordered out from the Thibetan district of Solalosun, while they would be passing through the Chinese jurisdiction of Lharingo as they have been informed that their progress has been stopped on account of the Chinese refusing to provide them with the same. As it appeared that the Thibetans were bent upon creating serious complications if their request for providing horses and transports be not complied with, the Amban has issued an order to the Chinese subjects of the place to provide those things to the Thibetans."

Dated Saturday, the 26th Baisakh, 1961, corresponding with the 7th May, 1904.

Translation of a Letter written in cypher from the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa.

With due respect I beg to report as follows :—

The Sekusay, of Sayisindopo, the officer in rank just below the Fapoon of the Chinese subjects, says :—

"The Amban sent for me and told me that the Thibetans have brought matters to this pass in defiance of the orders of His Majesty the Emperor of China. In case it was required to arrest and bring under control one or two of the ringleaders of these Thibetans, and should the Thibetans then act in a violent manner, necessary or suitable steps should be taken, and so I was asked to issue order to the Chinese subjects under me to keep themselves and their arms ready for any emergency. I then told the Amban that the Thibetans would not dare to go to such extremes, but should it appear that they were resolved to go to such lengths, I was ready to serve him to the best of my power with all the men under me when the emergency arose, because the issue of such orders at the present time would cause the matters to be talked about and as all men could not be depended upon, things might come away. The Amban very much pleased with the reply told me to go on doing my duties properly when he would give me a high lift. Now it appears as if the Amban has become despondent."

The following conversation took place between me and the Sekusay :—

Sekusay : It appears that there have been some secret understanding between Russia and Thibet from the fact that when the Potala Lama entered into some agreement through the Chhengi Khenebu with Russia, the King of Russia expressing his high regard for the Buddhist religion, desired to become a convert to it and offered to come to the help of Thibet should anything untoward happen to her. It was the act of Potala Lama which has ruined Thibet. She is doomed, no matter whether the British or the Russians come. All the knowing high men of Lhasa talk amongst themselves that it was a grave mistake on the part of their Government not to have sent the Amban and other officers to carry on the negotiations, but none dared to speak so before the Potala Lama.

I : How far is Russia and what is the nature of the road leading from it? Ten or fifteen thousand troops would count for nothing when facing the British. Even this number cannot be brought easily through such difficult roads. Besides, you also might have heard that Russia was obliged to set in order her own military affairs now-a-days, having suffered defeat in the Russo-Japanese war. To run after such impossible ideas and to disregard the instructions or orders of the Emperor of China and the Amban, whom they had been obeying all along and to act on her own initiation, were serious mistakes on the part of Thibet.

Sekusay : The officers and Councillors and other people are not to blame in the matter. It is because the Potala Lama is completely under the thumb of the Chhengi Khembu by whom he is invariably led in everything, and as others have no chance of their advice being heard, dire ruin stares Thibet in the face.

As the Chharong Dhaibun, a newly appointed Kagi, was confined to his house owing to illness, I sent word to him requesting him to send a man in his confidence

to my place, on which he sent his Simpone to me. I sent him away with the following message:—

“Tell the Kagi that I have inquired after his health and that I have requested him to have good medical treatment. As he is suffering from rheumatism, if he can walk about it will benefit his health, and if he be able to attend the Kasyal office soon, then Government business will not suffer. He must have seen the letter which his Highness the Maharajah had addressed to them and he must be acquainted with the contents thereof. He would do well to act promptly according to the advice and instructions given therein, and to send a reply to that letter detailing all that they have to say on the subject.”

In reply to the above message he informed me that he had gone through and digested the contents of the letter in question and that they would send a detailed reply to it in due course; but as everything that has befallen Thibet was fully known to me, it was unnecessary for him to dilate upon it, and I should address your Highness in such a manner as to induce you to act for the good of Thibet. He was impatient to get about and that he was extremely sorry to be confined to bed at such a critical time.

I then sent another message in reply to his, stating that if the old Kagis had acted readily according to your Highness' directions, there would not have been so much loss of lives and such troubles to Thibet. If they would but take even now your Highness's instructions to heart and act according to their tenour, and report to your Highness unreservedly all that they were doing, and request for further instructions, all would go on well with Thibet.

Now I think that if the Chharong Kagi were to speak out his mind, he would be held responsible for it, so he spoke in that fashion. Information from all sources point to the Khendechbega and the Potala Lama being at the root of all what has happened. It is said that they have decided to send men selected from the monks of the Sera, Dhaibung, and Galdan Gumbas. These two evil genii of Thibet seem to be bent upon doing to death the poor helpless people of the country who are quite innocent of the ways of war.

Although there appears to be so much dissension between the Amban and the Thibetans, I still am not free from certain doubts about them. It may be suspected that the Amban, while trying to satisfy or dallying with the British by their promises of going to the frontier, have been putting forward the Thibetans as mainly responsible for putting obstacles in the way of his going. Gulam Mohamed's following information may explain the conduct of the Amban. It was to the effect that when Russia and China were about to enter into a Treaty, the news getting wind and other Powers remonstrating against it, it could not be signed. Your Highness might have been already informed of the accuracy or otherwise of this piece of Peking news. I am also making my inquiries here. As for the understanding between Russia and the Potala Lama, I think that it is already evident to your Highness.

Dated Saturday, the 26th Baisakh, 1961, corresponding with the 7th May, 1904.

Translation of a Letter from the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa.

With due respect I lay before your Highness in the following lines the news that I have heard and been able to gather here for your Highness' information.

Manila had informed me that the sepoys of Solalosun sent for by the Thibetan Government for warlike purposes, having had to pass on their way to Lhasa through Chinese territory, and the people of the tract having refused to supply them with horses and transports, the Amban has written to the Chinese people of the tract to supply the sepoys with horses and transport. This, however, has now been explained away by a clerk of the Yamên saying that although the Amban had intended to write to that effect, he subsequently changed his mind and decided whatever the consequences of it might be, to stick to the order received from His Majesty the Emperor of China not to bring on war but to adopt peaceful means as he would be held responsible if he were to disobey the order. The said clerk also brought to me two papers written in Thibetan characters which he said were the copies of memoranda addressed by the Amban to the Potala Lama on the subject as well as on the subject of frontier disputes with the British. I beg to inclose the papers herein in original.

Gulam Mohamed says :—

“ On the 22nd Baisakh four horsemen belonging to the British coming to reconnoitre at a hill called Lung, one of them was killed by the Thibetans stationed therein. The next day about 700 or 800 British infantry and cavalry came to a place called Jara and killed about 300 Thibetan troops stationed there. The Rangtui who had gone to officiate for the Dhaibun at that place, has fled and his whereabouts are not known. The Banda Kazi, who had been sent from here and who was at Nagarchay Jhong, ran away from there and is now living at a place called Jasi, half-a-day's journey away from Nagarchay. As for the other soldiers left there they say that they are quite unable to face the English and that they prayed continually to their officers, with tears in their eyes, for their lives to be spared. When this news was received here and taken to the Potala Lama, he said that it was time to send all those who were capable of fighting from amongst the members of the three monasteries as well as men picked out of those levies who were expected from the villages; that arrangements be made for their supplies as well as for serviceable weapons; and that if these men be not sufficient, then all the inhabitants of Lhasa should be sent forward. So the report goes.”

Dated the 28th Baisakh, Monday, 1961, corresponding with the 9th May, 1904.

The following was written in cypher.

Formerly I had expressed some suspicion that the Chinese might be in league with Russia but from certain recent events detailed below that suspicion of mine is gradually abating.

1. In the Memorandum from the Amban to the Potala Lama it was written that formerly when the Thibetans were hard pressed, Rhrintarin Amban had the Kagi and his own officers sent back from the boundary to Lhasa and had the matters explained fully to the Potala Lama, the Raja Lama, and the Chhengdui Council. They all having assembled together and having arrived at a decision had the same signed by the Chhengdui Council, and subsequently the Treaty was signed by the Amban on behalf of His Majesty the Emperor of China. The said decision of the Thibetan Government being on record, he (the Amban) could not understand how the Thibetans could speak as if they were quite ignorant of the said Treaty and behave as if the said Treaty was made by the Chinese over their heads and without their knowledge especially when the said decision was on record as a proof.

2. The fact that the levies raised in Talasun, at the instance of the Government of Thibet, were not supplied by the Chinese with horses and transport while passing through the Chinese territory.

3. The suspicion with which the Amban is looked upon by the Potala Lama.

Although I have tried every means according to your Highness' wishes to have the matters explained to the Potala Lama, yet he, having fallen on evil days and even when matters have come to such a pass, without paying heed to anybody's advice, is led by the nose by the Khendechhega to the eventual ruin of his country.

Dated Monday, the 28th Baisakh, 1961 (9th May, 1904).

Translation of a Letter from the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa.

With due respect, I beg to report to your Highness that the clerk of the Yamên came this morning to inform me that a letter has been received from a Chinese Pumba Ayala living at Gyanchi to the effect that the Thibetan sepoys have caused some loss to the British by penetrating into the valley of Gyanchi.

Again, Dana Bajra came to say that he had just had a conversation with Sijunsay Kagi, to whom he had gone in the morning, to the effect that a letter has been received by him overnight stating that the Thibetans have killed and driven the British troops stationed at Gyanchi, and have annihilated the European troops on the Nagarchay side, and that Gyanchi has been recovered, and also that letters have been received from Bhutan assuring them of their help.

Lapsay, a clerk, says that there was a Chinese dak-runner at Jara when the fighting between the British and the Thibetans took place, the man and his wife have been

murdered in the confusion. The Amban says that the murderers must be Thibetans, for if they were English they must have killed other Chinese also wherever they came across them, and that the matter must be thoroughly investigated.

I have just noted down the above, as the news was received when the mail was about to close. I do not, however, have any faith in the story brought by Dana Bajra. Still I shall make inquiries about the correctness or otherwise of the story, and shall inform your Highness accordingly.

Dated Tuesday, the 29th Baisakh, 1961, corresponding with the 10th May, 1904.

Inclosure 7 in No. 22.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ravenshaw to Government of India.

The Residency, Nepal, June 13, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that at an interview with the Prime Minister on the 9th May he informed me that he had received a letter from the Dalai Lama at Lhasa and some presents, which were brought by a Thibetan Jongen, or Captain, who, with a few Thibetans, accompanied the Chinese Mission from Lhasa. The Prime Minister informed me that the Dalai Lama's letter, though not written by him, bore his signature, was couched in most friendly terms, but made no allusion to the affairs concerning our Mission to Thibet. This the Prime Minister seemed to think indicated that the Dalai Lama was kept in ignorance of what was going on.

2. The Chinese Mission, with the Thibetans, was to have started on the return journey between the 1st and 7th instant, but owing to the report—which I have communicated to the Prime Minister—conveyed in paragraph 4 of the Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling's Confidential letter dated the 16th May last, to the effect that it is not improbable that attempts will be made by the Thibetans to butcher the Chinese and Nepalese at Lhasa, the Mission with the Thibetans who accompanied it have been detained here for the present, the latter especially as some guarantee of the good behaviour of the Thibetans towards the Nepalese Representatives and subjects.

3. I inclose a translation of a letter from the Prime Minister in reply to the Dalai Lama's letter, which has, under present circumstances, been sent by a special messenger to Lhasa.

Maharajah Chandra Shamsher Jang to Potala Lama.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

[Undated.]

I HAVE the pleasure to inform your Holiness that the Dheba of Kuti, whom you had so kindly sent in the company of the Chinese officers, charged with the conveyance of the warrant and robes of honour and of the order graciously conferred on me by His Majesty the Emperor of China, arrived here safely on Wednesday, the 2nd Baisakh last.

The friendly relations that have so long existed between our Governments have added to the pleasure I felt at the receipt of your letter conveying news of your welfare and of the presents from you brought by the said Dheba, who will start on his return journey in a few days, carrying with him the reply of your kind letter and the customary presents from me, according to former usages, which I hope will be delivered to your Holiness in due course. Such pleasant exchanges of mutual regards are sure to strengthen the old bonds of friendship that have existed between the two Governments in the past, promote cordial relations between them in the future, and ultimately conduce to the welfare and happiness of their respective peoples. Under such circumstances, the news that the differences regarding the frontier matters between the British and the Thibetan Governments, not having been peacefully settled, had culminated in open warfare, and thus become the cause of great suffering to a large number of people, has marred the enjoyment of the full measure of happiness derived from such a happy occasion. Words fail to describe my anxiety consequent on this breach of relations brought about by the failure of the Government of Thibet to have the matters in dispute settled by friendly negotiations. That your Holiness, who is the embodiment of virtue, should be afflicted by the gravest anxiety on this head goes without saying.

It having struck me that the matter in question, not having been conducted according to the rules of morality and policy, might be productive of unpleasant consequences, and the Governments of Nepal and Thibet having long been mutually bound

together by ties of brotherly feeling, I wrote without the least reserve, and in full detail, to the four Kagis of the Kasyal Office on the subject on the 20th Bhadra and 18th Falgoon, 1960 S. E., all that appeared to me reasonable, moved thereto by the consideration of your welfare, and as the contents of those letters must have been communicated to your Holiness by the said Kagis, it would be quite superfluous to repeat them here.

Wise and far-seeing as you are, the vast resources of the British Government must be well known to you. To rush to extremes with such a big Power, and to bring calamities upon your poor subjects wantonly without having strong and valid grounds of your own to insist upon, cannot be readily accepted as a virtuous course or wise policy. Hence it may be fairly inferred that the detailed circumstances of the pending questions have not been properly and correctly represented to you, so I strongly hope that it is not yet too late for you even now, in your wisdom and out of your great regard for the welfare of your entire people, having fully mastered the details of the subject, to issue proper instructions, consonant with morality and policy, to your duly authorized Kagis and officers, and to direct them to proceed to meet the British officers and cause a settlement to be arrived at, after discussing fully the points at issue, and thus ward off the calamities that have overtaken your people. I believe nothing was further from the views of the English than to go to your country to fight with your Government, and I hear that the present embroglio was precipitated by the Thibetan troops rashly striking the first blow.

Should you be inclined to listen to me, the best advice that I would give you now will be to desist from fighting with the British Government, and try your best to bring about a peaceful settlement of the issues in dispute, otherwise I see clearly that great calamities are in store for Thibet.

Our present Representative at Lhassa had been there for many years before, and has also spent the last few years in his present capacity there, and so he has naturally a great love for your country. If your Kagis and other officers will but openly and sincerely discuss matters with him, he is sure to give the best advice possible for the good of your country.

Your Holiness is too sacred to be troubled with mundane affairs, especially when there is the Kasyal Office to look after such business. But the present critical situation in Thibet demands the utmost foresight. On you now depends the salvation of your country, and under this belief I have written this to your Holiness because I am convinced that the only hope of such deliverance lies in your Holiness setting right the affairs of the Government of Thibet by adopting or pointing out the proper course conducive to the well-being of your people and country. More is unnecessary. You yourself are full of wisdom.

Dated Thursday, the 28th Jaistha, 1961, S. E., corresponding to the 9th June, 1904.

Inclosure 8 in No. 22.

Government of India to Colonel Younghusband.

(Telegraphic.)

Simla, June 22, 1904.

DO you think that it is advisable and possible to make any notification of our objects and intentions to the Thibetans before the Mission leaves Gyantse? The Government of India are disposed to think that a Proclamation should be issued to the following effect :—

“ A General Proclamation.

“The British Government have no desire to be on other than friendly terms with the people of Thibet, but it must be known to all that the present Government of that country have for some time past displayed entire ignorance of, and disregard for, international obligations by repudiating their Treaties with the Government of India, and, moreover, have shown gross disrespect to the Government of His Majesty the King-Emperor, firstly, by refusing to negotiate in an amicable manner on the points at issue between the two Governments; and, secondly, by committing overt acts of war in attacking with armed forces the British Mission sent for the above purpose.

"It has, therefore, become necessary for the British Government to mark their grave displeasure, and to demand reparation of the Government of Thibet for the insults offered to their Representative, and the armed attacks made on their peaceful Mission.

"As such reparation and satisfaction can only be obtained from the present Rulers of Thibet at Lhasa, the Mission will proceed to that place, in order to impress upon the Government of Thibet the serious consequences of the course they are pursuing, and to obtain necessary redress for the insults offered.

"The nature of (these)* *the terms to be exacted* will greatly depend on the attitude of the Thibetan Government, and *to whom a further opportunity of a* (upon their readiness to make a) reasonable settlement of the matters in dispute *will then be offered.*

"All Thibetans are, therefore, warned by this Proclamation, that any interference with the British Mission, or the armed force escorting it, will meet with condign punishment, and any such action will only result in making the terms demanded more exacting, and the measures taken to enforce them more severe.

"It is also hereby notified and declared that the British have no desire to fight with the people of Thibet (or to annex their country), or to interfere with their liberties, and that the British Government will, in accordance with their traditional policy, scrupulously respect the religion of the people. At the same time, it is necessary to impress unmistakably upon the Government of Thibet that they cannot with impunity offer insults to the British Government, and must realize the obligations they have entered into, and act up to them in all respects."

If you agree, you should issue the Proclamation in such a manner as may be possible, and report how you have done so. If you think any important modifications desirable, you should first consult us. You will observe that in the Proclamation nothing is said as to the possibility of the Mission remaining at Lhasa, but at the same time there is nothing to restrict the future action of the Mission. The Government of India hold that it is the wisest course not to announce any definite intentions in this respect, lest circumstances should render it impossible for the Mission to act up to them.

We shall shortly send you instructions by post with regard to general policy.

Inclosure 9 in No. 22.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.)

Kangma, June 23, 1904.

I DO not think issue of Proclamation will have any immediate result. I think, indeed, that mass of people would be more pacified by a Proclamation saying we did intend to stay: but proposed Proclamation may be subsequently useful to refer to, for purpose reassuring Lhasa authorities. It would also be useful as declaration of our purpose to surrounding peoples, such as Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim, and also to the Chinese. The only modification I would suggest would be in regard to words "or to annex their country." For the only reparation we can in practice exact from the Thibetans and the only guarantee for future observance of any settlement will be continued occupation of Chumbi. In view of their neutrality (this eventuality?) would some such words as "or to diminish their independence," be more suitable. The people of Chumbi are not people of Thibet. I will try and get Proclamation printed at Gyantse, and will post copies in villages, and send some to Bhutan, Sikkim, and Resident, Nepal. I will also take any means of sending them to Lhasa.

* Portions in brackets were subsequently omitted, and words in italics added by telegram dated the 24th June, 1904.

Inclosure 10 in No. 22.

Government of India to Colonel Younghusband.

(Telegraphic.)

Simla, June 24, 1904.

YOUR telegram of 23rd June.

General Proclamation. The sentence "or to annex their country" may be omitted, and sentence beginning "the nature of these terms" should run as follows :—

The nature of the terms to be exacted will greatly depend on the attitude of the Thibetan Government, to whom a further opportunity of a reasonable settlement of the matters in dispute will there be offered.

Proclamation should be issued in manner you propose when advance from Gyantse takes place. Copies should also be given to General Macdonald for information and further publication by any means at his disposal. Abstract of instructions will be sent by telegram, but question of communications with Mission is under consideration.

Inclosure 11 in No. 22.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ravenshaw to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Nepal, June 17, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to forward translations of four letters received by the Prime Minister from the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa, and also the copy (in original) of the Memorandum addressed by the Amban to the Potala Lama, which formed the inclosure of a letter, dated the 21st Baisakh (2nd May, 1904), from the Representative, and of which I request the favour of your furnishing me with two copies of a translation in English when returning the original. The two letters dated the 21st Baisakh reached here later than those of the 26th and 29th idem, translations of which were forwarded to the Government of India with my letter dated the 13th June, 1904.

2. As regards the Representative's conversation with the Chinese drill sergeant, reported in his letter of the 1st Jestha (corresponding with the 13th May last), he has been instructed to reply to the Amban's treasurer that his proposal to take Nepalese troops to Thibet is altogether out of the question, as it might cause complications with the British Government; and, moreover, the presence of Nepalese troops in Thibetan territory, when the interests of that Government or its subjects have not been interfered with, would be regarded as an act of unprovoked aggression, and might lead to serious and unpleasant consequences, the utter inability of the Chinese to control the Thibetans being a fact which should be taken into account. It might also endanger the lives of the Nepal Representative and other Nepalese subjects and their property, as well as the yearly tribute of 10,000 rupees which the Thibetan Government have been paying to the Nepal Government regularly. The Nepal Representative has also been instructed to say that, if the interests of Nepal are threatened by the Thibetans, the Nepal Government will move promptly and effectively to safeguard its own interests. It is anticipated that this reply from the Representative will have the desired effect of making the Amban drop the matter.

Translation of a Letter from the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa.

A clerk of the Yamên says :—

"On Wednesday, the 16th Baisakh, a deputation, composed of Kazi Sejunsay, the Chikhiap-Khembu, and the Councillors of the Chhengdui Council, waited upon the Amban to tell him that, with reference to his Memorandum expressing his wish to proceed to meet the British to negotiate with them on the pending frontier questions, the Thibetan Government would provide him for his journey the necessary horses and transport, and make all other necessary arrangements, if he could assure them that he could confirm the boundary established in the fifty-ninth year of Emperor Chhyanlun, and establish or maintain everything in the same position as it existed

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before, and that what would be done for the massacre of the Thibetan troops committed by the British by forcibly entering their territory? In case he could not give the required assurance by accepting full responsibility for it, they could not ask him to go nor desist him from going, but that he might do anything he liked. At this the Amban demanded of them to write down their statement then and there, and put their signatures to it. They said that they had come to him to represent what they had to say, and that there was no reason why they put it down in writing and attest it with their signatures, because an official reply to his Memorandum would be sent to him in due course."

Gen, another clerk of the Yamên, says that a Memorandum stating the same reply as was given by the above-mentioned deputation, as stated above, has been received by the Amban, who, in reply, wrote to say that he did not want to enter into the lengthy details of the case, but would ask to be informed plainly whether or not they wanted him to proceed to negotiate with the British. No reply to it has been received.

Translation of a Letter in cypher from the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa.

On the 30th Baisakh last, Sunseay, a Chinese drill sergeant, came to my place and spoke to me as follows:—

"In the pending frontier dispute between the British and the Thibetan Governments, the Potala Lama and other Thibetans have prevented the Amban from going to mediate or settle the frontier dispute in defiance of the order of His Majesty the Emperor of China, and have thus brought about a great loss of life, and were about to cause loss of territory belonging to the Chinese Emperor. These troubles were due to the Amban not having a sufficient force with him here. Were the Amban to go to take part in the dispute without having been officially requested by the Thibetans to do so, they who had already disregarded the orders of the Emperor would not care to pay any heed to his advice or instructions, not to speak of the British who, as an independent Government, were outside the sphere of his authority. Under such circumstances, matters might take a satisfactory turn if the Amban could go there accompanied or backed by a sufficient number of troops to enforce any just decision of his that either of the parties might refuse to accept. The troops which should accompany the Amban might be composed of 1,000 or 2,000 Kham-bali soldiers of Khumbu Karunaru and Getay Khong of his jurisdiction, and 2,000 or 3,000 Ghorkhali soldiers. For the latter, an application might be made to His Highness the Maharajah of Nepal, as being required for the safety of the Amban's person at the place of negotiation, having previously obtained the sanction of His Majesty the Emperor of China for their pay. The Amban's words would have some weight were he to go there so backed by troops. As for the future, Thibet could only be saved if the Potala Lama could be made to devote himself to religious pursuits and another person set up in his place to administer the country. Otherwise, the present Potala Lama, ignorant of his duties as a ruler and unable to discern his own interests, would be hurrying this country to its ruin. If the Thibetans would ask the reason of the collection of troops by the Amban, the reply would be that they were collected in order to give them the help which they had requested before in case matters could not be settled amicably with the English. On the other hand, if the British were to ask the same question, they would be told that, as the Thibetans having become refractory, matters could not be settled, those men had been brought together. In order to have recourse to this ruse, it might be considered advisable to refer the matter previously and privately to the Emperor of China and obtain his sanction to it. The above is the message which I have been desired by the Treasurer of the Amban to deliver to you in private and to take your own opinion as to the best course to be followed. I was also requested to tell you that you know well the disregard shown by the Thibetans to us, the Chinese, and that, the distance being great, there were great difficulties in getting troops from China at once. As the Amban and the Treasurer are very intimate with each other, I should think that this message must have been sent at the suggestion or with the consent of the Amban."

I replied:—

"The Treasurer and others know very well that it is by no means proper to incite either of the parties to quarrel, and thus to wantonly cause loss of life. Our earnest endeavours should lie in the direction of justice and pacifying the angry feelings of both

the parties. I have already explained to the Amban the contents of the letters addressed by our Maharajah to the Kasyal Kazies. Had the Thibetans followed the advice given therein, they would at the present time have been spared the sufferings predicted therein and which have now overtaken them. As to the remarks of the Khajanchi or Treasurer that without the help of the troops it has been found impracticable to bring about a just and politic settlement, I have to say that when these Thibetans have got out of hand of the Amban they would surely never allow our troops if sent for to pass through their country without opposition or fighting. It would also be difficult to arrange for provisions in Thibet. Besides, friendship having long subsisted between our Maharajah and the British Government, to send troops to Thibet at a time when there is a dispute between the two, would be considered as a cause of the breach of those friendly relations. Thibet, too, has been regularly paying a tribute to our Government. In case a fighting takes place between the Nepalese and the Thibetans on account of our having taken our troops into their country without any valid ground, and the Thibetans refuse to pay the said tribute, what guarantee can the Amban give for the regular payment of the same? This being a very knotty question, I should have time to think over it, and shall myself call at the Treasurer's to explain my views to him."

With the above reply I sent the Chinese sergeant away.

In this matter, when the Treaty was concluded with the British during the incumbency of the Hintarin Amban, it was fully explained to the Potala Lama, the then Rajah Lama, and the Chhengdui Council, and their written assent taken to it, and afterwards the sanction of His Majesty the Emperor of China was also obtained. This fact is borne out by the records of the Chinese Office. Such being the case, how can it be said that this Treaty was entered into by the Chinese only? All these facts were embodied in the Memorandum addressed by the Amban to the Potala Lama, a copy of the substance of which was written in Thibetan characters and brought to me by a clerk of the Yamên, was forwarded to your Highness in original, inclosed in my letter of the 29th Baisakh last. Notwithstanding this proof of cognizance of the Thibetan Government of the documents or Treaties attested by the Government of China, the Potala Lama's insulting, unjust, and impolitic behaviour towards the British, who patiently waited at the frontier more than a year in expectation of the Amban and duly authorized Kazi and officers to negotiate with them, will have its reward in the just victory of the British, and shows the unjustifiable attitude of the Thibetans. Further, in spite of my explaining the contents thereof, the Potala Lama, without caring to accept the same, has acted childishly in blindly following the advice of the Khendechhega, as he has never before met with disappointments or experienced adversity, and so the Amban had sent, I believe, the said sergeant to sound my opinion. With reference to this help in men, promising to have their expenses defrayed by the Chinese Government, so that, in case the opinion was favourable, he might at once apply to your Highness for it. I would have sent a reply to the Treasurer to the effect that, as the matter was a very grave one, I would write home first for instructions; but, as I was not quite sure of the future, I sent Sunsey back with the reply that it was a very important question. I would first think over it myself, and then some day I would call at the Treasurer's and talk over the matter with him, and I have submitted this for such instructions as your Highness may deign to give, so that I may act accordingly.

Had the Potala Lama been any other than what he is, he would have been taught a good lesson by the people of Thibet on account of his conduct. He has been spared as he is the reigning Lama.

Let us see what the future has in its store. It is quite plain that the Chinese and the Thibetan Kazies and officers are all deeply displeased with the Potala Lama. The Thibetans are a race given to religious pursuits all along. Even the high people of this country have no knowledge of the Governments of other countries. They have no knowledge at all of military affairs. Like a frog in a well (*i.e.*, one with limited experience) they are far from being astute or cunning. Their idea is that the Potala Lama and other lamas are their gods, and so the country has been governed in this belief. The loss of many innocent lives is taking place owing to the imposture practised by the Khendechhega upon the Potala Lama, who is a youth inexperienced with the ways of the world.

Dated the 1st Justha, Friday, 1961, corresponding with the 13th May, 1904.

Translation of a Letter from the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa.

With due respect I beg to lay before your Highness in the following lines the news that I have heard and been able to gather here for your Highness' information.

The said Khani says:—

“When the order was issued by the Government of Thibet to the three Gumbas to send their quota of warlike Bandas (monks) in the proportion 550 from the Dhaibun Gumba, 350 from the Sera Gumba and 150 from the Gulden Gumba, in all, 1,050 men, and to assemble at Lhasa on the 31st day of Baisakh in order to go to war, the said Bandas remarked, “up to this time we have been kept under control and constrained to refrain from commerce and cultivation as being improper for us to undertake, and to devote ourselves to the pursuit of religion within our monasteries; as we were men who had forsaken the world, now how is it that we should be detailed for war where men are to be killed; we who have left the world and lived the life of hermits? We are capable of doing these virtuous acts, such as the recitation of sacred books and the worship of gods which conduce to the welfare of His Majesty the Emperor of China and the Potala Lama; if we are to participate in this war, we cannot do so without some understanding being arrived at.’ Further they say that if the old Kazies had remained in office things would not have come to such a pass; and they have not even heard in detail that the Kazies mentioned had committed such offence and that they had been dealt with in such and such a manner. It is said that they are to receive the muskets made at the Teech magazine.”

The Thibetans have also put into circulation another rumour to the effect that the war is going on between the British and the Russian Government and that victorious Russians have caused great embarrassment to the British, and that on account of this the principal English officers have gone back to Calcutta hence. It is strange that such rumours should be made current.

News from the Chinese source is to the effect that war is going on between the Russians and the Japanese, as mentioned in your Highness' letter; it is also said that the Russians have lost certain battles.

The Simpun of Sathay says that the Sathay is reported here by his Chipuns to have said that instead of acting according to the instructions of your Highness in the matter or calling in the Chinese Amban and your Highness to prevent war, and instead of pursuing such conduct to the best of their ability as would conduce to the good of Thibet, they are causing the slaughter of the people of Thibet in this unjustifiable manner. They cannot speak out their mind even if they have a mind to do so, and so they are quite helpless.

It is said that the Banda Kazi, who had proceeded to Nagarchay, has gone to Rampun Jhong near Digarcha.

Dated the 1st Justha, Friday 1961 (corresponding with the 13th May, 1904).

Inclosure 12 in No. 22.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.)

Saotang, June 25, 1904.

UGYEN KAZI telegraphs from Phari that Thibetan Councillor is afraid to come in unless Tongsa Penlop is present. I have telegraphed to Tongsa Penlop to come to Gyantse at once, and, on my arrival at Gyantse to-morrow, I will contrive some means of conveying to Councillor, who is at Nagartse, that he will be given safe conduct and treated with respect if he has authority, and is anxious to treat. I am not very hopeful that much will come of this, but I will test sincerity of Thibetan desire to treat.

Inclosure 13 in No. 22.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.)

Saotang, May 25, 1904.

THIBETAN messenger with flag of truce and bearing letter from seven lamas from Lhasa to Tongsa Penlop has passed through. These Lhasa lamas are now at Gyantse, and had expected Tongsa Penlop to have been there. I will endeavour get in communication with them to-morrow.

No. 23.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 20.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 18th instant, relative to Thibet affairs

India Office, July 19, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 23.

Government of India to Mr Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

July 18, 1904.

THIBET. Macdonald arrived Ralung the 16th instant. Mounted Infantry report Karo-La strongly held, and fresh defences built.

No. 24.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 20.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 20th instant, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copy will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, July 20, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 24.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

July 20, 1904.

YOUNGHUSBAND reports suggestion of Wilton's that if Chinese Government were requested by His Majesty's Minister at Peking to send special instructions to the Amban that he is to bring negotiations to speedy conclusion, matters might be expedited.

No. 25.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Satow.

(No. 105.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, July 21, 1904.

NEGOTIATIONS with Thibet.

It is suggested that, at this juncture, it might hasten matters if you were to request Chinese Government to instruct Amban specially to bring negotiations to a speedy conclusion.

You should make a communication to the Chinese Government in that sense.

No. 26.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 26.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosure in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 7th instant, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copy will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, July 26, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 26.

Government of India to the British Commissioner for Thibet Frontier Matters, Gyantse.

(Telegraphic.)

Simla, June 29, 1904.

IT has been reported to us, in connection with former Convention, that Amban declares that matter was referred to General Council, who signed a document agreeing to the terms of the Convention, which was finally signed by Amban. If you could secure copy of this signed Agreement, it would give us great advantage in present negotiations, and prove that Thibetans have been in the wrong throughout.

No. 27.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 26.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of two telegrams from the Viceroy, dated the 25th July, relative to Thibet Affairs.

(Copies will be sent to the D.M.O.)

India Office, July 26, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 27.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

July 25, 1904.

ON the 19th Mission arrived without meeting with further opposition at Nagartse. Meeting took place between Younghusband and Yutok Shape, Ta Lama and Grand Councillor, the Thibetan Delegates, at which latter protested against advance of Mission to Lhasa on ground that it would give rise to disturbance; they urged, moreover, that there would be no one there. Delegates refused to discuss terms, of general nature of which they had been apprised by Tongsa Penlop. Younghusband

reports that the Councillors do not seem even yet to realize the seriousness of the situation though they were respectful in demeanour. He informed them that we must proceed to Lhasa but that the character and duration of our stay there was dependent on the Thibetans themselves, as we had no wish to remain any longer time than was required for conclusion of settlement.

(Repeated to Peking.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 27.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

July 25, 1904.

WE are of opinion that Convention embodying terms should be one between Great Britain and Thibet, and should be signed by Younghusband and the Dalai Lama. Signature of Chinese Amban should, we propose, be obtained to a separate Agreement, which, after citing the Convention of 1890 and the Trade Regulations of 1893, should contain provisions—(1) recognizing validity of the Anglo-Thibetan Agreement, and (2) binding the Chinese Government to help in securing that terms of Anglo-Thibetan Agreement are fulfilled by the Thibetan Government and adopted. The Agreement with Thibet would be merely the complement of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890. Do you agree? The alternative is that, Convention now to be executed should be tripartite and signed by Representatives of Great Britain, China, and Thibet; but this latter course is open to the objection that proceedings will be liable to be delayed by the action of the Chinese, whereas it is possible that Younghusband will be able to conclude Agreement with Thibetans; in that event negotiations for its ratification by the Chinese can be conducted at Peking or London, should the Amban decline, on behalf of China, to adhere to it. With a view to preventing future complications as to treaty ports, it is desirable that the special position of Thibet, as distinct territory under the direct control of the Chinese Government, should be emphasized. In view of the attitude of China towards the Treaty with Corea, when that country was under Chinese suzerainty, we have hopes that first arrangement as proposed by us, recognizing as it does Chinese suzerainty over Thibet, would be accepted by the Chinese Government; moreover, with the prospect before them of being held liable, in whole or in part, for indemnity, they might be disposed the more readily to acquiesce in separate adhesion Agreement which did not require them to pay indemnity. I should be glad to know whether you concur in arrangement we propose; if so, the Wai-wu Pu might perhaps be moved to send Amban instructions to the effect that he is to accept, on behalf of China, an Agreement to be concluded between Younghusband and the Dalai Lama in [amplification?] of Convention of 1890 and in pursuance of Articles IV and VI of the 1890 Convention and of general Article 2 of the Trade Regulations of 1893.

(Repeated to Peking.)

No. 28.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 27.)

(No. 156.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Peking, July 27, 1904.

THIBETAN negotiations.

Please refer to your telegram No. 105 of the 21st July, instructing me to communicate with Chinese Government in order to accelerate conclusion of negotiations.

On the 25th July I reminded two Ministers of the Foreign Board, whom I saw, that on the 13th June, notice had been given that advance of Mission would be continued to Lhasa if Thibetan delegates failed to appear at Gyantse. I then gave them a summary of subsequent events and informed them that a start for the capital had finally been made.

Information had been received, I said, that idea of negotiating was not repugnant to the Dalai Lama, and His Majesty's Government were anxious that instructions should be sent to the Amban to do his utmost to insure bringing the negotiations to a speedy conclusion.

They replied that a telegram had, a few days ago, been sent to him, via Tachienlu,

instructing him on no account to retire from Lhasa, and ordering him to use every effort to assist a settlement. They showed me a copy of the above-mentioned telegram.

I am now sending it to Simla, having offered, in order to save time, to transmit it to the Government of India with a request to forward it to its destination.

I gather that since Parr's departure from Mission, scarcely any information has been received by Chinese Government.

No. 29.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 28.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of two telegrams to the Viceroy, dated the 26th July, relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, July 27, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 29.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, July 26, 1904.

THIBET. His Majesty's Government, having considered the views expressed in your three telegrams of the 11th July, and your telegram of the 13th July, have approved certain modifications of the terms stated in my telegram of the 6th July. Terms to be named to Thibetans, as modified will now run as follows:—

1. Neither at Lhasa nor elsewhere is Resident to be demanded.

2. Thibetans and Chinese to be required to undertake—

(a.) That, without the previous consent of the British Government, no portion of Thibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged, or otherwise given for occupation to any foreign Power.

(b.) That no intervention by any foreign Power in the affairs of Thibet shall be permitted.

(c.) That, without our previous approval, no representatives or agents of any foreign Power shall be admitted to Thibet; that no grant of concessions for roads, railways, or telegraphs, or for mining or other rights shall be made to any such Power, or to any subject thereof, without the consent of the British Government; but that, if their consent to such concessions be given, the British Government shall be granted similar or equivalent concessions.

(d.) That without the previous consent of the British Government no Thibetan revenues, whether in cash or in kind, shall be pledged or assigned to any foreign Power, or to any subject of such Power.

3. The production of the two Lachung British subjects, who were taken by the Thibetans, should be asked for by Colonel Younghusband, and, in the event of their having been ill-treated, pecuniary reparation should be demanded. In regard to the question of an indemnity, the sum to be demanded should not exceed an amount which, it is believed, will be within the power of the Thibetans to pay, by instalments, if necessary, spread over three years. Colonel Younghusband will be guided by circumstances in this matter.

4. Fortifications to be demolished in all accessible positions between the frontier and the point which the Mission may have reached.

5. The establishment of trade marts at Gyantse and Gartok, in addition to that at Yatung. The provisions for regulating the new marts to be similar to those existing at Yatung. Free access to the mart at Gyantse to be insured for British and Thibetan subjects, and the road between it and the frontier to be kept clear of obstruction, and in a state of repair suited to the needs of the trade. There will be located at Gyantse, as at Yatung, an Agent of the Thibetan Government who will receive any letters that may be sent to him by the British Agent, and who will be held responsible for the

delivery of these letters to the Thibetan authorities, as well as to the Chinese, and for the transmission of their replies. British Agent will have right of access to Gyantse, similar to that prescribed in respect of Yatung by the Regulations of 1893.

5A. In addition to the establishment of mart at Gyantse the Thibetan Government to be required to undertake to consider the question of establishing fresh marts, if required by the development of trade, and to place no restrictions on trade by routes at present existing.

6. Boundary laid down in the Convention of 1890 to be recognized by the Thibetans as the frontier between Sikkim and Thibet, and erection of boundary pillars to be carried out accordingly.

7. The regulations as to trade and the levying of Customs duties to be on general lines of those attached to the old Convention. The Thibetans to give undertaking that no dues of any sort other than those which may be provided for in Tariff mutually agreed upon shall be levied.

8. The occupation of the Chumbi Valley will be the security for the indemnity, and for the fulfilment of the conditions in regard to the trade marts to be opened. The occupation will continue till the payment of the indemnity shall have been completed, or the marts opened effectively for the space of three years, whichever is the latest.

Turning to the other points raised in your telegrams above cited—

1. I concur in your view that insertion in Convention of conditions guaranteeing Thibet against Russian aggression is unnecessary. The intimations made on the 11th and 18th February to the Russian Ambassador, and the statement made by him on the 8th April, to the effect that in no case does Russia contemplate interference in Thibet, should alone be made use of by Younghusband, who should be very careful not to commit us to any engagement in the nature of a guarantee, express or implied.

2. There is no objection to consulting Younghusband as regards definition of the boundaries of Thibet for the purpose of clause 2, but beyond this no action should be taken without previous reference to me. It would not be safe to adopt any definition in the absence of complete and reliable information.

3. As regards your suggestion that clause 4 should be amended so as to provide against future erection of fortifications, the proviso in clause 5 to the effect that the road between Gyantse and the frontier is to be kept clear of obstruction, seems to meet the point sufficiently.

4. As regards Kumaon boundary cases, these seem to take place within British territory. Would it be possible to settle the claims of Thibetans by means of local action of our officers when suitable opportunity offers, without including them in present negotiations? It is not clear from the information we have received what is the nature of settlement you wish to effect.

Inclosure 2 in No. 29.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, July 26, 1904.

THIBET. Your telegram of the 25th.

Your proposal to embody terms in Anglo-Thibetan Convention, which shall be signed by Younghusband on the one part and the Dalai Lama or his accredited representative on the other, and to secure signature of Amban to a separate Agreement has my concurrence.

No. 30.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 1.)

(No. 209.)

My Lord,

Peking, June 13, 1904.

ALTHOUGH the press in China cannot be said to influence public opinion in the same manner as in most parts of the world, still the articles which appear in the Chinese papers reflect to a great extent the views of educated persons in regard to current events, and must make some impression on the class of newspaper readers, which is always growing more numerous in this country. The various items of news which have

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been published from time to time during the last few weeks in regard to Thibetan affairs are therefore not devoid of interest. As your Lordship will perceive, those which do not merely record passing events, and which contain expressions of opinion, are for the most part couched in quiet and sensible language, and do not indicate the apprehension as to our intentions which recent events in Thibet might well have excited.

In the third week of May the "Peking Times" contained the following statements:—

That the Chinese Agent at Lhasa had telegraphed to say that the Thibetans and brigands were uniting to oppose the British; that two battalions of a superior class of recruits were being raised in Yunnan for service, when trained, in Szechuan, on the Thibet frontier; and that Hsi-Liang, the Viceroy of Szechuan, and Yu-tai, the Chinese Resident in Thibet, had telegraphed that the Thibetan opposition to the British was very alarming, as the latter were boldly pressing on: they beg that the Chinese Minister in London may be instructed to request that no more British troops may be dispatched.

"L'Impartial" (a Tien-tsin paper) says that the Assistant Resident at Lhasa, Kuei-Lin—who has been permitted to resign his post—has strongly recommended the abandonment of Thibet in a Memorial to the Throne. He declared that the Thibetans were so inveterately obstinate that civilizing influences were of no effect. China was wasting large sums of money, and the Thibetans had better be given their independence in order to avoid complications between China and other countries. Kuei-Lin, moreover, said that he would prefer to be cashiered for shirking his duties than remain in Thibet. This showed how difficult affairs had become in that country; yet the Government continued blind to the crisis, and was sending another Manchu official in Kuei-Lin's place, of Taotai rank, when a first-class man was urgently required.

The same paper, a few days later, in an article on foreign aggression, expresses the fear that Russia, if driven from Manchuria, will turn her attention to Turkestan and Thibet. England has her eye on the latter, and if she and Russia go to war on that question China will have to continue neutral, as at present, while others are robbing her of her territory.

Yu-tai is reported as having telegraphed that the ignorant and truculent Thibetans continue to attack the British with ardour which no defeat can abate. Nothing can be done, but the presence of the British makes it possible to give the Thibetans a good lesson, who are not likely to rise against the Imperial troops.

The "Universal Gazette" states that Yu-tai telegraphed on the 21st May asking for arms and funds, and reporting that the Thibetans "refuse to obey your commands." This the "Gazette" thinks must mean that the Throne had ordered the Thibetans not to commit acts of hostility against the British.

The "Tien-tsin News" of the 2nd June says that a censor memorialized the Throne respecting the situation in Thibet, which was becoming very dangerous. He advocates the various members of the Government be told to furnish proposals for a settlement.

The same paper states that the Empress Dowager asked a high official why England had sent troops to Thibet. "She was informed that England wished to create a diversion so as to call off some Russian troops from Manchuria. This was in Manchuria's interests, and England had no idea of annexing Thibet. All she wanted was trading facilities. Her Majesty's mind was much relieved."

Hsi-Liang has informed the Foreign Board, according to the "Tien-tsin News," that he has written to the Imperial Agent at Lhasa, telling him to endeavour to persuade the lamas to cease fighting. He also begs the Board to see the British Minister and get orders sent to British troops not to attack without due grounds. On the 4th June the Imperial Agent at Lhasa is reported to have informed his Government that the lamas were on very good terms with the British. He asks for supplies to prepare for all emergencies.

The "Nanking Gazette" publishes a long Memorial to the Throne from Yu-tai, written shortly after his arrival at Lhasa. He describes the steadily increasing authority and numbers of the lamas, who hold the entire power in their hands. He urges that prompt steps be taken to coerce them before it is too late, and for that reason has asked the Szechuan Viceroy to send additional troops to Chiamdo. He does not make any proposals for settling the conflict between the British and the Thibetans, not being as yet sufficiently acquainted with the true position of affairs, but he sadly alludes to the difficulties of "restraining a powerful neighbour by argument and of instructing our Thibetan feudatory."

The "Peking Times" of the 9th says that the Thibetans are furious with the Russians, who instigated them to attack the British, and who refuse them money and supplies in their need.

The Viceroy of Szechuan has sent several telegrams to the Throne, which are published in the "Peking Times," giving information respecting the progress of events in Thibet. He regards the situation as very serious; the Thibetans, in spite of heavy losses, refuse to give way owing to their inveterate obstinacy, and he begs that some means may be devised for pacifying them, and that negotiations for a settlement of the question may be arranged with the British Minister in Peking.

A copy of this despatch will be forwarded to the Indian Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

No. 31.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 1.)

(No. 210.)

My Lord,

Peking, June 14, 1904.

IN continuation of my immediately preceding despatch, summarizing articles from the native Chinese press on the Thibetan question, I have the honour to inclose précis of a Memorial from Yütai, the Chinese Resident at Lhasa, on the condition of affairs in the border districts between Szechuan and Thibet, and relations of Thibet with India.

This document, though not published officially, bears every mark of authenticity. It was probably written about the end of February, the Resident having reached Lhasa on the 11th of that month.

(A copy of this despatch will be sent to India.)

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

Inclosure in No. 31.

Précis of Memorial published in "L'Impartial" of June 9, 1904.

YOUR servant left the Szechuan Province for Thibet on the 11th October, 1903. On his journey he passed through Tachienlu, Litang, and Batang under the jurisdiction of Szechuan, and Chamuto (Chamdo) and Lali (H'lari) in Thibetan jurisdiction. The barbarians in these places were well behaved, and there was no delay in providing the necessary grooms and horses. In one or two places only did they prove obstinate, but a very little chastisement had an excellent effect on them. Thus your servant was able to reach his destination (Anterior Thibet) in four months, a very quick journey. It is his duty now to inform your Majesties of all that he was able to find out about the state of affairs in Szechuan, and about the rupture in the relations between Thibet and India. Litang is under the jurisdiction of Szechuan. The two native tribes in the district are very well-conducted and are loyal subjects of your Majesties, but, being savages, they cannot help having savage instincts. They will quarrel, for instance, over the most trifling matters. If the local officials would look after them they could easily keep them in order. But the trouble is that the country swarms with lamas. The power of their abbots is greater than that of the officials. If anything displeases them they instantly raise a disturbance. These abbots prey on the people, to whom they lend money at exorbitant rates of interest, and on whom they impose in every way. If a debt is not paid them on the exact date due they promptly seize the house and property of the debtor. What is even worse, they employ a lot of rascally lamas to rob and plunder for them. If any one ventures to bring a case before them, he is bled without mercy. The result is that even as far as Batang, Chamuto, and Chaliao robbery cases are of everyday occurrence, and trade has come to a standstill.

Your servant would observe that, after all, lamas are only ordinary people whose business it is to pray. Their profession does not entitle them to override the law. If some curb is not put on their audacity in interfering in local affairs it will soon be impossible to exercise any restraint at all over them. Consequently, your servant has consulted with the Viceroy of Szechuan and the Assistant Resident of Thibet with a view to having a strong garrison placed at Chamuto with an official of high rank in command, who could not only put fear into the Thibetans but also keep the border

districts in order. On his way to Thibet a despatch reached your servant from the Viceroy saying that he has memorialized the Throne to have the Assistant Resident stationed at Chamuto. This, in your servant's opinion, is a most desirable and necessary step.

As to the Thibet and India frontier question there is already every appearance of hostilities breaking out. The British troops have reached Tuilang (? Tuna) and the Thibetans are confronting them. Your servant has reasoned with the British to try and stop their advance, and has admonished the Thibetans. How difficult his position is your Majesties will understand. It is his duty, however, in gratitude for the favours bestowed on him, to do all that lies in his power to deal with the situation. Being new to his post, your servant is not yet very conversant with Thibetan affairs. After discussing the situation personally with the Dalai Lama and making himself thoroughly acquainted with local conditions, he will again memorialize the Throne as to what, under the circumstances, would be the best policy to adopt. To be dilatory might aggravate the situation, but too much haste would be imprudent. The object, however, that your servant will ever keep in view is to meet your Majesties' desire to cultivate friendly and neighbourly relations with the British.

No. 32.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 1.)

(No. 217.)

My Lord,

Peking, June 15, 1904.

ON the 2nd instant I had the honour to receive your Lordship's instructions that on receipt of an intimation from India, I was to acquaint the Chinese Government that notice had been given by Colonel Younghusband to the Chinese Resident in Thibet that His Majesty's Government would insist upon negotiations at Lhasa unless the Resident, together with competent negotiators, presented himself at Gyantse by the 25th instant.

Yesterday I received the intimation in question from the Government of India, and took advantage of an interview that had previously been arranged with Na-t'ung, an Assistant President of the Board of Foreign Affairs, to make the communication as directed by your Lordship.

I began by informing his Excellency that complimentary letters had been received at His Majesty's Legation from the Resident in Thibet announcing his arrival at Lhasa, to which he replied that he had himself been the medium through which those letters were transmitted.

The way being thus paved, I proceeded to state that your Lordship had more than six months ago informed the Chinese Minister in London, and I had myself repeated to one of the Directors of the Board, that unless the Resident and Thibet negotiators met the British Commissioner on the frontier, the Mission would proceed to Gyantse. Having waited fruitlessly until the month of March, the Mission finally left Phari and reached Gyantse on the 11th April. Since its arrival there a message had been received from the Resident to say that he was coming down with the Thibetan Delegates as soon as he could obtain transport, but up to the 1st instant he had not made his appearance. Under these circumstances Colonel Younghusband had been authorized to inform the Resident on the 1st June that he would wait until the 25th, and that, failing his arrival by that date, the Mission would proceed to Lhasa to meet him there.

Na-t'ung received this communication as if he had almost expected it, and informed me that quite recently the Board had received a telegram from the Resident stating that, owing to the obstinacy of the Dalai Lama, he had found it impossible to proceed to Gyantse. He had not a single soldier with him with which to overawe the Thibetans, and the latter, under orders from the monks, refused to furnish him with transport of any kind. He had, consequently, no alternative but to remain at Lhasa and to use his best endeavours to persuade the Dalai Lama to alter his policy. His Excellency added that the latter was a stupid, obstinate man, who was entirely in the hands of the monks of the three great monasteries, and refused to listen to any other advice than theirs.

The tone of the Assistant President of Foreign Affairs left no doubt upon my mind

that the course pursued by His Majesty's Government with regard to Thibet is regarded without objection by the Chinese Government, and his language confirms the view that they are unable to exercise any control whatever over the policy of the Dalai Lama.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

No. 33.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 1.)

(No. 218.)

My Lord,

Peking, June 15, 1904.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 217 of to-day's date, I have the honour to state that on the 11th November, 1903, I received your Lordship's telegram informing me that His Majesty's Government, in view of the recent conduct of the Thibetans, had come to the conclusion that it was necessary to sanction the advance of Colonel Younghusband's Mission to Gyantse.

During the course of the day I received a call from Mr. Lien-Fang, one of the Directors of the Foreign Board, who came with a message from Prince Ch'ing to say that the Chinese Minister in London had telegraphed that the British troops were to advance into Thibet, and his Highness asked that I would telegraph to your Lordship a request to have them stopped. I told him that I had seen a statement to that effect in Reuter's telegrams, but I could give him no official information. Apparently the Thibetans still refused, I said, to give up the two British subjects whom they had detained at Gyantse. It was, I thought, much to be regretted that the new Resident Yütai, whose departure for Lhasa had been announced for February of last year, should have delayed at Chengtu till October.

Your Lordship's telegram above referred to mentioned a telegram of the 4th November from the Indian Government, which had not then reached me. As it apparently would contain a detailed account of the proceedings of the Thibetans which had furnished the motive of the decision taken by His Majesty's Government, I did not feel justified in communicating the bare information of the intended advance to Gyantse.

On the 1st November Mr. Lien-Fang dined with me, and as he was leaving the house he asked whether I had received any reply from your Lordship. In the interval your Lordship's telegram No. 182 had reached me, recording a conversation with the Chinese Minister, in which your Lordship stated to him, in reply to a request that Colonel Younghusband's advance might be countermanded, that the recent proceedings of the Thibetans compelled His Majesty's Government to exact satisfaction, and that you could not undertake to suggest any further delay. I accordingly answered Mr. Lien-Fang that my information coincided with the reply given to the Chinese Minister. I added that the Thibetans had not given up the two British subjects, but, on the contrary, were reported to have put them to death, and that they had carried off some of the transport animals furnished from Nepal. Under the circumstances His Majesty's Government considered it necessary to occupy the Chumbi Valley and to advance to Gyantse. The Chinese Government were not blamed for the acts of the Thibetans, but reparation must be exacted. Mr. Lien-Fang responded that a telegram had been sent to the Resident by way of India to hurry forward to meet Colonel Younghusband and endeavour to arrange matters. I said I hoped he would be successful.

It was immediately after this conversation that I telegraphed to your Lordship that the communication made to the Chinese Minister seemed to have aroused the Chinese Government from their apathy, and that they had resorted to telegraphic communication by way of India in order to instruct the Resident to proceed to meet Colonel Younghusband and negotiate with him. Up to that time they had been contented to use their own line to Tachienlu, and the courier service thence across the mountains to Lhasa, so that messages took between two and three months to get through.

I regret that in the pressure of business I neglected at that time to place these facts on record in a despatch.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

No. 34.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 2.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of two telegrams to the Viceroy, dated the 29th July, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copies will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, August 2, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 34.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, July 29, 1904.

THIBET. On the 21st July, Foreign Office telegraphed to His Majesty's Minister at Peking, instructing him to make representations to the Chinese Government, as suggested in your telegram of the 20th instant.

On the 27th, Sir E. Satow reported that he had obtained from the Chinese Government a telegram containing instructions to the Amban in sense desired, and that this is being sent direct to you for transmission to Amban.

No. 35.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 2.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of three telegrams from the Viceroy, dated the 1st August, relative to Thibet affairs.

(Copies will be sent to the D.M.O.)

India Office, August 2, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 35.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

August 1, 1904.

YOUR telegram of the 26th July: Thibet. We would invite reference to words: "British Agent shall have right of access to Gyantse similar to that prescribed in respect of Yatung by the existing Regulations," precise intention of which is not understood. Effect of provision expressly stipulating for mere "right of access" to Gyantse might be to throw doubt on the wider "right of residence" at both marts. Our rights at all trade marts which may be established are sufficiently secured by Article 1 of "The Trade Regulations, 1893." We would therefore suggest omission of words above quoted.

Secondly, as regards roads, railways, telegraphs, &c., in the Chumbi Valley, we propose to reserve to ourselves the right to construct such communications, whether before or after evacuation; the Thibetans to be required to afford us facilities in this respect.

Thirdly, it appears to us to be open to argument whether any fortification commanding the road constitutes an "obstruction" within the meaning of clause 4. It would, in our opinion, be preferable that there should be an express prohibition against future construction of fortifications, or placing of armaments, on road from frontier, not merely to Gyantse, but to Lhasa.

Lastly, having regard to the further opposition offered by the Thibetans during advance of Mission to Lhasa, we would ask that the proposal that our Agent at Gyantse should have right of proceeding, if and when necessary, to Lhasa (see my telegram of the 13th July), may be agreed to by His Majesty's Government, if it be found that this

condition would be accepted without serious demur by the Thibetans. Clause might be worded to the following effect: "that right of free access to the supreme Thibetan authorities, and to the chief Chinese local authorities, shall be accorded to the Trade Agent at Gyantse, and that he shall be treated by them with due respect." This would obviate difficulty of mentioning Lhassa, if that is considered open to objection.
(Repeated to Peking and Colonel Younghusband.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 35.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

August 1, 1904.

THIBET. Provisional draft Convention was enclosed with despatch which issued on the 28th July. I do not propose to incur the expense of telegraphing the draft verbatim, as it follows your instructions. Should ratification of clause be considered necessary, we could telegraph [*sic*]; but, in present case, as with ordinary Indian and Arabian Treaties, ratification by Viceroy will perhaps be considered sufficient, since new Convention is supplementary to Convention of 1890, which was left for Viceroy to carry out.

Inclosure 3 in No. 35.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

August 1, 1904.

TELEGRAPHING on the 26th July from Chaksam ferry, Younghusband reports receipt, through the Dalai Lama's Chamberlain, of letter from National Assembly promising negotiations, and asking that Mission should not proceed to Lhassa. Younghusband replied to the Dalai Lama to the effect that he must go on to Lhassa, but that he will not stay there any longer than is required for conclusion of a settlement, and, that, unless opposition is offered, no injury will be done to religious buildings which are not occupied by soldiers. This reply was accepted for delivery by the Chamberlain, who sent it to Lhassa. On the 27th, a meeting between Younghusband and Ta Lama and the Chamberlain was to take place.

No. 36.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 3.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 14th July, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copy will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, August 3, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 36.

Mr. Garrett to Government of Bengal.

(Confidential.)

Darjeeling, June 28, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith my Confidential Report for the week ending on Saturday, the 25th instant.

2. Lieutenant Pahalwan Singh, of Nepal, who came into Ghoom with a party of Nepalese coolies, informed Inspector Beckwith that the Nepal Durbar had ordered 1,000 troops to be kept in readiness at Ilam under Colonel Harack Jung Thapa, so as to be prepared to proceed to join our forces in Thibet at a moment's notice, if called upon to do so.

3. I have nothing further to report this week.

Inclosure 2 in No. 36.

(a) Apparently issued by the Lhasa Government.

To all the Jongs (a).

(b) In the Nechung Tratsang Monastery, a few miles out of Lhasa.

(c) Approximately the 21st April.

(d) Approximately the 19th April.

For the sake of the Emperor of China and of the Dalai and Tashi Lamas, and for the happiness of all the people. At this time the British have traversed much territory, and have unlawfully come to our land, trusting in their strength. On account of this, I consulted the oracle (b), which has ordered that we should ask help from our ancestors, gods, and goddesses, and commencing from the 8th day of the 3rd month (c), on every day during one month, all the Jongs and monasteries, and the rich and the poor, must perform religious ceremonies, and rouse the deities of different places to help us in withstanding the enemy. I will myself see whether this is done, and if anybody disregards it, I will punish the Jongpen concerned. If you obey this, it will be well; otherwise, not understand this.

Dated the 6th of the 3rd month (d).

(a) Apparently from the Amban to the Kyaping Chempo. This latter, who resides at Tashilumpo, and is the Chief Minister of the Tsang Province, is known to the people of Tsang as Kyaping Chempo, and to those of the Lhasa Province as the Tashilumpo Shappe or as the Dzasa Lama. The reason of his being known as a Shappe is that he is considered equal in rank to the Lhasa Shappes, though not a member of their Council.

(b) Approximately the 13th April.

Inclosure 2 to Letter No. 62 (a).

I have received the letter from you, Dzasa Lama, in which you state that the officers and soldiers of the British Government are arriving near Shigatse. You think that harm may befall the Tashi Lama, and you ask what you should do. I reply that, although the British soldiers arrive, as long as we can stay in our own land and keep quiet, the British will not without any reason shoot at us with their rifles.

But if your men heed what the soldiers of the Lhasa Government say, and show hostility, disturbance may occur. If disturbance occurs, both you and I will certainly suffer grief. If you stay, shutting the door, there will be no trouble. You should bear this in mind, and act accordingly.

Dated the last day of the 2nd month (b).

(c) Apparently from the Amban to the Dalai Lama, in continuation of Inclosure 3 to letter No. 62.

(d) ? Younghusband.

(e) Apparently the 26th of the 2nd month, i.e., approximately the 9th April.

Inclosure 3 to Letter No. 62 (c).

On the 4th day of this 3rd month I received a letter from the British officer, Yun-he-kung (d) that on the 26th of the month (e) the British officers are waiting for me at Gyantse. The British letter to me continues to the following effect: "I sent you many letters before for the good of all your people, and asked you to send a high official to meet me, but to my surprise I have had no reply from you. Now, are you coming with a high official, or is there any difficulty in giving me a reply?" The monks and the high officials have been fighting. Is this by your order, Dalai Lama, or have they done so of their own accord? The British letter continues thus: "Formerly I thought that the monks would stay in their own monasteries, carry on their religious exercises, and abstain from fighting. Up to now, in spite of their fighting, the monasteries have not been damaged. You, Amban, should inquire and see

for yourself whether it is true that the monks are fighting on the side of the Thibetan soldiery, and constructing buildings like forts near the monasteries, and let me have an answer about this." In my inquiry I found that the monks were acting in this way without understanding the effect of their actions. If this continues, and if monasteries are destroyed in consequence, the Buddhist faith will sustain a severe blow, and all the people will suffer much grief. Cannot you understand this? Do you pay no heed to the instructions received from the Emperor of China? In accordance with our previous conversation, you should send a learned Shappe (to meet the British); and if you like to fix a day for me to go, and give me riding ponies and transport animals and porters, I can easily go also. If you will give me early instructions on these matters. I can easily reply to the British. Please bear this in mind.

Dated the 4th of the 3rd month (f).

(f) Approximately the 17th April.

(a) Apparently written by the Amban to the Dalai Lama.

Inclosure 4 to Letter No. 62 (a).

(b) Approximately the 10th April.

(c) ? Younghusband.

(d) 4 to 5 P.M.

(e) i.e., to the Gelukpa sect of Thibetan Buddhism, to which the Dalai and Tashi Lamas and a large number of the people belong.

I received a letter from the men living on the boundary, describing the commencement of the war. They report that on the 27th of the 2nd month (b) the British officer, Yun-ha-kung (c), with cavalry and infantry, crossed the land; that the Thibetan soldiers remonstrated with them, but they did not heed, and at the monkey time (d) arrived at Gyantse; that they say that they will wait fourteen days there for the Amban to come and settle up affairs, and that if he does not come they will advance to Lhasa. Now, Thibet belongs, firstly, to the Chinese Government; secondly, to the Jamgon Lama (e); and, thirdly, to the Dalai Lama. If they come to Lhasa we shall be ruined. The Thibetans have fought three times, and have been defeated. Now they are sitting idle, neither fighting nor negotiating, which is an unsatisfactory state of affairs. I have received a sealed letter from the Chinese Government, in which it is stated that you are to negotiate the matter quietly, and if you do not know how to do this, I will show you. Otherwise, if you fight, the lives of many men will be lost. You Thibetans think that, if you fight once, you will secure your territory. The British have cannons and other weapons, you have flesh and bones, and if you fight the British, many of you will be wounded and killed. It will hardly be possible to stop the British with high walls and large rivers. Now, the British have made up their minds to advance after the expiry of a fixed time. In my opinion, it will not do to let them come. Either, therefore, you, Dalai Lama, should go yourself, or you should quickly authorize me to go, and fix a date for my departure. In the letter given me by the Tsondu (f) there are divided counsels (*lit.* feet placed in different directions), some saying that we ought to fight, others that we ought to negotiate. Please give me a definite reply as to which of these alternatives is to be followed. Consider these things carefully in your mind, and give me an answer quickly.

Dated the last day of the 2nd month (g).

(f) The Tsondu or Tsondu Chempo is an assembly attended by officials below the rank of Shappe. Its Resolutions are submitted through the Shappe to the Dalai Lama, and sometimes also to the Amban.

(g) Approximately the 13th April.

No. 37.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 5.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 3rd August, relative to Thibet affairs.

(Copy will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.)

India Office, August 4, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 37.

Mr. Brodrick to the Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

August 3, 1904.

YOUR telegram of the 1st August as to terms of settlement with Thibetan Government.

His Majesty's Government adhere to their decision that no demand for right of access to Lhasa for our Agent at Gyantse is to be made. Intention of His Majesty's Government is that Agent's functions are to be essentially commercial; but the additional clause Proposed by you would result in his functions being assimilated to those of a political Resident. This we are anxious to avoid.

Sentence which you propose to omit from clause (5) appears to us to be required, but we will not insist on its retention if, in your opinion, our rights of access to Gyantse are adequately secured under the terms of the Regulations of 1893.

As regards proposed inclusion in clause (4) of provision prohibiting erection of fortifications on road to Lhasa, His Majesty's Government have consistently aimed at avoiding, as far as possible, necessity for intervention; but effect of your proposal would be to leave us with no alternative but to intervene, possibly at an inconvenient moment, should it appear that fortifications were being erected by Thibetans.

As regards proposal to reserve right to construct roads, railways, &c., in the Chumbi Valley, even after it has been evacuated, this would be inconsistent with policy as laid down in my telegram of the 6th November, 1903, that withdrawal shall take place as soon as reparation is obtained. If the condition as to the effective opening of trade marts for term of three years has been fulfilled, and the indemnity paid, His Majesty's Government see no reason why complete withdrawal should not be effected.

No. 38.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 8.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a Secret despatch to the Government of India, dated the 5th instant, relative to the terms of settlement with the Thibetan Government.

Copy will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, August 8, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 38.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Secret.)

My Lord,

India Office, August 5, 1904.

YOUR Excellency was informed in my telegram of the 26th July of the decision taken by His Majesty's Government as to the terms of the settlement to be demanded from the Thibetan Government. That decision was not arrived at until His Majesty's

Government had had an opportunity of considering the Secret letter of your Excellency's Government of the 30th June last, which stated at length your views as to the nature of the settlement to be effected.

2. His Majesty's Government have, throughout the present difficulty, been very reluctant to take any steps which would involve an advance into Thibet or interference with Thibetan affairs. As stated in Lord George Hamilton's despatch of the 27th February, 1903, they had to consider the question not as a local one, concerning India and Thibet alone, but from the wider point of view of the relations of Great Britain to other Powers, both European and Asiatic, and as involving the status of a portion of the Chinese Empire. Formerly European nations and their interests were in the main far removed from the scope of Indian policy, and the relations of India with the States on her borders rarely involved any European complications. But the effect of Indian policy in relation to Afghanistan, Siam, Thibet, or any other portion of the Chinese Empire is liable to be felt throughout Europe. This immediate responsibility towards Europe which Indian policy nowadays imposes on this country necessarily involves its correlative, and the course of affairs on the Indian frontiers cannot be decided without reference to Imperial exigencies elsewhere.

3. His Majesty's Government have also been consistently averse to any policy in Thibet which would tend to throw on the British Empire an additional burden. The great increase to our responsibilities, however necessary, which recent additions to the Empire have involved, make it obvious that it would be most imprudent to further enlarge them, except upon the strongest ground. In military and naval matters the resources of Great Britain and India must be considered together. India has from time to time given effective and ready help in the defence of British interests and British Colonies. On the other hand, it must be remembered that the British army largely exists in order to defend India, and every new obligation undertaken by India is as much a charge upon the common stock of our heavily-burdened resources as if it were placed upon the people of this country.

4. The policy of His Majesty's Government expressed in Lord George Hamilton's despatch of the 27th February was further defined by the telegrams of the 28th May and the 6th November, 1903. The despatch of the 27th February, which was written while communications were still taking place with the Russian Government as to their attitude towards Thibet, laid down the principle that it was indispensable that British influence should be recognized at Lhasa in such a manner as to render it impossible for any other Power to exercise a pressure on the Thibetan Government inconsistent with the interests of British India. But, as recorded in Lord Lansdowne's despatch to Sir C. Scott of the 8th April, 1903, the result of our communications with the Russian Government was that His Majesty's Government received explicit assurances from them that they had no Convention about Thibet either with Thibet itself or with China, or with any one else, and that they had no Agents in Thibet, and no intention of sending Agents or Missions there. His Majesty's Government, therefore, having regard to the satisfactory nature of these pledges, which modified the apprehensions that had been felt as to the establishment at Lhasa of foreign influences incompatible with our interests, decided, as stated in the telegram of the 28th May, 1903, that it was unnecessary and undesirable that any demand for the recognition of a Political Agent, either at Gyantse or at Lhasa, should be included in the proposals to be made in the negotiations for a settlement with Thibet. We held then, as we hold now, that such a political outpost might entail difficulties and responsibilities incommensurate with any benefits which, in the situation created by the Russian assurances, could be gained by it. The Mission was accordingly authorized to proceed to Khambajong, with instructions that the negotiations there should be restricted to questions concerning trade relations, the frontier, and grazing rights.

5. The Thibetan Government having refused to negotiate at Khambajong in response to our invitation, it became necessary, on the 1st October, 1903, to sanction contingently the advance of the Mission to Gyantse. But the conduct of the Thibetan Government towards the Mission, intolerable as it was when taken in connection with their action in the past, was not such as to necessitate any alteration of our general policy. It was therefore laid down, in the telegram of the 6th November, 1903, that the advance of the Mission was not to lead to permanent intervention in Thibetan affairs in any form; that it should be made for the sole purpose of obtaining satisfaction; that as soon as reparation was obtained a withdrawal should be effected; and that the question of insisting on the fulfilment of our Treaty rights of trade in Thibet was to be considered subject to these considerations.

6. The opposition offered by the Thibetans to the progress of the Mission, coupled

with their refusal to negotiate at Gyantse, has necessitated the advance to Lhasa, which it has been our object to avoid, and which we have postponed till no alternative was left to us. But His Majesty's Government adhere to the view that, while our influence must be duly recognized at Lhasa, so as to exclude foreign pressure which would have a disturbing influence on territories adjoining Thibet and British India, it is unnecessary, in view of the present political conditions of Thibet, to insist on the appointment of a permanent political officer as the basis of the settlement to be proposed to the Thibetan Government.

7. It was from this point of view that the terms which Colonel Younghusband was authorized by my telegram of the 6th July to name to the Thibetans were decided on by His Majesty's Government, and the modifications suggested in your telegrams of the 11th and 13th July have been considered in the same light. We are satisfied that, so long as the political position of Thibet in relation to foreign Powers remains unaltered, the provisions of clause 2 as now approved will satisfactorily accomplish our object of excluding undesirable foreign influences from the country. As regards the status of the British Agent, who, under clause 5, is to have a similar right of access to Gyantse as is prescribed in respect of Yatung by the Regulations of 1893, we do not consider it desirable to claim for him the right in certain circumstances of proceeding to Lhasa. The effect of this proposal would be to alter the character of the duties of the Agent, which, it is intended, shall be essentially commercial, and to assimilate them to those of a Political Resident.

8. As regards the provisions for trade in clauses 5, 5 (a), and 7, it is not the intention of His Majesty's Government that the Thibetans should be pressed to open marts immediately elsewhere than at Gyantse and Gartok. The acceptance of the principle by the Thibetan Government should suffice for the present. It may, not unreasonably, be anticipated that the Thibetan people will be led by the prosperity that will result from the establishment of free marts at Gyantse and Gartok to modify their attitude of exclusiveness in respect of trade in other parts of their territory, and that habits of commercial intercourse will be developed, which would continue after the conditions attached to the occupation of the Chumbi Valley have been fulfilled and our withdrawal completed. Should these conditions unfortunately not be fulfilled, it will be necessary to consider the question of maintaining our hold on the Chumbi Valley.

9. As regards clause 6, the provision as to the erection of pillars along the frontier defined in the Convention of 1890 should sufficiently impress on the Thibetan Government the hopelessness of attempting to regard the question as an open one, and should prevent any repetition on their part of the infringements of the boundary of which they have been guilty in the past.

10. Similar considerations apply to clause (4). The destruction of all fortifications commanding the route by which the Mission has advanced will be a token to the Thibetans of the futility of their efforts to resist us by force. On the other hand, it is not desirable to demand an undertaking that, on our withdrawal, no fortifications are to be constructed in the future. An unqualified stipulation to that effect would leave us no alternative but to take action should the Thibetans infringe it, and it is the object of His Majesty's Government to avoid, as far as possible, imposing conditions tending to create a situation which would place us under the necessity of intervening further. Our interests should be sufficiently guarded by the requirement that the road to Gyantse is to be kept free from obstruction.

11. As regards the amount of the indemnity, our ignorance of the resources of the country makes it impossible to speak with any certainty. The question, in the circumstances, must be left to the discretion of Colonel Younghusband. The condition that the amount should be one which it is estimated can be paid in three years indicates the intention of His Majesty's Government that the sum to be demanded should constitute an adequate pecuniary penalty, but not be such as to be beyond the powers of the Thibetans, by making a sufficient effort, to discharge within the period named.

12. In conclusion, I desire to express the appreciation of His Majesty's Government of the courage and endurance of the troops attached to the Mission, and of the valuable services of those who have been employed on the lines of communication, both beyond and within the British frontier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ST. JOHN BRODRICK.

No. 39.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 8.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 6th August, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copy will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, August 8, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 39.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

August 6, 1904.

ON the 3rd August, at midday, the Mission arrived at Lhasa, no further opposition having been offered. The population was quiet. The Dalai Lama was away at a private monastery some miles off.

Younghusband received a visit from the Amban, who expressed himself willing to assist in arriving at a settlement, and made the troops a present of food. He has collected supplies for two days, and promises to collect more.

The Representative of Nepal sent a deputation to visit Younghusband. He intended to come himself shortly.

Tongsa Penlop is with Younghusband.

The valley is well cultivated, and two or three miles broad. There is an abundance of supplies.

(Repeated to Peking.)

No. 40.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 9.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of telegrams from the Viceroy, dated 5th (two)* and 6th August, relative to Thibet Affairs.

Copies will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, August 9, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 40.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

August 6, 1904.

YOUNGHUSBAND wired from Chaksam Ferry, on the 29th July, having had two visits from Ta Lama, and one from Dalai Lama's Grand Chamberlain, who brought letter from Dalai Lama asking Younghusband not to proceed to Lhasa. Chamberlain said he and councillors were ready to negotiate at Chaksam Ferry, but our presence in Lhasa would so spoil religion that Dalai Lama might die.

Younghusband told Delegates that Mission must proceed to Lhasa. He wrote second letter to Dalai Lama expressing hope that latter would appreciate inconvenience to Mission to halt this side of Lhasa now it had left Gyantse.

Chinese merchant, who arrived Chaksam Ferry, offered to sell us anything wanted at Lhasa. He saw no Thibetan troops on the way. Sangpo Valley most fertile; wheat, barley, and peas abundant.

Despatch from Amban arrived answering Younghusband's from Gyantse. He

* Not printed.

said he had communicated purport to Dalai Lama. Bearer said confusion prevailed at Lhasa, every one shifting responsibility. Dalai Lama, in religious seclusion at private monastery 18 miles from Lhasa, has ordered monks to attend to religious duties. Supplies abundant at Lhasa, and people would sell readily. Amban anxious for settlement. Dorjief believed to have returned to Siberia.

(Repeated to Peking.)

No. 41.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 11.)

(No. 166.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Peking, August 11, 1904.

THIBET. My telegram No. 156 of the 27th July.

Following telegram sent to Acting Viceroy of India :—

“At an interview I had yesterday with Prince Ch'ing, his Highness expressed surprise that they had so far received no reply from the Amban to the telegram which I sent to him for them on the 27th July by way of India.”

No. 42.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 15.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of two telegrams from the Viceroy, dated the 13th and 14th August, regarding Thibet affairs.

A copy will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, August 15, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 42.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

August 13, 1904.

WE have sent the following telegram, dated the 12th August, to Colonel Younghusband :—

“In the absence of regular information, Government of India find it difficult to form estimate of exact situation. As, however, transmission of correspondence takes twelve days, and the stay of the Mission at Lhasa cannot be protracted, they consider it desirable to communicate to you their present views, which may prove of some help and guidance to you, in the event of your having to assume the responsibility of taking energetic measures. As regards the action which should be taken if it becomes necessary to requisition by force for supplies, and if prospect of negotiations being opened is hopeless, you will no doubt have made up your mind. It is, of course, necessary that you should take what supplies you require, but no destruction of religious property, and nothing in the nature of loot, shall be allowed. Detention of principal officials, and, if necessary, their conveyance to Gyantse, as hostages for settlement and for safety of the force, would have the approval of the Government of India; they would also be quite prepared to approve of your taking steps to bring in the Dalai Lama, if this should be possible, or to insure his seal being used under his authority, in the event of necessity for such action being well established.”

(Repeated to Peking.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 42.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

August 14, 1904

TELEGRAPHIC report from Younghusband, dated the 10th August, states that all is confusion at Lhasa. Yutok Shape is ill, Ta Lama is in disgrace, while of the remaining Shapes one is hostile and others [?] useless. The Tsong-du (National Assembly) is sitting in permanent Session. The Dalai Lama is three marches off. Neither of these authorities, however, will take any action. Nepaulese Representative at Lhasa and the Tongsa Penlop of Bhutan are in despair at the stupidity of the Thibetans, while the Amban openly recommends resort to force. Grain has been requisitioned from the Depung Monastery, as, although camp bazaar is well attended, Thibetan authorities refuse to allow villagers to sell us any. General attitude of the Thibetans is not so much hostile as futile, but there is likelihood of some more energetic action being found necessary, such as seizure of the Potala. Younghusband refrained from occupying the Summer Palace as a residence, as he had intended, on the Tongsa Penlop representing to him that the building was specially sacred.

(Repeated to Peking.)

No. 43.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 16.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a letter from the Viceroy, dated the 11th August, respecting Thibet affairs.

A copy has been sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, August 16, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 43.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.)

August 11, 1904.

FOLLOWING telegram received from Younghusband:—

"Lhasa, 5th August. I yesterday returned Amban's visit, conducted by Amban's body-guard, and escorted by one company Mounted Infantry and two companies Royal Fusiliers. Amban again expressed sincere intention to induce Thibetans to make speedy settlement. On my return to camp I proceeded through heart of city. Large crowds looked on apathetically. I have received visits from Tongsa Penlop, Nepaulese Representative, and two Shapes. It appears that Dalai Lama is at Reteng, and has handed over his seal to a Regent to carry on business.

"No further opposition seems likely, and, after pressure from Amban, Tongsa Penlop, and Nepaulese Representative, Shapes were distinctly more subdued than before, and they presented me with 280 coolies' loads of tea, flour, butter, dried fruits, sugar, and peas, besides 1,500 rupees for the troops, and twenty yaks and fifty sheep, but they have not yet made signs of coming to business.

"I have, through Wilton, informed Amban's Secretary of terms of Convention, and have asked both Amban and Shapes to have Thibetan Delegates for negotiations definitely appointed. Bazaar has been opened outside camp, and 340 Thibetan, Chinese, Nepaulese, and Kashmiri traders brought produce there this morning."

(Repeated to Peking.)

No. 44.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 16.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated 13th August, respecting the ratification of the proposed Agreement with Thibet.

India Office, August 16, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 44.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

August 13, 1904.

YOUR telegram of the 1st instant. As regards Convention to be signed by Younghusband and Dalai Lama or his accredited Representatives, ratification by Viceroy, as proposed by you, is approved. I should be glad to learn whether it is customary, in the case of the Arabian and Indian Treaties referred to, for the Viceroy's ratification to be communicated to the other party.

As regards Convention with China to be signed by Amban, ratifications should be exchanged in London, the precedent of the Convention of 1890 being followed. Please instruct Younghusband to ascertain whether Amban has received from Emperor of China proper authority to sign Agreement.

No. 45.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 16.)

(B.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 15th instant, respecting Thibet affairs.

A copy will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, August 16, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 45.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, August 15, 1904.

THIBET. The instructions to Colonel Younghusband, as reported in your telegram of the 13th instant, are approved generally by His Majesty's Government. We wish them to be communicated to Colonel Younghusband and General Macdonald for their guidance, in the following specific form:—

1. Date on which return of force from Lhassa is to begin should be fixed by military authorities in consultation with Younghusband.

2. Having regard to probability that withdrawal of main force would be compromised or delayed if troops are engaged in pursuit of Dalai Lama, His Majesty's Government consider it undesirable to engage in such a pursuit.

3. Ultimatum to Dalai Lama should be drawn up, stating the penalties which will be exacted in the event of his refusing either to return and treat or to give the necessary authority for signature of Treaty.

4. Colonel Younghusband should take steps with a view to informing the Dalai Lama of these penalties. Before they are exacted the Dalai Lama should be given as long a period as possible in which to treat.

5. As regards the penalties to be inflicted—

(a.) You are conscious, as we know, of the objections that exist to any avoidable

affront to the Buddhist religion and the destruction of ancient and historical monuments. His Majesty's Government will, however, support you in any course you may consider required by the circumstances. We are not in a position here to give specific directions as to the particular buildings to be destroyed, should it unfortunately become necessary to take such measures, but we suggest that the arsenal, walls, and gateway of the town, or any buildings destruction of which would be likely to produce most lasting effect, should be demolished.

(b.) There is, in our opinion, no objection to valuables or treasures being taken as security, but the nature of the treasure to be so taken, and the question of the propriety of this course can only be judged by those on the spot. In no case must anything in the way of looting by the troops be permitted.

(c.) Thibetan Representatives may be taken back to Gyantse as hostages.

6. Younghusband should insist on the release of the two British subjects, as laid down in clause 3 of the terms.

7. In the event of it being found impossible to make a Treaty with Dalai Lama and Amban jointly, a Treaty, on the lines of the terms laid down in my telegram of the 26th July, should in any case be concluded with Amban.

It should be suggested to Younghusband that in all measures the Amban should, as far as possible, be officially associated with the action to be taken, and that, if practicable, his written assent should be obtained thereto.

No. 46.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 17.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 28th July, respecting Thibet affairs.

A copy has been sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, August 17, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 46.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ravenshaw to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

The Residency, Nepal, July 7, 1904.

IN continuation of my letter dated the 4th July, 1904, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a translation of a letter, dated the 24th May, from the Nepal Representative at Lhasa to the Prime Minister.

2. The letter is of more importance than usual, as it contains a definite and repeated request from the Chinese Amban to the Nepal Representative for some 2,000 or 3,000 Gurkha troops with the object of supporting the Amban to bring the Thibetans to a due sense of obedience to the orders of the Emperor of China, the calling in of Gurkha troops being explained to the British as necessary to put matters straight as to the Thibetans and to the Thibetans as assistance against the British. The Amban seems also to have in view the limiting of the power of the Potala Lama to matters spiritual and the appointment of some suitable secular authority to carry on the administration of the country.

3. The Government of India will no doubt be able correctly to gauge the purposes of the Amban, but, as his request does not now seem based on fear of personal danger, but on the special distinction lately conferred on the Prime Minister by the Emperor of China, while the Thibetans also expect armed assistance if reduced to extremities, the Prime Minister considered the position of such urgency as to call on me with the translation of the letter and to ask my advice.

4. As regards the Thibetans, they have already been warned by the Prime Minister to expect no assistance beyond good advice; but the Prime Minister said that if it would in any way tend to assist the interest of the Government of India he would send troops to help the Chinese, provided that the Amban could guarantee they were not attacked on the way. During further conversation the Prime Minister gave me to understand that he was anxious to increase the escort of his Representative, and that if troops

were sent he would take the opportunity of permanently locating a larger number of troops as a more suitable escort.

5. I explained to the Prime Minister that while it was extremely improbable that the dispatch of troops to assist the Amban in coercing the Thibetans would in any way assist the object of our Mission, it would certainly be misunderstood by the Thibetans and lead to complication which it was desirable to avoid, and that the Government of India were most anxious to avoid any action which might embroil Nepal in a matter purely between the Government of India and Thibet. I advised him to instruct the Representative to explain the position in suitable terms to the Amban and express his inability to meet his request.

The interview lasted for nearly an hour, and the Prime Minister left agreeing with my views and said he would instruct his Representative accordingly.

6. I trust the Government of India will approve my action.

Inclosure 2 in No. 46.

Letter from the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa (in cypher).

(Translation.)

WITH due respect, I beg to report to your Highness the following:—

In spite of the beneficial advice which your Highness had given to him, the Potala Lama, by following a contrary course, caused the loss of so many lives of the people of Thibet and is continuing to cause the loss of many more lives, bent upon, as he appears to be, the destruction of his own administration.

On Wednesday, the 6th Jestha, Sejunsay, the Chinese drill sergeant, came to me to say that the Khajanchi (treasurer) of the Amban had sent him with the following message, viz., that the Thibetans in the present Anglo-Thibetan dispute have not obeyed the orders of His Majesty the Emperor of China, and that the mediation of the Amba would be of no avail or would not fit in unless properly backed; that it might mean utter ruin to the administration of the country should the Potala Lama continue in power even after a settlement has been arrived at with the British, and so it would be advisable to limit the powers of the Potala Lama to matters spiritual, which was his proper function, and to have another person with such many-sided qualifications as are said to be possessed by the present Prime Minister of Nepal to look after the administration of the country; that on account of the distance of China, whence no immediate help to support the Amban could be expected, and as no one could find fault with, nor was there any objection to, China's taking the help of a country, or, more properly speaking, from a person who has been so highly honoured by the Celestial Emperor with a distinction which had been conferred on the four wangs only in the whole Empire, to do a thing which was right and just, some 2,000 or 3,000 Gurkha troops be brought to support the Amban, for the necessary expense to mobilize which, and also for all other expenses, a sanction had to be previously obtained from the Emperor of China, when if the British want to know the object of bringing up the troops, they might be informed that they were intended to put straight the Thibetans who had wrought so much mischief by disobeying even the order of the Emperor, and if the Thibetans made the same inquiry, they in turn be given to understand that in case the British would not listen to just and reasonable words, these troops were to help them, or, in other words, to remove the danger threatening the Thibetans, to uphold what is just, to put out the conflagration, and to set right the administration of the country; that the other day the Khajanchi, in accordance with the views entertained by the Amban, had sent him to me with a message to the above effect, to inquire whether or not the help of a force of 2,000 or 3,000 troops could be procured from the Nepal side; that now the Khajanchi wishes to know what I thought of the suggestion. He (Sejunsay) further said that reports have reached the Chinese to the effect that, from the tenor of the talk amongst the Thibetans it appeared that they took it that it was owing to the Chinese blundering in the past that the present difficulties have arisen, and, if the Chinese could, they should now mend matters; if not, since they have come to this pass, they would at this extremity first destroy the Chinese without caring much for what follows.

To this I sent a reply to the effect that the Thibetans would be fools to act against the handful of Chinese residents here in the manner described, which would surely bring on ruin to themselves, and that it was incomprehensible why they should act in that way prejudicial to their own interests, and that, as I was a little out-of-sorts, I could not go to the Yamun, but that I would do so when I could, to talk over the matter.

Later on, the Thakali (headman) of Tarusyapala came to inform me that he heard from some intimate Thibetan friends of his, who belonged to the higher circles, that there had been some talk in the Chhongdui Council to the effect that the Chinese were in league with the British, and that the boundary dispute was spoiled by those very Chinese, and that it also suspected that even now two or three Englishmen, disguised as Chinese, were in the retinue of the present Amban, and, therefore, the first thing that they should do would be to destroy the Amban and the Chinese. He had further heard that in a day or two—the precise date not being known—the monks of the monasteries would be employed to plunder the Chinese.

It will be observed that the above account tallies with what Galden Thiring Pochhay Lama had hinted to me the other day with regard to the suspicion entertained by the Thibetan Government, of the Amban having probably brought with him an Englishman.

The said Drill Sergeant, Sejunsay, called on me again the very next day, *i.e.*, Thursday, the 7th Jestha, and conveyed to me a message from the Khajanchi, which he assured me was confidential and in accordance with the views of the Amban. The message was to the following effect:—

“Instead of requesting the Amban to go to arrange affairs in such and such a way in the boundary dispute with the British, the Thibetans under various pretences did not allow him to go even when he himself volunteered for it. The Amban remained inactive so long to see to what lengths the Thibetans would go, and besides, he thought that it would be more effective should he proceed only when in the extremity they entreat him to mediate for them. On account of the foolishness of the Thibetans the matter has reached to such a crisis, and there is even the possibility of greater danger and consequent confusion in the administration of the country. Nobody has in the interval appeared where the British and the Thibetans have come in contact, to prevent them from falling out. At this juncture, should the Amban express a desire to proceed to negotiate on the frontier question, these stupid Thibetans, in their vanity, will do nothing but what will lead to the ruin of their own country. The matter is growing worse and worse every day; so if you will make the Kazies of the Kasyal to understand the situation and can prevail on them to send the Amban with a Kazi as soon as possible, it will better the prospect of the country; otherwise it will be past mending. Should the Thibetans not listen to your counsel, tendered again for their benefit, they will have to bear the brunt of the misfortune that will befall on them, and we too will then be prepared to prepare whatever befalls on us.”

Having conveyed to me the above message, he continued that I should speak on the subject of sending the Amban as if from my own side, without giving the Thibetans the least inkling that I was instigated by the Chinese to speak so.

I replied that I had already explained to them what was to be explained to them, and they must now be ruing for not having acted according to that advice, and that as it related to the well-being of the people, I would again try my best.

As it appeared that the Amban, having failed to impress the foolish Potala Lama, had sent to me the above message in a state of agitation, and as the very action of the Potala Lama—a raw and inexperienced youth of 30 years—has brought so much trouble to the country, which, if continued, might lead to a great war causing loss of many lives, the effects of which would reach even up to Lhassa, and unhinge all management and rule, and also as I understood that no reply had yet been sent to your Highness' letter to the Kazies, so to remind the Kazies about the same and to talk about the suggestion now put forward by the Ambans which tallied with your Highness' views on the subject, as also to explain over again your Highness' views on the situation, I, on the morning of the 8th Jestha, Friday, sent word to the Kasyal, saying that I would call there that day. In reply, I was told that the Chharong Kazi having been able to attend the office since two or three days, they were in consultation of writing out a reply to your Highness' letter, which reply they would now send soon, and that as nowadays they were much pressed for time on account of the expected arrival of sepoy from Sotalosang, they would beg to be excused for their inability to see me that day and even for two or three days after it, and that as of yore they had to go to the Linkore on the full-moon day, they would be glad to see me on the Adhik Jestha Badi 1st. I will accordingly call at the Kasyal office on that date and will report to your Highness of what transpires there.

The information that in two or three days some mischief was intended to be done against the Chinese, combined with the fact of the seeming agitation of the Amban, and the above reply to me from the Kasyal, made me apprehensive that something might

happen in the interval, and so I sent word to the Chharong Kazi, who was suffering from rheumatism or gout, and consequently attended the office only occasionally, and who appeared to be the cleverest of the Kazies, to say that I would call on him to inquire after his health, and paid a visit to him on the evening of Friday, the 8th Jestha. The notes of the conversation I had with him and also what I said to the Dhankuseo Kazi, the son of the Itu Kazi, who was formerly my Thibetan teacher, and who, having been appointed one of the new Kazies, has been ordered to go towards Nagarchay, are inclosed herewith for your Highness' perusal. I am trying my utmost to have the Amban and others sent.

Dated Tuesday, the 12th Jestha, 1961 (corresponding with the 24th May, 1904).

Notes of the Conversation.

Chharong Kazi.—I hope, Captain Sahab, you are doing well.

I.—Thank you, I am quite well. I hope that this indisposition of yours will soon pass off, but even up to now you could not get well, so I have come to inquire after your health.

Chharong Kazi.—It was very kind of you—many thanks.

[Here he gave an account of his disease.]

I.—It is beneficial to walk as much as possible when one is suffering from gout. Should you care to take our medicine I can give you some. A clever person like yourself, if laid down with disease at such a busy time like this, is a great loss to the administration of the country. Now, speaking of business, last year his Highness the Maharaja sent his advices to the late Kazies of the Kasyal, and at the present time you were also addressed on the same subject, of which you are well aware. (Here I repeated to him all that your Highness had written to them, and continued.) Had your predecessors in office following the counsel so given, acted up to it, the present difficulty in which you were placed would never have arisen and it would have gone well with the Thibetan Government. To cause the death of so many innocent lives for nothing and to bring in disorder in the administration of the State is not the work of a capable man. Irrespective of what has been done before, it is on you that the praise or censure would fall now. People may make such an adverse comment as that, in the time of such and such Potala Lama and such and such Kazies, misfortune befell upon them and their administration was unhinged in such and such a way. You should try to avoid such comment. Even the commonest of men live and have their food, but you know it is the Kings and Ministers who should look after the well-being of the subjects and should live and act in such a manner as to earn a fair name. Had the advice given by our Maharaja last year been followed, the matter would have been very easily settled. Now, though you are high up in your difficulties and in spite of all the previous confusions, I would advise you to look up to the Emperor of China with the same respect and regard as you have hitherto shown, and, taking the advice you have received from our Maharaja in its proper light, write to his Highness a reply setting forth facts as are just and proper and send the Amba with the Kazies immediately for negotiation, having due regard to the well-being of the Potala Lama and the Government of Thibet. I understand that there is an inclination to suspect and look down upon the Chinese. Any disrespect shown to those whom you have so long respected will bring contempt on you and put you in difficulty. Justice and equity reign everywhere. One should carry out his project, showing proper regard to those who were held in respect before. To take a leap in the dark foolishly is an unjustifiable act, as everyone, being bound by justice and equity, cannot uphold it, so one should be careful to weigh his own actions to avoid the censure of high-handedness. Keeping all these things in view, you no doubt know how to guide your actions.

Chharong Kazi.—When I was sent to negotiate with the British on the Ghambajhong side, in the conversation I had with the British officers they expressed a desire to open trade and exchange letters with Thibet, and to uphold the boundary-line established by the Hrintarin Amban. But as the British are *mlechhas** and of different religion, and by virtue of the long-standing engagement made in writing not to allow them in Thibet nor to exchange letters with them, and also because the boundary settlement, which was

* Meaning an unclean race, and which makes no distinction between clean and unclean food; also a barbarian, or one who speaks any language but Sanskrit.

not accepted by us, being a document prepared by the said Amban only, we would not accept those proposals. Secondly, as there were Chinese, Thibetan, and British officials at Gnatong, the Thibetans requested the British to retire to that place, where then the Amban and Kazies would come to meet and negotiate with them. Great as the British Government is, it was quite improper for their officials to forcibly enter our territory and to come to Ghambajhong with an armed force. I tried to impress the views of my Government on them. But I was told, in reply, that unless representatives with full powers, such as the principal Kazies, Bharadars, and Amban came to discuss matters they would have nothing to do with us. We said that we, the Dhaibun and Dhuikshemu, were properly-appointed officials of the Thibetan Government, and if they spoke to us what was just we could settle the question at once, and that if it were anything which we could not settle we would represent the same to our Government and get a decision for them. They, however, said that if we could not decide one and all of the pending questions they thought it useless to negotiate with us. For a few days matters stood still. Subsequently news came of the withdrawal of the British force and officers from Ghambajhong, when we hoped they would go to the Gnatong boundary, where we thought of sending also our Bharadars or officers to transact business. Soon after I fell ill, and I was away at home on sick leave, when I suddenly heard that the British have come to Phari, and now, after having killed many of our subjects for nothing, they have forced their way up to Gyanchi. Things have come to such a pass. At this juncture if I were to speak out outright what I think that may or may not be liked by others. I tried to send in a resignation on a plea that though I have been favoured with such a high post as that of a Kazi, yet on account of my ill-health I could not discharge the duties attached to the said office, but that resignation was not accepted. It is indeed a great favour that such an honourable post as that of a Kazi is given to me, who knows little or knows nothing, and I am in duty bound to look to and act for the interest and well-being of the Potala Lama and the country, which I shall do to the best of my ability. As to your reference to the Khendechhega, I beg to say that the Russians are as much of *melechha* and Englishmen as the British; they are of the very same religion as the British, as much as blood from the same body is alike, and consequently such transactions from the side of Thibet would be at once strange and impossible. I for my part do not think it in the least likely, but as I was ill and in my bed, and as I have recently been to the council for one or two days only, and as still I am not free from any complaint, I am not in possession of all the details. I shall now master the details and send to his Highness such facts as are of any importance. But I request you to continue to write to his Highness in a proper manner on matters relating to the well-being of Thibet. When we are reduced to the last extremity, will not the Gurkha Government help us with 5,000 to 6,000 troops?

I.—You will no doubt come to know of the facts of the Khendechhega having brought in wealth and property from Russia to this place, and of his sayings and doings from the letter which his Highness addressed to the Kasyal Council. I was also taken to task as I could not gather the details from the Kasyal and send those to his Highness. Taking into consideration the friendly relation so long existing with Thibet, our Maharaja has openly given his sincere opinion on matters dealt with in those letters, and I hope in return you will also write to his Highness equally sincerely of all that had taken place in the past (and up till now), owning up your own mistake and stating what is reasonable and what will hold in future. As high and low alike bend before justice, and as an unjust and high-handed action from one side will never prove satisfactory to any one because of its injustice, so justice in the end gains the day, the necessary help coming somehow. But one should at the outset see whether he is in the wrong, and should not accuse only others. Because your predecessors in office (the former Kazies) did not care to act according to the advice given by our Maharaja, so you are in such deep water now. As you are well aware, our boundary in several places is in touch with the British, and even then, as we have strictly observed the Treaty clauses, there has been no difficulty; on the contrary, it has been beneficial. Similarly, by a Treaty with you, up till now both the Gurkha and Thibetan Governments are living as cordially as two brothers. Our Gurkha Government having Treaty relations with both, and in consideration of the friendly feelings toward Thibet, gave you detailed advice for the good of Thibet. You are now repenting, as you did not follow his counsel, and will have yet to repent bitterly. So do now pay attention to the advice, and with Amban, Kazies, and Bharadars, set about mending matters, or otherwise inevitable ruin is at hand for Thibet.

Notes of Conversation with Dhunkuseo, a newly-appointed Kazi, and the son of the Kazi.

1.—I hear you are posted towards Nagarchay. From the way in which you are conducting yourself here, it appears to me that you are still bent upon fighting with the British. You were once my teacher, and to-day you are on your way towards Nagarchay as a Kazi, so I consider it my sacred duty to give you the following advice:— You are well aware of the advice given by our Maharaja to you Kazies of the Kasyal in previous and recent letters. If you had taken that advice, affairs would not have taken this turn. Now you are going. On your arrival try by sending some person from your side to the British officers to proceed amicably. Should any difficulty arise you may call in the Chinese, and with their help settle the business in a friendly way. If you go to war it will never be to your advantage. Considering that, by all manner of means you should try to do your best to do good to the Potala Lama and the Thibetans. It would be better if you, on your arrival there, send to the Potala Lama full details of the on-goings of the place, of the strength and means of your side, as about what would be just and beneficial to both sides, and do so without being biassed. Indeed, it would be better if you try to settle this matter by words without coming to blows. Should you come to blows and begin hostilities, you will never prosper. Calling God to witness and in your presence who was my teacher, I earnestly tell you never to countenance an act which will throw in chaotic confusion the Thibetan Administration, and will cause the useless sacrifice or destruction of several lives. Consider to what sanctity you will arrive if, when you are born of a human being, you can set right a matter like the present.

Dhunkuseo.—You know that as I had all along held such posts as Phapoon, Labran, and Dhwanji in the Civil Department, and as I am not of active habits, I had no inclination for this honour of Kaziship. When suddenly I received an order from the Potala Lama to proceed at once as a Kazi to Nagarchay, I represented to my elder brother or cousin, Chikhiap Khembu, that I could not possibly discharge properly the duties of a Kazi, and was told that at a time like this a representation to the effect should not be made before the Potala Lama. So I had no alternative left but to go. I shall start in a day or two, and will remember what you have advised. You will also continue to write to his Highness about matters relating to the welfare of Thibet.

1.—The wake of justice should be followed by every one, and should you on your side act according to justice, we on our side will render every help to avoid a war as far as we can.

Inclosure 3 in No. 46.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Gyantse, July 9, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to make the following detailed report of the communications I have recently had with the Thibetan Delegates to test their willingness to undertake formal negotiations:—

2. Though the Commanders in the jong had returned the letters I had under your directions written to the Dalai Lama and the Amban, announcing that if they did not send proper negotiators to meet me by the 25th June we would advance to Lhasa, yet they knew the contents of these letters from an open letter which I sent with them. They were also informed of the same by the Tongsa Penlop, who had come from Bhutan to see General Macdonald and myself, and who, after seeing General Macdonald and all our military preparations in Chumbi, and being informed that unless the Thibetans sent negotiators by the 25th June, an advance to Lhasa would be made, had written to the Dalai Lama, warning him of the danger which threatened him and advising him to send negotiators in time.

3. While returning from Chumbi, I received at Kangma, on the 24th June, an intimation by telegraph from the Tongsa Penlop to say he had heard from the Shape Ta Lama (the Lama Member of Council) that the Dalai Lama wished a settlement to be made, and he was on his way to Gyantse for the purpose. The Tongsa Penlop also asked to be allowed to come to Gyantse. I replied to the Tongsa Penlop, asking him to

come at once, and I asked for and obtained the permission of the Government of India to defer the advance to Lhasa for five days to give the negotiators a chance of coming in.

4. In consequence of the fight at Naini on the way here, I arrived here too late on the 26th to send a message to the Delegates on that day, but on the following morning I caused a lama in my employ to write letters to the Shape, who was at Nagartse, and the Ta Lama, who was on his way up from Shigatse, intimating to them that I had heard from the Tongsa Penlop that they were coming here to negotiate, and that, if they were sincere in their intentions, I would guarantee their security and treat them with respect but that they must come in quickly, as we were about to advance to Lhasa.

5. On the 28th June General Macdonald captured the Thibetan position at the Tse Chen monastery, and, impressed by this, the Commanders in the Jong on the following morning sent a flag of truce with a message by the bearer to the effect that my letter to the Shape at Nagartse had been brought in to them; a Council had been held to consider it, and it had been decided to ask us to grant an armistice to enable the Ta Lama to reach here. I consulted with General Macdonald, and, as it was a convenience to him to have an armistice, I replied that I was prepared to grant one for the purpose, and I sent the terms upon which it was made in writing to the Ta Lama. A copy of these terms is appended.

6. The Ta Lama was very deliberate in his movements, and I was willing that military operations against the Jong should be resumed, as the Ta Lama had been specially informed that he could always come in under a flag of truce. But General Macdonald was willing to continue to suspend them, so the armistice was informally prolonged.

7. The Tongsa Penlop, though he had considerably further to travel, came in here at midday on the 1st July and immediately came to see me. I thanked him for the efforts which he was making to effect a settlement, and asked him if the Thibetans were really in earnest in their intentions. We certainly wished to make a settlement, I said, but, as he knew, we were perfectly ready to go to Lhasa if necessary. He assured me that the Dalai Lama really wished for a settlement, and had written him a letter, of which I have the honour to inclose a translation, asking him to assist in making one, and naming Delegates whom he was sending for that purpose. The Tongsa Penlop also produced a packet of silks, which he said the Dalai Lama had sent me. But, as I doubted whether the packet had really been sent by the Dalai Lama, I told the Tongsa Penlop that it was not our custom to receive presents of this nature unless they were either accompanied by a letter or handed by an official of the dignitary who sent them.

8. About 3 in the afternoon the Ta Lama arrived in Gyantse, and I sent a message to say I should be glad to see him that afternoon. He replied that he proposed to visit the Tongsa Penlop on the following day, and would come and see me some time after that. I returned a message to the effect that unless he visited me by 9 on the following morning military operations would be resumed. Undisturbed by this threat, he shortly after 9 on the following morning proceeded to visit the Tongsa Penlop, but, as he had to pass my camp, I sent out Captain O'Connor to say that I insisted on his coming to pay his respects to me unless he wished me to consider he was not anxious to negotiate. He was at perfect liberty to discuss matters with the Tongsa Penlop, but he must no longer delay paying his respects to me and giving me evidence that the Thibetan Government were sincere in their wish to negotiate.

9. At 11 I received the Ta Lama and the Tongsa Penlop in Darbar. There were also present the Tung-yig-Chembo (the Grand Secretary, who was one of the Delegates at Khamba Jong last year) and six representatives of the three great Lhasa monasteries. As all except the Grand Secretary were men who had not met me before and were probably ignorant of our view of the situation, I recounted it at length, showing how we had lived on very good terms with Thibet for nearly a century and a-half, and it was only after the Thibetans had wantonly invaded Sikkim territory in 1886 that misunderstanding had arisen; that Mr. White had for years tried at Yatung to make them observe the Treaty made on their behalf by the Chinese, and that when I came to Khamba Jong, a place of meeting which the Viceroy had been informed was approved of both by the Emperor of China and the Dalai Lama, they still repudiated the old Treaty, refused to negotiate a new one, or have any intercourse at all with us, while after my arrival here, when I told them I was ready to negotiate, instead of sending me negotiators, they sent soldiers and treacherously attacked me at night. I concluded by saying that the Viceroy, on hearing this, had directed me to write letters to the Dalai Lama and the Amban, announcing that if proper negotiators did not arrive here by the 25th June we would advance to Lhasa to compel negotiations there but,

these letters had been returned by the Commanders in the jong, no negotiators had arrived here by the 25th, and it was only because on the 24th the Tongsa Penlop had informed me that negotiators really were on the way that the King-Emperor, in his anxiety for a peaceful settlement, had been graciously pleased to grant them a few days' grace. We were ready to go on to Lhasa the next day; we had the soldiers, we had the guns, we even had boats on which to cross the Brahmaputra; and while the army here would move on Lhasa, a second army was collecting in Chumbi Valley to take the place of this one when it moved on, and a third army was ready in India to march on Chumbi. If they were really in earnest and had power to make a settlement, I was ready to negotiate with them. If they were not prepared to make a settlement, we would advance to Lhasa forthwith. Had they proper credentials?

10. The Grand Secretary replied on behalf of the Ta Lama that we had come by force into the country and occupied Chumbi and Phari, and though the Thibetan soldiers at Guru had strict orders not to fire on us, we had fired on them and killed all the high officials. He said they did not know I was here when this camp was attacked on the 5th May. But they now had orders to negotiate with me. They had no special credentials, but the Dalai Lama, in his letter to the Tongsa Penlop, had mentioned that they were coming to negotiate, and the fact of a man in the Ta Lama's high position being here was evidence of their intentions.

11. I replied that I did not wish to discuss the past, except to make clear one point. They were not at the Guru fight, but I was, and I saw the first shot fired by the Thibetans after General Macdonald had purposely restrained his men from firing. But what concerned me was the future. If they made a settlement with me now, would it be observed or would it be repudiated like the last one? They at first replied that this would depend upon what was in the settlement; but subsequently explained that, though they might have to refer to Lhasa for orders, yet once the Dalai Lama had placed his seal on a Treaty, it would be scrupulously observed. They said they wished to talk matters over with the Tongsa Penlop, who would act as mediator and arrange matters with me. I informed them that I would be very glad if they would discuss the situation with him, and I was quite willing that he should accompany them when they came to see me, but they themselves must come to me if they desired that negotiations should take place. They said they would have a talk with him the next day and come and see me the day after. I told them, however, that they must have their talk before noon on the following day and come and see me again at that hour, as I was not yet satisfied of the earnestness of their intentions.

12. The same afternoon they had a prolonged interview with the Tongsa Penlop, who asked them what they had gained by their silly attitude of obstruction, and advised them to give up fighting and make terms with us. The Tongsa Penlop informed me he thought the Delegates, or certainly the Dalai Lama, were really anxious to make a settlement, and suggested my giving them a written paper showing them exactly what our demands would be. He added that the Thibetans were anxious to make a settlement with us, irrespective of the Chinese, with whom they were not at present on good terms.

13. On the 3rd July, the Tongsa Penlop arrived half-an-hour before the time fixed for the reception of the Delegates. At noon I took my seat in the Darbar, which was attended by General Macdonald and many military officers, while a strong guard of honour lined the approach. I waited for half-an-hour, but as at the end of that time the Thibetan Delegates had not arrived, I rose and dismissed the Darbar. At 1:30 the Thibetan Delegates appeared. They were shown to a spare tent, and shortly before 4 I received them in Darbar, but to mark my displeasure I did not rise from my seat, and I informed them that the inference I drew from the disrespect they had shown me in arriving an hour and a-half late was that they were not in earnest in desiring a settlement. The Ta Lama assured me that they were really in earnest, but that the Grand Secretary was ill.

14. I then informed them that as I had been attacked here without any warning, and after I had written repeatedly to the Amban saying I was waiting here to negotiate, and as I had been fired on from the Jong continually for two months since the attack, I must ask them to evacuate the Jong. General Macdonald was prepared to give them till noon of the 5th—that is, nearly two days—in which to effect the evacuation, but if after that time the Jong was occupied, he would commence military operations against it. Irrespective of these operations I would, however, be ready to receive them if they wished to make a settlement and prevent the necessity of our proceeding to Lhasa.

15. The Grand Secretary, in reply, said that when the attack was made on the

post they were quite unaware that I was in it. We now have accurate information from Lhasa, dated nine days before the attack was made, stating that a night attack on the British camp was contemplated. It was, of course, perfectly well known to all about that I was here. So I told the Grand Secretary, whom we know to be at the bottom of a great deal of the present trouble, that I should be obliged to write to the Dalai Lama declining to negotiate with a man who told falsehood as he did.

16. He then said that if the Thibetan troops withdrew from the Jong, they would expect that we also would withdraw our troops. otherwise the Thibetans would be suspicious. I replied that the Thibetans would have to remain suspicious, that they did not at all seem to realize that they would have to pay a penalty for the insult they had offered the British Representative, and that I could not discuss the matter further; they must either leave the Jong peaceably before noon on the 5th or expect to be then turned out by force. On leaving, the Ta Lama very politely and respectfully expressed his regrets for having kept me waiting, and begged that I would not be angry. But the Grand Secretary, though looking thoroughly shamefaced, went away without a word of apology.

17. The following morning the Delegates had a long interview with the Tongsa Penlop, and asked whether time could not be given them to refer to Lhasa for orders. I sent back a message, saying that it was already nearly a week since I had let the Ta Lama know that the evacuation of the Jong would be demanded, that they ought to be grateful for the opportunity that had been given them of withdrawing unmolested, and that no further grace could be allowed.

18. The Tongsa Penlop also informed me that they were very suspicious, that we would go on to Lhasa all the same after we had got them to evacuate the fort, and wanted an assurance that we really wished a settlement. I told him he might inform them that the best evidence that we desired a settlement was the fact that the control of affairs was in my hands. If we had intended war, the control would have been in the hands of a General. We wanted a settlement, but were ready to make war if a settlement was refused.

19. The Delegates and the Commanders in the Jong were still undecided. No one would take the responsibility of evacuating the Jong. On the morning of the 5th the Tongsa Penlop with some Lhasa lamas came to see me, and I sent one of the latter over to the Delegate, saying that at 12 a signal gun would be fired to warn them that half-an-hour afterwards firing would commence. I told them that if they came over either before or after with a flag of truce they would be given an asylum in the Tongsa Penlop's camp. I begged that the women and children should be taken out of the town. And I sent a special warning to General Ma.

20. No notice was taken of any of those warnings. At 12 I had a signal gun fired, and at 12:30 I heliographed to General Macdonald that he was free to commence firing. At 1:45 he began his military operations, which, planned with great skill and carried out with the utmost gallantry, resulted in the capture of the Jong on the afternoon of the 6th and in the dispersal of the Thibetan forces.

21. Immediately after the capture of the Jong the Tongsa Penlop sent a message of congratulations, and I asked him to try and find the Thibetan Delegates and tell them and the Shape at Nagartse that I was still ready to negotiate as previously announced, but that they must come in at once if they wished a settlement, otherwise we would proceed to Lhasa. It was found, however, that the Delegates had fled. It is now three days since the Jong was captured, and nothing further has been heard of them.

Inclosure 4 in No. 46.

Political Diary of the Thibet Frontier Commission.

July 4, 1904.—Minimum temperature, 46°.

The Thibetan Delegates held a long conference with the Tongsa Penlop, and returned to the Jong, saying that they would consult with the military leaders and give a reply on the following morning.

July 5.—Minimum temperature, 52°.

The Tongsa Penlop came to visit the British Commissioner informally about 10:30 A.M. He said the Thibetans had as yet given no reply to our ultimatum, but had sent some Lhasa monks with an evasive message, asking for further delay. Colonel

Younghusband sent a warning to the Jong that hostilities would commence punctually at 12:30, and urging the removal of all women and children. He sent a similar warning to Colonel Ma. At noon a signal gun was fired, and at 1:45 some shells were fired against the Jong, and a demonstration was made during the afternoon against the north-western side of the monastery.

July 6.—Minimum temperature, 52°.

At 3:30 A.M. three storming columns, starting from Palha house, attacked the town, and established themselves in the outskirts. At 4 P.M., after the artillery had succeeded in making a practicable breach in the wall of the Jong, the Gurkhas, with great gallantry, stormed the breach and entered the Jong. The Thibetans then fled into the monastery, and the whole Jong was occupied before nightfall.

July 7.—Minimum temperature, 50°.

A messenger sent by the Tongsa Penlop to inform the Thibetan Delegates that the British Commissioner was still ready to treat with them, found the monastery empty, all the Thibetan troops having fled. Colonel Younghusband, accompanied by the Tongsa Penlop, visited the Jong, and the Tongsa Penlop subsequently went over the monastery.

July 8.—Minimum temperature, 49°.

A column marched to Dongtse, where large stores of food-grain were discovered.

July 9.—Minimum temperature, 45°.

Colonel Younghusband paid a formal visit to the Tongsa Penlop, and informed him that the Government of India were not convinced of the sincerity of Thibetan Delegates, and could no longer delay the advance to Lhasa.

A reconnoitring party proceeded to Penam Jong, some 20 miles below Dongtse. The Jong was found quite deserted, and the country everywhere quiet. The Thibetan soldiers are reported by the country people to have dispersed to their homes. The Thibetan Delegates appear to have gone in the direction of Nangkartse.

July 10.—Minimum temperature, 46°.

(Signed) F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND,
British Commissioner for Thibet Frontier Matters.

Camp Gyantse, July 11, 1904.

No. 47.

Sir C. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 402.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, August 16, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a summary of an article in the "St. Petersburg Gazette," expressing satisfaction at the news of British successes in Thibet as a gain to civilization, and in no way interfering with Russian interests.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 47.

Newspaper Extract.

THE Russian "St. Petersburg Gazette" of the 28th July (10th August), 1904, contains an article on the subject of Thibet, in which it expresses the opinion that the success of the English should be welcomed as a gain to civilization. Some Russians seem to regard the English expedition as a menace to Russia. But the distance from Thibet to Siberia is too great, and the roads are too bad, for the British forces to advance on Russian territory. As for Russia she possesses already too much sand and desert for her to wish to occupy Thibet. Even if Russia wished to attack India (which she does not), Thibet is not the best way in. And if there are any dreamers who play with the idea of a Russian occupation of Thibet, they should abandon their dreams now. For now the object of Russia is to secure not additional territory in the heart of the continent, but access to the open sea. We have neither the time nor the means for such dreams. The key of the Pacific is worth a thousand Thibets.

No. 48.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 19.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 18th August, regarding the Thibet Mission.

(A copy will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.)

India Office, August 19, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 48.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

August 18, 1904.

I HAVE communicated to Younghusband the instructions contained in your telegram of the 16th instant.

Telegraphic report, dated Lhasa, the 11th August, has been received from Younghusband, to the effect that Dalai Lama, accompanied, it is believed, by Dorjieff, is at Nagchuka, eight marches to the north of Lhasa. Mission has transferred its quarters to the best house in the city. Supplies which were requisitioned from Depung Monastery are being brought in, and supplies have also been requisitioned from Sera Monastery. Younghusband paid visit to the Amban on the 16th August, and impressed upon him responsibility which lies on the Chinese Government to make the Thibetans conclude a settlement. Amban expressed himself as personally most anxious to work with Younghusband, and stated that he had sent a message to the Dalai Lama urging him to come back to Lhasa. Amban has sent Wilton, unofficially, written reply of the Thibetans to our terms. Reply is highly unsatisfactory, all our points being refused by Thibetans, who enter into arguments about boundary and, while offering Rinchengong as trade mart, refuse to agree to other marts being opened in future. They decline to pay any indemnity, saying we ought to pay them an indemnity instead of their paying one to us. This document has been returned by Younghusband to the Amban, with an intimation that he could not officially receive so preposterous a reply.

(Repeated toeking.)

No. 49.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 22.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 20th August, on the subject of the Thibet Mission.

India Office, August 22, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 49.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

August 20, 1904.

REPORT, dated the 14th August, from Lhasa contains the following news. Amban says that National Assembly's first reply to our terms has been returned by him to the Thibetans, with an intimation that they must be more amenable. It is stated by two Shapes who came to see Younghusband that the Assembly's reply was intended for the Amban only; it was hoped that he would be able to secure more favourable terms. This statement is confirmed by Ta Rimpoche, who presides over Assembly and who now has the Dalai Lama's seal in his keeping, though he is not

empowered to use it. It is reported that Assembly have written to Dalai Lama, who has fled to Nagchukha and possibly beyond, asking him to return to Lhasa; they are said to be angry with him in consequence of his flight. Supplies, both at Lhasa and on line of route, are coming in satisfactorily. Thibetans acknowledge their defeat, and the common people are well disposed; only the monks display opposition, and even they are beginning to realise that we have the monasteries at our mercy. It has been made clear to the Thibetans by Younghusband that the terms stated represent the minimum that will be accepted by us.

(Repeated to Peking.)

No. 50.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 22.)

(No. 178.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Peking, August 22, 1904.

THIBET Mission.

I am informed by the Chinese Government that they are sending instructions to Mr. Parr to consider his mission at an end, since the Amban has now entered into direct communication with the British Representatives.

No. 51.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 23.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 4th August, 1904, relative to the affairs of Thibet.

A copy has been sent to the Director of Military Operations, War Office.

India Office, August 23, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 51.

Translation of a Letter from the Dalai Lama addressed to the Tong-sa Penlop of Bhutan.

BY the blessing of God, the religions of Thibet and of Bhutan are the same. I have understood the contents of the letter, as well as the verbal message recently brought to me by the Serkhang Tul-ku and the Nye-ma Gyal-po Jongpon. I also understood the contents of the letter which you previously sent to me by the Serkhang Tul-ku, saying that it would be well to conclude a Treaty; I am pleased also to hear by word of mouth from the Serkhang Tul-ku that it is your intention to proceed to the Chumbi Valley with a view to saving the lives of all living creatures. A long time has now passed since the negotiations which took place at the conclusion of the Sikkim war of 1888-1889.

The English very well recollect that the Treaty which was then concluded was made between the Chinese and the English without in any way consulting the Thibetans. Last year the English came without permission to Khamba Jong, and afterwards crossed the Yatung barrier and advanced up the Chumbi Valley to Phari and Gurü. We had only a few men to safeguard our frontier, and with them a quarrel arose. Our men did not strike the first blow, and it will be known later, after careful inquiry, who began the quarrel. Both you and we are obliged to observe the frontier in accordance with the orders of the Emperor Chen-lung, as you are well aware from numerous communications which we have sent you. The English Government have sent us many communications, but according to our ancient national covenant the bearers and recipients of such letters are subject to heavy penalties, and it is impossible for us to receive or to answer them. Now we are all resolved, monks and laymen alike, that according as the English behave to us so we will behave to them; if they want war we will fight, if they want peace we will be peaceful. But I,

fearing that to both sides great misfortunes may arise, am much grieved in mind. Now you have often sent me word that it will be well to effect a settlement; and the English have fixed a date upon which the Thibetan Representatives should arrive, saying that if they do not come they will assemble a large force and that the Viceroy has ordered them to wage war with Thibet even if it lasts for twenty years. So I have dispatched the Ka-ton Lama, the Grand Secretary, Lo-Sang Tin-le, and representatives of the three great Lhasa monasteries to conduct negotiations. When they arrive at Gyantse, please assist in making a Treaty between Thibet and the English. I intrust you with this duty, and beg you to help the Thibetan Delegates and to see that they are not seized or killed. Please send me quickly any private news you have. I will send the Serkhang Tul-ku after you with full instructions. I send you eight pieces (squares) of fine silk.—Dated the 5th day of the 5th month of the Wood Dragon year (18th June, 1904).

Inclosure 2 in No. 51.

Terms of Armistice.

WE give a guarantee not to occupy the Jong if evacuated peaceably. The Thibetans give a similar one not to re-occupy.

2. The defences made since the attack on the Mission to be demolished; we have the right to send a periodical patrol accompanied by Thibetan officers detailed by the Shape to see the Jong is empty.

3. That Thibetan armed force, other than personal guard of negotiators, be removed beyond Karo La, Yang La, and Dongtse.

4. That we remove restrictions regarding use of river water.

5. That villagers may return to villages and resume occupations.

6. That supplies we may require will be paid for.

7. That any infringement of above conditions entitles me to take military measures to enforce their observation.

Inclosure 3 in No. 51.

Mr. Garrett to Government of Bengal.

(Confidential.)

Darjeeling, July 18, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith my Confidential report for the week ending Saturday, the 16th instant.

2. One Phupu Tshiring arrived at Kalimpong during the week. This man had been seen by my special agent at Khamba Jong last year, when he appeared to be in attendance upon the Thibetan General Teling. The agent accordingly detained him, pending instructions, and reported the matter. Upon inquiry it has been ascertained that the man is a Sikkim-Bhutia, and not a Thibetan, and that he is an orderly of the Maharajah of Sikkim, and had come in to Kalimpong on a perfectly unobjectionable message from his master to the manager of the Government estates. The explanation given of his apparently having been in attendance on Teling last year is that he had been sent by his master to buy certain carpets, and was waiting with Teling till the carpets arrived from Thibet.

3. My agent at Ghoom has heard that, at the last annual sacred ceremony (held in March 1904) of the three great monasteries, the Oracle of the Depon Monastery prophesied that the British Mission would proceed to Lhasa itself, and it would be useless to try and prevent it, as the time for the invasion of Thibet had come.

4. I have nothing further to report for this week.

Inclosure 4 in No. 51.

Colonel Younghusband to the Government of India.

Gyantse, July 13, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a letter which I have written to the Chinese Imperial Resident at Lhasa, informing him of my intended advance to Lhasa.

Inclosure 5 in No. 51.

Colonel Younghusband to Yu Tai, Chinese Imperial Resident at Lhasa.

Gyantse, July 12, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, as neither your Excellency nor any Thibetan negotiators possessing proper power or authority to make a settlement have come to negotiate with me here, I am proceeding to Lhasa. My purpose is still to negotiate, but I must ask your Excellency to prevent the Thibetans from further opposing my Mission. I have received the orders of His Majesty's Government as to the terms which I must demand of the Thibetan Government. These terms will be made more severe if I am still further opposed. But if no further opposition is offered to me by the Thibetans, no further fighting will be initiated by us. I must in any case, however, advance to Lhasa to effect the settlement which I have found it impossible to effect either at Khamba Jong or here.

No. 52.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 24.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 23rd August, relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, August 24, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 52.

Government of India to Mr. Broderick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

August 23, 1904.

NEWS from Lhasa, dated the 17th August, is as follows:—

“At the instance of the Amban, the two Lachung prisoners have been released by the Shaps in open Durbar. The men were well, and 200 yaks having been seized in retaliation at Giaogong, further compensation was not required. Attitude much more satisfactory of Thibetan Government and people, and supplies freely coming in. The party in favour of settlement is growing in strength, and it is now hoped that even the revision of the trade regulations may be carried out at Lhasa. Ta Rimpoche is making overtures to Younghusband, who, in return is showing him special attention as the principal in negotiations. Amban says that the seal in Ta Rimpoche's possession is not sufficient for the Treaty, but recognizes him as principal in the negotiations. Dalai Lama has been summoned to return by the Amban; if summons is not obeyed, Amban proposes to denounce Dalai Lama to the Emperor, effect of which he says will be to reduce him to a private person. Amban would then invite Tashi Lama, of Shigatse, to assume the government in accordance with precedent. Amban has been requested by Younghusband to quote the precedents for this course. Younghusband considers that it will be possible, even should Dalai Lama not return, to

negotiate satisfactory Convention in the manner proposed by the Amban, the Convention being sealed also by the heads of the three great monasteries and by the National Assembly. Rough draft of Adhesion Agreement has been communicated to the Amban for remarks.

(Repeated to Peking.)

No. 53.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 25.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a letter from the Government of India, Secret, dated the 28th July last, relative to Thibetan affairs.

A copy has been sent to the Director of Military Intelligence, War Office.

India Office, August 24, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 53.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Secret.)

Sir,

Simla, July 28, 1904.

IN continuation of our Secret despatch, dated the 30th June, 1904, we have the honour to forward, for the information of His Majesty's Government, a copy of further correspondence regarding Thibetan affairs.

2. We also inclose, with reference to your telegram of the 26th July, 1904, a copy of the draft Convention to be concluded at Lhasa between the British Government and Thibet, supplemented by an Agreement to be signed by the Amban on behalf of the Government of China. We would explain that the portions in italics* in the draft have been inserted provisionally, pending receipt of your reply to our telegram of the 11th July, 1904.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

AMPTHILL.
KITCHENER.
E. FG. LAW.
E. R. ELLES.
A. T. ARUNDEL.
DENZIL IBBETSON.
H. ERLE RICHARDS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 53.

Mr. Walsh to Colonel Younghusband.

Chumbi, June 8, 1904.

IN continuation of my telegram of to-day's date, in which I have given the main points of the interview which I had with the Tongsa Penlop, to whom I paid a return visit at Eusakha yesterday, I have the honour to submit the following full report of the interview. The interview was of an informal character, and none of his attendants were present at it.

2. He informed me that he had that morning dispatched a letter to the Dalai Lama by the Dugye Jongpon and Lama Serkhang Tulku, and another to the Ta Lama, who is Chief Minister of the Dalai Lama, and over the four Shapes, and who is at present at Shigatse, advising them to send the Chief Secretary (Chi-Khyab Khempo) and one of the Shapes to negotiate at Gyantse within nineteen days, which was the limit of time stated to him by General Macdonald.

3. He said that he thought the Thibetan Mongolians and also the people of Gyarong and the other seventeen Eastern Kingdoms would fight for the Thibetans, and as although these kingdoms are under China, they owe spiritual allegiance to the Dalai Lama, and would fight for him.

* Printed within brackets.

4. He repeated what he said at the former interview, that the Dalai Lama and the Thibetan Government would escape from Lhasa before the Mission arrived there, and said that he thought the Dalai Lama would either escape to Thibetan Mongolia or to Kham. He might possibly be influenced by Tshan-nyid Khampo (Cheni Khempo) to escape to Russian Mongolia, but he did not think this probable, as he was very displeased with Tshan-nyid Khampo for having intrigued with Russia and so brought on all the present troubles.

5. He said that when the Dalai Lama received the presents which Tshan-nyid Khampo brought for Russia he did not know that they were the presents of the Russian Government or he would have refused to receive them, but supposed that they were the offerings of Buddhists in Russian Mongolia. I said that this seemed very unlikely, as the Dalai Lama had sent a return Mission to St. Petersburg, which he would certainly not have done if he had been unaware of the source of the presents, or if he had been unwilling to enter into relations with Russia.

6. He said that Tshan-nyid Khampo was a great friend of the Dalai Lama's tutor, Gyama Rinpoche, and in that way was able to influence the Dalai Lama, and that Gyama Rinpoche has died two or three years ago.

7. He said that he had inquired from Lama Serkhang Tulku, and that there were no Russians in Lhasa, or elsewhere in Thibet, but that it was probable that Russian Buriats were assisting the Thibetan forces.

8. He said that every monastery in Thibet had been ordered by the Government to furnish ten armed men, and that the monasteries would have to comply. This also applied to monasteries of the Bhutan sect of Lamas in Thibet (the red-cap school), and he had asked General Macdonald that any Lamas of that sect who had to fight against us might be treated considerately. I replied that the English had no wish to interfere with the Buddhist religion in any way, and that it was a great pity that Lamas should take up arms which was contrary to their religion, and that if they did so, they must necessarily incur the risks of battle.

9. He gave me further particulars about the grounds of complaint which Bhutan has against the Thibetan Government mentioned at his former interview, and in paragraph 11 of my letter of the 3rd instant. These grounds are three, which are as follows :—

10. The first is of long standing, and dates back some 200 years. The Dharma Rajah was then incarnated in the person of Dujom Dorje at Kaling, in Thibet, and the incarnation was accepted by the Bhutanese, and he was duly installed. The *De-sri* (Governor) of Tsang set up another incarnation in the person of Pasang Wangpo, who was born at Tsari, and who was repudiated by the Bhutanese as an imposter. The *De-sri* of Tsang, to enforce the claims of his nominee, raised an army and invaded Bhutan. After nine battles the Thibetans were driven back, and the Bhutanese were about to invade Thibet but were prevented from doing so by the Dharma Rajah, as Thibet was his native country, and also on account of the community of religion. The Regent of Thibet (Miwang sonam Tobye) and the "De-sri" (Deb Rajah) of Bhutan therefore concluded a Treaty terminating hostilities. The Dharma Rajah has, however, never since corresponded officially with the Dalai Lama on account of this quarrel, and any official correspondence with the Thibetan Government is carried on by the Deb Rajah.

11. The second ground of complaint is that twenty-two years ago Alo Dorje, who was the then Timpuk Jongpon, bribed a *Nyer-pa* to murder the present Tongsa Penlop. The *Nyer-pa*, however, informed the Tongsa Penlop, who went to war with the Timpuk Jongpon and defeated him. The Timpuk Jongpon escaped to Lhasa, and there got the support of the Thibetan Government, who sent an army to Phari with the Rampa Shape, and threatened to invade Bhutan if the Timpuk Jongpon was not received back. The Tongsa Penlop was then in his 25th year, and, according to Thibetan custom, could not therefore undertake any enterprise, so was unable to lead an army to oppose the Thibetans, and consequently had to send an envoy to Phari, and terms were arranged by which the Jongpons of *Gasha*, *Lingshi*, *Gokhana*, and *Ha* were appointed by Thibet, and the revenues of those four Jongs were appropriated to them, though the revenues of the districts under those Jongs continued to be paid to Bhutan. Alo Dorje was also not given up, but remained in Thibet, and took up his residence at Chumbi, and was one of the Thibetan leaders against the English in the war of 1888. He died at Chumbi last year. The revenues of the three Jongs, *Gasha*, *Lingshi*, and *Gokhana*, were shortly after restored to the Bhutanese Government, though they had to retain the Jongpons appointed by the Thibetans, but that of Ha Jong has continued to be collected by the Ha Jongpon (or "Tongpa"), who considers himself to be a Thibetan official, and does not pay them to the Bhutan Government, but keeps them for himself.

12. The third ground of complaint is that twenty years ago the then Para Penlop, who was the elder brother of the present Tongsa Penlop, went to bathe at the hot springs in the Khambu Valley. He was attacked by the Jongpons of the Phari, but defeated them. Two Tibetans were killed in the encounter and five Bhutanese. The matter was afterwards settled, and the Tibetans had to pay a sum of money to the Bhutanese for the excess of three men killed on their side. Notwithstanding that the matter had been settled, the Thibetan Government afterwards fined the then Para Penlop's uncle (who was also the uncle of the present Tongsa Penlop) and who was the Abbot of Lha-lung monastery in Thibet the sum of 24 "do-tses," or 6,000 rupees. This is considered by the Bhutanese as a breach of faith and quite unjustifiable. As the Abbot of Lha-lung had nothing to do with the affairs and the matter had been settled, these matters are still considered by Bhutan as grievances against the Thibetan Government.

13. The Tongsa Penlop is 47 years of age. He is an intelligent man, with a straightforward manner which inspires confidence in what he says.

(Indorsed by Mr. Walsh.)

Chumbi, June 8, 1904.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, for information.

Inclosure 3 in No. 53.

Mr. Walsh to Colonel Younghusband.

(Confidential.)

Chumbi, June 12, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to submit, for your information, a translation of the letter sent by the Dalai Lama to the Tongsa Penlop (marked A) by Lama Serkhang Tulku, referred to in paragraph 10 of my letter dated the 3rd June, 1904, and also of a letter dated the 19th January, 1904, sent to him by the Thibetan Council (Kasha) (marked B). These two letters were given to me by the Tongsa Penlop to see. I have kept a copy of them, and made the inclosed translations, and am now returning the originals to the Tongsa Penlop.

(Indorsed by Mr. Walsh.)

Chumbi, June 12, 1904.

Copy, with copies of translations, forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, for information.

Inclosure 4 in No. 53.

(A.)—*Letter from the Dalai Lama to the Tongsa Penlop, sent by Lama Serkhang Tulku, April 28, 1904.*

(The most pure, virtuous youth in the firmament; enjoying the best skill of the bodily senses with the best skill of the wings of good works.)

I AM very pleased to receive your letters with the supporting present, which have arrived safely. Here also my health is as before. I am protecting the religious kingdom without slackness for the immense benefit and happiness of the doctrine and of all human beings.

The subject.—Regarding the quarrel between the English and Thibetans. The Thibetans made no promise about the former Treaty, but the Chinese and English have settled a few matters; moreover, formerly they avoided bad intentions and only showed signs of purity; latterly they encroached upon our lands and have deceived us on many occasions by means of diplomacy. All the details of the reasons sent are remembered by the qualified representatives and all the monks and laymen.

Now you have also privately thought of carrying the burden of our Government many a times with an earnest desire of leading us to the good road without a mistake.

[1762]

2 C

This time also we are very pleased at your great reverence to the three holy ones and the lamas, and in giving your heart for the happiness of the doctrine and living creatures.

The subject of the letters respectively received during the former and current year is regarding the negotiation between the English and the Thibetans. Even in those letters your pure thoughts of belief are seen, and we have great boldness and hopes as to the end. According to the order of the great Emperor of China, we, Thibetans, have dealt with British officials in a good and agreeable manner. Regarding the boundary, it was thought that the former orders passed* by us will stand good, but they† have put on an armour and worked to be victorious by diplomacy. If the arrangement would be virtuous in the present and future according to the result of discussion of the qualified officials and the general consent of the kingdoms in conformity with the main substance of the subject with explanation noted above, then no harm will be done to living creatures, and the war, which deprives the parents of their children and which adds burdens of grievous sins on both the parties, will cease. This is important, and therefore it is necessary to do the utmost to mediate. This time, the letters ask for free access for traders, travellers, and letters, but my mind will not accept‡ this at all; in addition to this, the assembly of Ministers have also given the same reply, and also regarding other matters. In brief, if there is a negotiation for peace to stop the war between us it will be very good, and the particulars will be told you personally by Serkhang Tulku in detail. This time, will you begin by holding the pulse of the sick one, and do the best according to what you clearly think? Be assured that your thought is absolutely necessary to augment the merit of the present and the next life.

Now, again, I wish you youth, increased prosperity and friendship between the Thibetans and the Bhutanese in the doctrine. May light pour forth and may you do all in order. This is written from "Nor-ling-kyi-tshel," viz., "the palace of Norbu-Lingar," with the presents of an amulet, ten precious crystals, and a cloth, on the 13th day of the 3rd moon in the wood-dragon year.

Inclosure 5 in No. 53.

(B.)—*Letter from the Thibetan Council ("Ka-sha") to the Tongsa Penlop, dated January 19, 1904.*

(His Excellency the noble Governor ("Dsa-sa") possessed of good works.)

WE are very pleased that your virtuous deeds are spreading perfumes and that the hundred leaves of youth are spreading in both the fountains.§ First of all, we are all enjoying good health as usual, by the mercies of the dispenser of gifts, and are discharging our duties properly. The reason of writing this letter is—

On the whole, the Thibetan and the Bhutanese have got one common object; and, moreover, you have a great faith in the kingdom of the Buddhist religion. Regarding the present case between the English and the Thibetans, the information given by you with great virtuous wisdom about the conditions of diplomacy have been reported to the Dalai Lama. The news here is that on receipt of the three kinds of goods sent by you as a present, we have offered them to the Dalai Lama, together with your letter. Regarding the boundary question to be settled by the chief officials of Thibet, the English have formerly raised a dispute and deceived us. This year also they have avoided peace, and to enrage us they have encroached upon our land on the Khampa side and have assumed a threatening attitude. Now the Commander of the English army has encroached upon our land of Dromo and Phari also without measure. All the people of Thibet depend solely on the religious doctrine, and whatever be the result, whether good or bad, we are quite decided to be mild or angry according to the circumstances, and the Dalai Lama will abide by the orders which he has passed before and stamped with his own seal. If it is true that the Bhutanese have a good sincere mind towards the Thibetans as before, endeavour to do what is best. The English Commanders should go back to their own land. Then the officials of the three kingdoms, viz., China, Thibet, and English, may meet at Dromo Yatung and settle the boundary question, &c., according

* Lit. "lifted."

‡ Lit. "bear."

† Viz., the English

§ Viz., secular and religious.

to the former orders passed by the Dalai Lama under his own seal, which will increase the virtue of the doctrine now and hereafter.

Again, protect yourself, youthful and virtuous one, and increase useful means for the prosperity of Bhutan. This is sent on the 2nd of the 12th moon with the present of one idol-cloth and another piece of cloth sufficient for one suit.

Inclosure 6 in No. 53.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Chumbi, June 13, 1904.

I HAVE the honour, in continuation of previous telegrams, to make the following report on the conversation held between the Tongsa Penlop and myself during his visit to me and my return visit to him on the 9th and 10th June. Copies of letters to me from Mr. Walsh describing his interviews with the Tongsa Penlop have already been sent to you direct by Mr. Walsh.

2. The Tongsa Penlop is a straight, honest-looking, dignified man of about 47 years of age. He bore himself well; both he and his retinue were well-dressed. His presents to me were numerous and costly, and altogether he showed himself a man of importance and authority.

3. He said he had been long wishing to visit me, in accordance with the desire expressed in the letters he had received last autumn from the Bengal Government, but had been delayed first by sickness and afterwards by the news of fighting. I told him I had been disappointed at not having seen him earlier, but was happy at last to make his acquaintance. He then said he was most anxious to effect a settlement between us and the Thibetans. The latter had been very obstinate and wrong-headed, but the Dalai Lama was a young man who needed good counsellors, and unfortunately there were bad men at Lhasa who acted in his name to the detriment of the country. General Macdonald had told him we were prepared to receive negotiations up to the 25th June, and he (the Tongsa Penlop) had accordingly written urgently to the Thibetans to send a negotiator before that date. Would not I therefore show patience up to then.

4. I asked the Tongsa Penlop whether he himself would be inclined to be patient if he had been attacked four times at night after waiting eleven months for negotiators to come. He admitted that for his part he would under those circumstances like to go about killing people, but I was the representative of a great Government and ought to be more patient. I told him that matters were now out of my hands, that I had reported everything to the Viceroy, and his Excellency had reported them to the Emperor. His Majesty's orders were now awaited. It was true I had on the 1st June sent letters to the Amban and Dalai Lama saying I was still ready to receive negotiators by the 25th June, but those letters had been returned by the Thibetan Commander at Gyantse, who had that very night attacked my camp, and a few nights afterwards once more attacked me at Kangma on my way down. I could not answer for it therefore that I should still be authorised after these additional insults to receive negotiators. That was a point upon which His Majesty's order had not yet been conveyed to me. I could, however, assure the Tongsa Penlop that the Ruler of so great an Empire as ours had not the slightest wish to make war upon a miserable, insignificant people like the Thibetans unless he was absolutely compelled to.

5. No Englishman liked killing unfortunate villagers who were forced from their houses to fight us, but who had no chance against our modern arms. We knew they did not want to fight us and we had no quarrel with them. But unfortunately it seemed impossible to get at the real instigators of the opposition to us except by fighting, in which the innocent peasant soldiers and not the authors of the trouble suffered most. If these latter would only lead their men I should be better pleased, for then they would appreciate what opposition to the British Government really meant. The Tongsa Penlop was much amused at the suggestion, but said the leaders always remained a march behind when any fighting was likely.

6. He frequently pressed me, however, during the two interviews, to show patience, and said the Ta Lama, whom I understand to be a Minister over the four councillors, had actually been on the way to negotiate with me, and had been waiting near Nagartse Jong, but had to fly in consequence of the Karo-La fight. I told the Tongsa Penlop I also had waited at Gyantse for more than three weeks before the Karo-La fight for negotiators but none had appeared. And I could not believe that the Ta Lama had any intention of

coming, for we happened to find letters at Karo-La written from this very place, Nagartse, intimating the repeated dispatch of arms and ammunition to the Karo-La, at which place reinforcements were arriving at the rate of 500 a day immediately before the fight. When all these warlike preparations were being made, when the Ta-Lama still remained at Nagartse and made no signs of coming to see me, and when the Amban wrote to say the Dalai Lhama still showed no inclination to send a proper Delegate, I could not accept the Tongsa Penlop's statement that the Ta-Lama was on the way to negotiate with me. The Tongsa Penlop then said that he had always mistrusted the Ta-Lama, and believed him to be at the bottom of all the mischief.

7. The Tongsa Penlop then took my hand, and in a very earnest and affectionate manner said he had been most anxious for my safety, and that it was only by God's mercy that I had been preserved from many dangers. I told him that I never feared: I knew that I was working in a good cause and God would protect me.

8. I went on to say that though I had little hope that any settlement would be arrived at without fighting, yet fighting or no fighting, I had to make a settlement sometime and one that would last another hundred years. If the Thibetans had only been as sensible as the Bhutanese, and come and talked matters over with me as he and the Trimpuk Jongpon had, we could easily have arrived at an arrangement long ago. But I felt sure that all Thibetans could not be as stupid as those who now held power. I was convinced that before long there would be a great revulsion of feeling against the men who had brought ruin on their country; the sensible men would come to the front, and the Tongsa Penlop would be of great service to me if he would from time to time let me know of any such change in feeling, and who were the men upon whom I could rely in making a settlement, which I hoped would eventually result in the Thibetans being as closely bound in friendship to the British Government as the Bhutanese are.

9. I added that the monks had taken up arms against us, and many of the monasteries were also manned by soldiers. We could not, therefore, maintain our original intention of respecting these monasteries and treating the monks as men of peace. But when fighting was over we would most strictly respect the religion of the Thibetans, and the more time the monks devoted to their religion and the less to politics and war the better we would be pleased.

10. Before leaving I expressed to the Tongsa Penlop the great pleasure this meeting with him had afforded me. He had impressed me with the conviction, which I would report to his Excellency the Viceroy, that the Bhutanese Government sincerely desired the friendship of the British Government. I congratulated him on their wisdom in adopting such a policy, and I assured him on behalf of the Viceroy that all we desired was to be on friendly and neighbourly terms with States like Bhutan and Thibet lying on our frontier. War, though it could have but one result, gave us a lot of trouble which we had no wish to unnecessarily incur. We therefore much preferred peace. I sent my best respects to the Dharma Raja and the Trimpuk Jongpon, and I asked the Tongsa Penlop to often write to me and give me advice regarding the settlement with Thibet.

11. The Tongsa Penlop fervently assured me of the goodwill of the Bhutanese Government, and said they would never depart from their friendship with the British Government.

Inclosure 7 in No. 53.

Mr. Walsh to Colonel Younghusband.

Chumbi, June 12, 1904.

IN continuation of my letter of the 26th ultimo, I have the honour to submit the following Report for your information:—

2. I left Chumbi for Phari on the 30th May to meet the Tongsa Penlop, who was expected to arrive there on the 1st June. I halted at Gautsa, and went on the Phari the following day. I had had all arrangements made for him and his retinue to reside at the Chatsa Monastery, while at Phari, as was done for the Trimpuk Jongpon. The Tongsa Penlop arrived with a retinue of 200 officers and men on the afternoon of the 2nd June, having taken a day longer on the way than was expected. He was met at the Tremo-La on the Thibetan frontier by Ugyen Kazi, the British Agent for Bhutan, and Katshog Kazi, the local Bhutanese Agent at Phari, and proceeded at once to Chatsa Monastery.

3. On the morning of the 3rd instant the Tongsa Penlop had an interview with me which lasted two and a-half hours. It was held in a tent which I had pitched for the purpose on the plain, and a guard of honour of one company of the 32nd Pioneers with the regimental bugle band was in attendance. The report of the interview has already been submitted in my telegram of the 3rd instant, and my letter of the same date.

4. The Tongsa Penlop started for Chumbi to pay a friendly visit to General Macdonald, on the 5th instant, halting on the way at Lingmathang where I had had a camp of twenty-six tents procured from the villagers pitched for him and his retinue. I also went to Lingamithang, and on arrival paid an informal visit to the Tongsa Penlop, who had arrived before me, to see if he was comfortable. He was enthusiastic about the road which has been made, and which is probably better than anything he had seen in Bhutan, and when I told him that it had been made equally good all the way to Gyantse, said that the Thibetans would be very indebted to us for it.

5. The Punakha Jongpon, who was delayed in arriving at Phari owing to the death of his father-in-law, and did not arrive until after the interview which the Tongsa Penlop had with me there, came over to my camp to see me in the morning. He is a much older man than the Tongsa Penlop, is small, and has a quiet manner. I then went on to Chumbi. The Tongsa Penlop came later, and proceeded to Eusakha, a village about half-a-mile below the camp, where I had had four houses arranged for him and his retinue while he stayed here.

6. He visited General Macdonald in the afternoon, and General Macdonald paid him a return visit the following morning.

7. I paid the Tongsa Penlop a return visit on the afternoon of the 7th instant, which has been already reported in my telegram of the 8th instant, and my letter of the 8th (11th) June, 1904.

8. The Tongsa Penlop left Chumbi on the 8th to return to Phari to meet yourself there. He went as far as Lingmathang where I had had the camp left standing for his return. General Macdonald showed him the troops at Chumbi before he started. I started later and halted at Gautsa.

9. The Tongsa Penlop went on to Phari on the 9th, and proceeded at once to the Chatsa Monastery, until his interview with you in the evening. I also proceeded to Phari.

10. I accompanied you the following day to Chatsa Monastery when you paid your return visit to the Tongsa Penlop, and then returned with you to Chumbi.

11. When I was at Phari on the 3rd June there was a rumour that the Thibetans intended to attack the fort, with two columns, one of which was collected in the Khambu Valley and the other across the Bhutan frontier. The attack was to be simultaneously delivered at night by the two armies. The information had been given by the Chinese Petty Officer ("Chanzan") at Phari to Captain Rawling, in command of the Ekka corps, and preparations had been made to guard against it.

12. I questioned the two Jongpons about it. They both denied that there had ever been such a rumour, but this is clearly false, as Katsbog Kazi, the Bhutanese Agent at Phari, whom I also questioned, informed me that there was a rumour that troops were collected above the Khambu Valley at a place called Mati-piti, and that an army of men from Khams and Kangbu would march on Phari through Bhutan, and deliver a simultaneous attack, and also occupy the Tang-La to prevent escape by that way, or reinforcements being sent from Tuna. According to the rumour, the attack was to have been delivered on the 15th of the Thibetan month (29th May). He had not, however, believed the rumour, as he had recently come from Khamba Jong where he had been to buy yaks, ponies, and sheep, and had seen no gathering of Thibetans on his way back. The military reconnaissances also discovered no parties of Thibetans nor trace of there having been any. The Tongsa Penlop also assured me that there had never been any Thibetan troops marching through any portion of Bhutan; so that although such an attack may have been projected, the plan must have been given up before it was commenced.

13. The Katsbog Kazi also informed me that when he was at Khamba Jong he noticed that the walls of the fort had been recently loopholed.

[Inclosure 8 in No. 53.]

Draft Convention.

WHEREAS doubts and difficulties have arisen as to the meaning and validity of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, and the Trade Regulations of 1893, and as to the liabilities of the Thibetan Government under these agreements; and whereas recent occurrences have tended towards a disturbance of the relations of friendship and good understanding which have existed between the British Government and the Government of Thibet; and whereas it is desirable to restore peace and amicable relations, and to resolve and determine the doubts and difficulties as aforesaid, the said Governments have resolved to conclude a Convention with these objects, and the following Articles have been agreed upon by Lieutenant-Colonel F. E. Young-husband, C.I.E., in virtue of full powers vested in him by His Britannic Majesty's Government, and on behalf of that said Government, and the illustrious Dalai Lama, Nag-Wang, Lo-ssang Theedan Gyarso Gyon Rimboochay, Supreme Pontiff of the Great Buddhist Church, on his own behalf and on behalf of the Government of Thibet:—

I.

The Government of Thibet engages to respect the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, and to recognize the frontier between Sikkim and Thibet as defined in Article I of the said Convention, and to re-erect the pillars previously set up thereon.

II.

The Thibetan Government undertakes to open forthwith trade marts to which all British and Thibetan subjects shall have free right of access at Gyantse [Shigatse, Gartok, and at some point in Eastern Thibet to be hereafter determined by common agreement between the British and Thibetan Governments].*

The Regulations applicable to the trade mart at Yatung under the Anglo-Chinese Agreement of 1893 shall, subject to such amendments as may hereafter be agreed upon by common consent between the British and Thibetan Governments, apply to [all]* the marts above mentioned.

III.

The question of the amendment of the Regulations of 1893 is reserved for separate consideration, and the Thibetan Government undertakes to appoint fully authorized Delegates to negotiate with Representatives of the British Government as to the details of the amendments required.

IV.

The Thibetan Government undertakes to keep the road to Gyantse from the frontier clear of all obstruction, and to establish at Yatung and Gyantse [and at each of the other trade marts that may be established]* a Thibetan Agent, who shall receive from the British Agent appointed to watch over British trade at the marts [in question] any letter which the latter may desire to send to the Thibetan or to the Chinese authorities. The Thibetan Agent shall also be responsible for the due delivery of such communications and for the transmission of replies.

V.

[In case of need the British Trade Agent at Gyantse shall have the right of proceeding to Lhasa to confer at that place with the Chinese or Thibetan authorities, by whom he shall be treated with due respect.]*

VI.

As an indemnity to the British Government for the expense incurred in the dispatch of armed troops to Lhasa to exact reparation for breaches of Treaty obligations, and for the insults offered to, and attacks upon, the British Commissioner and his following and escort, the Thibetan Government engages to pay a sum of £. to the British Government.

The indemnity shall be payable at such place as the British Government may from time to time after due notice indicate, whether in Thibet or in the British districts of Darjeeling or Jalpiguri, in annual instalments on the 1st January in each year, beginning from the 1st January, 190 .

VII.

As security for the payment of the above-mentioned indemnity, and for the fulfilment of the provisions relative to trade marts specified in Articles II and IV, the British Government shall continue to occupy the Chumbi Valley until the indemnity has been paid and until the trade marts have been effectively opened for three years, whichever date may be the later.

VIII.

[The British Government reserve to themselves the right to construct roads, railways, telegraphs, or other means of communication in the Chumbi Valley, whether during or after the period mentioned in Article VII; and the Thibetan Government hereby engages to grant all necessary facilities for the maintenance, free use, and efficient working of such roads, railways, telegraphs, or other means of communication as may be constructed.]*

IX.

The Thibetan Government agrees to raze all forts and fortifications and remove all armaments which might impede the course of free communication between the British frontier and the towns of Gyantse and Lhasa [and in future not to construct any such forts or fortifications, or place in position such armaments without the previous consent in writing of the British Government].*

X.

The Government of Thibet engages that, without the previous consent in writing of the British Government—

It will permit no foreign Power to intervene in Thibetan affairs;

[It will admit to Thibet no Representative or agent, commercial or other, of any foreign Power]*;

It will not cede, [sell, lease, mortgage, or otherwise assign or pledge]* any portion of Thibetan territory [or of Thibetan revenues, whether in cash or in kind],* to any foreign State, person, or persons;

[It will grant no Concession for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining, or other rights to any foreign State, or to the subject of any foreign State.]*

XI.

In witness whereof the two negotiators have signed the same, and affixed thereunto the seals of their arms.

Done in quadruplicate at Lhasa, this day of , in the year of
our Lord 1904, corresponding with the Thibetan date, the day of .
(Signatures.)

In proceeding to the signature of the Convention, dated this day, the Representatives of Great Britain and Thibet declare that the English text shall be binding.
(Signatures.)

Adhesion Agreement.

Whereas doubts and difficulties had arisen as to the due execution of the Convention signed at Calcutta on the 17th day of March, 1890, on behalf of the British and Chinese Governments and of the Trade Regulations under that Convention, which were signed by British and Chinese Commissioners on the 5th day of December, 1893;

And whereas the Thibetan Government, contrary to the wishes and instructions of the Chinese Government, had declined to recognize the validity of, or to carry into full effect, the provisions of the said Convention and Trade Regulations, and had thereby entailed on the British Government the necessity of taking active measures to secure their rights and interests under the said documents;

And whereas I, Yu Tai, Chinese Imperial Resident in Thibet, have been duly authorized by His Majesty the Emperor of China to enter into negotiations with Lieutenant-Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., the duly accredited Commissioner of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and to effect a definitive settlement of the points now at issue between Great Britain and Thibet;

And whereas a Convention of eleven Articles has this day been concluded, with the consent of the said Yu Tai, between the Governments of Great Britain and Thibet for the restoration of peace and amicable relations, and for the confirmation, further elucidation, and fuller execution of the said Convention of 1890:

Be it known, therefore, that I, the said Yu Tai, hereby agree to and confirm the said Convention now concluded between Great Britain and Thibet, and engage, on behalf of the said Chinese Government, to assist in securing the due fulfilment of the terms specified therein by the Thibetan Government.

Signed and sealed this day of , 1904, in the presence of (British Commissioner).

No. 54.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 26.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated 25th August, relative to the proposed Convention with Thibet.

India Office, August 25, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 54.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

Telegraphic.) P.

August 25, 1904.

THIBET. Following news from Lhasa up to the 21st August:—

Younghusband met Acting Regent, Representative of Nepaul, and the Tongsa Penlop, in conference on the 21st August instant. Acting Regent intimated willingness to accept our terms, though provision as to indemnity presented difficulty; he hoped lasting friendship between Great Britain and Thibet would be result of settlement. Similar sentiments were expressed by Representative of Nepaul and by the Tongsa Penlop, who observed that Bhutan, Nepaul, and Thibet were allied by religion, and that British were regarded by them as powerful friends.

Younghusband also paid a visit to the Amban on the 21st August, and received from him a paper containing suggestions with regard to the draft Convention. Amban merely asked that consideration should be shown to the Thibetans in the matter of the indemnity; he raised no objection whatever to the provisions as to the trade marts, and none of importance to clause 9 of the Convention.

(Repeated to Peking.)

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 26.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 25th instant, relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, August 26, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 55.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P

August 25, 1904.

THIBET. Following telegraphic Report, dated Lhasa the 21st instant, received from Younghusband :—

“Telegram purporting to contain denunciation of Dalai Lama has been sent to me by Amban, with the request that it may be forwarded to Peking, *vid* Gyantse. Amban declares that, if the Emperor of China acts on this telegram, result will be to reduce Dalai Lama to common monk. Tashi Lama, of Shigatse, will then be invited to Lhasa by the Amban, who will recommend him as spiritual head of the Thibetan Church. For transaction of secular business a Regent will probably then be appointed. Amban believes Dalai Lama is retiring, not to China, but to the north; he says Thibetans have been oppressed by Dalai Lama, and will be glad to be rid of him. It was stated by Amban, when questioned on the point, that if at any time the Dalai, Lama were to affix the seal in his possession to an Agreement with a foreign Power such Agreement would not be valid unless ratified by the Emperor of China. Most satisfactory solution of present difficulty would, in my opinion, be afforded by the denunciation of Dalai Lama and exaltation of Tashi Lama, and I would recommend that Chinese Government be urged by His Majesty's Minister at Peking to denounce Dalai Lama. To save time they might be asked to telegraph their reply to Amban by way of India. I am informed by Amban that no reply has been received by him to his telegram to the Wai-wu Pu which was sent on the 5th instant from Lhasa, *vid* Gyantse. Amban is very anxious to get reply, but does not like to mention this himself to the Chinese Government.”

We have telegraphed to Younghusband in reply as follows :—

“Please report whether Amban has proved to your satisfaction that there are precedents for degradation of Dalai Lama by Chinese Emperor, or for the assumption of his place by Tashi Lama. Is it not possible that this is an attempt on the part of the Chinese to exercise prerogative never effectively possessed by them, and that, if action taken is resented by Buddhists, they intend to lay whole blame on us?”

See my telegram of the 23rd instant. Sir E. Satow might inquire of the Chinese Government what action they propose to take on the Amban's suggestion; but, unless satisfactory reply to our inquiry is received from Younghusband, I think it would be better not to press the Chinese Government to take action, but leave the matter to them.

No. 56.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Satow.

(No. 122.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, August 26, 1904.

THIBET. Amban has suggested denunciation of Dalai Lama and exaltation of Tashi Lama in his stead.

Do you see any objection to pressing Chinese Government in that sense, as proposed by Colonel Younghusband (see telegram of the 25th August from Viceroy of India)?

No. 57.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 27.)

(No. 186.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Peking, August 27, 1904.

MISSION to Thibet.

Your Lordship's telegram No. 122 of yesterday.

It would be inexpedient, I think, to press the Chinese Government in the sense of Colonel Younghusband's suggestion; but I propose to adopt the advice of the Indian Government, and to inquire whether such a proposal was made by the Amban, and what their opinion is.

No. 58.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 28.)

(No. 187.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Peking, August 28, 1904.

NEGOTIATIONS of Colonel Younghusband at Lhasa.

My telegram No. 186 of yesterday.

A telegram from the Amban was received by the Chinese Government on the 24th August, in which the Dalai Lama was denounced to the Throne, and his deposition and substitution by the Tashilumpo Lama were proposed.

An Imperial Decree was issued on the 26th August that the Dalai Lama should be reduced to the station of a private individual by being "temporarily" deprived of his dignity, and that his place should be taken by the Tashilumpo.

By this Decree all spiritual functions and authority are transferred from the one to the other.

It was sent to the Amban by telegram forwarded through me on 26th August, via Simla.

The Dalai Lama, so I am informed, will be permanently degraded should he remain contumacious, in which case the usual process of drawing lots (effected by the Amban) would become necessary to select a successor.

The view held by the Chinese Government is that as the Emperor appoints the Dalai Lama, he can also cancel the appointment.

They seem to have no misgivings as regards this step, but appear not to know of a precedent for it.

The telegram of 5th August, mentioned by the Amban as not having been answered by the Chinese Government, cannot reach Peking for about another week, as it seems to have been dispatched via Tachienlu.

No. 59.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 244.)

My Lord,

Peking, July 7, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul-General at Chengtu relating to affairs in Thibet.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

Inclosure in No. 59.

Consul-General Hosie to Sir E. Satow.

(No. 16.)

Sir,

Chengtu, June 11, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to report that Kuei Lin, the Assistant Resident for Thibet, who has been here since July last year, having resigned his post on the ground of approaching

blindness, has been succeeded by Feng Ch'üan, an expectant Taotai and lately Head of the police force in Chengtu. The latter has had the rank of Fu-tu-t'ung or Military Deputy Lieutenant-Governor conferred upon him on his appointment. Previous to taking charge of the police force he was Prefect of Chengtu, and for a short time Acting Taotai. He is well known as a fearless official, who has on more than one occasion tendered his resignation to the Viceroy when urged, while in the execution of his duties as Chief of Police, to pardon official servants guilty of punishable offences. It was rumoured some months ago that the Viceroy had recommended him for the post of Assistant Resident; but it was not till the 21st May, the day before he had arranged to start for Peking for Imperial audience, that the appointment was made. He will leave for his new post in September, and, in accordance with the recent arrangement, will reside at Ch'ando, not Lhasa.

An official named Chin Yüan arrived here on the 4th May from Peking. He is charged with a Special Imperial Mission to proceed to Thibet and inquire into the condition of affairs there. He has removed from the inn where he at first took up his quarters to a private house, and will probably remain here the usual hundred days preparing for the journey.

Yü Kang, the retiring Imperial Resident, crossed the Thibetan frontier some days ago on his return to China.

Rumours from Ta-chien-lu state that the Dalai Lama, having imprisoned and confiscated the property of the four Kalön, has himself left Lhasa for the front.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ALEX. HOSIE.

No. 60.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 29.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith with reference to his letter of this day's date, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram dated the 22nd August, and of letters from the Government of India dated the 4th and 11th August respectively, on the subject of the draft Convention with Thibet.

India Office, August 29, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 60.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

August 22, 1904.

THIBET. Draft Convention with Thibet and Chinese Adhesion Agreement inclosed with our letter of the 4th August, which should reach you to-morrow. With reference to your telegram of the 13th August as to ratification, Chinese undertaking, as drafted, could hardly be made subject of dual ratification, as it is unilateral. To meet this difficulty, we suggest addition of a clause at the end of the draft, which would be followed by the usual bilateral ratification clause. Additional clause which we propose would be signed by Younghusband, as principal, and would be to the effect that he (Younghusband) accepts, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the (Anglo-Thibetan) Convention duly confirmed by Yutai, on behalf of the Chinese Government, and the engagement made by Yutai, on behalf of the Chinese Government, to assist in securing the due fulfilment by the Thibetan Government of the terms specified in the (Anglo-Thibetan) Convention, in full settlement of the dispute which has arisen as to the (Anglo-Chinese) Convention of 1890, and of all claims arising therefrom.

(Repeated to Thibet.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 60.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Secret)

Sir,

Simla, August 4, 1904.

IN continuation of our despatch dated the 28th July, 1904, we have the honour to forward a revised draft of the Convention which it is proposed to conclude with the Thibetan Government.

2. *Article I* reproduces the conditions as to the Sikkim-Thibetan Boundary sanctioned in your telegram of the 6th July, as modified by your later message of the 26th July, and calls for no comment.

Article II.—The first clause of this Article requires the Thibetans to open trade marts at Gyantse, as approved in your telegram of the 6th July, and at Gartok, as sanctioned in your communication of the 25th. We should have been glad to see opened to trade the towns of Shigatse and Lhassa, and also some place in Eastern Thibet. The engagement, however, which we have been authorized to demand, that the Thibetan Government shall consider the question of establishing fresh marts, should this be required by development of trade, may render it unnecessary to press at the present stage for marts at these points.

The second clause of this Article applies to the marts mentioned the provisions of the Trade Regulations of 1893 as they now stand, or as hereafter amended. We think that it will be well to revise the Regulations, and for this we have provided both by the language of this clause and also by the conditions embodied in Article III.

The third clause of Article II sets out the terms sanctioned in your telegram of the 26th July, safeguarding the interests of existing trade by other routes, and providing for further commercial developments.

Article III.—We have already referred to the provisions of this Article which require the Thibetans to appoint Delegates to discuss the revision of the Trade Regulations as they now stand.

Article IV has been added in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 26th July that the Thibetan Government should be required to undertake to levy no dues of any kind other than those provided for in the Tariff to be mutually agreed upon.

Article V provides—

(a.) For the maintenance of the road from the frontier to Gyantse (1) clear of all obstruction, and (2) in a state of repair suited to the needs of the trade, as authorized in your telegrams of the 6th and 26th July, respectively;

(b.) For the appointment at each of the marts hereafter to be established of a Thibetan Agent, who shall receive letters from the British Agent, and be responsible for sending them to, and for transmitting replies from, the Thibetan and Chinese authorities. This condition was prescribed by your telegram of the 6th July in the case of Gyantse, and we have made it applicable to Gartok as well as to any other mart which may hereafter be established. It is not, however, compulsory on us to appoint an agent or a European agent at each mart, and the term British is wide enough to cover subjects of His Majesty of any race or class.

Your telegram of the 26th July directed the addition at the end of this Article of the words: "The British Agent shall have the same right of access to Gyantse as to Yatung under the existing regulations." As explained in the Viceroy's message of the 1st August, our right to maintain a Resident Agent at all trade marts is sufficiently secured by Article I of the Regulations of 1893, which are to apply to all marts opened hereafter, and for this reason we have suggested the omission of this additional provision.

Article VI confers on our trade agent at Gyantse the right of proceeding to Lhassa to confer at that place with the Chinese or Thibetan authorities. This, it was suggested in the Viceroy's telegram of the 13th July, should be one of the more stringent terms to be exacted in the event of opposition on the way from Gyantse to Lhassa. We have not yet received your orders on this proposal, and in view of the further opposition which has actually been encountered, we are strongly of opinion that, unless the condition be seriously resisted by the Thibetan Government, it is one on which we should certainly insist either in the form in which it appears in the draft Convention, or in the alternative and modified form suggested in the Viceroy's telegram of the 1st August. It is easy to conceive circumstances in which, unless the right of free access to the chief Thibetan authorities is secured to the Gyantse Agent, all the concessions gained by us will be rendered nugatory, and we may be compelled again to force our claims upon the Thibetan Government by an armed Mission.

Article VII provides for the indemnity which we are empowered by your telegram of the 6th July to demand, and the amount of which is, subject to conditions, left to our discretion and has not yet been fixed.

Article VIII deals as contemplated in the same telegram with the retention of the Chumbi Valley as security for the payment of the indemnity and for the fulfilment of the provisions relative to trade marts.

Article IX reserves the right to construct roads, railways, telegraphs, or other means of communication in the Chumbi Valley whether during or after the period of our occupation, and requires the Thibetans to grant facilities in respect of the same. The provision is one which was suggested in the Viceroy's telegram of the 13th July, but in regard to which we have not yet received your orders. We attach importance to the condition, and trust that you will approve its retention.

Article X provides, as authorized in your message of the 6th July, for the razing of all forts and fortifications which might impede the course of free communication between the frontier and the towns of Lhasa and Gyantse. We have also added the removal of all armaments. The draft further binds the Thibetans to abstain in future from the construction of such forts or fortifications, or the placing in position of such armaments without the previous consent of the British Government. This addition is one on which we lay some stress. From your telegram of the 26th July, we understand that you consider that the point is sufficiently met by the provision which we have inserted in *Article V*, regarding the maintenance of the road to Gyantse clear of all obstructions. We would point out, however, that, in the first place, this condition does not apply to the road to Lhasa, and, in the second place, that the road might be kept clear of obstructions within the meaning of the Treaty, while still exposed to forts or armaments so placed as to command it.

Article XI deals with the relations of Thibet to foreign Powers and their subjects on the lines approved in your telegrams of the 6th, 26th, and 29th July. The third of the terms which your telegram of the 6th July directed Colonel Younghusband to name to the Thibetans, required the production of the two Lachung men (British subjects) who were taken, and pecuniary reparation, if they have been ill-treated.

Regarding this demand, as in the nature of a preliminary to peaceful negotiations, we have not included it as the subject of an Article in the permanent Convention.

3. The draft is that of a Convention between the Governments of Great Britain and Thibet only, and we have prepared a second and separate instrument in which we hope to obtain the recognition and approval of the Chinese Government in respect of the Treaty with their feudatory. The past attitude of China towards Korea, where prior to 1886 her claims of suzerainty seem to have been at least as well founded as in Thibet, suggests that, in order to escape a claim for an indemnity or other inconvenient consequences, the Wai-wu Pu may be glad formally to recognize the right of their recalcitrant feudatory to enter into direct Treaty relations with the British Government through the Government of India and to save their face by being able to point to the fact that the imprimatur of the Chinese Government was considered necessary to the validity of the proceedings.

4. We trust that the drafts which we had prepared will meet with the approval of His Majesty's Government. Copies have been forwarded to Colonel Younghusband with the instruction that, subject to such orders as he may receive hereafter, he may treat them as finally settled, except in respect of *Articles VI and IX* and the concluding portion of *Article X* (printed in italics*) and the omission of the concluding words of *Article V*, all of which still require your sanction.

We have, &c.

(Signed) AMPHILL.
KITCHENER.
E. R. ELLES.
A. T. ARUNDEL.
DENZIL IBBETSON.
H. ERLE RICHARDS.

Inclosure 3 in No. 60.

Draft Convention.

WHEREAS doubts and difficulties have arisen as to the meaning and validity of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, and the Trade Regulations of 1893, and as to the liabilities of the Thibetan Government under these Agreements; and whereas recent occurrences have tended towards a disturbance of the relations of friendship and good understanding which have existed between the British Government and the Government of Thibet; and whereas it is desirable to restore peace and amicable relations, and to resolve and determine the doubts and difficulties as aforesaid, the said Governments have resolved to conclude a Convention with these objects, and the following Articles have been agreed upon by Lieutenant-Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., in virtue of full powers vested in him by His Britannic Majesty's Government and on behalf of that said Government, and the illustrious Dalai Lama, Nag-Wang, Lo-ssang Theedan Gyarsa Gyon Rimboochay, Supreme Pontiff of the Great Buddhist Church, on his own behalf and on behalf of the Government of Thibet.

I.

The Government of Thibet engages to respect the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and to recognize the frontier between Sikkim and Thibet as defined in Article I of the said Convention, and to erect boundary pillars accordingly.

II.

The Thibetan Government undertakes to open forthwith trade marts to which all British and Thibetan subjects shall have free right of access at Gyantse and Gartok, as well as at Yatung.

The Regulations applicable to the trade mart at Yatung, under the Anglo-Chinese Agreement of 1893, shall, subject to such amendments as may hereafter be agreed upon by common consent between the British and Thibetan Governments, apply to the marts above mentioned.

In addition to establishing trade marts at the places mentioned, the Thibetan Government undertakes to place no restrictions on the trade by existing routes and to consider the question of establishing fresh trade marts under similar conditions if development of trade requires it.

III.

The question of the amendment of the Regulations of 1893 is reserved for separate consideration, and the Thibetan Government undertakes to appoint fully authorized Delegates to negotiate with Representatives of the British Government as to the details of the amendments required.

IV.

The Thibetan Government undertakes to levy no dues of any kind other than those provided for in the Tariff to be mutually agreed upon.

V.

The Thibetan Government undertakes to keep the road to Gyantse from the frontier clear of all obstruction and in a state of repair suited to the needs of the trade, and to establish at Yatung, Gyantse, and Gartok, and at each of the other trade marts that may hereafter be established, a Thibetan Agent who shall receive from the British Agent appointed to watch over British trade at the marts in question any letter which the latter may desire to send to the Thibetan or to the Chinese authorities. The Thibetan Agent shall also be responsible for the due delivery of such communications and for the transmission of replies. [The British Agent shall have the same right of access to Gyantse and Gartok as to Yatung under existing Regulations.*]

* (?) Omit.

VI.

[In case of need the British Trade Agent at Gyantse shall have the right of proceeding to Lhasa to confer at that place with the Chinese or Thibetan authorities by whom he shall be treated with due respect.]

VII.

As an indemnity to the British Government for the expense incurred in the dispatch of armed troops to Lhasa to exact reparation for breaches of Treaty obligations and for the insults offered to and attacks upon the British Commissioner and his following and escort, the Thibetan Government engages to pay a sum of £ to the British Government.

The indemnity shall be payable at such place as the British Government may from time to time after due notice indicate whether in Thibet or in the British districts of Darjeeling or Jalpiguri, in annual instalments on the 1st January in each year, beginning from the 1st January, 190 .

VIII.

As security for the payment of the above-mentioned indemnity, and for the fulfilment of the provisions relative to trade marts specified in Articles II, III, IV, and V, the British Government shall continue to occupy the Chumbi Valley until the indemnity has been paid and until the trade marts have been effectively opened for three years, whichever date may be the later.

IX.

[The British Government reserve to themselves the right to construct roads, railways, telegraphs, or other means of communication in the Chumbi Valley, whether during or after the period mentioned in Article VII; and the Thibetan Government hereby engages to grant all necessary facilities for the maintenance, free use, and efficient working of such roads, railways, telegraphs, or other means of communication as may be constructed.]

X.

The Thibetan Government agrees to raze all forts and fortifications and remove all armaments which might impede the course of free communication between the British frontier and the towns of Gyantse and Lhasa, and in future not to construct any such forts or fortifications or place in position such armaments without the previous consent in writing of the British Government.

XI.

The Government of Thibet engages that, without the previous consent of the British Government—

(a.) No portion of Thibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged, or otherwise given for occupation, to any foreign Power.

(b.) No such Power shall be permitted to intervene in Thibetan affairs.

(c.) No Representatives or Agents of any foreign Power shall be admitted to Thibet.

(d.) No concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining, or other rights shall be granted to any foreign Power, or the subject of any foreign Power. In the event of consent to such concessions being granted, similar or equivalent concessions shall be granted to the British Government.

(e.) No Thibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to any foreign Power, or the subject of any foreign Power.

XII.

In witness whereof the two negotiators have signed the same, and affixed thereunto the seals of their arms.

Done in quintuplicate at Lhasa, this day of in the year of our Lord, 1904, corresponding with the Thibetan date, the day of .
(Signatures.)

In proceeding to the signature of the Convention, dated this day, the Representatives of Great Britain and Thibet declare that the English text shall be binding.
(Signatures.)

Adhesion Agreement.

Whereas doubts and difficulties had arisen as to the due execution of the Convention signed at Calcutta on the 17th day of March, 1890, on behalf of the British and Chinese Governments and of the Trade Regulations under that Convention which were signed by British and Chinese Commissioners on the 5th day of December, 1893;

And whereas the Thibetan Government, contrary to the wishes and instructions of the Chinese Government, had declined to recognize the validity of or to carry into full effect the provisions of the said Convention and Trade Regulations and had thereby entailed on the British Government the necessity of taking active measures to secure their rights and interests under the said documents;

And whereas I, Yu Tai, Chinese Imperial Resident in Thibet, have been duly authorized by His Majesty the Emperor of China, to enter into negotiations with Lieutenant-Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., the duly accredited Commissioner of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and to effect a definitive settlement of the points now at issue between Great Britain and Thibet;

And whereas a Convention of eleven Articles has this day been concluded, with the consent of the said Yu Tai, between the Governments of Great Britain and Thibet for the restoration of peace and amicable relations, and for the confirmation, further elucidation, and fuller execution of the said Convention of 1890:

Be it known, therefore, that I, the said Yu Tai, hereby agree to and confirm the said Convention now concluded between Great Britain and Thibet, and engage on behalf of the said Chinese Government to assist in securing the due fulfilment of the terms specified therein by the Thibetan Government.

Signed and sealed this day of , 1904, in the presence of (British Commissioner).

Inclosure 4 in No. 60.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Secret.)

Sir,

Simla, August 11, 1904.

IN continuation of our despatch, dated the 4th August, 1904, Secret, we have the honour to forward a copy of the draft Convention with Thibet as further revised in the light of your telegram of the same date.

A copy of this draft has also been sent to Colonel Younghusband, and it is now submitted for information and approval, subject to any further modifications that His Majesty's Government may consider necessary on receipt of news of the course of negotiations at Lhasa.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

AMPTHILL.
KITCHENER.
E. R. ELLES.
A. T. ARUNDEL.
DENZIL IBBETSON.
H. ERLE RICHARDS.

Inclosure 5 in No. 60.

Revised Draft Convention.

WHEREAS doubts and difficulties have arisen as to the meaning and validity of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, and the Trade Regulations of 1893, and as to the liabilities of the Thibetan Government under these agreements; and whereas recent occurrences have tended towards a disturbance of the relations of friendship and good understanding which have existed between the British Government and the Government of Thibet; and whereas it is desirable to restore peace and amicable relations, and to resolve and determine the doubts and difficulties as aforesaid, the said Governments have resolved to conclude a Convention with these objects, and the following Articles have been agreed upon by Lieutenant-Colonel F. E. Young-husband, C.I.E., in virtue of full powers vested in him by His Britannic Majesty's Government, and on behalf of that said Government, and the illustrious Dalai Lama, Nag-Wang, Lo-ssang Theedan Gyarso Gyon Rimboochay, Supreme Pontiff of the Great Buddhist Church, on his own behalf and on behalf of the Government of Thibet:—

I.

The Government of Thibet engages to respect the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, and to recognize the frontier between Sikkim and Thibet as defined in Article I of the said Convention, and to erect boundary pillars accordingly.

II.

The Thibetan Government undertakes to open forthwith trade marts to which, all British and Thibetan subjects shall have free right of access at Gyantse and Gartok as well as at Yatung.

The Regulations applicable to the trade mart at Yatung, under the Anglo-Chinese Agreement of 1893, shall, subject to such amendments as may hereafter be agreed upon by common consent between the British and Thibetan Governments, apply to the marts above mentioned.

In addition to establishing trade marts at the places mentioned, the Thibetan Government undertakes to place no restrictions on the trade by existing routes, and to consider the question of establishing fresh trade marts under similar conditions if development of trade requires it.

III.

The question of the amendment of the Regulations of 1893 is reserved for separate consideration, and the Thibetan Government undertakes to appoint fully authorized Delegates to negotiate with Representatives of the British Government as to the details of the amendments required.

IV.

The Thibetan Government undertakes to levy no dues of any kind other than those provided for in the Tariff to be mutually agreed upon.

V.

The Thibetan Government undertakes to keep the road to Gyantse from the frontier clear of all obstruction and in a state of repair suited to the needs of the trade, and to establish at Yatung, Gyantse, and Gartok, and at each of the other trade marts that may hereafter be established, a Thibetan Agent, who shall receive from the British Agent appointed to watch over British trade at the mart in question any letter which the latter may desire to send to the Thibetan or to the Chinese authorities. The Thibetan Agent shall also be responsible for the due delivery of such communications and for the transmission of replies.

VI.

As an indemnity to the British Government for the expense incurred in the dispatch of armed troops to Lhasa to exact reparation for breaches of Treaty obligations, and for the insults offered to, and attacks upon, the British Commissioner and his following and escort, the Thibetan Government engages to pay a sum of 75,00,000 rupees [?] to the British Government.

The indemnity shall be payable at such place as the British Government may from time to time, after due notice indicate, whether in Thibet or in the British districts of Darjeeling or Jalpiguri, in seventy-five [?] annual instalments on the 1st January in each year beginning from the 1st January, 190 .

VII.

As security for the payment of the above-mentioned indemnity, and for the fulfilment of the provisions relative to trade marts specified in Articles II, III, IV, and V, the British Government shall continue to occupy the Chumbi Valley until the indemnity has been paid, and until the trade marts have been effectively opened for three years, whichever date may be the later.

VIII.

The Thibetan Government agrees to raze all forts and fortifications and remove all armaments which might impede the course of free communication between the British frontier and the towns of Gyantse and Lhasa.

IX.

The Government of Thibet engages that, without the previous consent of the British Government—

(a.) No portion of Thibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged, or otherwise given for occupation, to any foreign Power ;

(b.) No such Power shall be permitted to intervene in Thibetan affairs ;

(c.) No Representatives or Agents of any foreign Power shall be admitted to Thibet ;

(d.) No concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining, or other rights shall be granted to any foreign Power, or the subject of any foreign Power. In the event of consent to such concessions being granted, similar or equivalent concessions shall be granted to the British Government ;

(e.) No Thibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to any foreign Power, or the subject of any foreign Power.

X.

In witness whereof the two negotiators have signed the same, and affixed thereunto the seals of their arms.

Done in quintuplicate at Lhasa, this day of , in the year of our Lord, 1904, corresponding with the Thibetan date, the day of (Signatures.)

In proceeding to the signature of the Convention, dated this day, the Representatives of Great Britain and Thibet declare that the English text shall be binding. (Signatures.)

Adhesion Agreement.

Whereas doubts and difficulties had arisen as to the due execution of the Convention signed at Calcutta on the 17th day of March, 1890, on behalf of the British and Chinese Governments, and of the Trade Regulations under that Convention, which were signed by British and Chinese Commissioners on the 5th day of December, 1893 ;

And whereas the Thibetan Government, contrary to the wishes and instructions of the Chinese Government, had declined to recognize the validity of, or to carry into full effect, the provisions of the said Convention and Trade Regulations, and had thereby entailed on the British Government the necessity of taking active measures to secure their rights and interests under the said documents;

And whereas I, Yu Tai, Chinese Imperial Resident in Thibet, have been duly authorized by His Majesty the Emperor of China to enter into negotiations with Lieutenant-Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.C., the duly accredited Commissioner of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and to effect a definitive settlement of the points now at issue between Great Britain and Thibet;

And whereas a Convention of ten Articles has this day been concluded, with the consent of the said Yu Tai, between the Governments of Great Britain and Thibet for the restoration of peace and amicable relations, and for the confirmation, further elucidation, and fuller execution of the said Convention of 1890:

Be it known, therefore, that I, the said Yu Tai, hereby agree to and confirm the said Convention now concluded between Great Britain and Thibet, and engage, on behalf of the said Chinese Government, to assist in securing the due fulfilment of the terms specified therein by the Thibetan Government.

Signed and sealed this day of , 1904, in the presence of (British Commissioner).

No. 61.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 29.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 27th August, relative to the negotiations for a Convention with Thibet.

India Office, August 29, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 61.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

August 27, 1904.

NEWS from Lhasa up to the 20th August is as follows:—

"On the 19th August the Amban paid a visit to Younghusband, and handed him the second reply of the Thibetans to our terms. Clause 9 of the draft Convention (forwarded with our letter of the 11th August, Secret) is practically agreed to by the Thibetans; they also agree to destroy all sangared positions, and to pay a small indemnity if boundary is fixed at Giaogong. They stipulate that, in the event of our occupying Chumbi Valley, we should pay for fuel, water, and grass. They consent to establishment of mart(s) below Phari, but not elsewhere. No British official is to be allowed to proceed into Thibet beyond trade-marts after Treaty has been concluded. No objection was raised by Amban to form of the Adhesion Agreement; he took exception at first to fact that China is nowhere mentioned in the draft Anglo-Thibetan Convention, but was relieved on its being explained to him that the term "foreign Powers" was not intended to apply to China.

"On the 18th August a monk, wearing chain armour under his monk's robe and armed with sword, ran amuck and wounded Captains Cook-Young and Kelly, Indian Medical Service. Members of Council were summoned by Younghusband, who demanded hostages from each monastery, and from the National Assembly, as well as a fine of 5,000 rupees; he also announced that the man would be banged.

"On the 20th August Younghusband reports that positive information has reached him to the effect that Dalai Lama left Nagechuka on the 8th August for the north. Thibetans do not regret his departure. In a letter which he has written to National Assembly he said he was going away to look after the interests of the faith, and warned the Assembly to bind the crafty English very tightly in any Agreement that might be made."

(Repeated to Peking.)

No. 62.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 30.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 29th August, relative to the affairs of Thibet.

India Office, August 29, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 62.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

August 29, 1904.

TELEGRAPHIC report, dated the 22nd August, from Younghusband, states that the Thibetans are giving the four hostages demanded in consequence of the attack on the two medical officers. Younghusband believes it will be possible to get trade regulations through without much delay and difficulty. This question is under our consideration.

Amban, on Wilton asking him why he raised objection to the indemnity, seeing that it was largely owing to his not having come to meet the Mission that it was attacked, replied that he only made his suggestions to show the Thibetans that he was doing something for them; he was really, he said, most anxious to work on terms of friendship with us, both in public and private capacity, and to meet our wishes.

(Repeated to Peking.)

No. 63.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 31.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of two telegrams from the Viceroy, dated the 27th instant, and to the Viceroy, dated the 28th instant, relative to proposed Trade Regulations with Thibet.

India Office, August 30, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 63.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

August 27, 1904.

THIBET. Younghusband proposes to arrange at once for admission of Indian tea into Thibet at rate of duty not exceeding that at which tea is admitted into India. We had contemplated reserving details of Trade Regulations for separate negotiation (see draft Convention, forwarded with our letter of the 4th instant), but, subject to your approval, we propose to sanction Younghusband's proposal.

(Repeated to Thibet and Peking.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 63.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, August 28, 1904.

THIBET. I concur in proposal contained in your telegram of the 27th instant as to Trade Regulations.

No. 64.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 31.)

Sir,

India Office, August 31, 1904.

WITH reference to Mr. Villiers' letter of the 9th August, on the subject of the negotiations at Lhassa, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Brodrick to request that you will draw Lord Lansdowne's attention to the letter from the Government of India, submitting drafts of the Convention which it is proposed to conclude with the Thibetan Government and of the Adhesion Agreement to be signed by the Chinese Amban; and to the telegram from the Viceroy proposing an addition to the latter document with a view to making it ratifiable.

Mr. Brodrick proposes, with Lord Lansdowne's concurrence, to approve the drafts, and I am to inclose the draft of a telegram which he proposes to address to the Viceroy, should Lord Lansdowne see no objection.

I am, &c.
(Signed) HORACE WALPOLE.

Inclosure in No. 64.

Draft Telegram from Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Secret.)

YOUR Secret despatch dated 11th August: Thibet.

The draft Convention is approved; also the Adhesion Agreement as amended by your telegram of 22nd August.

Younghusband's attention should again be drawn to instructions contained in my telegram of 29th July about guarantee against Russia.

No. 65.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 1.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 30th ultimo, on the subject of the proposed indemnity from Thibet.

India Office, August 31, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 65.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

August 30, 1904.

FOLLOWING telegram received from Younghusband:—

"Amount of indemnity which I am at present demanding, viz., 5,000 rupees a-day, reckoned from date on which Mission was attacked, is excessive, and I would not press it seriously. But, by giving way on this point, I might be able to secure trade-mart at Zagal [*sic*]. I should be glad to learn whether Government would approve of this. Payment of indemnity would make us very unpopular, and I would suggest a policy of concession in regard to it, and securing, in place of indemnity, additional facilities for trade, and, perhaps, mining rights as well."

Do you consider it desirable to modify in any way the instructions contained in your despatch of the 5th instant, paragraph 8, in view of the considerations now advanced by Younghusband?

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 1, 1904.

WITH reference to your letter of the 31st ultimo, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to state, for the information of the Secretary of State for India, that he concurs in the terms of the Agreement which it is proposed to conclude with the Thibetan Government, and of the Adhesion Agreement to be signed by the Chinese Amban and Colonel Younghusband.

I am, however, to point out that the instruments are, properly speaking, Agreements between Governments as opposed to Conventions between Heads of States, and should be alluded to as such.

The necessary modifications of form have been indicated in the alternative draft telegram inclosed herewith, and I am to suggest, for the consideration of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, that it should be substituted for the one forwarded in your letter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) F. A. CAMPBELL.

Inclosure in No. 66.

Draft Telegram from Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Secret.)

YOUR Secret despatch dated 11th August: Thibet.

The draft is approved, but should be called an Agreement throughout, as it is between the Governments as distinguished from a Convention between Heads of States. In preamble substitute "authority" for "full powers."

Adhesion Agreement approved subject to same amendments in form, and addition suggested in your telegram of 22nd instant also approved, but in latter insert "Government" after words "His Britannic Majesty." At end of Adhesion Agreement insert—

"The present Agreement shall be ratified by His Britannic Majesty and by His Majesty the Emperor of China, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at London as soon as possible."

Younghusband's attention should again be drawn to instructions contained in my telegram of 29th July about guarantee against Russia.

No. 67.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 2.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 1st instant, relative to the Thibet negotiations.

India Office, September 1, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 67.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

September 1, 1904.

TELEGRAPHIC report, dated the 26th ultimo, has been received from Younghusband. He states that reply of the Chinese Government is still awaited by Amban, and that consequently little progress has been made with negotiations. Younghusband suggested that it would be well to ascertain, by inquiry at Peking, whether authority to sign Agreement has been given to Amban, and that, if not, authority should be communicated to him by telegraph. Insertion of a clause to the effect that Thibet is under sole protectorate of China was desired by Amban. Younghusband, however, considers that a statement that term "foreign Power" does not include China will be sufficient. It now appears that the Dalai Lama's seal was not affixed to the Treaty with Nepal, and is not essential to Agreement. General position is very satisfactory.

and attitude of people friendly. Since the arrival of the Mission more attention is being paid to Amban by Thibetans, who have been informed by Younghusband that England and China are at one in this matter. Excellent effect was produced by distribution of 4,000 rupees as alms to poor of Lhasa and neighbourhood, numbering 12,000, our conduct being favourably contrasted by Thibetan people with that of their own troops. Temples and other institutions have been visited by a party of British officers. (Younghusband's report ends.)

We transmitted, on the 27th ultimo, the Chinese Government's reply to Amban; it will, however, be desirable to ascertain for certain what are the powers actually given to Amban.

(Repeated to Peking.)

No. 68.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Satow.

(No. 130.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, September 2, 1904.

THIBET. See telegram from Viceroy of India of the 1st September.

Please ask Chinese Government to authorize Amban by telegraph to sign the Agreement if, on inquiry, you find that he has not authority to do so.

No. 69.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.—(Communicated by India Office, September 3.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

September 2, 1904.

THIBET: Your despatch of the 11th August.

In preamble of Agreement with Thibetan Government for words "full powers" substitute "authority." With this modification, the draft is approved, but as it is between the Governments it should throughout be styled an "Agreement," as distinguished from a "Convention" concluded between Heads of States. Similar amendments in form should be made in the draft Adhesion Agreement, which is also approved, with the additional clause proposed in your telegram of the 22nd August as amended by your telegram of the 31st. Words "His Britannic Majesty's Government" should, however, be substituted for "His Britannic Majesty" in clause proposed in telegram of the 22nd August. Ratification clause should be to the effect that the present Agreement shall be ratified by His Britannic Majesty and by His Majesty the Emperor of China, and that exchange of ratifications shall take place as soon as possible at London. This clause should be inserted at the end of the Adhesion Agreement.

I request that you will again draw Younghusband's attention to the instructions that no guarantee of Thibet against Russia is to be given. See my telegram of the 29th July.

No. 70.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 3.)

IN continuation of his letter of the 31st August, the Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to Viceroy, dated the 31st August, and of the reply, dated the 2nd September, relative to the establishment of a trade mart at Zayul in Thibet.

India Office, September 3, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 70.

*Mr. Brodrick to the Government of India.**August 31, 1904.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

YOUR telegram of the 30th August: Thibet.

Please repeat name of the mart in return for which reduction of indemnity is proposed by Younghusband. Is it the centre of any considerable trade at present? Name of the mart has been received as "Zagal."

Inclosure 2 in No. 70.

*Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.**September 2, 1904.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

THIBET: Your telegram of the 31st August.

"Zagal" should be "Zayul." It is a fertile valley, whence run routes to Eastern Thibet and to Batang. It lies on the border of Assam, to the south of the main watershed. As regards the amount of trade there, we have little information. We had given up intention of pressing Thibetans to agree to a mart in Eastern Thibet; should, however, an opportunity present itself of securing such a mart, we may afterwards regret not having availed ourselves of it, and I trust that the importance which may hereafter attach to our possessing right of access to a mart on one of the routes which lead to Szechuen will not be overlooked by His Majesty's Government.

No. 71.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received September 4.)

(No. 192.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Peking, September 4, 1904.

THIBET Mission.

I have to-day sent the following telegram to the Viceroy of India:—

"In the afternoon of 6th September I am to visit an official of the Wai Wu Pu, when I can carry out the suggestion in your telegram of the 1st instant that I should ascertain whether authority to sign the Agreement has been delegated to the Amban or not.

"Your despatch of 5th August, inclosing draft Convention, received here to-day.

"Is the present form of the draft sufficiently indicated by the telegrams which I have received from you?

"I feel it my duty to inform you that the Chinese procedure in the matter of delegating authority to sign, as, for instance, to the Amban, is to wait until Government is satisfied with the conditions of a draft Treaty, and then to memorialize the Emperor.

"It is the latter's rescript which delegates authority to sign.

"Consequently, if the Chinese Government have not the final draft in their hands yet, it seems to me unlikely that your request will be complied with."

No. 72.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 5.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of three telegrams from the Viceroy, dated the 3rd September, relative to the affairs of Thibet.

India Office, September 5, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 72.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

September 3, 1904.

THIBET. It has been suggested by Younghusband that Wilton, with passports from Chinese and Thibetans, should return to China, accompanied by two orderlies, either via Nagehuka and Gyekundo or via Chiamdo and Batang.

Younghusband also suggests that officer with survey party could be sent up the Sanpo for the purpose of establishing trade-mart at Gartok; for this duty Young-husband proposes to depute Captain Rawling, an experienced traveller in Thibet, and Lieutenant Bailey, of the 32nd Pioneers, together with geologist; they would be escorted by a few orderlies. It would of course be understood that, until Convention has been concluded, the Thibetans are not to be approached on the subject.

Provided that we first secure Convention, Younghusband's proposal might, I think, be accepted, on condition that the parties are accompanied by Thibetan officials, and that they obtain passports both from Chinese and Thibetans.

Inclosure 2 in No. 72.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

September 3, 1904.

TELEGRAPHIC report has been received from Younghusband stating that, according to a remark which he has been told was recently made by Acting Senior Officer [? Regent], the reason why Dalai Lama has fled is in consequence of his having, without the knowledge or sanction of the Council or National Assembly, committed himself with Russia, and he is now afraid of binding himself by concluding a Treaty with us.

Many Thibetans were inclining to turn towards Russia owing to reports which had reached Lhasa of Czar's conversion to Buddhism.

We have also received a letter from Younghusband, in which he reports that a copy of a draft Russo-Chinese Treaty, by which Russia was to provide drill instructors for Thibet, and Russia and China were jointly to protect Thibet, has been shown to him. Copy of draft is now in the office of the Thibetan Executive Council.

Younghusband adds that, since arrival of our Mission last year at Khambajong, at least two separate Envoys have been sent to Russia by Dalai Lama.

(Repeated to Peking.)

Inclosure 3 in No. 72.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

September 3, 1904.

TELEGRAPHING from Lhasa on the 30th August, Younghusband reports that he has been visited by the Amban, accompanied by Acting Regent and Council, who had agreed verbally to Articles V, VIII, and IX of the draft Convention, and to a portion of Article II, viz., the first section and the third section, with the exception of the last sentence, requiring Thibetans to consider question of establishing fresh marts if required by development of trade.

Amban anticipates that considerable difficulty will be experienced in securing assent of National Assembly in writing.

Amban's request for assurance that China is sole protector of Thibet has now been withdrawn by him.

General situation continues satisfactory, supplies coming in with regularity. Kashmiri and Chinese traders at Lhasa are desirous of opening shops at Gyantse.

It is reported that there are about 500 Mongolians at Reting, but they are not proceeding to Lhasa unless required.

Dalai Lama has been seen on Sining border in company with Dorjieff.

(Repeated to Peking.)

No. 73.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received September 6.)

(No. 193.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Peking, September 6, 1904.

MISSION to Thibet.

Following telegram sent to Viceroy of India to-day:—

“My telegram of the 4th instant.

“I inquired at the Wai Wu Pu this afternoon what was the nature of the powers of the Amban, and was informed by one of the Ministers that before the Amban could sign the document he would undoubtedly have to submit its terms to the Emperor and receive his sanction.

“The Minister observed that, if the telegraph were employed, the delay involved would not be great.

“On 12th August the Amban sent a telegram via Tachienlu, which ought to arrive here before long. From it the Chinese Government hope to learn some details of the negotiations, but it seems to me unlikely that the proposals, as they stand at present, should be contained in it.

“I would suggest requesting the Amban to communicate to the Chinese Government the purport of our proposals by telegraph without delay.”

No. 74.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 7.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of telegrams to the Viceroy, dated the 31st August and the 5th September, relative to Thibet affair

India Office, September 7, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 74.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

August 31, 1904.

YOUR telegram of the 30th August. Thibet:

His Majesty's Government have throughout aimed at obtaining the maximum of reparation while incurring the minimum of future liability. As regards indemnity, amount suggested seems altogether excessive, but we think that by requiring Thibetans to pay a substantial sum the danger of provoking us will be brought home to them. On the other hand, additional Treaty Concessions, while costing Thibetans less at present, are likely to involve us in further trouble hereafter, since attempts may be made to evade them in the same way as the 1893 Regulations were evaded.

Additional marts and mining rights, desirable as they may be in the abstract, can only be made effective by affording protection to miners and traders, and by keeping roads open. Unless in future the Thibetan Government show a disposition very different from that which they have hitherto displayed, our apprehension is that every fresh mart and mining enterprise will result in questions being raised between the Thibetan Government and the Government of India, which will require support and pressure from us periodically.

Inclosure 2 in No. 74.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

September 5, 1904.

YOUR telegram of the 2nd September. Thibet:

See my telegram of the 31st August, which conveyed to you the general views of His Majesty's Government on suggestions made by Younghusband. Should an

opportunity of securing a mart in Eastern Thibet on easy terms present itself, His Majesty's Government offer no objection; they are not, however, desirous of adding to the marts already specified, unless this can be done under circumstances which are not likely to entail trouble in future, and with the Thibetan Government's goodwill.

No. 75.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 8.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 7th September, relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, September 7, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 75.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.
THIBET.

September 7, 1904.

On the 1st September Younghusband paid a visit to the Amban. Acting Regent, Shape and most of the members of the Tsong-du (National Assembly) were present at the interview. Draft of Convention was handed to Thibetans by Younghusband, with an intimation that measures would be taken to enforce compliance if not agreed to within a week. Thibetans have given assurance in writing that they will accept Article IX of Convention, and opposition to all terms has now been practically overcome, except as regards indemnity. Representative of Nepal believes that indemnity should be payable without undue hardship, and, having regard to the wealth of the monasteries, Younghusband is of the same opinion. He considers that, should terms be subsequently found to be really too onerous, it would be more fitting that reduction, if any, should be made by Viceroy. Text of Agreement is being telegraphed to Wai-wu Pu by the Amban.

No. 76.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 9.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 11th August, relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, September 8, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 76.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Camp Ralung, July 16, 1904.

IN continuation of my telegram of this day's date, I have the honour to inclose English translations of the Tong-sa Pen-lop's letter to me and of its inclosures.

Inclosure 2 in No. 76.

Tong-sa Pen-lop to Colonel Younghusband.

[Received July 16, 1904.]

I RECEIVED to-day (the 2nd day of the 6th month—15th July) a reply from the Dalai Lama to letter which I had written to him after the fight here. In this letter the Dalai Lama tells me that I must certainly effect a settlement between England and Thibet, but I have also received a letter from the two Shapes to say that we must endeavour to arrange a settlement. The Yutok Shape and the Kalon Ta Lama say that they are coming to Gyantse. I am therefore sending to you my servant with the letters of the Dalai Lama and the Shapes for your inspection, and I beg of you to consider carefully the possibilities of making peace. The Yutok Shape and the Kalon Lama have come to Ralung with the object of making a settlement. I have written to the Shapes asking them not to make war, but to effect a peaceful settlement.

Inclosure 3 in No. 76.

Dalai Lama to Tong-sa Pen-lop.

ON the 26th of the 5th month (9th July) I received your letter written on the 23rd (6th July). You tell me that the Kalon Lama and the Tung-Yig-Chempo, after negotiations conducted on the 20th and 21st (3rd and 4th July), did not succeed in establishing friendship; that the English said that if the Delegates wished for friendship, they must withdraw their soldiers beyond the Karola; and that the Delegates could remain in the Jong, and that English soldiers would not occupy the Jong—the clauses of the Agreement were well arranged by you. But the Delegates said that if the Thibetan soldiers must withdraw, the English soldiers must withdraw with them, and it was on this account that peace could not be arranged, and a disagreement arose. You also say that as you are a small nation, neither the English nor the Thibetans will pay any attention to you, and you ask where the boundary should be fixed. A letter from the Kalon Lama and the other Delegates reached me on the 28th (11th July), in which they announce the capture of the Jong, and say they are coming to Nagartse viâ Rong. Now, you told the Delegates that they should come to you, but they did not listen to you, and thought that they themselves were clever. We have written to the Yutok Shape inquiring from him whether it will be easy to effect a settlement or not. Will you also request the English privately not to nibble up our country? Please use your influence well both with the English and the Thibetans. I cannot at present speak with exactness with regard to the frontier, but I have said something on the matter to the Pukong Tulku, so it will be well if the negotiations are begun quickly. Once they have begun, we shall hear gradually who is in the right.

Inclosure 4 in No. 76.

Dalai Lama to Tong-sa Pen-lop.

ON the 28th of the 5th month (11th July) I received your letter, written on the 25th (8th July), announcing that the English had captured Gyantse Jong. I believe that the Kalon Lama and the Tung-Yig-Chempo are about to arrive at Nagartse from Rong. It is well that, owing to your representation, the Pang-Kar-Cho-de Monastery has been left unmolested. But great loss has been occasioned to other Monasteries and to the peasants. You say that our Delegates ought to reach Gyantse between the 25th of the 5th month and the 2nd of the 6th month (8th and 15th July), and that you yourself have come to inquire into the making of a Treaty, so we dispatched Delegates at once. We have also sent a messenger, and he should have reached you by now, but if he has not arrived, you should explain matters to the English. Negotiations for establishing friendship should begin quickly. You should regulate your conduct in accordance with the attitude taken up by the English, and should do your best in every matter which arises between the English and the Thibetans. Please send me news frequently by letter.

Inclosure 5 in No. 76.

The two Shapes to Tong-sa Pen-lop.

YOU have sent letters to each of the two Kalons, which have reached us. In this letter you ask whether we really desire friendship with the English, and you say the Delegates should come quickly to Gyantse. We have already sent a letter to you, and, after consulting together at Nagartse, we will start on the 30th of the 5th month (13th July); so please send a man to Ralung to assist us against molestation on the road. We are sending herewith letter from the Dalai Lama, dated the 30th of the 5th month (13th July).

Inclosure 6 in No. 76.

Government of India to Colonel Younghusband.

Simla, August 4, 1904.

IN continuation of my letter dated the 26th July, 1904, I am directed to forward, for your information, a copy of the draft Convention, with supplementary Agreement as further amended in consequence of instructions received from His Majesty's Government.

2. Subject to such orders as you may receive hereafter, you may treat these drafts as finally settled, except in respect of Articles VI and IX and the concluding portion of Article X (printed in italics) and in regard to the omission of the last sentence of Article V, all of which still require the sanction of the Secretary of State for India.

3. I am also to inclose a copy of the despatch with which the draft Convention and Agreement, as now settled, have been forwarded to the Secretary of State.

Inclosure 7 in No. 76.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ravenshaw to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

The Residency, Nepal, July 25, 1904.

IN continuation of my letter dated the 8th July, 1904, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a translation of a letter dated the 12th June, 1904, received by the Prime Minister from the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa regarding Thibetan affairs.

Translation of a Letter from the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa.

With due respect I beg to report to your Highness that on Saturday, the 30th Jestha, Sunsar, the Chinese drill sergeant, and a senior clerk named Nabi, of the Nepal Department of the Yamun, called at mine and spoke to me to the following effect:—

"Lin Talay, the Khajanchi or Treasurer of the Amban, has sent his compliments to you and has instructed us to tell you that the Amban had addressed several memoranda to the Government of Thibet referring to the difference now at issue between the British and the Thibetan Governments, and requested to be provided with necessary horses and transports as soon as possible, as he was to go to negotiate on the frontier dispute; that in reply the Amban was told that the Thibetans would provide him horses and transports only if he could take the responsibility to restore the original boundary line of Thibet as settled in the 59th year of the reign of the Emperor Kwangsew; that, consequently, should the Amban write again to them offering to go himself to carry on negotiation regarding the frontier dispute, and should the Thibetans in reply consent and request the Amban to proceed from their side to settle the dispute, providing the necessary horses and transports for the purpose, that would be well and good; but in spite of the good advice the Thibetans received from

us, and acting contrary to which they have repeatedly suffered loss, paying no heed to their loss up to date and to what they would lose, and with the obstinacy of the deaf and dumb, were they to foolishly send back a reply to the Amban in the terms as they did before, asking him to go and do what is impracticable, then, while striving for the well-being of these Thibetans, a reply like that would be taken on all hands as detracting to the dignity of the Amban; that, besides, it appeared, from the trend of their opinion expressed on the subject now-a-days, that the Thibetans suspected that the Chinese were also on the side of the British, so that it was not improbable that, even if the Amban went to the frontier, the Thibetans might make light of him there by not taking to his suggestions in the same perverse manner as they were doing at present, and vague reports to this effect have reached us; that if things take the turn mentioned above, then instead of the intercession proving beneficial it will be harmful; that were we to sit idle because of those facts, then the foolish act of the Thibetans might lead to the loss of life and property of the Thibetan subjects and to the loss of the territorial possession of China, and the loss to life and property that had already taken place not having brought them to their senses might precipitate a crash which appears to be imminent, so we should not remain inactive any longer, but should put forth our best endeavours; that, therefore, and as a report has reached us that the Thibetan Government, while setting at naught the order of His Majesty the Emperor of China, were falsely accusing the Chinese of collusion with the British and attribute to the Chinese the blame of having been the root of the difference. Although the Chinese Amban may do his level best to mend matters, it is but probable that the Thibetans, misunderstanding the motive, might spoil the whole business by their perverse action, leading to the ruin of the country; that unless the matter be settled soon these fools will cause the loss of many lives; that while revolving these things in their minds, and taking into consideration the fact that the Thibetans have a regard for the Gurkha Government up till now, and hold the same in greater awe than they do the Chinese, and besides, as it was understood that the British Government were not likely to disregard a suggestion from the Gurkha Government so to move aside the misfortune now imminent over the subjects of Thibet, the Treasurer (Khajanchi) proposes to write to the Thibetans that the Representative of the Nepal Government at Lhasa will go to Gyanchi to negotiate in the matter now at issue between the Thibetans and the British, and also instruct them to send the Representative away to Gyanchi at once with needful advice; to write to the British officers at Gyanchi and also to the Lath Sahab of Hindostan to say that the said Representative will be at Gyanchi to bring on a settlement of the present dispute and to request them to carry on the negotiations with him; to write to the Emperor of China to intimate that such and steps were being taken to settle amicably the difference through the Gurkhas; and to write to the Maharajah (Ko-Kang Wang) of Nepal that matters having come to a point in the manner aforesaid, his Lhasa Representative has been sent to Gyanchi to talk over and settle the pending dispute and to request him to send necessary instructions to the said Representative; that being quite confident that you (the Representative), by proceeding to Gyanchi, would be able to bring the matter to a termination by acting nicely and reconciling both the parties, he (the Treasurer) was of opinion that you would do well to proceed directly to Gyanchi, and thence should inform his Highness the Maharajah, the Chinese authorities, as well as the Thibetan Government, about the matters on which all are agreed and those on which there were any difference, and by such action alone he (the Treasurer) thinks that the remnants of the Thibetan subjects may tide over the threatened ruin; otherwise the foolish Thibetan authorities would cause the utter ruin of Thibet; that you, being conversant with the manners and customs of this country and as you are suited to carry on the negotiation by reconciling all concerned, it being an act of humanity, you would kindly undertake the trouble to go; that the Treasurer, with the Amban's consent, has sent us to ask your opinion on the above suggestion."

I replied as follows:—

"I have explained to the Amban the contents of the letters of advice written to the Kazies of Kasyal by his Highness the Maharajah last year and also quite lately. The Amban is well acquainted with the facts from them. Last year, while conversing with the Kazies, I told them that I had heard of some difference having arisen between them and the British; that they should send the Bharadars of Thibet with the Amban to the frontier and settle quickly the difference; that if they had anything to ask of us to facilitate the business they should do so beforehand, so that I might, by representing the matter to his Highness, prevent open rupture between the parties, and assured them

at the same time that his Highness would do what was just and what was to the well-being of Thibet; that they should, without taking it amiss, represent without reservation the facts to our Maharajah, keeping in mind his advice and acting according to it, and that, should they act contrary to the said advice and follow a different course, the ill-feeling between Thibet and British would grow apace, and from this beginning would come a flash which would involve Thibet in ruin by causing loss of several lives. I tried at that time to impress upon them the utter foolishness of an action not upheld by justice and not at all politic, and sure to bring trouble on the subjects, and so forth. As the Thibetan Government did not follow the just and equitable advice given by His Majesty the Emperor of China and his Highness the Maharajah, so the present loss to their army and the present trouble to their people have occurred; and as the Thibetans acted in a manner which was against sound policy and justice, thus putting the British Government to such expense, they have, by their own foolishness, now caused the matter to reach the gigantic proportion of a mountain. I have from the very beginning and up till now been trying to make the Thibetans understand the utility of sending the Amban for settlement, stating that in this matter, if it were brought to a close through the Representative of His Majesty the Emperor of China, it would be for the benefit of all concerned.

I should think that it would be better if the Amban were to request our Maharajah to do what was necessary to prevent hostilities and further the ends of justice. As to the suggestion that I should go to Gyanchi, in my opinion even now I should think the first endeavours should lie in making the Thibetans understand that they should send the Amban with their Kazies. When this point is gained, should the Amban wish to have any one from the Nepal side, and were he to write on this subject to his Highness the Maharajah, his Highness will do whatever would be proper by either sending a person from there or by giving me permission to proceed, or by directly communicating with the British and the Thibetans. Please see that these views of mine are represented in a proper light before the Amban. Above all, every one will lend a helping hand in matters which are just and equitable, which is sound in policy, which will prevent hostility, and which will free the subjects from their troubles."

The visitors then departed, saying that they would duly convey my reply to the Treasurer. As it seemed to me that the Amban or his Treasurer, in sending me the above message, was actuated by the motive of seeing the whole burden of thrashing out all the points at issue fall upon Nepal, if they could manage to have some one sent from the Nepal side ahead to confer on the dispute between the British and the Thibetans, and as in the case of some one from the Nepal side going ahead of the Amban, and the negotiations being carried on, it must end in either one side or the other gaining its object, and we, who would thus be placed between the two, would surely have to put up with the unpleasant and severe comments which the losing party is sure to make upon our words and actions, and taking into consideration also the foolhardiness of the Thibetans, I did not say in reply to the message that I would represent the matter to your Highness, but laid stress upon the advisability of the Amban himself going, and said that, if the Amban went, should he wish to be joined by some one from the Nepal side in his peaceful and diplomatic negotiation, and were he then to write to your Highness on the subject, your Highness would do what would be considered proper either by giving me permission to proceed or by sending a person from Nepal or by directly communicating with the British and the Thibetan Governments. In case the Amban were to broach the question again, were I to be favoured at an early date with your Highness' views and instructions on the subject, I shall be happy to follow them. I also beg to be excused for any shortcomings that might have occurred on my part in the present instance.

Dated Sunday, the 31st Jestha Sambat, 1961, corresponding with the 12th June, 1904.

P.S.—Report is current here that some 800 or 900 Khamba levies from the Chhyandor Hringnachheba district will arrive here in the course of four or five days.

Khanila says that a monk officer called Lulunla, who is in charge of Lhasa Sole, and who is a pupil of the Chikhiat Khembu, and is an officer of the 5th class, has received order from the Potala Lama to proceed towards Gyanchi in matters military, and so he will start in four days hence.

Inclosure 8 in No. 76.

*Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.**Camp Nagartse, July 20, 1904.*

IN continuation of my telegram of to-day's date, I have the honour to furnish you with the following full report of the interview which was held yesterday between the Thibetan Delegates and myself:—

2. When the advance guard arrived near Nagartse they found the Delegates had come out from the Jong with a white flag and had pitched a tent a mile outside. They said that a Council had been held at Lhasa and they had been sent to treat. Word to this effect was sent back to me, and I sent forward Captain O'Connor to say that I was willing to treat with them and would receive them in my camp in the afternoon, but that they must understand that we would still advance to Lhasa and that we must occupy the Jong.

3. The deputation, which consisted of the Yutok Shape, the Ta Lama, the Grand Secretary, and some monks, arrived in my camp shortly before the time appointed. The Yutok Shape took the chief place. He is a stout, round-faced, genial, gentlemanly official, of good family and pleasant manners. But it soon became apparent that both he and the Ta Lama were in the hands of the Grand Secretary, the astute official who from our first meeting at Khamba Jong has ever been an obstacle in our way. This latter official, acting as spokesman, said that they had heard from the Tongsa Penlop that we wished to negotiate at Gyantse, and they had set out to meet us when they heard that we were advancing, and that their messengers, whom they had sent on ahead, had been fired on by our troops. This made it very difficult for them to come to a peaceful settlement with us, but they were quite willing to negotiate if we returned to Gyantse, and in that case they would accompany us and make a proper settlement with us there.

4. I repeated, for the fiftieth time, that I had waited for more than a year to negotiate; that even at Gyantse I had given them many opportunities; that when I had first arrived there I had announced my desire to negotiate; that after the attack upon me I had still declared my willingness to negotiate up to the 25th June; that, on the intercession of the Tongsa Penlop, the Viceroy had extended that term for some days; that, even after the capture of the Jong, I had sent messengers over the country to find them and had waited for another week at Gyantse, but that eventually the patience of the Viceroy had become completely exhausted, and his Excellency had ordered me to advance to Lhasa forthwith, as he had reluctantly become convinced that only there could a settlement made. I regretted that their messengers had been fired on, but on inquiring from General Macdonald, who was present, I found that the messengers had no white flag, while they bore arms; they were in consequence fired on by our advance guard. In future I would advise them to always send a large white flag with any messengers, and this would be strictly respected. We were now advancing to Lhasa; I would be quite ready to negotiate with them on the way, and if the Thibetan troops did not oppose us we would not fight against them; but as our troops had on the previous day been fired at from the Jong we must send our troops in to occupy it; we would, however, allow the Delegates to remain in it unmolested, and would see that their property was not disturbed and that they themselves were accorded proper marks of respect.

5. The Delegates replied that if we went on to Lhasa there was no chance of a settlement being arrived at; that they had come here with the sincere intention of making friendship with us and securing peace, but if we sent troops into the Jong they did not see how they could be friends with us; they were the two biggest men in Thibet next to the Dalai Lama, and it was both against their religion and disgusting to them to have soldiers in the same place where they were staying.

6. I said they must, after all, allow that this could not be half so disgusting to them as having their soldiers firing into my camp at Gyantse while I was asleep was to me. I asked them to send some responsible man with the soldiers whom General Macdonald was just sending to the Jong to look after their property and point out to the officer in command the quarters which they wished reserved for themselves. But they continued one after another wrangling and protesting against our occupying the Jong, and eventually the troops had to start off without any of their men.

In consultation with General Macdonald I had purposely arranged that the Jong should be occupied while the Delegates were in my camp, because I feared that if the troops marched into the Jong (which we knew was not occupied in force by Thibetan

troops) there might be some silly fracas with the attendants and the Delegates might be shot down, as the other Delegates were at Guru.

7. After listening for an hour to their protests, I asked them if they would now care to hear the terms we intended to ask of them. They replied that they could not discuss any terms till we returned to Gyantse. I said I had no wish to now discuss the terms, but merely desired to know if they wanted to be acquainted with them. They continued to protest that they would discuss nothing here, and it was only after considerable fencing that I got them to admit that they had heard the terms from the Tongsa Penlop. I then said that I wished them to understand that if we were further opposed on the way to Lhasa or at Lhasa itself, these terms would be made stricter. I said His Majesty the King-Emperor had no wish to be on any other than friendly terms with Thibet; that we had no intention of remaining in Lhasa any longer than was required to make a settlement, and as soon as a settlement was made we would leave. But I had the Viceroy's orders to go to Lhasa, and go there I must. I desired, however, to give them most earnest advice and warning. They were the leading men in Thibet, and upon them lay a great responsibility. I was quite prepared, on arrival at Lhasa, to live on as friendly and peaceable terms with the people as I had at Khamba Jong, and when I first arrived at Gyantse; to pay for everything and to respect their religious buildings. It rested with them now to decide whether our stay at Lhasa should be of this peaceable nature and of short duration, and whether the settlement should be of the mild nature we at present contemplated, or whether we should have to resort to force, as we had been compelled to at Gyantse, to impose severer terms and to prolong our stay there.

8. The Delegates listened attentively while I made this exhortation to them, but after consulting together, replied that even if we did make a settlement at Lhasa it would be of no use, for in Thibet everything depended on religion, and by the mere fact of our going to Lhasa we should spoil their religion, for no men of other religions were allowed in Lhasa. I asked them if there were no Mahommedans living in Lhasa, and they replied that there were a few, but they were not allowed to practise their religious rites—a sad admission in view of the toleration which the Buddhist religion in reality enjoins. I added that we would not have gone to Lhasa unless we had been absolutely compelled to by their incivility in not meeting us elsewhere; that, personally, I had suffered great inconvenience, and would much prefer not to have the further inconvenience of going to Lhasa; but no other resource was now left to us, and my orders from the Viceroy were final.

9. At this stage one of their servants rushed up with the information that their mules had been seized by our mounted infantry. He was followed, however, by Captain Souter, who commanded the mounted infantry, and who said that on the far side of the Jong he had come upon armed Thibetans. In accordance with the instructions he had received he had not fired on them, but after they had twice fired on him he had been compelled to return their fire, and he brought in with him nine prisoners. One of these he indicated as having fired shot after shot at him, and he produced the rifle which the prisoner had used. It was a Russian rifle, and the prisoner the Yutok Shape identified as one of his servants.

10. I informed the Delegates that, as their own men had been firing on our troops at the very time that they had been talking about peace to me, I could no longer permit them to remain in the Jong. They said their men had disobeyed their orders in firing.

I replied that that might be so, but it only showed how little control they had over their men, and how impossible it was, therefore, to allow them to remain in the Jong with our troops. They made many earnest requests to me to modify my decision, but as the interview had already lasted for three hours and a quarter, I told them I had had a long march that day, and asked them if they would kindly excuse me from further prolonging the interview.

11. The Yutok Shape throughout was calm and polite, and at his departure was cordial in his manner. The Ta Lama, though more excited, was not ill-mannered. The Grand Secretary was very excited throughout and argumentative and querulous. The whole tone of the Delegates showed that they—or at any rate the Dalai Lama—had not even yet realized the seriousness of the position. The tone they adopted entirely ignored their many defeats, their serious breaches of international courtesy, and was that of people with a grievance against us and quite ignorant of the fact that we had grievances against them. They were too excessively unbusinesslike and impracticable, and I anticipate an infinity of trouble in carrying through a settlement with such men. On the other hand, the disposition and manners of the Yutok Shape gave one more confirmation to the impression I had long formed that the laymen of Thibet are by no

means inimical, and that, but for the opposition of the monks, we might be on extremely friendly terms with them.

12. I am glad to be able to report that under General Macdonald's well thought-out arrangements the occupation of the Jong was effected without any mishap or loss of life. Captain O'Connor accompanied the Delegates back towards the Jong, which, however, they did not again enter, but took up their quarters in the village, while their followers and baggage were sent down to them there. I expressed my regret to the Yutok Shape that at our first meeting I should have had to put him to such inconvenience. But the occupation of the Jong is a military necessity, and it is a matter of congratulation that it should have been effected without the loss of life on either side.

Inclosure 9 in No. 76.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Nagartse, July 21, 1904.

THE Thibetan Delegates yesterday held another prolonged interview with me, lasting three and a-half hours. They made no further mention of the occupation of the Jong, but were very insistent that we should not advance to Lhasa. The Yutok Shape was the chief spokesman at first, but during the course of the interview each one repeated separately much the same arguments. They said that in Lhasa there were a great number of monks and many unruly characters, and disturbances might easily arise; to which I replied that I should much regret any such disturbances, and hoped the Delegates would do their best to prevent them, for the result could only be same as the result of the disturbances at Gyantse.

Another argument the Delegates used was that, if we went to Lhasa we should probably find no one there.

To this I replied that this would necessitate our waiting till people returned.

2. I reminded them that they lived apart from the rest of the world, and did not understand the customs of international intercourse. To us the fact of their having kept the Representative of a Great Power waiting for a year to negotiate was a deep insult which most Powers would resent by making war without giving any further chance for negotiation. But our King-Emperor disliked making war if he could possibly help it. His Majesty had, therefore, commanded that they should still be given one more chance of negotiating, though that chance could only be given at Lhasa itself. Let them make the most of this chance.

The Delegates replied that they had intended no insult by keeping me waiting a year; it was merely the custom of their country to keep out strangers. "But anyhow," they said, "let us forget the past. Let us be practical, and look only at the present. Here we are, the leading men in Thibet, ready to negotiate at Gyantse and make a settlement which will last for a century."

3. I replied to the Yutok Shape that I had no doubt that if a sensible man like him had been sent to me sooner we might have made up a satisfactory settlement long ago, and there would have been no necessity for us to go through all this inconvenience of advancing through an inhospitable country to Lhasa. But after the many chances which had been given them of negotiating at Gyantse, they could hardly consider it reasonable that we should give them any more. Moreover, the Viceroy had formed the opinion, from the fact of the Ta Lama having told me at Gyantse that he had no authority to evacuate the Jong without referring to Lhasa, and from the fact of his running away, that he had not sufficient power to make a settlement. For all these reasons we were compelled to go to Lhasa, though I was ready to negotiate on the way, and we would return directly a settlement was made.

4. They then made further reference to their religion being spoilt if we went to Lhasa, and I asked them to make more clear to me in what way precisely their religion would be spoilt. I said we were not intolerant of other religions, as they themselves were. They had yesterday told me that, though there were some Mahommedans in Lhasa, yet they were not allowed to practise their religious rites. We had no such feelings towards other religions. On the contrary, we allowed the followers of each to practice their religious observances with the utmost freedom.

The Delegates said that they were not so intolerant to the Mahommedans; they merely forbade building mosques and prevented any new Mahommedans coming into their country.

I said that, at any rate, some were there, and apparently they had not spoilt their religion.

They replied that the ancestors of these had come many, many years ago, and the Thibetans had become accustomed to them; to which my rejoinder was that if Mahomedans had lived among them, practising their religious rites without hindrance for all these years—apparently for centuries—without spoiling the religion of Thibet, I could not believe that the fact of our going to Lhasa for a few weeks only could have any permanent ill-effect on the religion of Thibet.

5. The Delegates then said that if we went to Lhasa the gods would be angry, and would send thunder and hail, and would destroy the crops, kill the people, and bring great trouble upon the country.

I replied that this would show that the gods were displeased with them, not with us. It was evident, indeed, that the gods were already displeased with them, or all the trouble which had already been brought upon Thibet would never have occurred. Their Government must have done something wrong, and one thing I could myself suggest as a cause of their trouble: they had not been honest in their dealings with outside nations. Instead of being either friendly with all outside nations or consistently excluding all, they had made advances to one and rejected the advances of the other. This very naturally caused resentment and brought on trouble.

6. They then remarked that, if we now went to Lhasa, all the other nations would want to go there and see the sights and establish Agents there.

I told them I had not the smallest wish to see the sights of Lhasa. I had already travelled in many different lands, and seen far finer sights than they could show me at Lhasa; and as to stationing an Agent there, we had no such intention. Could they tell me if any other nation wished to?

They replied that the Russians were getting very near at Sining, and would soon be wanting to send an Agent to Lhasa.

I told them they need not be in any fear on that score, for the Russian Government had assured our Government that they had no intention of sending Agents to Thibet. If any such Agents were sent, the Thibetans might at once inform us, and we could remind the Russian Government of their declarations, and I had no doubt the Agent would be withdrawn.

7. I added that, though we had no intention of establishing a Political Agent at Lhasa, we desired to open a trade mart at Gyantse on the same conditions as the trade mart at Yatung had been opened, that is, with the right to send a British officer there to superintend the trade. They lived secluded, and did not know the custom of other nations; but all over the world it was customary for nations to appoint in each other's countries Agents to look after their trade and settle disputes. In every part of the Chinese Empire we had such Agents, and the Chinese had like Agents in our country. Such an Agent we desired to establish at Gyantse.

8. The Delegates would not, however, be led into a discussion of the terms. They said they could only discuss the terms at Gyantse, and the conversation drifted back into the old lines of withdrawing to Gyantse. Each of the four members of the delegation repeated in turn the same arguments for withdrawing to Gyantse, and I gave to each in turn my reasons for advancing to Lhasa.

I said I feared they must think me extremely obstinate, and I felt sure that, if they had been deputed by their Government earlier in the day, I should have been able to accede to their wishes, and we could have soon come to an agreement. As matters stood at present, I could do nothing but obey the orders of the Viceroy.

They asked me if I could not stop here, represent to his Excellency what they had said, and await further instructions.

I replied that so great a man as the Viceroy only issued his orders after a very careful deliberation, but once they were issued he never revoked them.

9. I endeavoured throughout the interview to avoid being drawn into petty wrangling, and I am happy to say that at the close even the monk, who formed the fourth member of the delegation, went away with a smiling face, while the Yutok Shape, who is a thorough gentleman, was especially genial and polite. Even more important than the securing of a paper Convention, which may or may not be of value, is the placing of our personal relations with the officials of Thibet upon a good footing from the start. I had to be severe with them at Gyantse because they would not pay proper respect to me, but at each interview here they came well before the appointed time, they were thoroughly respectful throughout, and I was able to treat them with the

politeness I prefer to show them when they make this possible. I trust that, after I have suffered two interviews, one of three and a-quarter hours and another of three and a-half hours, they will feel that I am at any rate accessible, and will not have compunction in coming to see me whenever they feel inclined to. Until, however, they receive further orders from Lhasa, there is nothing more to be said on either side.

Inclosure 10 in No. 76.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyantse, August 4, 1904.

CHAKSAM Ferry, 29th July.

Have had two visits from Ta Lama and one from Dalai Lama's Grand Chamberlain, who brought me letter from Dalai Lama, asking me not to go to Lhasa. Chamberlain said he and Councillors ready negotiate here, but our presence in Lhasa would so spoil religion that Dalai Lama might die. I believe Dalai Lama and Councillors sincerely anxious settlement, but have real cause fear turbulent monks may cause futile collision with our troops, which may irritate us into sacking Lhasa. They probably also fear Dalai Lama may be murdered. Have told Delegates we must proceed Lhasa, and I have written second letter Dalai Lama, expressing hope he will appreciate inconvenience it would be to me to halt this side Lhasa, now I have left Gyantse. Chinese merchant arrived with offer sell us anything we want at Lhasa. He saw no Thibetan troops on way. This valley most fertile; wheat, barley, and peas abundant. Despatch from Amban arrived, answering mine from Gyantse. He says communicated purport to Dalai Lama. Bearer says all in confusion at Lhasa; every one shifting responsibility. Dalai Lama in religious seclusion, and believed to have retired secretly to private monastery, 18 miles from Lhasa; he has ordered monks attend religious duties, and they are delighted obey order. Being now well frightened, Thibetans can now only put 2,000 men in field against us. Supplies abundant at Lhasa, and people will sell readily. Amban anxious make settlement. Dorjief believed to have returned Siberia.

Inclosure 11 in No. 76.

Government of India to Colonel Younghusband.

(Confidential.)

Simla, August 5, 1904.

IN continuation of my letter dated the 4th August, 1904, I am directed to forward a revised draft Convention, with adhesion Agreement, amended in accordance with the instructions contained in the telegram from His Majesty's Secretary of State, dated the 4th August, 1904, which has been repeated to you. This draft should be regarded as finally settled, unless and until you receive further orders on the subject from the Government of India.

Inclosure 12 in No. 76.

Revised Convention.

WHEREAS doubts and difficulties have arisen as to the meaning and validity of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and the Trade Regulations of 1893, and as to the liabilities of the Thibetan Government under these Agreements; and whereas recent occurrences have tended towards a disturbance of the relations of friendship and good understanding which have existed between the British Government and the Government of Thibet; and whereas it is desirable to restore peace and amicable relations, and to resolve and determine the doubts and difficulties as aforesaid, the said Governments have resolved to conclude a Convention with these objects, and the following Articles have been agreed upon by Lieutenant-Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., in virtue of full powers vested in him by His Britannic Majesty's Government and on behalf of that said Government, and the illustrious Dalai Lama, Nag-Wang, Lo-ssang Theedan Gyarso Gyon Rimboochay, Supreme Pontiff of the Great Buddhist Church, on his own behalf and on behalf of the Government of Thibet:—

I.

The Government of Thibet engages to respect the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, and to recognize the frontier between Sikkim and Thibet as defined in Article I of the said Convention, and to erect boundary pillars accordingly.

II.

The Thibetan Government undertakes to open forthwith trade marts, to which all British and Thibetan subjects shall have free right of access at Gyantse and Gartok, as well as at Yatung.

The Regulations applicable to the trade mart at Yatung, under the Anglo-Chinese Agreement of 1893, shall, subject to such amendments as may hereafter be agreed upon by common consent between the British and Thibetan Governments, apply to the marts above mentioned.

In addition to establishing trade marts at the places mentioned, the Thibetan Government undertakes to place no restrictions on the trade by existing routes and to consider the question of establishing fresh trade marts under similar conditions, if development of trade requires it.

III.

The question of the amendment of the Regulations of 1893 is reserved for separate consideration, and the Thibetan Government undertakes to appoint fully authorized Delegates to negotiate with Representatives of the British Government as to the details of the amendments required.

IV.

The Thibetan Government undertakes to levy no dues of any kind other than those provided for in the Tariff to be mutually agreed upon.

V.

The Thibetan Government undertakes to keep the road to Gyantse from the frontier clear of all obstruction and in a state of repair suited to the needs of the trade, and to establish at Yatung, Gyantse, and Gartok, and at each of the other trade marts that may hereafter be established, a Thibetan Agent who shall receive from the British Agent appointed to watch over British trade at the mart in question any letter which the latter may desire to send to the Thibetan or to the Chinese authorities. The Thibetan Agent shall also be responsible for the due delivery of such communications and for the transmission of replies.

VI.

As an indemnity to the British Government for the expense incurred in the dispatch of armed troops to Lhasa to exact reparation for breaches of Treaty obligations and for the insults offered to and attacks upon the British Commissioner and his following and escort, the Thibetan Government engages to pay a sum of £. to the British Government.

The indemnity shall be payable at such place as the British Government may from time to time, after due notice, indicate, whether in Thibet or in the British districts of Darjeeling or Jalpiguri, in annual instalments on the 1st January in each year, beginning from the 1st January, 19 .

VII.

As security for the payment of the above-mentioned indemnity, and for the fulfilment of the provisions relative to trade marts specified in Articles II, III, IV, and V, the British Government shall continue to occupy the Chumbi Valley until the indemnity has been paid and until the trade marts have been effectively opened for three years, whichever date may be the later.

VIII.

The Thibetan Government agrees to raze all forts and fortifications and remove all armaments which might impede the course of free communication between the British frontier and the towns of Gyantse and Lhasa.

IX.

The Government of Thibet engages that, without the previous consent of the British Government—

- (a.) No portion of Thibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged or otherwise given for occupation to any foreign Power ;
- (b.) No such Power shall be permitted to intervene in Thibetan affairs ;
- (c.) No Representatives or Agents of any foreign Power shall be admitted to Thibet ;
- (d.) No concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights, shall be granted to any foreign Power, or the subject of any foreign Power. In the event of consent to such concessions being granted, similar or equivalent concessions shall be granted to the British Government ;
- (e.) No Thibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to any foreign Power, or the subject of any foreign Power.

X.

In witness whereof the two negotiators have signed the same, and affixed thereunto the seals of their arms.

Done in quintuplicate at Lhasa, this day of , in the year of our Lord, 1904, corresponding with the Thibetan date, the day of (Signatures.)

In proceeding to the signature of the Convention dated this day, the Representatives of Great Britain and Thibet declare that the English text shall be binding.

(Signatures.)

Adhesion Agreement.

Whereas doubts and difficulties had arisen as to the due execution of the Convention signed at Calcutta on the 17th day of March, 1890, on behalf of the British and Chinese Governments and of the Trade Regulations under that Convention which were signed by the British and Chinese Commissioners on the 5th day of December, 1893 ;

And whereas the Thibetan Government, contrary to the wishes and instructions of the Chinese Government, had declined to recognize the validity of, or to carry into full effect, the provisions of the said Convention and Trade Regulations, and had thereby entailed on the British Government the necessity of taking active measures to secure their rights and interests under the said documents ;

And whereas I, Yu Tai, Chinese Imperial Resident in Thibet, have been duly authorized by His Majesty the Emperor of China to enter into negotiations with Lieutenant-Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., the duly accredited Commissioner of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and to effect a definitive settlement of the points now at issue between Great Britain and Thibet ;

And whereas a Convention of ten Articles has this day been concluded, with the consent of the said Yu Tai, between the Governments of Great Britain and Thibet, for the restoration of peace and amicable relations, and for the confirmation, further elucidation, and fuller execution of the said Convention of 1890 :

Be it known, therefore, that I, the said Yu Tai, hereby agree to and confirm the

said Convention now concluded between Great Britain and Thibet, and engage, on behalf of the said Chinese Government, to assist in securing the due fulfilment of the terms specified therein by the Thibetan Government.

Signed and sealed this day of , 1904, in the presence of (British Commissioner).

No. 77.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 9.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 8th September, relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, September 9, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 77.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

September 8, 1904.

YOUNGHUSBAND telegraphs from Lhasa on the 2nd September as follows, in reply to inquiry which we addressed to him (see my telegram of the 25th August):—

“Your No. 2781 E. B. Chinese deposed sixth Dalai Lama on ground of licentious living. In absence of Dalai Lama, Tashi Lama would be head of the Buddhist Church; it is not intended that he should ‘assume the place’ of Dalai Lama. Fact that I endeavoured to induce Dalai Lama to come in is well known to Buddhists here, and they are also aware that, after he had definitely fled from the country, it was on the initiative of Amban that he was denounced. I, personally, consider the denunciation a very politic step, as proving that it is impracticable for Thibetans to resist the Chinese and ourselves acting in concert. It also has approval of Tongsa Penlop and Nepalese.”

(Repeated to Peking.)

No. 78.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 194.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Peking, September 9, 1904.

THIBET. A few days ago an announcement appeared in Reuter, who had clearly obtained his information from official sources, to the effect that the Mission would leave Lhasa on the 15th instant.

There are indications that the Chinese Government may be influenced by this information, the publication of which seems unfortunate, to obstruct Colonel Younghusband's endeavours to settle matters.

I learn unofficially that the Amban has transmitted to his Government first eight Articles, and subsequently two additional Articles, and that the conversion of Thibet into a vassal State of Great Britain is the construction put on these by the Chinese Government.

The Viceroy of India has been informed of the above.

No. 79.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 10.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 28th August, relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, September 7, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 79.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, August 28, 1904.

THIBET. Your telegram of the 25th instant.

Inquiry is being made by His Majesty's Minister at Peking whether Amban has made proposal as stated, and how it is regarded by Chinese Government. Sir E. Satow deprecates pressing Chinese Government in the matter, and Lord Lansdowne concurs in this view, as he fears attempt might prove abortive. If, however, Younghusband is convinced, I am inclined to press Satow further, in view of what was stated in your telegram of the 26th instant.

No. 80.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 10.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 10th September, relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, September 10, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 80.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.)

September 10, 1904.

Lhasa, September 7.—CONVENTION in full signed to-day in Potala in presence of Amban. Seals affixed were, (1) that of Dalai Lama affixed by Acting Regent; (2) that of Council; (3) those of three great monasteries; (4) that of National Assembly. Amban will sign adhesion to Agreement when formal sanction arrives from Peking. He says he personally has no objection to terms. Perfect good temper was shown by Thibetans during Durbar, and at conclusion Shapés said Treaty would be observed by whole people.

No. 81.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received September 12.)

(No. 253.)

My Lord,

Peking, July 19, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copies of two despatches which I have received from His Majesty's Consul-General at Cheng-tu relating to Thibetan affairs.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

Inclosure 1 in No. 81.

Consul-General Hosie to Sir E. Satow.

(No. 18.)

Sir,

Cheng-tu, June 24, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to report that the following information has just reached me from a correspondent at Ta-chien-lu :—

The retiring Imperial Resident, Yü Kang, and his staff arrived at Ta-chien-lu early in June. They state that the new Resident, Yu T'ai, had caused the Chinese Commissary, Li Mêng-pi, found guilty of intrigue, to be beheaded, and that the Kalön Hsia Cha and two other high Thibetan officials had committed suicide. They report meeting on the Lhasa-Batang road several bands of Thibetans, numbering from 200 or 300 up to 1,000 men each, on their way to Lhasa, whither people were proceeding from all parts of the country.

My informant states that a number of mounted Mongolian Lamas had arrived at Ta-chien-lu with the intention of entering Thibet and taking part against the British, but that they were stopped by the Chinese authorities and are now trying to dispose of their mules. He adds that the sympathy of the Chinese in Thibet appears to be with the British, and that of the Thibetans only the Lamas desire to fight.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ALEX. HOSIE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 81.

Consul-General Hosie to Sir E. Satow.

(No. 19.)

Sir,

Cheng-tu, June 25, 1904.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 18 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to report that part of the information received from Ta-chien-lu proves to be inaccurate.

The Chinese official named Li therein referred to is not Li Mêng-pi, the Commissary at Lhasa, but a military officer of the third rank who has spent some thirty years in Thibet. The Dalai Lama requested the Imperial Resident to punish him with death, but the latter replied that he had not the power to pass or carry out a death sentence on an officer of that rank, and I am informed that the man is now on his way, under guard, to Cheng-tu.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ALEX. HOSIE.

No. 82.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 12.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 12th September, relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, September 12, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 82.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

September 12, 1904.

AGREEMENT with Thibetan Government was signed on the 7th instant in the Potala in the presence of the Amban, as already reported to you direct by Colonel Younghusband. Instructions conveyed in your telegram of the 2nd September had not reached Younghusband; otherwise Agreement was as finally approved by His Majesty's Government, with the following modifications :—

Preamble.—Style and title of Dalai Lama were omitted, and the following

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officials named as acting "on behalf of the Government of Thibet," viz., Ti Rimpoche and representatives of the Council of Ministers, of the three great Lhasa monasteries, Sera, Debung, and Gaden, and of the officials, ecclesiastical and lay, of the National Assembly.

Article 5.—Words "and Gartok" were inserted after words "road to Gyantse," in first sentence.

Article 6.—500,000*l.* was entered as amount of the indemnity, to be paid in seventy-five annual instalments of 1,00,000 rupees each; first instalment payable on the 1st January, 1906.

Article 10.—Word "two" before "negotiators" is omitted.

Following seals are affixed to the Agreement :—(1) That of Dalai Lama; (2) that of Council; (3) that of the three great monasteries above named; (4) that of National Assembly.

The instalments of indemnity were fixed at one lakh of rupees a-year at the special request of the Ti Rimpoche. Younghusband, after considerable demur, was obliged to give way on this point, having regard to the necessity for obtaining early signature of Treaty and to the Thibetans' anxiety to conclude settlement. In the circumstances, he asks for confirmation of his action.

Agreement should, in my opinion, be accepted as it stands. Thibetans can be allowed to pay more than one lakh a-year if, later on, they are able and willing to do so, or amount can, of course, be reduced, if His Majesty's Government so decide, upon good behaviour of Thibetans and due fulfilment of terms, in consideration of further facilities in regard to trade. No immediate action, however, seems necessary.

As regards Adhesion Agreement, Amban, who was present at signing of Thibetan Agreement, is prepared to sign on receipt of formal sanction from Peking. If he has not signed before the 20th September (which is date on which Younghusband hopes to leave Lhasa), Amban would go down to Gyantse with Mission.

(Repeated to Peking.)

No. 83.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Satow.

(No. 136.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, September 12, 1904.

THIBET. Your telegram No. 194 of 9th September and Viceroy of India's telegram of 11th September.

What view do Chinese Government take of Convention generally, and particularly of proposal that payment of indemnity should be spread over a period of seventy-five years?

Please telegraph any reliable information you have.

No. 84.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received September 13.)

(No. 199.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Peking, September 13, 1904.

YOUR Lordship's telegram No. 136 of yesterday: Thibetan Agreement.

I will endeavour to find out the opinion of the Chinese Government on the subject, but I have no information at present.

Unless Colonel Younghusband insisted on the Amban transmitting the text of the Convention, as signed, over our telegraph lines to the Chinese Government, I doubt whether it has yet reached them.

The Tachienlu route, which takes over a month, is the one preferred by the Amban, when left to himself.

I have informed the Indian Government of the above.

No. 85.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 14.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated 12th September, relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, September 14, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 85.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

September 12, 1904.

PLEASE convey to Younghusband hearty congratulations on the conclusion of the Agreement with the Thibetan Government. The conduct both of the expedition and of the negotiations must be a source of satisfaction both to the Government of India and to those selected as their Representatives. Younghusband will be supported generally in the action he has taken. As regards the indemnity, a further communication will be made to you.

No. 86.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received September 14.)

(No. 200.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Peking, September 14, 1904.

THIBET. Your Lordship's telegram No. 136, of the 12th instant.

In reply to a question from Nat'ung, whom I saw to-day, as to whether I had any news, I informed him of the signature of the Agreement on the 7th instant, adding that authority to make a confirmatory declaration was being awaited by the Amban.

Nat'ung, from whom I ascertained that the Chinese Government had not received the final draft, volunteered the information that the grave difficulties contained in the former one had led them to ask for explanations from the Amban.

Nat'ung said that he was not authorized to discuss details with me, but gave me the information confidentially, to which I rejoined that I also was not at liberty to discuss the matter.

No allusion was made, naturally, to the question of extending the indemnity payments over seventy-five years.

A statement, the truth of which I have no means of ascertaining, has appeared in the native papers to the effect that the Chinese Government has been urged by the Russian Minister not to ratify.

The above has been repeated to the Viceroy of India.

No. 87.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 15.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in letters from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 18th and 25th August, relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, September 13, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 87.

*Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.**Camp, Chaksam Ferry, July 26, 1904.*

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, translation of a letter from the Thibetan National Assembly, together with my reply.

2. This letter is remarkable as the first ever received by a British official from a Thibetan official. I have addressed my reply to the Dalai Lama, as this is the course of procedure adopted by the Chinese Amban. I have received to-day a letter from the Dalai Lama's Chamberlain, saying he has received and forwarded my letter to the Dalai Lama. This, again, is the first letter from a British official which has been accepted by a Thibetan official.

Inclosure 2 in No. 87.

Translation of a Letter addressed to the All-wise Sahib sent by the English Government to Settle Affairs from the Thibetan National Assembly.

RECENTLY the Tongsa Penlop sent a letter to the Dalai Lama, and also communicated with the two Delegates, but hitherto a Treaty has not been effected. The Sahibs say that they intend to come to Lhasa and to see the Dalai Lama and to negotiate there, and that they will there establish friendship. The letter which contains the nine terms of the Convention has arrived here. This is a matter of great importance, and therefore the Chigiyab Kenpo (Lord Chamberlain) has been sent to Chusul. Now, our Thibetan religion is very precious, so our Regent, officials, monks, and laymen have consulted together. Formerly we made a national Convention that none was to enter the country. So now, even if the Sahibs should come to Lhasa and meet the Dalai Lama, this will not advantage the cause of friendship.

Should a fresh cause of dispute arise, we greatly fear that a disturbance, contrary to the interests of friendship, may follow. So we beg of the Sahibs both now and in the future to give the matter their earnest consideration, and, if they will negotiate with the Delegates who are now here, all will be well.

Please consider well all that has been said, and do not press forward hastily to Lhasa.

Dated the Wood Dragon year.
(Received on the 24th July.)

Inclosure 3 in No. 87.

*Colonel Younghusband to His Holiness the Dalai Lama.**July 24, 1904.*

I HAVE received a communication from the National Assembly, in which it is stated that, if I come to Lhasa and meet your Holiness, there will not be advantage to the cause of friendship, and there may be disturbances. The Council beg me, therefore, to negotiate with the Delegates deputed for the purpose.

2. More than a year ago, I arrived at Khamba Jong, which, according to a communication received by his Excellency the Viceroy from the Chinese Government, your Holiness had approved of as a place of meeting where matters in dispute between the British Government and the Thibetan Government could be settled. I waited there for several months, but the Delegates appointed refused to negotiate. I then advanced to Gyantse, and wrote several letters to the Amban, informing him that I was prepared to negotiate there. But no negotiators arrived, and I was instead treacherously attacked at night in my camp. I then wrote to both your Holiness and the Amban, stating that, if negotiators did not arrive by the 25th June, I would have to advance to Lhasa. By that date no negotiator had arrived, but, hearing from the Tongsa Penlop that the Ta Lama was on the way, his Excellency the Viceroy authorized me to wait at Gyantse a few days longer. When the Ta Lama arrived, I told him that the Jong must be evacuated, as the Thibetans had been firing at my camp for two months from it, but that I was ready to negotiate. The Jong was not evacuated, and our troops had to turn the Thibetan troops out of it by force, but

immediately it was taken, I sent message to the Ta Lama to say I was still ready to negotiate at Gyantse, if he would come at once. I waited there another week, and then his Excellency the Viceroy, considering that I had already been a year in the country awaiting negotiators, and that the negotiators when they did arrive appeared to have neither power nor authority to treat, ordered me to advance to Lhasa to negotiate there.

3. These orders I must obey, but I have no desire to create disturbances in Lhasa, or interfere with the religion of the country, and as soon as I have obtained your Holiness' seal to the Convention I have been instructed to negotiate, I will retire from Lhasa. No religious places which are not occupied by Thibetan soldiers will be occupied by British soldiers. Our soldiers will not fire, if no opposition is offered to them. And all supplies taken from the peasants will be paid for. But if opposition is offered, our troops will be compelled to commence military operations as they did at Gyantse, and the terms of the settlement will be increased in severity.

4. I would, however, assure your Holiness that it is the most sincere wish of His Majesty the King-Emperor and of the Viceroy of India that there should be no further bloodshed, but instead peace and friendship between England and Thibet. For more than a century, the English and Thibetans lived side by side without a quarrel till Sikkim was invaded by the Thibetan troops. The Convention which was negotiated by the Amban at the conclusion of the campaign in Sikkim has been repudiated by your Holiness' officials. When I have negotiated a new Convention which will be acknowledged by all your officials, I trust that all causes of dispute will have been removed, and that we shall ever after be able to live together in terms of mutual amity.

It is my earnest hope that I may be able to subscribe myself, with the greatest respect and consideration.

Inclosure 4 in No. 87.

Political Diary of the Thibet Frontier Commission.

July 18, 1904.—Clear, fine morning.

The force marched at 8 A.M., and captured the Karo La position almost without opposition, the Gurkhas turning the enemy's left flank by a wide flanking movement. The only Thibetan troops encountered were some 600 Khambas. The force camped some 2 miles below Zara.

July 19. Fine, clear morning.

The force marched to Nagartse, 12 miles. The Yutok Shape, Kalon Ta Lama, and the Tungyig Chembo came out from the Jong to meet the column, and were requested by Colonel Younghusband to call upon him at 3 P.M., and were also warned that, while he was willing to negotiate with them, it would be necessary for us to occupy the Jong and to advance to Lhasa. The Delegates called at 3 o'clock, and in the long interview which followed they protested against the occupation of the Jong and the advance to Lhasa, and requested Colonel Younghusband to return to Gyantse. During the interview news was brought in that some mounted men had fired on our Mounted Infantry; and as these were men for the most part in the following of the Delegates, the latter were told that it would be impossible for them to continue in occupation of the Jong. They removed accordingly into a house in the village, and the Jong was occupied without opposition. Large stores of tsamba (barley-flour), estimated at some 3,500 maunds, were found in the Jong. Hailstorm during the evening.

July 20.—Fine morning. The force halted at Nagartse. The Thibetan Delegates called again on the British Commissioner at 3 P.M., and a long interview followed, much to the same effect as on the previous day. Heavy hail fell during the afternoon, and rain during the night.

July 21.—Light rain fell till about 8.30 A.M. The force marched to Yarsik, 11 miles. The Delegates left Nagartse about midnight, and proceeded towards Lhasa. Rain fell during the afternoon and evening.

July 22.—Wet morning, rain continuing until about 8 A.M.

The force marched to Pede Jong, 5 miles. Rain fell during the afternoon.

July 23.—Wet morning, rain continuing until about 8 A.M.

The force marched to Trimalung, 4 miles.

July 24.—Fine morning.

A messenger arrived in camp about 7 A.M., bearing a letter from the National Assembly at Lhasa, requesting the British Commissioner to consent to negotiate with the Delegates now at Chisul, and not to advance to Lhasa. These Delegates are the Chikyab Kenpo, or Lord Chamberlain to the Dalai Lama, and a new Tungyig Chembo from Lhasa. A verbal message was sent in reply to say that the Commissioner would be pleased to receive the Delegates, but could not consent to defer his advance to Lhasa. The force marched to Kampa Partsi, 7 miles. Colonel Younghusband wrote a letter to the Dalai Lama in reply to the letter received in the morning. Rain fell during the evening and lasted into the night.

(Signed) F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND, Colonel,
British Commissioner for Thibet Frontier Matters.

Inclosure 5 in No. 87.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Camp, Chaksam Ferry, July 26, 1904.

WHEN I showed General Macdonald the letter I received from the National Assembly on the 24th July, he suggested to me that I should take advantage of the opening offered, in order to try to obtain from the Thibetans the signature to the Convention without going to Lhasa. His idea was that, in order to prevent our going to Lhasa, the Thibetans would be ready to agree to our terms, and that, if our terms were acceded to, the object of the Government would have been obtained. He quoted as a somewhat parallel case, the action of Bismarck in making terms after Königgrätz instead of going on to Vienna.

2. I informed General Macdonald that my instructions were quite clear that the Mission should go to Lhasa; that I was ready to negotiate on the way there, but that the settlement could be finally concluded only at Lhasa itself.

3. On the following morning General Macdonald wrote me two letters, of which, together with my reply and his answer to it, I have the honour to forward copies, for the information of the Government of India. My instructions are so definite, and my own opinion is so decided, that we should go to Lhasa, that, even if the Thibetans agreed to our terms—which they have not yet shown the slightest signs of doing—I would still proceed. I have not, therefore, thought it necessary to refer the matter for the decision of the Government of India, but have told General Macdonald that the Mission will proceed to Lhasa, and that I rely upon him to dispose of any opposition it may meet with on the way.

Inclosure 6 in No. 87.

Brigadier-General Macdonald to Colonel Younghusband.

July 25, 1904.

IN the course of conversation yesterday morning, you informed me that the primary object of the Mission and the force escorting it was to reach Lhasa, and that the effecting a satisfactory settlement was secondary.

As this does not appear to be in accordance with such official communications as I have received on them, I would be much obliged if you would kindly let me have a copy of the order you referred to, or, if this is not possible, would let me see the order.

Inclosure 7 in No. 87.

Brigadier-General Macdonald to Colonel Younghusband.

Khamba Barji, July 25, 1904.

FROM a communication received from the Thibetan Government, which you kindly showed me yesterday, it appears that the military operations have produced the effect of inducing the Thibetan authorities to agree to negotiations at Chusul Jong, with a view to

an early settlement of the pending questions on the lines laid down by His Majesty's Government.

In these circumstances, I would be glad to know whether you propose to grant their prayer for peace, or if I am to continue military operations and force my way to Lhasa.

Inclosure 8 in No. 87.

Colonel Younghusband to Brigadier-General Macdonald.

July 25, 1904.

I AM in receipt of your two letters of to-day's date. You will remember that at Gyantse on the 9th July I came to your camp and showed you a telegram I had just received from the Government of India, in which I was informed that they considered an advance to Lhasa was inevitable and should not be delayed. It was essential, they said, to demonstrate our power of going to Lhasa to prevent future misconception and misrepresentation.

When after showing you the letter I yesterday received from the National Council you were good enough to suggest that I should take advantage of the opening to negotiate at Chusul Jong, I informed you that, while I was prepared to negotiate on the way, I must in any case go to Lhasa. That, according to my instructions and according to my own personal view, was a primary necessity antecedent to the conclusion of any settlement. It was not within my option, nor did I consider it advisable, to now conclude a settlement at any other place than Lhasa itself.

The Mission will, therefore, advance to Lhasa, and, if any opposition is offered to its passage, I would rely upon you to overcome it.

Inclosure 9 in No. 87.

Brigadier-General Macdonald to Colonel Younghusband.

Chaksam Ferry, July 25, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of to-day's date in reply to two of mine of this morning's date, and am glad to learn that in your conversation you did not refer to any fresh orders of Government, which might have necessitated alterations in my military arrangements.

I also note that I am at liberty to use force, if necessary, in getting the Mission to Lhasa, irrespective of the presence of negotiators at Chusul.

I would point out that you appear to have somewhat misunderstood my well-meant suggestion of a method of taking advantage of the present feeling amongst the Thibetans to secure an early settlement, and that I am not aware of having recommended our halting at Chusul unless the formally sealed and signed Agreement was placed in your hands at that place.

I have fully informed you of the limited resources of the Lhasa column and of the slender nature of our communications, which will preclude our getting up from Gyantse much in the way of supplies or extra clothing. We have, as I have informed you, to depend to a large extent on local supplies for subsistence, and you are aware that the sickness in the column, due partly to unaccustomed diet, has caused me some uneasiness.

For these reasons our stay at Lhasa cannot be indefinitely prolonged, and though I can promise to give you every day that I safely can, I would nevertheless urge on you the necessity of securing as early a settlement as possible.

Inclosure 10 in No. 87.

Government of India to Colonel Younghusband.

(Telegraphic.)

Simla, August 12, 1904.

IT is difficult for Government of India to estimate exact situation in absence of regular information; but as stay at Lhasa cannot be protracted, and correspondence takes twelve days, they think that it may be of some help and guidance to you to

know their present views, in case you should have to take the responsibility of energetic action.

You have doubtlessly made up your mind as to action which should be taken if prospect of negotiating is hopeless, and if it becomes necessary to requisition supplies by force. Government of India would approve of principal officials being made hostages for safety of force and for settlement, and, if necessary, of their being taken back to Gyantse. You must, of course, take what supplies you require, but nothing should be done in the nature of looting or destruction of religious property.

Would it be possible to bring in Dalai Lama, or to insure his seal being used under his authority? Government of India would be quite prepared to approve of steps being taken to this end if necessity for it is well established.

Inclosure 11 in No. 87.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyantse, August 13, 1904.

Lhasa, 8th August.—Thibetan authorities all in confusion; Ta Lama disgraced, Yutok Shape gone sick, and of remaining two Shapes one is inimical and other useless. National Assembly sits permanently now, but only criticizes, and is afraid act without reference Dalai Lama, who is three days' distant, and will not in his turn act without sanction Assembly. Every one in fear, not of us, but of each other, and each is working against the other. No attempt commence negotiations been made. Amban openly expresses opinion kindness thrown away and force only method dealing Thibetans, and I anticipate necessity taking Potala Palace itself. Have given Amban rough outline terms we are asking of Thibetans. Tongsa Penlop and Nepaulese Representative visit me daily; they express despair at silliness Thibetans, and say their heads ache with arguing with them; they also say people generally are angry at inaction of authorities and wish settlement with us rapidly effected. Bazaar outside our camp is daily attended by over 300 vendors, but authorities have not yet removed prohibition on villagers to sell us grain there, and in spite of my protests and warning they have sent insufficient quantity supplies themselves.

I authorized Macdonald take supplies from Depung Monastery by force. Monastery was surrounded this morning, but not entered; small amount supplies obtained, and lamas arrested as security for furnishing full amount within five days. No fitting residence having been provided for Mission, I informed Shapes I would occupy Summer Palace, but on Tongsa Penlop representing this was considered very sacred owing to its being residence Dalai Lama, I consented occupy next best residence in Lhasa, but told Shapes would expect Dalai Lama receive me and thank Viceroy for consideration his Excellency has ordered me show their religion. General attitude of Thibetans, though exasperating, is probably more futile and inept than intentionally hostile.

Inclosure 12 in No. 87.

Government of India to Colonel Younghusband.

(Telegraphic.)

Simla, August 14, 1904.

YOUR telegram of 8th August.

Your action, which anticipated our suggestion, is fully approved.

The situation does not seem entirely hopeless, and Viceroy will support you in any further action you may find it necessary to take so long as you do not transgress the spirit of your instructions, which you seem to understand very thoroughly.

Inclosure 13 in No. 87.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Camp, Chaksam Ferry, July 27, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Dalai Lama's Chamberlain, accompanied by the Ta Lama and one of the Secretaries of the Council, paid me a visit this morning. They brought with them a letter from the Dalai Lama, of which a translation is inclosed,

together with my reply. They repeated the old request that we should not go to Lhasa. The only new argument they used was that our going to Lhasa would so spoil their religion that the Dalai Lama might die. I told them that I should much regret that our arrival in Lhasa should have any such melancholy result, but I had studied their religion, and could not believe it was so weak that it could not stand our presence in Lhasa for a few weeks.

2. The Delegates repeatedly urged me to realize the personal inconvenience our presence in Lhasa would be to the Dalai Lama. The Ta Lama explained that the Chamberlain was in constant personal attendance on the Dalai Lama and enjoyed his fullest confidence, and for that reason had been specially deputed by the Dalai Lama. I was given to understand that this was a very unusual favour, and I was earnestly begged to accede to the Dalai Lama's personal wishes. The Delegates further told me that if I did not accede to them they would themselves be severely punished by the Dalai Lama.

3. I replied that I much regretted my inability to accede to the Dalai Lama's wishes, and trusted they would ask His Holiness to excuse my insistence. They had spoken of the inconvenience our presence in Lhasa would cause the Dalai Lama, but His Holiness would, I felt sure, realize the inconvenience we had already suffered through the delay in the arrival of negotiators. I could assure them that the Viceroy had every desire to consult the feelings of the Dalai Lama, and it was because we knew that His Holiness was averse to the presence of strangers in Lhasa that his Excellency had not sent me there in the first instance, though the capital of a country was the natural and usual place in which to conduct negotiations. It was only after we had found it impossible to effect a settlement anywhere else that I had been ordered to proceed to Lhasa. I added that after an Envoy had been kept waiting for a year, and had been attacked and shot at for two months, most Rulers would have refused to allow their Representative to negotiate till the capital had been captured. We were not, however, advancing with that object. They could see that here, now opposition had ceased, we were paying for all supplies we took, and the monastery immediately outside the camp was left unmolested. I was prepared to show like considerations on our arrival at Lhasa if we were unopposed, and I trusted His Holiness would appreciate this concession.

4. The Delegates assured me again that the Dalai Lama was really anxious to make a settlement, that they had come in a peaceful manner and had let the army they had with them a few days ago disperse to their homes. I had little difficulty in believing these assertions, for we have received accounts that the Thibetan army has scattered in a panic, the Kham levies looting in all directions. A peaceful settlement is undoubtedly, therefore, the sincere desire of the Dalai Lama, though turbulent monks may yet create a disturbance in Lhasa itself.

5. As to the Delegates being punished if we advanced to Lhasa, I said that I myself would be punished if we did not.

6. A discussion afterwards followed on the question of other foreigners coming to Thibet if we were allowed there. I told them it was the usual custom for countries to have Representatives at each other's capital, and we would probably have avoided all the misunderstandings which led to the present troubles if we had had a Representative at Lhasa and they had had one in Calcutta. We knew, however, their aversion to keeping a British Agent in Lhasa; we were not, therefore, pressing the point, and were only insisting upon having trade agents at Gyantse and other marts. There would therefore be no special reason for other foreigners establishing an Agent at Lhasa. The only Power which was at all likely to wish to was Russia, and she had declared to us that she had no intention to send an Agent to Thibet. If at any time she should attempt to station an Agent there the Thibetan Government might inform us, and we would remind the Russian Government of their declarations.

7. The Delegates replied that our establishing an Agent even at Gyantse would be against their custom and spoil their religion. I said that I understood then that they were not prepared even now to agree to our terms, and they informed me that they were only authorized to discuss them, and they would have to be considered in the National Assembly. "You expect me, then," I said, "to remain out here in a half desert place discussing terms. I have already remained for months together in desert places in Thibet, and can now negotiate in no other place than Lhasa." I begged the Chamberlain, as a practical man, to accept this as inevitable and to now turn his mind to insuring that there should be no more useless bloodshed on the way, and that we should be enabled by the speedy conclusion of the settlement to leave Lhasa at an early date.

8. Before closing the interview I had some conversation with Delegates on the

general question of intercourse between Thibet and India. I said that we should be very glad if they would more frequently accept the hospitality we were always ready to offer them in India. They would find that in India they could travel wherever they liked, and would everywhere be protected and welcomed. They would see, too, that though we were Christians we not only tolerated but protected Buddhists, Hindus, and Mahommedans. We even spent large sums of money in preserving ancient buildings of other religions. In this camp was an officer, Colonel Waddell, who had spent his life in studying the Buddhist religion, and while reading the ancient books had discovered instructions indicating exactly where the birth-place of Buddha could be found. The British Government had spent a considerable amount of money in clearing away forests, and the town in which Buddha was born was actually discovered. We did not believe that every religion except our own was wrong. On the contrary, we believed that the same God whom we all worshipped could be approached by many different roads, and we were ready to respect those who were travelling to the same destination, though by a different road to that which we ourselves were following.

9. The Delegates expressed their satisfaction that we should have studied their religion, but the conversation soon returned to the more pressing question of our advance to Lhasa. The Chamberlain was the most sensible, practical man we have so far met, and I was specially polite to him, as in the event of the flight or murder of the Dalai Lama he might be a possible Regent. But even he had evidently very little power, and, while he was nervous throughout the interview, was clearly more nervous of his own people than of us.

10. After the interview had lasted three and a-half hours I asked them to report my words to the Dalai Lama, and I told them that I should be very glad to see them again whenever they liked either to further discuss official business, or, putting official matters aside, to pay me a friendly private visit.

11. They took one of my Thibetan Munshis with them and gave him a special present of silk for Captain O'Connor, and also told the Munshi that the man who had brought all this trouble on Thibet was the Tungyig Chembo (the Grand Secretary) who was at Khamba Jong, Gyantse, and Ngartse, but who was not present at this interview. It is satisfactory to find that two such influential men as the Chamberlain and the Ta Lama have discovered this, and if the man is now cast aside our chance of getting on terms of friendship with high Thibetan officials will be vastly increased.

12. It is unnecessary to point out to the Government of India the great importance which attaches to the receipt of a letter from the Dalai Lama, and Captain O'Connor tells me that the form in which it is written is that adopted from one equal to another. I shall lose no opportunity of keeping up the correspondence. I have now accepted the silk which he sent me through the Tongsa Penlop, but which I had refused to accept unless accompanied by a letter or handed to me by one of the Dalai Lama's own officials. The present was mentioned in the Dalai Lama's letter to me, and the Chamberlain also told me the Dalai Lama begged me to accept it. I could therefore accept it without loss of dignity. I have sent him in return a large and very handsome silver-gilt bowl.

Inclosure 14 in No. 87.

Translation of Letter from the Dalai Lama, received at Chaksam Ferry on the 27th July, 1904.

To the Saheb sent by the English Government to settle affairs.

IN a letter recently received by the Shape from the Tongsa Penlop he says that the establishment of friendship has now become difficult, as the English officers with their escort say that they are about to proceed to Lhasa to make a Treaty and to meet the Dalai Lama. With this communication the nine terms of the Convention were also received. The National Assembly has been consulted regarding this matter, and as it has decided for friendship, it has sent a separate communication to the British. I, too, in accordance with the religious customs of Thibet, am at present in retreat, and it would be a difficult matter for me to meet the Sahebs. I have sent two Representatives on ahead to negotiate regarding friendship, and also the Chikyab Kenpo, who lives always near me. It will be well if matters are discussed with my Delegates there for the sake of peace.

But it is not well for the establishment of an Agreement between the two countries if you come to Lhasa contrary to my wishes. Please consider this well. I send a scarf, and have already sent some silks separately.

Dated the 8th day of the 6th month, Wood Dragon year (the 26th July, 1904).

Inclosure 15 in No. 87.

Colonel Younghusband to His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

Camp, Chaksam Ferry, July 27, 1904.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Holiness' letter, dated the 26th July. I have also received a visit from the Representatives whom you had sent to meet me. They explained your views at great length and with much politeness, and did their best to persuade me from proceeding to Lhasa. I have no doubt that if such able men, possessing as they do your Holiness' entire confidence, had been sent earlier to meet me, an amicable arrangement could have been made at Gyantse. But I am sure your Holiness will realize the inconvenience it would be to me, now that I have left Gyantse, to negotiate at any other place than Lhasa itself. I trust, however, that, as the terms of the settlement which I am prepared to make are so very light, an arrangement will be speedily come to, and my stay in Lhasa will consequently be very short. In any case, I will disturb your Holiness as little as possible in your religious seclusion.

I desire to thank your Holiness for the silks you sent me at Gyantse. They were not accompanied by any letter from you or handed to me by one of your Holiness' officials, so I was not certain that you had really sent them. Now I am assured that you did, I have much pleasure in accepting them. I am dispatching with this a silver bowl. I trust your Holiness will accept it as a token of my esteem, and will believe me to be, &c.

Inclosure 16 in No. 87.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Camp, Chaksam Ferry, July 29, 1904.

IN continuation of my letter dated the 27th July, I have the honour to report that the Ta Lama, accompanied by the same Secretary of Council who was present at the interview of the 27th July, came to visit me this morning. He explained that the Chamberlain had returned to Lhasa to report personally to the Dalai Lama the result of his interview with me, and he hoped that I would wait here till the reply of the Dalai Lama should reach me. I informed him that I could not wait here longer than the 31st, when General Macdonald's arrangements would be complete, that it was not our custom to act in a dilatory manner, and that I was, indeed, daily expecting a telegram from the Viceroy asking me for an explanation of the delay which had already occurred.

2. During the interview, which lasted three hours, the conversation was of a discursive nature, as the Ta Lama clearly had no power to even discuss anything else than our advance to Lhasa. I gathered that what he and the other Delegates, and probably also the Dalai Lama himself, fear is the turbulence of the war party among the monks of the three great monasteries, leading to some futile collision with our troops, which would not have the slightest effect in stopping us, but which would merely irritate us into sacking Lhasa. Probably what the Dalai Lama's party also fear is that these same turbulent monks may turn upon the Dalai Lama and make away with him.

3. I told the Ta Lama that I considered it a great pity that he and the other able Councillors who had recently met me had not come to Khamba Jong, for the Secretary of Council, who had met Mr. White and me there, had not comported himself in at all a conciliatory manner; he had, in fact, irritated us considerably, and made a peaceful settlement impossible. This surprised me the more because the Chinese Government had informed his Excellency the Viceroy that the Dalai Lama had agreed to Khamba Jong as the meeting place where negotiations should take place. The Ta Lama replied that what the Dalai Lama meant was the Khamba boundary, not Khamba Jong. I told him that this was hardly intelligible, as the Khamba boundary was along the top of mountains. We clearly could not sit on the top of a mountain and negotiate; we had to meet on either the one side or the other, and as the Amban and Thibetan officials had come to India on the last occasion, it was natural that we should expect to meet in Thibet on

this. I added that when the Chinese and Thibetan officials came to India we treated them as our guests, as Mr. White, who was present at Darjeeling, could testify; we provided houses, food, and transport for them, allowed them to have their own soldiers as escort, and took them down to Calcutta to visit his Excellency the Viceroy. On the other hand, when Mr. White and I arrived at Khamba Jong last year, we were not even allowed to buy supplies.

4. The Ta Lama said that what was meant by the Khamba boundary was not the top of the mountains, but the wall at Giaogong. He did not deny that Thibetan officials had been treated as guests at Darjeeling, but he said we did not realize the great expense the Thibetan Government had incurred in transporting them to the Indian frontier.

5. I then asked the Ta Lama what reason they had for originally starting this trouble, which, after all, originated in their invasion of Sikkim in 1886. Why did they send troops into the territory of a British feudatory State? We had lived for so many years without troubling one another: why did they start a trouble which has lasted up to the present time? He replied that they considered Sikkim to be a feudatory of Thibet, and the Dalai Lama was accustomed at that time to send orders to the Sikkim Chief. I said that they must surely have been aware of the Treaty which had been concluded more than twenty years previous to the Thibetan invasion of Sikkim, between Sikkim and the British Government, by which the former acknowledged the suzerainty of the latter. If the Thibetans had had any objection, the proper course would have been to make representations at the time, and not twenty years after to send troops into Sikkim.

6. As regards the Treaty we now wish to make with them, how would the negotiations be conducted, I asked, and who had the final authority in the State? The Ta Lama said that the Councillors and Secretaries and Representatives of the National Assembly would meet me and discuss the terms. The final authority was the National Assembly, which was composed of representatives from all over Thibet, but chiefly from the three great monasteries at Lhasa. Both monks and laymen attended it, as well as many officials, but the Councillors ("Shapes") were not included in it, and the Dalai Lama had no representative there. I told the Ta Lama that this seemed rather extraordinary, for the Councillors were presumably the most able men in the State, and yet their counsels were liable to be overridden by the decision of a body of irresponsible and less capable men. "Supposing," I said, "that the Dalai Lama and the Councillors wished to agree to the terms I was asking and the National Assembly declined to agree, whose views would be adopted?" The Ta Lama said that the Dalai Lama and the Councillors never disagreed with the National Assembly, for the decision of the latter was final. I said this made matters very difficult for me, for I negotiated with the Councillors as being the leading men in the State, and yet they could not even enter the National Assembly to report what I had said to them. The Ta Lama said the custom was for the Councillors to send one of the Secretaries to present their views to the National Assembly. I asked who presided, what was the number of representatives, and whether the decision was arrived at by votes. He said no one presided, that there were about 500 representatives, and that they arrived at a decision by discussing till they were all of one mind.

7. I remarked that under these circumstances the negotiations promised to last a considerable time. Did he think they would be concluded in a year? He said a good deal depended upon how we proposed to set about negotiating. If we took each point separately and had it discussed in the National Assembly till agreed to, the settlement might be made fairly quickly, but if we gave the whole Treaty in a lump and said this and nothing less must be agreed to he did not think a settlement would ever be made. I told the Ta Lama that it was a matter of indifference to the British Government how long the negotiations lasted, for we should expect the Thibetan Government to pay for our expenses from the date of the attack on the Mission at Gyantse, and of course if a settlement were never arrived at we should simply have to move more troops into the country.

8. The Ta Lama urged that we should not be hard on the Thibetans by demanding an indemnity, for if we did we could never be friends. I answered that we would not have demanded an indemnity if they had been reasonable, and had negotiated at Khamba Jong or Gyantse, but as they had chosen to fight and had been worsted, they must take the consequences of their own actions.

9. The Ta Lama then dwelt upon the habit of the Thibetans to take plenty of time in making decisions. They liked to think well before taking action, and could not stand being hurried. I informed him that we also tried to think well before taking action, but we thought quickly and acted at once, so as to get on without delay from one thing to

another. The lives of men were short, and we wished to get through as much as possible in the little time we were here. The Ta Lama said that their time was taken up with the study of religion, which did not admit of hurry. I told him while he had only studied his own religion I had been able to study not only my own but his, and Hindooism and Mahommedanism as well. To which his final reply was that the study of Buddhism alone required the whole of a man's attention.

10. During this latter part of the discussion the Ta Lama and the Secretary laughed heartily. Then the former, after asking leave to depart, repeated as I was shaking hands with him another appeal to me not to go to Lhasa.

Inclosure 17 in No. 87.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ravenshaw to Government of India.

The Residency, Nepaul, August 4, 1904.

IN continuation of my letter dated the 25th July last, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a translation of a letter dated the 6th June last, received by the Prime Minister from the Nepaulese Representative at Lhasa, regarding Thibetan affairs.

Inclosure 18 in No. 87.

Translation of a Letter from the Nepaulese Representative at Lhasa.

WITH due respect I beg to lay before your Highness, in the following lines, notes of the conversation which I had with the persons named below on the dates mentioned. Conversations with Kazy Sejunsay and Kazy Chharong on Monday, the 18th Jastha, at the Kasyal Office.

I.—Are you all right now?

The Kazies.—(Chharong Kazy?) Thanks, I am a little better now. But as this office building is plastered with mortar all over, the ailment sometimes increases. The other day you sent us a message expressing a wish to call here, but as we were then very much pressed with business which required our immediate attention and as we always feel a great pleasure to have long talks with you when we meet, we could not ask you to come that day, for which please excuse.

I.—At the time when one sends a message that he will come, to say that you are engaged may be a violation of the rules of etiquette, besides, in case of some urgent business having had to be transacted, it may do harm. You speak of being engaged in urgent business. Should the Thibetan Government persist in the way they have chalked out for themselves, you should have your eyes open to realize the weight and importance of the business that is to come. We have been constantly pressing before you the matter since last year, but your old Kazies having paid no heed to it, you are now entangled in a weighty and urgent matter. Please let me know whether or not you have sent a just and proper reply, without reservation, to his Highness the Maharajah's letter to you, stating forth in detail and in clear terms all the facts. Mind you well that you may not make the Gurkhas think that you have slighted them by not replying.

The Kazies.—Some days ago, owing to the forcible and unlawful advance of the British troops as far up as Nagarchay, which kept us very busy in arranging for the dispatch of men and the Banda Kazy and other similar works, and as it would not have done to have sent a haphazard reply to his Highness' letter without consulting the Chhongdui Council, revolving the matter amongst us, and laying it before the Potala Lama, some delay happened, as I, Chharong Kazy, was laid up with an attack of rheumatism and could not attend the Kasyal, and I, Sejunsay Kazy, being single-handed could not cope with all the business in hand. Now we jointly have gone through the former and the subsequent letters of his Highness and realize that, as the Thibetan and Nepaul Governments have so long been living in amity like brothers, and as the Thibetan Government has got entangled in a dispute with the British Government, his Highness without any reservation and with a clear exposition of facts has given us advice and instructions. Formerly we never had had any dealings with the British in India. On

their occupying Sikkim on the pretence that it belonged to them, we came in contact with them and subsequently had a war. Since then, it having been settled that in case of difference arising Representatives of both Governments would meet at a place called Gnatong, outposts and gate were erected at that place, and the Chinese, Thibetan, and British Representatives have been residing there. When the British represented to us that we should abide by the terms of the Treaty made by Hrintarin Amba and asked us to come and discuss the matter with them, the Potala Lama appointed me, Chharong Dhaibun, and Dhuikshemu of Potala with instructions to proceed and to settle matters in a civil and peaceful way by referring to the Potala Lama any point which we were not empowered to decide, and we, under the impression that the trysting-place was Gnatong, were proceeding towards it, when we heard of the intention of the British to advance at once to Ghambajhong. We therefore proceeded towards Ghamba frontier, where we met the British officers, accompanied by an armed force, who insisted that they would proceed to Ghamba and not stop at the frontier, and represented to them that they had at first requested us to come and meet them at the frontier to discuss matters, and so we, accompanied by only our ordinary retinue, had come to them, but that they have come towards Ghamba without sticking to their words of going to Gnatong. We also pointed out to them the impropriety of coming, attended with such an armed force, for discussion of Treaty terms, and tried our best to induce them to go to Gnatong, where we said the business would be done. Notwithstanding our protestation they forcibly entered our territory, demonstrating their superior armed force, and settled at Ghambajhong. There again we repeated our protests two or three times more, requesting them to withdraw to Gnatong, and pointing out that, should they not do so, we would be blamed and the difference might not be settled, but they were quite deaf to our words and told us that they had such and such army, such and such weapons, and such and such warriors, thus in every way putting slight on others that should the Amban and the Kazies, who have full powers to settle the case at the spot, come to them, they would negotiate, if not, they would do such and such thing, and made other tall talks only. We replied that, though we had not the full power to settle all matters then and there, we would take note of objections which might be urged on their side, and which we had to urge, as there might crop up questions which are objectionable on religious grounds on the Thibet side, so we should consult and settle the matter amicably, doing as much as we are empowered to do, and for the rest they should go to Gnatong, and, if necessary, the Amban and Kazies would be sent there. They paid no attention to what we said, but, vaunting of their wealth and army, demanded the presence of fully authorized Representative there, threatening to bring about severe consequences. In short, it appeared to us that they were seeking some pretence to enter into the heart of Thibet. This matter rested for a time till we heard that they returned from Ghamba. We believed that they were going to Gnatong and that the business would be done there, for which, if necessary, the Amban and the Kazies too would go. Subsequently, however, the British suddenly came up to Phari and occupied the place. Even then the Thibetan Government patiently bore this unjustifiable act and sent Lheting Dhaibun with instructions to induce the British to go to Gnatong frontier, and with strict injunction not to lay hands upon or take arms against them. As the British officers had come attended with troops which they gave out were intended as an escort for their safety, and crossed the frontier into Thibetan territory, we also sent some troops with the Dhaibun for his safety, with strict orders as mentioned above. The British, instead of withdrawing to the frontier, advanced even further up than Phari, fired on our officers and men, causing severe loss, and have even come up to Nagarchay-Gyanchi, where they are still committing mischief. Why should these British be so proud as to show off to us in this might-is-right fashion the superiority of their arms, wealth, and so forth? We also have some knowledge of what they are; but simply because they are powerful and because we are a people who, on account of their religious tendency, have got no martial instinct and belong to a petty State, such high-handed proceedings are unwarrantable. In this we will very soon send a representation to his Highness the Maharajah after having consulted the Chhongdui Council and represented the matter to the Potala Lama; and we hope you will also represent to his Highness now and then what will be for the good of Thibet.

I.—From what you say it appears that it was the British who were the aggressors; on the other hand the British must also have been showing you to be the aggressors. Even in petty quarrels neither party sees his mistake nor engages in a quarrel with a conviction that he will lose. Both sides see the righteousness of their own cause. It is only after discussion that the plain truth comes out and mistake is traced to the right party. Consequently every one should side with the cause of justice, as, when the dis-

puted question is well thrashed, it will come out which of them are to blame. You say that you have realized that his Highness has given you unreserved, just, and premonitory advice in his letters, wherein he has, considering the amity of the two Governments with each other, showed you what was best for you to do and what would be the consequence to you. It may be that you have realized it. I have also been explaining these things over and over again to you. The principal thing is that you were not told to give up your rights, but you were simply told that, instead of pursuing a course which was neither just nor equitable and without any sufficient grounds for you to stand on against such a powerful Government, to provoke and increase ill-feeling with them and to bring on troubles on the heads of your lieges and ruin the Administration of the country would be an act unworthy of a capable statesman, and you were also told that you should for the good of your country act with amity beforehand; and such and other advices were given for your own good. As you did not promptly follow these advices, you have, with bitter experience, come to know of the consequences which you were told would follow an action contrary to the advice. If you do not take the advice even now the probability is that your Administration will be ruined. Late though it is, if you send Kazies, Bharadars, and the Amban towards Gyanchi, and are thus able to settle matters, the worst may be averted; otherwise things have come to such a head as to threaten the stability of your Government. I cannot understand what policy it is to obstruct the Amban from going and not to send with him Kazies and Bharadars to settle matters. Now, be quick to send a reply to our Maharajah setting forth in clear and unequivocal terms the facts and all what you have to say. Please also state the facts about the Khendechhega in detail without keeping back anything and giving out that now you have acted in such and such a manner according to his Highness' advice. If you procrastinate even now, remember please the proverb which says that a string can never draw back an avalanche. When the British troops come in earnest they will come upon you like an avalanche, and at that time you, thin and weak like the string, will never be able to check them, but your whole country will be flooded with the British troops. How often am I to explain this thing to you? If you realize it yourselves then only the knowledge will be of any service. I should like to know whether you are inclined to send the Amban without any further obstruction, with the Kazies and Bharadars, or whether you are bent upon causing the death of many lives, and the ruin of your Administration and of your country.

The Kazies.—We have fully realized the advice which, actuated by the friendly feelings, the Maharajah gave us. We shall now send a proper reply as soon as possible. But what can we do when, though we were sitting quite quiet inside our own territory, the British have forcibly entered into it and are committing mischief? There is no knowing what may happen in the future. We are not aggressors, but it is the British who, acting in a high-handed manner, have sought for our ruin, and if that is to be our ruin, there is no help for it. As the Amban is here to look after the affairs of this country, he must, as a matter of course, do his duty. We have never stopped him from going. We had sent a Memorandum to him stating all the facts and requesting him to tell us what could he do for us if he should go to the frontier dispute, but so far no reply has been received. We assure you that we have not stopped the Amban from going; what we have done was to ask for an information about what he could do for us. We understand it to be our duty to protect our people, and we will try our best for it, but if our efforts were to prove in vain, we are helpless in the matter.

I.—It is very difficult to realize the situation. If you cannot mend matters it would mean utter ruin to Thibet. Why, even a fool can understand it. If the Amban were able to say from here what he could do, it would not be necessary for him to go to frontier dispute all, but matters would have been settled by written communications only. The Kazies of the Kasyal are to Thibet what pillars are to a house. You now form these pillars, having the confidence of the Potala Lama. Your first duty lies in averting danger from your people and Administration. So for you to say that you will be doing your best, and, should anything happen even then, you are quite helpless, is like giving up all hopes and preparing for the worst. That would be like obtaining ashes by burning down a house. You should not be so very despondent. So long as the patient breathes hopes may be entertained of his recovery. You had better not put any difficulty whatever in the Amban's going to the frontier dispute. I shall go to the Amban and request him to proceed for the purpose. The existing ill-feeling between you and the British should be removed by the Amban and your Kazy and Bharadars going and settling the matter peacefully and amicably. Because of the going of the Amban he will not settle the matter offhand without at all referring it to the Thibetan

Government, but both of you will act in consultation. Do not act in this utter foolhardy manner. If I were to go to the Amban and tell him to proceed to the frontier dispute, would you be inclined to think that I am doing this to serve my own purpose? If that is so, please tell me so plainly at once.

The Kazies.—We are still exchanging communication with the Amban. In these Memorandums nothing has transpired as yet which would make either of us stop communication. We have fully realized what the Maharajah has written to us and what you have told us are for our good, and we should all act according to it, but in this matter we cannot as yet definitely express any opinion as we have to consult the Chhongdui Council and to lay the matter before the Potala Lama. We will settle it in two or four days. We can never take it amiss when for the good of all you intend to go and request the Amban to proceed to the frontier dispute. We all know that the Gurkha Government without any partiality and conscientiously, and for the benefit of all concerned, is giving us the best advice.

I.—There is no time to waste away. You must be up and doing. Kindly issue orders to the Jhompon of Digarcha for the quick transmission of the daks to Nepal.

After this I returned home. Your Highness will observe from the above that the Kazies altogether carefully avoid the mention of the name of the Khen-dechbega. I am not aware of the nature of the reply they intend sending to your Highness.

After my return from the Kasyal I received a message from the Treasurer of the Amban requesting my presence at the Yamun for a short time. I thought that, as reported to your Highness in one of my previous letters, where I mentioned that the Amban's Treasurer has requested me to speak to the Kasyal about sending off the Amban, the Treasurer, having had intimation of my visit to the Kasyal, has now sent for me, and accordingly went to him. He asked me what transpired at the Kasyal that day. I replied that:—

“Sunsay, when he came to me the other day to convey his (Treasurer's) message, had told me that the Bara Amban was aware of what his Highness had written about the sending of the Amban and the Kazies in this dispute, and also the talk we had on the subject; that the Thibetans were in such straits because they did not pay heed to the instructions given by His Majesty the Emperor of China, his Highness, and the Amban; that even now should I go and request the Kasyal Kazies to send off the Amban, it would be better. Accordingly I called at the Kasyal to-day, and again repeated to them the instructions which they have received in his Highness' letter, and urged them to send off the Amban and the Kazies, adding that if the matter was not settled amicably, and if they were bent upon war or fighting, their Administration would be utterly ruined. I further told them that I shall go and request the Amban to proceed to the frontier dispute, and they should accordingly make arrangement for the dispatch of the Amban and the Kazies. The Kazies replied that they shall think over this and represent the matter to the Potala Lama and do what was necessary as soon as possible.”

The Treasurer said: “You have spoken very well. It was not possible for the Kazies to give a definite reply then and there. In two or four days it will be known what decision they have arrived at. You know very well how to speak in a manner beneficial to all. Though we have explained to them the facts to the best of our ability, they always take it amiss. Since they do not care to follow the orders of His Majesty the Emperor of China, others may be let alone. Even now, if they follow your advice and send off the Amban, well and good; if not, let things happen what may, it will prove their ruin eventually.”

I said that, fools though the Thibetans were, he should not leave them to their fate, but that they should try their best to bring about amicable settlement peaceably.

This closed our conversation, and I returned home.

The next day Sunsay, the Chinese, came to me, and said that I should try and do what was necessary to send off the Amban and Kazies, and that if the Amban were to go to the frontier dispute, as I and my Government were all along inclined towards an amicable settlement, and we are trying for it with our head and heart, besides, as I was conversant with the ways of the Chinese, Thibetans, and Nepaulese, I, for the sake of humanity, should accompany the Amban, and that the above request was from the Treasurer.

I replied that I shall try my best to have the Amban sent, and as to the request that I should accompany him, I said I could not leave the station, even for a day or two, without obtaining permission from your Highness, and that if business be done in a proper way your Highness would do the needful, either by sending an officer from your Highness' side, or by writing letter to the Thibetan Government, and we too would act in accordance with the instructions that we might receive from his Highness.

I have tried my level best to advise the Kazies to prevent hostilities with the British, but the Potala Lama, a raw youth, who may be called to be the very incarnation of the destruction of Thibet, and who knows not the weak points of his country, nor has any experience of the outside world, has stood in the way.

Manila says that five Ghumba merchants or traders of Lhasa, who are the inhabitants of the frontier districts lying between Thibet and Sikkim, were suspected of being British spies and being in communication with them, and were arrested some days ago. From their deposition fresh suspicion was roused, and all the Ghumba residents of Lhasa were collected, of whom two were arrested on suspicion by the Naugsyal Office. On being thrashed, one of them, a servant, gave out that his master, while going for a hot spring bath, had sent him from the hot spring to Ghumba with a letter giving news of Lhasa.

The same informant further says that it was reported that the Thibetans attacked the British transport mules laden with ammunition and escorted by 200 sepoy, but were repulsed with loss.

The Bhemjing of Nechang says that the sepoy of Sota Losang went on looting the inhabitants on their way, and so most of the inhabitants with property have fled to other places, that the Kazy Itu was at Nagarchay, and that, should the said sepoy go on looting against the orders of their superior officers, not a single Thibetan subject who lived alongside the route will live there any longer.

The said Manila further says that there was a talk in the Yamun of some 800 British troops having been brought up to Phari Jhong, and of them 1,000 have already arrived at Gyanchi.

Report says that on the 12th Jestha Sudi the Thibetans attacked the British force in an entrenched position at Chhyanglo, near Gyanchi, and lost more than 300 sepoy and the Lunga Dhaibun.

It is said that the Thibetan Government have sent a force 200 strong towards Nagarchay, which were raised from the villages near Lhasa for the second time, and that news has been received from Kungo that best efforts will be made to send levies from that place.

Dated Monday, the 25th Jestha, 1901, corresponding with the 6th June, 1904.

Inclosure 19 in No. 87.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Camp, Tolung, August 2, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Ta Lama, the Tsarong Shape, a Chinese official deputed by the Amban, the Abbot in private attendance on the Dalai Lama, a Secretary of Council, and the Abbots of the three great Lhasa monasteries visited me this afternoon, and repeated the usual requests that we should not go to Lhasa. I reiterated my usual statements that we must go there. They said that if we would remain here they would supply us with everything—of course on payment. The Dalai Lama's private Abbot made a special appeal on behalf of the religion of Thibet. I told him I was particularly interested in hearing his views on religion, but I trusted he would not object to my reminding him that while he was an eminent authority on religion he had little experience of politics. In political life, when a country repudiated a Treaty, declined to negotiate a new one, and attacked the Envoy who was sent for that purpose, it was considered that that country had committed three very serious offences, any one of which would be justification for the capture of the capital of the offending country. In the present case, out of consideration for the special sanctity of the city, we were prepared, if we encountered no opposition, to abstain from capturing Lhasa, and I trusted the Abbot would appreciate the consideration. Perhaps, if he had himself been fired on continually for two months, he would not have been equally moderate. The Abbot laughed, but remarked that they also had had to suffer.

2. I promised the Abbot to respect the monasteries. If they were occupied by soldiers, and we were fired at from them as we were from the monasteries round Gyantse, we should, of course, have to attack them. But we did not wish to be obliged to resort to force, and as long as we were not attacked we would prevent our soldiers from entering the monasteries. I would also see that soldiers and followers did not enter the city of Lhasa unless in attendance on an officer. The Tsarong Shape asked me to give them a written Agreement to this effect. I said I would, provided they would give me a written Agreement that traders from the city would not be prevented from coming to sell things to the soldiers in camp, as the Gyantse traders had done. The Tsarong Shape said that this would be impossible without the consent of the National Assembly. I told him that I could not in that case give them the written Agreement, and that I would let soldiers enter the city as they pleased, and I rose at once and closed the Durbar.

3. The Tsarong Shape was the only member of the deputation who introduced a discordant note. He was the second of the two Delegates who met Mr. White and me at Khamba Jong last year, and it is significant that these two have been the most inimical men we have yet met. The Ta Lama, the Yutok Shape, and these Abbots, though all exceedingly obstructive, have been good-natured and polite. The Tsarong Shape (at Khamba Jong a Depon only) and the Grand Secretary specially have introduced into the agreement a petty, spiteful element. This delegation was composed of all the leading men in Thibet. They, of course, had power to allow traders to come to our camp, and the Tsarong Shape's objection was a form of petty objection which it was necessary to put a stop to at once.

Inclosure 20 in No. 87.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Camp, Jang, July 31, 1904.

AS I was passing Chisul to-day, on the march here from our camp at Chaksam Ferry, the Ta Lama asked me to stay for a short time to talk to him. He said he was much surprised at our advancing, as he had understood from me that we wished to make a settlement and be on friendly terms, and if we advanced there might be disturbances. I reminded him that I had always said we would advance, and remarked that if there were disturbances the responsibility would rest upon the Thibetan Government, for I had informed him many times, and had written to both the Amban and the Dalai Lama to say, that we would not commence fighting—our troops had orders not to fire unless they were fired upon.

2. The Ta Lama then begged me to stay till the Chamberlain returned with the reply from the Dalai Lama. His Holiness would not at all like our advancing without his permission, but if we waited for his reply we might find that he was willing for us to advance, and he would give orders to the Thibetan soldiers to allow us to pass. I replied that we had already waited nearly a week at Chaksam Ferry; that there had been plenty of time to issue such orders if there was any intention to issue them; and that, in any case, whatever the Dalai Lama's reply was, I should have to advance to Lhasa.

3. The Ta Lama then tried to persuade me to advance with only a small following. He said that my entering Lhasa with a large army would alarm the Thibetans, and make the Dalai Lama think that our intentions were not really friendly. I recalled to his remembrance that only a few minutes before he had spoken of the possibility of disturbances. It was to protect ourselves in case of disturbances, and to guard ourselves against such another attack as that which was made upon me at Gyantse in May, that we were taking a sufficient force to Lhasa. The Ta Lama begged me not to be always harping upon what had occurred at Gyantse. Let all that be forgotten, he said. The Thibetans were now really anxious to make a settlement, and he would give me a promise in writing that no harm would befall us if I went up to Lhasa with only a small following. I told him the Thibetans already had a promise in writing from me, in my letter to the Dalai Lama, that we would not fight unless opposed, and if with that in their hands they allowed disturbances to occur I should presume they were not anxious for a settlement. I required no written promise from them not to harm us, but relied upon their sense of self-interest not to bring on further disturbances.

4. The Ta Lama as a final effort begged me to stay here for a day, and, last of all, as he was shaking hands with me—a ceremony which lasted a quarter of an hour—entreated

me not to enter Lhasa city. I told him that I had the highest admiration for his eloquence and power of persuasion, and would have great satisfaction in telling the Dalai Lama that he really had done his very best to delay us. I, of course, realized the position in which he stood, and that it was his business by every means in his power to prevent us reaching Lhasa. At the same time I was sure, I said, that a man of his sense knew in the bottom of his heart that the Tibetans were extremely fortunate in having been able to secure our peaceful entry to Lhasa, and prevented the capture of the city by force of arms. An attack on the Representative of a Great Power was looked upon as an attack on the Sovereign himself, and the usual form of reprisal was the capture of the capital of the offending country. For instance, when His Majesty's Representative in Peking was attacked, Peking was seized and the Emperor's palace itself was occupied. In the present case we had promised not to occupy Lhasa if we were not further opposed, and with that promise they must be content.

5. The Ta Lama, though excessively urgent towards the close of the interview, was perfectly polite throughout. But so extraordinarily impracticable are these Tibetans that he evidently thought that, because I had assured him at previous interviews that we wished to make a friendly settlement, we were therefore committing a sort of breach of faith in now advancing to Lhasa. I had never ceased to assure him that we did intend to advance, but now we are actually advancing he regards it as a grievance.

Inclosure 21 in No. 87.

Political Diary of the Thibet Frontier Commission, dated Lhasa, August 3, 1904.

July 25, 1904.—Fine morning.

The British Commissioner dispatched by a Thibetan messenger a letter addressed to the Dalai Lama in reply to the letter received from the National Assembly the day before. The force marched to Chaksam Ferry, 6 miles, and camped whilst the ferrying across the river began. Major Bretherton, Chief Supply and Transport Officer, was drowned by an accident whilst crossing the river.

July 26.—Fine day. Halt at the ferry.

The Thibetan Delegates crossed the river in the evening *en route* to call on the British Commissioner.

July 27.—Fine day. Halt at the ferry.

The Thibetan Delegates, consisting of the Grand Chamberlain and the Ta Lama, called on the British Commissioner at 9 A.M., and had a three-hours interview, during which they presented a letter from the Dalai Lama. Thunderstorm during the evening.

July 28.—Fine day.

A letter from the British Commissioner to the Dalai Lama was sent to the Delegates at Chusul for dispatch to Lhasa.

July 29.—Shower 7 A.M.

The Ta Lama and the Tungyig Chembo called at 11 A.M., and had a three-hours interview with the British Commissioner, asking him to await a reply from the Dalai Lama before proceeding to Lhasa. In the evening a despatch was received from the Amban.

July 30.—Fine day.

Messengers arrived from the Tongsa Penlop to say he has started from Gyantse, and expects to reach the British Commissioner's camp in a day or two. The last of the force crossed the ferry.

July 31.—Rain during the night.

The force marched to Tsa-shi-tse, 10 miles. Colonel Younghusband visited the Ta Lama *en route* at Chusul. After a final effort to delay us, he rode off ahead of the column towards Lhasa.

(Signed) F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND, Colonel,
British Commissioner for Thibet Frontier Matters.

Inclosure 22 in No. 87.

APPROXIMATE Fortnightly Statement of Thibet Mission Expenditure ending 31st July, 1904 (in round thousands of rupees).

				Current.	Progressive from Commencement.
				Rupees.	Rupees.
Civil Department	1,000*	1,92,000*
Military Department	5,13,000	74,26,000
				4,78,000†	
Total	9,92,000	76,18,000

Indorsed by Comptroller of India Treasuries.

Submitted to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department Simla, with reference to Finance and Commerce Department letter, dated the 22nd July 1904.

August 13, 1904.

Inclosure 23 in No. 87.

Mr. Hance to Government of India.

Nagpur, August 13, 1904.

I AM directed to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a telegram, dated the 9th instant, received from Prince Khadga Shamsheer Jung of Nepaul, now residing at Saugor in the Saugor district.

Inclosure 24 in No. 87.

General Khadga Shamsheer Jung to the Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces.

(Telegraphic.)

August 9, 1904.

HEARTY congratulations to Government of British Mission safe arrival Lhasa.

Inclosure 25 in No. 87.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ravenshaw to Government of India.

Nepaul, August 11, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a congratulatory message forwarded through me by the Prime Minister to Colonel Younghusband on the arrival of the British Mission at Lhasa.

* Figures of British Commissioner for fortnight ending the 31st July, 1904, not yet received. Will be communicated later.

† Expenditure of 1903-1904, 92,000 rupees, and May 1904, 1,41,000 rupees, and June 1904, 2,45,000 rupees, now intimated by Military Department.

Inclosure 26 in No. 87.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ravenshaw to Colonel Younghusband.

(Telegraphic.)

Nepaul, August 10, 1904.

THE Prime Minister desires me to convey to you and General Macdonald his sincere congratulations on the safe and peaceful entry into Lhasa of the Mission.

Inclosure 27 in No. 87.

*Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.**Camp, Jang, July 31, 1904.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for the information of the Government of India, translation of the Amban's despatch, dated the 27th July, and of my reply thereto.

His Excellency Yu Tai, Chinese Imperial Resident at Lhasa, to Colonel Younghusband.

(Translation.)

Lhasa, July 27, 1904.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch yesterday. I have attentively studied its contents. I have the honour to express my sympathy with you in your trials of this long journey exposed to adverse climatic influences. The Thibetans are dull, unlettered men, obstinately averse to advice, and I am truly ashamed at the state of affairs.

Now that your military forces have reached Chisul, you will be here in a few days in order to discuss matters. I am therefore sending Captain Liu, Chief of the Military Secretariat, and Sub-district Deputy Magistrate Wu, Assistant Secretary, as my Delegates to bear my despatch to you. I have also instructed them to visit and acquaint you with the present condition of affairs.

I have communicated your despatch to the Dalai Lama, impressing upon him the necessity of seriously warning the Thibetans on no account to treat you unceremoniously. But these Thibetans are cunning and insincere to a degree, and it is necessary to obtain guarantees from them before a settlement of anything can be made.

I intend in a day or two to write again to the Dalai Lama to have you met in a respectful manner.

Should there be any matter requiring my consideration, I would request you to inform my Delegates, so that they may report to me.

English Version of a Despatch from Colonel Younghusband to the Chinese Imperial Resident at Lhasa, dated July 30, 1904.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch, dated the 27th July. I shall arrive at Lhasa on the 3rd August, and hope to have the pleasure of meeting you soon after my arrival. I inclose a cypher telegram, which I have been directed by his Excellency the Viceroy to forward to your Excellency.

No. 88.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 15.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 13th instant, relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, September 14, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 88.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, September 13, 1904.

THIBET. Your telegram of the 12th instant.

Difficulty is presented by amount of indemnity, especially when provision for its payment is read in connection with Clause 7 of the Agreement, effect being that our occupation of the Chumbi Valley may have to continue for seventy-five years. This is inconsistent with the instructions conveyed in my telegram of the 26th July last, and with the declarations of His Majesty's Government as to withdrawal. Amount, moreover, was admitted by Younghusband to be excessive, as reported in your telegram of the 30th August. I request that you will consider whether, without prejudice to the signed Agreement, it would not be possible to intimate to the Thibetans, in accordance with the suggestion in your telegram of the 12th instant, that amount of indemnity will be reduced on their duly fulfilling terms agreed to and granting further facilities for trade. Instructions have been telegraphed to His Majesty's Minister at Peking to ascertain and report what attitude the Chinese Government take.

No. 89.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 15.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 14th September, relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, September 15, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 89.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

September 14, 1904.

THIBET. Your telegram of the 13th September.

We recognize that any appearance of occupying Chumbi Valley for an indefinite period must be avoided, and we have already considered your suggestions. It has been suggested to the Thibetans by the Tongsa Penlop that indemnity might be paid out of customs duties levied at marts to be established under the new Agreement, and collected by us. To this Thibetans appear to be willing to agree, but they apprehend objections on the part of the Chinese. The proposal has received our very careful consideration. We propose to agree to the imposition, under new Trade Regulations, of duty on imports and exports from and to India, and we hope to be able to substitute, in place of duty and irregular transit fees, one consolidated payment at frontier. If this is agreed to by Thibetans, it is proposed to substitute for the trade registration posts at present existing on the principal trans-frontier routes leading to marts, small customs posts on the Indian side of the frontier, at which the duty would be collected, and the Thibetans credited with the amount.

We estimate that total receipts would be not less than $1\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs annually, on the basis of the present trade with Thibet. The whole, or a portion, of the amount so collected would go towards reduction of indemnity, though we might have to guarantee to Thibetans a minimum annual revenue, but this point might be left for further consideration.

Advantages of our proposal are that by it (1) trade will be facilitated; (2) payment of indemnity will be not only secured but accelerated; and (3) friction will be prevented and possibly future interference on our part obviated. Proposal might be welcomed by the Thibetans, who are reported to be in a very friendly frame of mind at present. It is understood, of course, that the proposed arrangements would be entirely outside the Agreement which has been concluded. Colonel Younghusband has been informed that the Government of India are disposed to regard the suggestion favourably.

Pending receipt of your orders, which it is desirable should be communicated at the earliest possible date, Younghusband has been instructed not to commit Government, but to make further inquiry with a view to ascertaining whether the Thibetans would be prepared to agree to establishment of trade mart in Zayal, to the survey referred to in my telegram of the 3rd instant, and to the customs arrangements indicated above, in consideration of the remission, as an act of grace, of one-third (25 lakhs) of indemnity. Remission might be made by Viceroy, on ratification of Agreement, should Thibetans agree to these conditions, and a supplementary note giving effect to them might be annexed to the Agreement. This note might also contain a provision giving Thibetans option of paying the balance of indemnity in instalments of more than 1-lakh annually, the number of which it will not be necessary to specify. The indefinite prolongation of our occupation of the Chumbi Valley under the terms of the Agreement would by this means be obviated.

No. 90.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 17.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 16th instant, relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, September 16, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 90.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

September 16, 1904.

THIBET. You will have observed from my telegram of the 7th instant that Colonel Younghusband altered his opinion as to the amount of indemnity being excessive (to which reference is made in your telegram of the 13th instant), and expressed his belief that Thibetans could pay the amount fixed.

(Repeated to Peking.)

No. 91.

Sir C. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received September 19.)

(No. 459.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, September 14, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a translation of a letter which appeared in the "Novoe Vremya" of the 11th instant, relating to an agitation which is alleged to be growing among the Buddhists of Mongolia, and the possibilities to which it might give rise.

My first attention was drawn to this question about two months ago by an English traveller, Mr. Hales, who had passed through Urga, and who informed Mr. Beaumont, of this Embassy, that there was a considerable effervescence in Mongolia, owing to the British expedition to Thibet, and that it was proposed to proclaim among the Buddhists of India a holy war against the British nation, which had committed the sacrilege of penetrating into the holy places, the sacred cradle of the Buddhist religion. The same informant stated that, in reply to a request for emissaries to preach the holy war, no less than 24,000 Mongolians offered their services.

There have since been one or two obscure references in the local press to an agitation in Mongolia, and to impending events in that province of China, and I have now learnt that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs have received information from their Consulate at Urga which tallies with that contained in the inclosed letter. It may be that the wish is father to the thought, but I gather that it is anticipated that the movement will take the form of an appeal to the "White Czar" to take the Mongolian Buddhists under His Majesty's high protection, and, no doubt, such a step would be

regarded here as an immense political success, far outweighing any increase of British influence in Central Asia which may be derived from the successful issue of the British Mission to Lhasa.

Mr. Hales stated, however, that the Russians, who after all are at this moment engaged in hostilities with Buddhists, are just as much disliked by the Mongolians as the English, and this fact receives confirmation from what I was told yesterday by a Russian official, viz., that the Buriat Cossacks were very disaffected, and that although some of the best sotnias had been selected to go to the front, it was very doubtful how they would behave before the enemy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 91.

Extract from the "Novoe Vremya" of September 11, 1904.

(Translation.)

A NUMEROUS caravan of wandering Lamas, who had in July last attended the festival of Maidari in their own sacred city of Kuren-Urga, has just arrived at Uliasutai, the commercial and religious capital of Mongolia. It is well-known that at Urga, in the month of July, takes place an annual pilgrimage, in most respects similar to that at Mecca, but with this difference that the pilgrims, often numbering over 100,000, include a large assembly of Buddhist priests, who take occasion of the meeting to discuss the state of religious affairs in the Buddhist world. This year the chief topic of discussion was the British inroad into Thibet, and the arrival of this caravan of so-called wandering Lamas almost at the frontier of Mongolia was a direct outcome of this discussion. Their object is of course kept secret from Russians, but it is easy enough to guess that it consists in visiting the utmost recesses of Buddhism in order to raise funds and volunteers in view of grave events which are expected to develop next spring, i.e., the rescue of the Dalai Lama and Lhasa.

Though a holy war has not yet been proclaimed, there are rumours afloat that this will be done after the next meeting at Urga, when the various delegates from all the various branches of Buddhism, including the Russian Buriats and the Indian Buddhists, will report on the available resources from those regions for the checking of British aggression on the religion of Buddha.

The rumours current at Muren at the time present a special interest as regards the attitude of these disaffected Buddhists towards Russia. Some maintained that Russia had always proved a genuine protector to the religion, and would assuredly have prevented the British inroad if it had not been for her preoccupation with the war; others declared that preparations had been made for the removal of the Dalai Lama's residence to a remote monastery in the north; others again held that the spiritual capital of Buddhism would be removed, once for all, within the precincts of Siberia, so as to emancipate the religion from the control of China, who had proved not only powerless to shield it, but even willing to see it trampled under foot. There were even those who advocated the incorporation of Mongolia and Thibet with Russia, by a simple offer to the Czar, without calling upon the people to rise. The proposition of establishing an independent Mongol state under a Mongol dynasty was also revived.

Whatever may be the outcome of the coming Conference at Urga, it is clearly apparent that events of grave consequence are being mooted on our frontier, and we shall have to devote more attention to Mongolian affairs in the near future than we have done hitherto. In view of the agitation prevailing, one can never tell what course it may take, and in what direction the blow may be aimed.

No. 92.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 19.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 16th September, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copy will be sent to the Director Military Operations.

India Office, September 19, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 92.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, September 16, 1904.

THIBET: Your telegram of the 14th September.

His Majesty's Government feel it highly undesirable that a term should be fixed for payment of indemnity which would have the effect of throwing burden on future generation and of relieving from any immediate sacrifice the monasteries and those to whom the present troubles are due. Moreover, they do not wish that indemnity should take the form of what would be regarded as a permanent tribute; and it is doubtful whether the Chinese Government would accept an arrangement of this character. It is therefore essential that indemnity should be fixed at a sum which can be liquidated within a moderate period.

Your suggestions for reducing indemnity appear to His Majesty's Government to afford a basis for a more satisfactory settlement in this respect. They accordingly authorize reduction of indemnity from 75 lakhs to 25 lakhs of rupees, which may be charged on security of customs receipts.

Under terms of Convention, our occupation of Chumbi Valley is to continue until indemnity has been paid, and the trade marts opened effectively for a period of three years, whichever is later.

Some alteration of these conditions would be required, so as to provide that our occupation of Chumbi should cease after three years' effective working of the arrangements in regard to the Customs, as well as of those for the opening of the marts, subject to proviso that a certain proportion of the indemnity (say, 5 lakhs of rupees) shall have been paid.

In no circumstances is the force to prolong its stay at Lhasa for the purpose of obtaining more favourable terms than those already agreed to.

Subject to these orders we leave it to Younghusband to secure from the Thibetans, in consideration of reduction of indemnity, any or all of the concessions specified in your telegram.

No. 93.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 19.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of four telegrams from the Viceroy, two dated 17th and two dated 18th September, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copies will be sent to the Director Military Operations.

India Office, September 19, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 93.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

September 17, 1904.

TELEGRAPHIC report from Younghusband, dated the 7th September, states that exchange of prisoners has been effected, all prisoners of war being released by Macdonald and Shapé's producing two men who had been imprisoned for giving assistance to Sarat Chandra Das and two others for helping Kawaguchi, the Japanese traveller. Two former had been in prison for nineteen years.

Younghusband also released hostages taken, and remitted fine imposed in consequence of monks' assault on British medical officers. 1,000 rupees were, however, retained as compensation for families of the two servants of Mission whom Thibetans tortured to death on the night they attacked Gyantse post.

Younghusband was informed on the 10th September by the Tongsa Penlop that no further trouble is, in his opinion, to be anticipated, as the Thibetans are well pleased with settlement.

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Both the Penlop and the Nepalese Representative are of opinion that Dalai Lama would be unable to upset the Convention, even if he were to return. They believe that Dalai Lama has been in communication with people throughout negotiations, and that he is at present not far beyond Nagchuka.

Younghusband has been authorized, if necessary, to remain at Lhasa for reasonable time after main force has left with an escort not exceeding 500 men or such smaller number as may be necessary for support of negotiations, and it is most desirable that final settlement of matters referred to in my telegram of the 14th September should be secured.

(Repeated to Peking.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 93.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

September 17, 1904.

YOUNGHUSBAND was informed by us some time ago that he might stay at Lhasa until the middle of October, but on no account was he to stay any later. I presume you will not object to his staying behind long enough to carry out your instructions and to get Thibetans to accept Trade Regulations. Present arrangement is that Younghusband, with moderate escort, is to stay at Lhasa, the bulk of the force being withdrawn without delay. There was no time to consult you about arrangement we have made, and I hope you will agree to it. Otherwise it will be impossible for your instructions as to occupation of Chumbi Valley and reduction of indemnity to be carried out.

(Repeated to Peking and Colonel Younghusband.)

Inclosure 3 in No. 93.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

September 18, 1904.

THIBET. Your telegram of the 16th.

Is the indemnity to be reduced to 50 lakhs of rupees, as proposed by us, or do you wish it reduced to 25 lakhs of rupees?

Inclosure 4 in No. 93.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

September 18, 1904.

YOUNGHUSBAND telegraphs from Lhasa, on the 14th September, as follows:—

“Wai-wu Pu have telegraphed to Amban, taking exception to our concluding Convention with Thibetans at all, and instructing him not to sign the Adhesion Agreement on the ground that Convention robs China of her suzerainty. Copy of this telegram was furnished to me to-day by the Amban.

“I warned him that China must not be surprised at our laying upon her the entire responsibility for the acts of her vassal if she insists on pressing her rights as Suzerain to extremes. Chinese suzerainty had not in practice been recognized by the Thibetans, and it was owing to the inability of the Chinese to make the Thibetans observe old Treaties or negotiate a new one that we had incurred expenditure amounting to 1,000,000*l*. Chinese suzerainty had throughout been respected by us, and in the Amban's own presence, on the important occasion of the signature of the Convention, I had made an express declaration to the Thibetans of our recognition of that suzerainty. Further evidence of our desire to acknowledge it was to be found in the wording of the Preamble and Article I of the Convention, and in the fact that we were asking for an Adhesion Agreement at all. I therefore considered that China would be wise not to force us to hold her responsible for neglecting her duties as Suzerain; she should be satisfied with what she had got.

“Amban expressed his entire concurrence, adding that the fact that he attended on

the occasion of the signature of Convention proved that he had no objection to it personally. He suggested that our Minister at Peking should state to the Wai-wu Pu what I had just said to him. He himself would make a further representation to the Wai-wu Pu, but he was afraid to put the matter as strongly as I had.

"I would recommend that His Majesty's Minister at Peking should be instructed to make representation to the Chinese Government. They should recognize that until my arrival here the position of the Amban was precarious in the extreme, and that he could not have remained here at all if, instead of co-operating with him, and recognizing him as the Representative of the Suzerain Power, I had gone without him. Even as it is the Thibetans have refused to allow his money to cross from China, and he is dependent on getting it from India.

"I am addressing Amban by despatch, reminding him that Convention has already been signed by the Thibetans, and warning him that, should any misunderstanding arise in future, responsibility for it will rest on Chinese Government, and that I propose to inform the Thibetans accordingly. My despatch also reserves to His Majesty's Government the right to demand that cost of detention of troops in Thibet from date of signature of Convention by Thibetans should be borne by Chinese Government. Should the latter delay agreeing to Convention, I anticipate that Thibetans, who are pleased at having effected settlement with us, will display resentment to Amban."

(Repeated to Peking.)

No. 94.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 19.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 18th instant, relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, September 19, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 94.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, September 18, 1904.

THIBET. Your telegram of the 17th.

There is no objection to Younghusband remaining behind at Lhasa to complete negotiations up to the date named by you, provided that you are satisfied that he can do so in safety, and on the understanding that that date is not exceeded.

No. 95.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received September 19.)

(No. 202.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Peking, September 19, 1904.

THIBETAN Agreement.

A Chinese newspaper has published the draft of the Agreement, without confirmatory declarations, as telegraphed by the Amban on the 2nd instant. Much adverse comment has been excited on the ground that Chinese suzerainty is ignored.

It seems to me probable that the Chinese Government published the draft text purposely. The native newspaper's information is clearly obtained from the Wai-wu Pu.

The Viceroy of India has been informed.

No. 96.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 20.)

Sir,

India Office, September 20, 1904.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Brodrick to request that you will draw the attention of the Marquess of Lansdowne to the telegram from the Viceroy of the 18th instant, reporting the instructions given by the Chinese Government to their Resident in Thibet with regard to the Anglo-Thibetan Agreement.

Mr. Brodrick trusts that Sir E. Satow may be authorized to take immediate steps to induce the Chinese Government to modify their attitude in this matter.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

HORACE WALPOLE.

No. 97.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 203. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Peking, September 20, 1904.

THIBET: My telegram No. 202 of yesterday.

I have been asked by my German colleague if the published text of the Agreement was authentic, to which I replied that he had merely to ask the editor of the newspaper in which it appeared, whose father is the conductor of the official Chinese journal at Kiaochow. He told me that the foreign Board had already informed him that it was nearly correct, and he observed that it was in contravention of the most-favoured-nation clause, although there were no German merchants in Thibet.

This argument was used by the German Minister in the question of limiting the transport of coolies for South Africa to Chinese and British ships, and I have no doubt that he will employ it again at Berlin as well as here.

No. 98.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Satow.

(No. 138.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, September 20, 1904.

THIBET. Viceroy of India's telegram of 18th September.

You should point out to the Chinese Government that, by asking their adhesion to the Agreement, His Majesty's Government recognize China's suzerainty over Thibet. You should lay stress on that fact, and make strong representations in the sense of the warning conveyed to the Amban by Colonel Younghusband, as reported by him in his telegram of 14th September.

No. 99.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 21.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 19th September, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copy will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, September 20, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 99.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, September 19, 1904.

THIBET. Your telegrams of the 18th September.

Language held by Younghusband to Amban is approved. As regards indemnity we prefer that amount should be fixed at 25 laks of rupees, with a view to prompt payment.

No. 100.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 21.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated 20th September, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copy will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, September 20, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 100.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

September 20, 1904.

THIBET. Please refer to the telegram of the 14th September from Sir E. Satow, and to my telegrams of the 25th July and the 18th September.

As China is now threatening to obstruct final settlement by insisting that, on the precedent of the Convention of 1890 and the Regulations of 1893 (which she has failed to enforce), arrangement should, in the first instance, be made with the Chinese Government direct, we suggest that His Majesty's Minister at Peking should be instructed to press for the immediate signature of the Adhesion Agreement by the Chinese Government, either through their Representative at Lhassa or else at Peking. It was the breach of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 that necessitated our taking action, and hitherto our proceedings have been conducted with the utmost deference for the susceptibilities of the Chinese and with their full approval. Our terms are regarded as quite satisfactory by the Amban, who was specially appointed to conduct negotiations, and he himself induced the Thibetans to accept them. The arrangement, in fact, is a most satisfactory one for China, her suzerainty in Thibet being fully recognized and her shortcomings in the past overlooked. Unless China is desirous of renouncing her suzerainty over Thibet, as she did in the case of Korea, we suggest that it should be intimated to the Chinese Government that, should the settlement be delayed, we shall require them to make good the damage we have sustained in consequence of their failure to secure the due fulfilment of the Convention of 1890 and the Trade Regulations of 1893, which they now put forward as a precedent, and that we shall accordingly prefer a claim against them for an indemnity, the amount of which would be calculated on the cost of the operations which their conduct has entailed upon us, any sum which we may recover from the Thibetans being deducted from the amount so claimed. We think, too, that an intimation should be made to the effect that, as the Agreement made with the Thibetans was entered into with the full cognizance and consent of the Chinese Representative on the spot, who fully approved of its terms, and as, moreover, Chinese suzerainty is fully recognized thereby, His Majesty's Government are unable to recognize the objections taken by the Chinese Government to the arrangement; and that, should their objections be pressed, we shall have no alternative but to reconsider our policy as to China's position in Thibet, and to take measures, in consultation with the Thibetans and without further reference to the Chinese Government, with a view to securing our interests in Thibet.

Terms, as finally concluded, have been communicated to His Majesty's Minister at Peking.

(Repeated to Peking and Colonel Younghusband.)

No. 101.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 22.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 20th instant, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copy will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, September 21, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 101.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, September 20, 1904.

THIBET. Your telegram of the 3rd instant.

Please see my telegram of the 16th instant, with regard to the proposed survey to Gartok. As regards Wilton's return to China, there is no objection to his travelling by either of the routes you suggest.

No. 102.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 205.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Peking, September 22, 1904.

THIBET Mission.

Telegram of the 20th September from Viceroy to Secretary of State for India:

Revised draft was inclosed in despatches from India which reached here on the 21st September, so that, after inserting alterations called for from telegrams, the text as signed on the 7th September is now in my possession.

Telegram of the 25th July from Viceroy of India:

It is perhaps fortunate that I was not directed to ask the Wai-wu Pu to instruct the Amban on the lines suggested, for the present Convention does much more than amplify that of 1890.

If, as Colonel Younghusband reports, the Chinese Government have stated to the Amban that they object to our making a Convention with Thibet, this probably means that they expected the Amban to sign the Agreement conjointly with the Thibetan Representatives. I myself was surprised by the announcement that the Convention had been signed with the Thibetans alone, for I had supposed that the text of both the Convention and the Adhesion Agreement would be telegraphed to the Chinese Government and that the Amban would sign simultaneously with the Thibetan Representatives when he had received authority to do so. I doubt whether China is really disposed to "insist on a direct arrangement with her in the first instance."

The terms of the Convention are probably what their objections refer to, for if their suzerainty were in fact infringed, any formal recognition of it would, of course, not be regarded as satisfactory. The points to which they particularly object have not been communicated to me, but it is evident that the freedom of action previously enjoyed by the Suzerain with regard to the vassal is limited in our favour by the requirement of the previous consent of the British Government to the steps enumerated in Article 9.

I am convinced that force would be necessary to compel compliance with a demand for an indemnity from China, for to hold the Chinese responsible, without previous warning, for breaches of the earlier Convention would be regarded by them as unjust, while, with regard to the demand for an indemnity for the present delay, they naturally cannot be asked to accept the Agreement without discussing its terms.

The Amban was certainly not authorized to commit his Government to their assent, and he will probably be recalled in disgrace if, in argument with the Chinese, we lay stress on his cognizance and approval of the terms.

I am unable, for the above reasons, to concur in the course recommended by the Viceroy.

Your Lordship's telegram No. 138:

Prince Ch'ing is at the Summer Palace, and I have asked for an interview with him in order to repeat to him the warnings which Colonel Younghusband addressed to the Amban. At our interview the precise views of the Chinese Government may transpire, but, unless your Lordship authorizes me to do so, I do not propose to discuss the terms of the Convention with his Highness.

(Repeated to India.)

No. 103.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 23.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 1st September, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copies will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, September 22, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 103.

*Inclosure to Letter from the Resident in Nepal, dated July 8, 1904.**

I HAVE received from the Tson-du, on the 3rd day of the 4th month of the 30th year of the present dynasty of China,† a letter in which they ask that a report may be submitted to the Emperor of China. I have been through the letter carefully, and understand its contents. Regarding the dispute about the boundary, I have been hoping day and night that it would be dealt with peacefully. Regarding the Thibetan request for riding horses and transport, the former Amban wrote clearly to the Emperor of China about this, and I showed you the reply of the Emperor refusing to sanction the request. Are you not aware of this? I have been carefully through all the former correspondence, and find that in the earth-mouse year‡ a letter was written to the Emperor of China for riding horses and transport, and that the Emperor, not forbidding the then war, granted the request. But in the present case the Emperor has written repeatedly forbidding the Thibetans to fight with the British, and it would be very difficult for me to accede to your request in opposition to the Emperor's orders. Please do not make it necessary for me to tell you this over and over again. Do you, Dalai Lama, please consider this carefully and pass orders accordingly (to the Thibetans).

Written on the 5th day of the 4th month of the 30th year of the present dynasty of China.§

Inclosure 2 in No. 103.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Camp, Lhasa, August 4, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Amban called upon me yesterday afternoon, and expressed his desire to work with me in effecting a speedy settlement with the Thibetans. He had hoped to have met me before, and had hastened to Lhasa at unusual speed, but the Thibetans had refused to furnish him with transport, and he had, therefore, been unable to proceed beyond here.

2. I said I quite appreciated the difficulties he must have had with the Thibetans, for I had had some experience of them now, and a more obstructive people I had never come across. He agreed that they were an exceedingly obstinate people; in his opinion, kindness was thrown away upon them, and the only way to deal with them was by force.

* Apparently from the Amban to the Dalai Lama.

† i.e., approximately the 16th May, 1904.¶

‡ i.e., in the Sikkim expedition of 1888.

§ i.e., approximately the 18th May, 1904.

3. He said he feared I must have had a very unpleasant time at Gyantse, and I told him that we had come there to negotiate, and not to fight, and therefore had very few soldiers with us at the time the attack was made. Later on, General Macdonald arrived with reinforcements, and the Thibetans had to suffer heavily for their misconduct. On the present occasion, however, we had come ready either to negotiate or to fight. We were prepared to negotiate; but if the Thibetans were obstinate, we would not hesitate to fight. I should be glad if he would impress upon the Thibetans with all his power that we were no longer to be trifled with. I added that one of the conditions we intended to impose was an indemnity to partly cover the cost of military operations, and I should be asking them 50,000 rupees per diem from the date the Mission was attacked up to a month after the date the Convention was signed.

4. The Amban thought this would be an effective way of dealing with them, and he promised to urge the Thibetans to be reasonable, and make a settlement without further loss of time.

5. I returned the Amban's visit this morning. He sent his bodyguard to conduct me to the Chinese Residency, and I was escorted by a company of mounted infantry and two companies of the Royal Fusiliers. To reach the Chinese Residency we had to pass immediately under the Potala Palace—a most imposing and solidly built edifice surrounded by a pagoda-shaped gilded roof.

6. The Amban spoke of the friendly relations which have so long existed between England and China, and trusted we should be able to work together in an amicable way on the present occasion. I replied that the coming negotiations would afford one more proof of the friendly feeling we entertained towards the Chinese. He again referred to the obstinate and insubordinate attitude assumed by the Thibetans, and said that in Eastern Thibet they had given the Chinese a great deal of trouble. I expressed my opinion that the Thibetans were grossly ungrateful, for they owed much to the Chinese, and certainly, after the Sikkim campaign, they would not have come off so easily in the ensuing settlement if the Chinese had not interceded on their behalf. It was merely on account of the friendly feeling we entertained towards the Chinese that the settlement we then made was so light. Now, however, that they had repudiated the settlement which the Amban had made on their behalf and had otherwise offended us, the new settlement would of course be more severe, and I should be greatly obliged if the Amban would make them understand from the start that the terms which I was going to demand from them would have to be accepted. I was not prepared to bargain about them like a merchant in the bazaar; they had chosen to make war upon us, and had come off the worst, and they must now suffer the consequences of their folly, and accept, without questioning, the terms which the British Government were demanding.

7. The Amban asked me if I would give him the terms. I replied that, if he would send over one of his Secretaries to Mr. Wilton this afternoon, Mr. Wilton would inform him of them, and explain them to him, and the Amban and I could then talk the matter over at an early opportunity.

8. I then asked the Amban if he would get the Thibetans to depute two or three Representatives for the special purpose of negotiating settlement with me. A variety of Delegates had been sent to meet me on the way up, but it was desirable that the same men without change should continue to negotiate with me till the settlement was arrived at. The Amban promised to arrange this.

9. After apologising for introducing business matters into the conversation during my first visit to him, I took leave of the Amban, and returned to camp by a détour through the heart of the city of Lhasa. Considerable crowds came out to see the procession, but they looked on apathetically, and no sort of opposition or protest was on this occasion offered to us on this first entrance of Europeans to Lhasa since the days of Huc and Gabet. The town and the inhabitants were very dirty, but the buildings were of most solid masonry, and we passed a number of the private dwelling-houses of the Lhasa nobility of considerable size surrounded by trees and garden, and showing evidence that the owners must be men of wealth.

10. This afternoon three of the Amban's Secretaries visited Mr. Wilton, and the terms of the Convention were communicated to them verbally. Mr. Wilton explained that I had received as yet only telegraphic instructions, and could not at this stage place a draft Convention in writing in the hands of the Amban, but the main provisions, subject of course to enhancement if the Thibetans showed further opposition, were those which I had authorized him to now communicate to them for the information of the Amban.

Inclosure 3 in No. 103.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Lhasa, August 4, 1904.

THE Nepalese Representative called upon me to-day in considerable state. His letters have shown that he is a man of ability, and personal acquaintance proved that he was a person of dignity and good breeding. During the course of conversation, which lasted nearly three hours, I was able to obtain from him valuable information as to the present position of affairs here.

2. It seems that the Dalai Lama, on receiving my letter stating that I should have to come to Lhasa, left that same night and proceeded to a small monastery at Reting, about three marches from here. The Nepalese Representative says that Dorjief accompanied him, and that the Dalai Lama intends to fly to Mongolia, but the Chinese Secretaries of the Amban confidently assert that Dorjief left for Siberia in May, and they refuse to believe that the Dalai Lama will fly to Siberia, Mongolia, or China. The Nepalese Representative says that formerly Dorjief was a servant in a small house, which he pointed out to me close by our camp; that he is the son of a clerk, and is undoubtedly Russian. He has acquired his recent influence by the distribution of enormous sums of money to the monasteries. He has lately given as much as four or five lakhs of rupees to the monks.

3. I asked the Nepalese Representative if the Thibetans now really wished for a settlement, and he assured me they did. He said there was no ill-feeling against us among the people generally; though, if the Dalai Lama ordered them to, they would fight us again, for they are in terrible dread of him, and allow themselves to be driven against us like sheep. The Dalai Lama had, however, retired into religious seclusion, and washed his hands of this business. He had handed over his seal to a Regent with full authority to carry on in his absence.

4. There seems to be no specially leading men in the State. The four present Shaps are without capacity, and have no great influence. In the National Assembly the man who has most influence is the Abbot of the Daipung Monastery, who, when the discussion has in his opinion proceeded long enough, seizes the seal, writes down his decision, and stamps the seal upon it. It is satisfactory to know that the patriotic feeling of this ecclesiastic does not extend beyond his own monastery; the preservation of his own monastery is what he is chiefly thinking of at present, and, fortunately, his monastery is in a most exposed position a few miles to the rear of our camp.

5. But the main feature in the situation is the entire absence of any responsible authority. The so-called Regent is an old man, who, according to the Nepalese Representative, is anxious to come and see me, but is afraid of the Shaps. He has really no authority, while the Shaps themselves are quite lacking in capacity and are all new to their post, the real Shaps having been imprisoned. They dare not do anything without reference to the National Assembly, and this is nothing but a mob of monks responsible to no one and without any leader.

6. The Chinese Amban should, of course, be a seat of responsibility and centre of authority, but the Nepalese Representative tells me he has little influence now. He and the Dalai Lama are at variance, and the Thibetans pay little attention to what he says.

Inclosure 4 in No. 103.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Camp, Lhasa, August 6, 1904.

TWO Shaps, with two of the Secretaries of Council, called upon me yesterday morning, bringing with them 280 coolie-loads of tea, sugar, dried fruits, flour, peas, butter, twenty yaks, and fifty sheep, and 1,500 rupees in cash. The present was made in consequence of representations of the Tongsa Penlop that the shabby presents of local cloth which they had hitherto brought were not a sufficient present with which to approach the Representative of the British Government.

2. I asked them if it always rained so much during this season as it had rained I said, the last day or two. They replied there was a great deal of rain at this season; during and in that case, I should have to remove into a house as soon as possible. They

offered a house nearly 3 miles away from Lhasa. I told them that was too far off, and I suggested the Dalai Lama's summer palace as being both a more convenient and a fitter residence. They protested that the summer palace was a sacred building, and that I had promised not to occupy sacred buildings. I informed them that I had no intention of occupying any chapel there might be in it; they might lock and seal up any such chapel or keep a few lamas there, and I would promise not to enter it. But it was essential that I should have some proper place to live in, and a fitting reception hall in which to receive the Amban and themselves when they come to visit me, and I had not yet heard of any other building than the summer palace which would be suited to the purpose. They might have two days in which to remove anything they wished to remove, and to close the chapel if there was one, and after that I would occupy the living and reception rooms.

3. In the afternoon, while the Nepalese Representative was paying me a visit, the Dalai Lama's private Abbot arrived straight from a meeting of the National Assembly which had been hastily convened to consider the question of our occupation of the summer palace. Both he and the Nepalese Representative said there was a very strong feeling against it, because the residence of the Dalai Lama was looked upon as being as sacred as a monastery. A letter also arrived from the Tongsa Penlop saying the same thing.

4. I told the Abbot that I had received the express orders of his Excellency the Viceroy to respect their religion and their religious buildings; but while we were prepared to show them consideration, we expected the consideration thus shown to be recognized and acknowledged, and equal consideration to be shown us in return. The Nepalese Representative could tell him that in India a Resident was accustomed to live in a large, well-furnished house with proper reception rooms in which to receive visitors of rank. If we had come to Lhasa making war, we would without compunction have seized and occupied the Potala itself. As the Thibetans had sought for peace, the least I had expected was that they would have provided for my residence here the very best building in the place after the Potala. I had also hoped that the Dalai Lama himself would have received me, and personally thanked me for the consideration his Excellency the Viceroy had directed me to show towards his religion. Instead of any such recognition being accorded, I was left to encamp upon a swamp. Though our soldiers were strictly kept from looting or even entering the Lhasa city and could be seen by the Abbot from my tent purchasing goods at exorbitant prices from Thibetan traders, and though General Macdonald was ready to pay well for all supplies, no attention had been paid to my request that supplies should be sent to us. This was not the kind of treatment which I had expected or would accept. I could quite well understand that they would like to receive every consideration from us, and do nothing on their part in return. But I must ask the Abbot to inform the National Assembly that, as they expected and were receiving consideration from us, they must show us consideration in return, and that, if they desired me not to occupy the summer palace, I should expect on their part that the Dalai Lama should receive and personally thank me, as the representative of the Viceroy, for the consideration which his Excellency had directed should be shown to his Holiness' religion; that a thoroughly suitable residence should be provided for me; and that supplies should be regularly furnished.

Inclosure 5 in No. 103.

Deputy Commissioner Garrett to Government of Bengal.

(Confidential.)

Darjeeling, August 16, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith my Confidential Report for the week ending on Saturday, the 13th August, 1904.

2. I have received the following information as to Thibetan affairs. I cannot say whether it is reliable, but I give it for what it may be worth. There were four so-called "lings," or monasteries, which were supposed to protect the Dalai Lama at Potala on four sides. The names of these "lings" are Tengeling, Kundeling, Tshomeling, and Tshe-Chogling. The chief of these was Tengeling, the head Lama of which, known as Tengeling Gyalpo, took great interest in fostering the trade of Thibet, especially that with China. In consequence of this he gained a great deal of power, and became an object of jealousy to the lay members of the Deba-Shung. In order to

ruin him, they concocted a story to the effect that the Gyalpo had conspired to bring about the death of the Dalai Lama, who was then a minor, aged about 16 years, and had employed an incarnate lama of the Tengeling monastery, by name Nyarong Tulku, to cast spells upon him. In furtherance of this plot, the Shapes caused some incantations to be written out and placed between the soles of a pair of boots worn by the Dalai Lama, and had them produced thence as having been placed there by Nyarong. A formal inquiry was then held by the four Shapes, who naturally reported that the charge against the Tengeling Gyalpo and Nyarong was proved. These two men were then arrested, and Nyarong put to an ignominious death, while the Gyalpo subsequently died in prison; also all the property of the Tengeling monastery was confiscated by the Deba-Shung. This caused a good deal of discontent among the people generally, and also very injuriously affected the trade of the country. Many years afterwards the Dalai Lama came to know that the whole story of the attempt upon his life had been concocted by the Shapes, but he did not at once take any action, as both the men against whom the conspiracy had been directed were dead; but when it came to his notice that the Shapes had been intercepting the correspondence between himself and the British Mission at Khamba Jong, he caused them to be arrested.

3. It is said that there is a man in Lhasa who is called Nejung-Chhoikyong; he may be a layman or an ecclesiastic; he is supposed to be the means by which the deity (Chhoikyong) communicates his views to the people, and in all times of emergency or anticipated distress the Nejung-Chhoikyong is consulted, and action is taken in accordance with his utterances, which are supposed to be inspired by the deity. Shortly after the British Mission entered Thibet, the Nejung-Chhoikyong was consulted, and he stated that no action was necessary, as the Mission would soon return to India of its own accord. When, however, it was found that, so far from returning to India, the Mission was steadily advancing, the Dalai Lama made inquiries into the matter, and came to the conclusion that the Nejung had been obsessed by the spirit of the murdered incarnate lama Nyarong to the exclusion of Chhoikyong, and that consequently he was no longer to be relied upon; he was accordingly driven away, and it is not known whether Chhoikyong has since taken up his abode in any other person. It is said that the only reason why greater resistance was not offered to the advance of the Mission was that reliance was placed on the prophecy of the Nejung-Chhoikyong, but now that it has been found out that he was not reliable, troops are being collected from all parts of Thibet, and it is probable that, as soon as the winter sets in, every effort will be made to inflict serious loss upon the British.

4. I am informed that Shape Sheda was a patron of the Gaden monastery, in which there are 3,300 monks, and that they were in consequence much incensed at his imprisonment, and declined to join with the monks of the two other great monasteries.

5. The Dalai Lama is believed to have gone to a place called Takpo, in Kham, which is said to be forty or fifty days' march from Lhasa. There is an old Buddhist prophecy to the effect that one day this place would be the seat of the Dalai Lama, and everything remains prepared in the monastery there for his reception.

6. It is stated that the country is swarming with beggars, and a great famine is feared.

7. A Chinaman has informed my agent at Pedong that he has heard that 3,000 Chinese troops have arrived at a place called Thinthu, on the borders of China, in order to prevent the British troops from crossing the frontier should they go as far in search of the Dalai Lama.

Inclosure 6 in No. 103.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Camp, Lhasa, August 9, 1904.

THE Nepalese Representative came to see me to-day and to inform me that last night he went to see the Tir Rimbochi, the Regent to whom the Dalai Lama has handed over his seal. "Captain" Jit Bahadur explained to the Regent that matters were getting serious, and that if some attempt at settlement were not soon made the British would be storming the Potala and burning the city.

The Regent replied that he and the Dalai Lama's brother were anxious to make a settlement, and were of opinion that the Government terms might well be accepted, with two or three modifications. They wished, for instance, to put the proviso, "if the British treated the Thibetans well," at the end of the clause excluding foreign intervention. I asked Captain Jit Bahadur what they meant precisely by this, and I gathered that their intention was to exclude us from imposing any further terms upon them after the present Convention was signed. If after that we tried to further intervene in Thibetan affairs, they wished to be considered free from the obligation not to exclude intervention from any other Power.

2. The Regent also thought that the amount of indemnity I had named—50,000 rupees a-day—was excessive. And he would ask that if they released the two Lachung men we should release the yaks and men whom we had seized last year in retaliation. With those modifications he thought the National Assembly might reasonably accept our terms.

3. The Nepalese Representative says the Regent is a moderate man, more inclined to make a peaceful settlement than the generality of the National Assembly. I was much relieved to hear, too, that since the departure of the Dalai Lama he has on the occasions when he has attended the National Assembly sat in a high seat and conducted its proceedings as a kind of President. Hitherto there has been no such presiding officer in the sittings of the Assembly, and this new departure is the first hopeful sign I have detected that a body with whom I can negotiate will be found. The Dalai Lama's brother—an elder brother—sits next to the Regent, but on a lower seat.

4. Captain Jit Bahadur having hinted that the Regent and the Dalai Lama's brother were anxious to visit me, I told him to let the Regent know that I would be glad to receive him; and I asked him to tell the Regent from me that we had no wish to be other than on friendly terms with the Thibetans. We had no desire to make war upon them or object to gain by it; we did not wish to annex their country, and the Viceroy had given me the very strictest orders to respect their religion, so that when I heard from him (the Nepalese Representative) and the Tong-sa Pen-lop that the Thibetans considered the summer palace a sacred building, I had consented to take up my residence elsewhere, even though at inconvenience to myself. But while we had thus no wish to make war, and were prepared to respect their religion, the Thibetans were putting me in a very difficult position. They had asked me to stop hostilities, saying they wished to make a settlement, but although they had been acquainted with the terms for three weeks, and I had already been here a week, yet not one word of negotiation had yet passed between me and them. Nor had they made proper efforts to furnish the troops with supplies. If they failed to negotiate, what could I do but continue hostilities, the only result of which would be that Lhasa would share the fate of Gyantse? It seemed to me that the Thibetans were like men in a bog. They were sinking deeper and deeper. Last year they were in up to their knees only. A month ago they were up to their waists. Now they are up to their necks, and in a short time, if they will not accept the hand which is stretched out to them, they will be in over their heads.

Inclosure 7 in No. 103.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Camp, Lhasa, August 10, 1904.

AS the Thibetans have made no sign of commencing negotiations, I called upon the Amban to-day and asked him to remind them that hostilities were only suspended because the Dalai Lama and the National Assembly had assured me that they wished to make a settlement. It was now three weeks since Delegates had first met me, and I had been a week already here at Lhasa itself, but not one word regarding the settlement had yet been said to me by the Thibetans, and unless I soon saw signs of their commencing negotiations I should have to allow hostilities to be resumed.

2. The Amban begged me not to act hastily; he said he was pressing the Thibetans with all his authority to make a settlement speedily with us, and he had also asked the Shapes to tell the Dalai Lama that he ought to return here to receive me.

The Dalai Lama was afraid, he said, that something might happen to him if he came here, but he had told the Thibetans that he would be perfectly safe and had nothing to fear. The Amban also said there was a good deal of opposition from the three great monasteries.

3. I thanked the Amban for having exerted his influence to bring the Dalai Lama back, but I said it was only fitting that he should be here to receive me to thank the Viceroy, through me, for the consideration his Excellency had ordered me to show to the Thibetan religion. Moreover, though I had no desire to discuss the details of the Convention with the Dalai Lama himself, it was evidently desirable that when it was concluded he should in my presence affix his seal to it.

4. I then informed the Amban that the Thibetans were putting us to very great expense. The cost of the Sikkim War was 1,000,000*l*. By October the present operations would have cost us another million. We had no return for the money expended in the Sikkim War, because the Thibetans had repudiated the Treaty made on their behalf by the Chinese. The Amban who had come to make that Treaty had discouraged us from then making a Treaty direct with the Thibetans, and had assumed responsibility for obtaining the assent of the Lhasa Government to the settlement he made. The Chinese were, therefore, certainly not free of responsibility for the trouble we were having. I added that I had not yet received orders to demand any indemnity from the Chinese, but I knew that the Government of India had been considering the question, and if the Thibetans were so dilatory that the indemnity we should have to demand from them amounted to a larger sum than they were able to pay, it was quite likely that we would make a demand that China also should bear a share of the cost of the military operations necessitated by the hostile attitude of the country over which she claimed suzerainty.

5. The Amban replied that such a claim if pressed would imperil the good relations between China and England. No indemnity was asked by us after the Sikkim War. The Chinese had not on the present occasion assisted the Thibetans to oppose us, nor had Chinese troops fought against us. On the contrary, the Chinese had done their best to dissuade the Thibetans from fighting.

6. I told the Amban that, as I had already informed him, I had no orders to press the point. Nevertheless, I mentioned it to him as a warning of what might be asked, for as long as the Chinese claimed suzerainty over Tibet, we considered them responsible for the actions of the Thibetans, and even if they had not been able to prevent the Thibetans fighting we at least expected that, now we were at Lhasa, the Chinese should exert their fullest authority to make the Thibetans come to a settlement. I went on to say that His Majesty's Ministers had frequently declared in public that they had no intention of keeping the Mission here permanently. At the same time they very naturally always added the proviso that their future action must depend upon the conduct of the Thibetans themselves, and His Majesty's Government could not undertake that they would not depart in any eventuality from the policy which now commended itself to them. That policy was outlined in the rough draft of the terms of settlement which I had already given him. But if the Thibetans persisted in their present obstinate attitude I could not answer for it that the present policy would be maintained, or that the terms now offered would not be made more severe.

7. The Amban replied that the Thibetans had already formulated a reply to the draft terms, and he would have the Shapes up at once and press them to make a settlement as speedily as possible.

8. I said it was most satisfactory to hear that the Thibetans were at last making a sign of negotiating. It was quite ridiculous that a petty people like them should be allowed to give so much trouble to two great Empires like the Chinese and the British. I was fully determined to press them with all the means in my power, and if he did too we ought between us to soon bring them to their senses.

9. The Amban said he was quite prepared to act hand in hand with me and would help me by every possible means.

Inclosure 8 in No. 103.

Political Diary of the Thibet Frontier Commission.

August 1, 1904.—Rain fell during the night. Cloudy day. The force marched to Nam, 10 miles. A letter arrived from the Ta Lama, who is lodged a few miles higher up the stream, to say that he had proposed to call on the British Commissioner; but that, owing to the expected arrival of two Shapas from Lhasa, he had deferred his visit, and would see the British Commissioner on the following day.

August 2.—Cold, windy morning.

The force marched to Tolung Bridge, 13 miles.

At 3.30 P.M. the Ta Lama, Sechung, and Tsarong Shapas, an Abbot in the suite of the Dalai Lama, and Abbots from each of the three great monasteries called on the British Commissioner and had a three hours' interview, in which they requested the Commissioner not to advance to Lhasa; or, if he must do so, to advance with only a small escort. The Amban's Secretary was also present at the interview.

August 3.—Damp, cloudy morning.

The force marched to Lhasa, and camped on an open plain $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles to the west of the Potala.

At 4 P.M. the Amban called on the British Commissioner.

August 4.—Heavy rain during the night, lasting up to about 9 A.M.

Colonel Younghusband returned the Amban's call, returning through the town of Lhasa. On arrival in camp he received the Nepalese Representative.

August 5.—At 10 A.M. the Sechung and Tsarong Shapas and the Tungyik Chembo, who was at Khamba Jong, called on the British Commissioner and had a long interview, during which the Tongsa Penlop also arrived. The Nepalese Representative called in the afternoon, and during his visit an Abbot came in from the National Assembly with a message regarding our proposed occupation of the Norbuling.

August 6.—Rain during the night.

The daily quantity of supplies required by the force not having been sent by the Lhasa Government as promised, a letter was sent to the Council to say that, if certain supplies were not produced by 5 P.M. that day, the British Commissioner would sanction the General Officer Commanding in taking any military action he considered necessary the next day. The Nepalese Representative and the Tongsa Penlop called during the afternoon. Only a small proportion of the requisite supplies were produced.

August 7.—Rain during the night. The General Officer Commanding called on the Amban.

(Signed) F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND, Colonel,
British Commissioner for Thibet Frontier Matters.

Camp, Lhasa, August 10, 1904.

Inclosure 9 in No. 103.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ravenshaw to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

The Residency, Nepal, August 8, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to forward translations of letters from the Dalai Lama and the four Kazis at Lhasa to the Prime Minister and the latter's reply.

2. The Prime Minister called on me on the 5th instant and brought these letters, asking me to read and to advise him as to a reply. He seemed anxious to convey some hope to the Dalai Lama in his reply that he could offer his mediation, but I pointed out to him that the Dalai Lama's request came somewhat late, and that Colonel Young-husband was quite able to deal direct with the Dalai Lama; and, as regards the Representative at Lhasa, I thought that Colonel Younghusband would not object to receive any communication from the Dalai Lama through the Representative if the

Dalai Lama could not trust his own officers. I have forwarded a copy of the translation of the Dalai Lama's letter and the Prime Minister's reply to Colonel Young-husband, and have written to him to the above effect, and asked him to have the Minister's letter delivered to the Nepal Representative at Lhasa, who has been instructed in it to personally deliver the reply to the Dalai Lama.

3. The Prime Minister does not expect that much attention will be paid to the advice in his letter or that the Dalai Lama will accept the conditions in paragraph 6, in which the Representative is permitted to convey any communication to Colonel Young-husband. As regards paragraph 9, "and such recommendations as I have thought best for the good of Thibet," the Prime Minister said he had merely put this in as some consolation for the Dalai Lama, and that, as stated in the subsequent part of the paragraph, he had "full faith in the justice and honesty of the British Government." As a fact, the Prime Minister seemed disposed to take no notice of the Dalai Lama's request for the reason that it had come too late, at the same time he did not wish to appear discourteous in not replying to his letter. After some consultation with me and amending of the original draft a reply as inclosed was sent.

4. I would ask that two copies of the inclosures, when printed, may be sent to me.

Inclosure 10 in No. 103.

The Potala Lama, Lhasa, to the Maharajah, Nepal.

(Translation.)

MAY your Highness enjoy health and peace, and may Gorkha (Nepal) and Thibet continue in the best friendly relations. All is well here, and religious rites and secular affairs are going on here as before.

With the insignia of the order conferred upon your Highness by His Imperial Majesty of China, while passing through this place, certain auspicious presents were also sent by us through the Dheba of Kuti, which, we hope, have reached you safely. May the friendly relations of the two Governments be never broken off or disturbed!

The letter anent the strained relations between the British and the Thibetan Governments addressed to the Kasyal was duly received. It ought to have been categorically replied to as a matter of course, but, difficulties having arisen, there has been some delay in the matter. The delay was not due to any feeling of contumacy for your Highness.

I was very happy to read the advice given by your Highness pointing out the consequences, moved thereto by a sincere desire to see the differences between the Thibetan and the British Governments made up, and also for the good of the people of Thibet.

With reference to the matter in dispute between the said two Governments, I believe, or am convinced, that the British trespassed upon our territory in spite of our officers and soldiers while keeping watch at the frontier. It was an excellent suggestion on your Highness' part, made with pious or the best of motives, that friendly negotiations should at once be started and an amicable settlement brought about between the two Governments.

Kazis were not dispatched to the frontier, as this step would have entailed hardships on the subjects. From the negotiations carried on by our officers on the spot, although the Representative of the Bhutanese Government at Lhasa, as also your Highness' Representative, had urged a friendly settlement, it was evident that any number of officers, though as numerous as ants deputed from here, could not have concluded the business.

In consideration of the fraternal and friendly relations existing between Nepal and Thibet, and on account of the said officers having gone wrong and produced unfriendly feelings, I would beg your Highness to send without fail a well-experienced officer, after consultation with your Councillors, for the settlement of the disputes or to assist in the conclusion of a Treaty on this occasion.

Those whose frontiers are contiguous should, as a rule, assist one another in bringing about an arrangement.

Your Highness would be the best judge of what would be in conformity with our religious books and conducive to the best interests of the people, as well as of the fact that there should not be any disturbance of the frontier line even by a single span as

evidenced by the genuine documents relating to the frontier of which your Highness has also been apprised by the Kasyal.

Thibet and Nepal are united together like brothers, and have all along acted in harmony with pure and sincere hearts in all matters. As regards the pending dispute, your Highness will learn everything from the high officer to be deputed by you.

All your Highness' instructions to your Representative here intended for us have been duly conveyed by him. We shall keep your Highness informed of all matters, together with the advice given by numerous other people consulted.

A large piece of silk cloth (Khata) accompanies this as a token.

Dated Friday, the 10th Asarh Badi, Sambat 1961, corresponding with the 8th July, 1904, from the Norbuling Palace.

Inclosure 11 in No. 103.

The Maharajah, Nepal, to the Potala Lama, Lhassa.

(After compliments.)

THE perusal of your Holiness' letter, dated Friday, the 10th Ashar Badi, Sambat 1961, has given me very great pleasure. I was happy to learn therefrom that your Holiness was in good health. I am deeply obliged to you for the kind inquiry about my health, which is, I am glad to say, satisfactory.

2. I owe your Holiness my hearty acknowledgments for the presents which you so kindly sent to me by the Dheba of Kuti. They arrived here duly, and their receipt has also been already notified to you.

3. Your Holiness' remarks as to the lateness in the acknowledgment of, and reply to, my letter of advice to the Kasyal Kazis, dated the 18th Fagoon, 1960, have been duly noted. I fully appreciate the cause of the delay, and can assure your Holiness that where there is harmony of hearts such delays can never be misconstrued. The matter, however, being urgent, and the situation grave, an early expression of your views would have been most welcome, as I was distressed at the turn events were taking in Thibet. I am glad to find that the spirit of my advice to the Kasyal Kazis relative to the said Anglo-Thibetan dispute has been properly appreciated by you.

4. I hope that you have, ere this, received also my letter of the 28th Jestha, 1961. Your Holiness must have observed that I have consistently tried to bring home to you and your Kazis the necessity of promptly coming to a decision with regard to the question in hand, and the advantages to be derived from acting according to the advice given in my letters. I cannot sufficiently impress upon your Holiness' mind that the safety and the continued prosperity of the country was in a great measure dependent upon friendly relations with our powerful neighbour, the British India Government. I find that you now see the wisdom of my advice, and ask me to intercede on your behalf. It is a matter of deep regret to me that you should have delayed matters till the last moment. It is, however, better late than never. The closeness and cordiality of our relations and the contiguity of our frontiers urge me to move in this matter as far as may be practicable.

5. If I am not mistaken, the British Government has repeatedly declared that all that it wanted from the Thibetan Government was an unequivocal and binding assurance that they would not have any relations, direct or indirect, with any other European foreign Power, and that they would honourably respect the terms of the Treaty made in 1890, and the Convention made in 1893. These assurances and intentions have been pacific from the very beginning, but as their prestige and good name were at stake, they were compelled to take the steps they have taken. I sincerely trust that your Holiness, who is so full of wisdom, would now see the things eye to eye, and would not by any means allow them to take a course fraught with calamity to your country. Allow me to tell your Holiness that the solution of all these troubles is easy and lies in your hands. My advice to you now is that you enter into negotiations with the British Commissioners at once, do not molest them, do not insist on untenable points; and I have every reason to hope that if you give them to understand that you mean to honourably abide by the terms of any Treaty that is to be made, the English, who mean honestly by you and wish that you would only be true to your

word now to be solemnly given, would not impose any severe conditions on you, but would, on the contrary, reciprocate your friendly feelings, and ultimately you will be considerable gainers. I have disburdened my mind to you frankly, inspired by such friendly and fraternal feeling as should exist between brothers, confident that you will take it in the spirit in which it is made.

6. As regards the question of sending an experienced and high officer of this Government to assist in the forthcoming negotiations, I am sorry to say that it is already too late. It would require a long time to make the necessary transport arrangements for him, and by the time the officer reached Lhasa all would have been over, as the English Commissioners are now said to be quite close to the place. My Representative at Lhasa has, however, my full authority and instructions to convey your Holiness' representations to them, if your Holiness' Government could give to him an undertaking in writing to the effect that Thibet will have no relations with any foreign European Power other than the British Indian Government, and that she will honourably observe and carry out any Treaty that might be made with the British Government by you. I can assure you that you will in no way be a loser by adopting such a course.

7. The assurance given by the Kasyal Kazis repeatedly in their letters to me and orally to my Representative at Lhasa, that the reports about the exchange of Missions and secret intercourse with Russia were unfounded, and that your religion and sacred books forbade any such intercourse, would present no difficulty for your Holiness' Government to come to a satisfactory understanding with the British Government on this point. And your Holiness will agree with me that it is anything but politic and moral to disregard a Treaty which has been once properly and regularly made. I therefore see no reason that my suggestions would be in any way objectionable to you. Of course I do not forget the friendly relations that have subsisted between the two Governments of Nepal and Thibet for such a long time, but I must have that undertaking in order to convince the British Government that you were in earnest and eagerly desired to end the disputes by a mutual and amicable arrangement before I can have a hand in the matter. I am sure that our friendly relations would continue as before, and that you will continue to regard me as your best friend and well-wisher.

8. I would also be plain with your Holiness in one matter. You ask me to instruct my Representative to be deputed from here at the negotiations to try to fix the boundary at the old line fixed by His Majesty the Chinese Emperor, and that not a span of your territory should be taken away from you. I believe that the British Government would not be unreasonable in their demands, and that they would not impose any intolerable conditions on you, if your Government would convince them that you intended to remain in friendly relations with them. They do not covet your country, and therefore have no desire to annex any part of it. All that they want has already been described above. What I should earnestly request your Holiness to bear in mind is, that you should not spoil this opportunity of extricating your country from the critical situation in which she finds herself now, by leaving Lhasa for any other place and producing suicidal complications. Pray now stick to the post where duty, honour, interest, and prudence demand your presence. Vague reports have reached me that your Holiness intends to quit Lhasa in case the British Mission proceeds thither. These have deeply mortified me, but I am confident that these are entirely unfounded. It is impossible to conceive that your Holiness would take such a serious step, leaving capital with all its inhabitants, &c., to their fate like a captain deserting a ship in mid-ocean. The longer a peaceful settlement of these disputes is deferred, the greater would be the mischief and the more difficult would be their solution. Should this letter of mine unfortunately not find you at Lhasa, I have instructed my Representative there, through whom this letter has been sent, to deliver it personally into your hands should you be within a few days' journey from Lhasa. As the matter is urgent, I have sent this by the British dak to accelerate dispatch or avoid delay in transit. In the event of your having already quitted Lhasa, I earnestly hope that your Holiness, following the advice of a sincere friend and well-wisher of yours, will see your way to hasten back to your capital to bring the critical situation to a speedy end, and thereby relieve the troubles or distress of your subjects, by which act you would be gratefully remembered by them, and also gain virtue. To one who is so full of wisdom and knowledge as you are, more is quite superfluous as a drop would be to an ocean.

9. I also beg to inform your Holiness that I considered it advisable to forward your Holiness' letter to me, dated the 10th Ashar Badi, to his Excellency the Viceroy of India through the British Resident in Nepal. I have requested the said Resident

to lay before his Excellency the fact that your Holiness was now anxious for a settlement of the pending disputes, and that you were now willing to enter into negotiations for that settlement, and that you had asked me to intercede on your behalf. I have also requested him to forward a copy of your Holiness' letter to his Excellency the Viceroy with such recommendations as I have thought best for the good of Thibet. I have full faith in the justice and honesty of the British Government, and I believe that, were it not for the manner in which you received their request for a settlement of old existing disputes, none of these misfortunes would have happened.

10. I shall also request your Holiness to consult at this time of danger and difficulty the Amban, and be guided by his advice and experience. This is a matter peculiarly within his province, and I am sure his presence at the negotiations would be a matter to be much desired.

11. Now, I shall impress upon your Holiness the necessity of promptness of action, caution, and forbearance in the conduct of the ensuing negotiations; a just desire to give and take, foresight, and true patriotism would consist in bringing about a settlement consistent with reason and honour as far as possible. The British are already at your gates. Any delay in settlement would mean a serious burden on your people and Government and would be to nobody's advantage. I pray heartily that the Author of all good will bless this business and end the sufferings of a brave and patriotic people. Hoping to have the pleasure to hear in reply that peace has been concluded between the British and the Thibetan Governments to the satisfaction of both the parties.

Dated Saturday, the 23rd Sravan, Sambat 1961 (6th August, 1904).

Inclosure 12 in No. 103.

The Honourable the Four Kazis of Thibet to the Maharajah of Nepal.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

WE would be happy should your Highness' person be as full of glory as the sun. All is going on well here as usual.

With reference to the representation we had made to your Highness last year on the subject of the Anglo-Thibetan dispute we received on Saturday, the 9th Chaitra Sudi, your Highness' letter, dated Monday, the 13th Fagoon Sudi, Sambat 1960. Realizing that the contents thereof pointing out the good and evil consequences were the outcome of that pure and sincere feeling which exists between an elder and younger brothers, whom our two Governments resemble, we were exceedingly happy.

We stick to our last year's representation to your Highness with regard to the high-handed proceedings of the British from the very beginning, and the false accusation brought by them against Thibet. In pursuance to the long-established custom which forbids the English from entering our territory, our officers told the British officers who had come to Ghamba Jhong that negotiations for a settlement would be carried at Domo Gnatong. To this, however, they turned a deaf ear, and by the month of Mangsir, without intimating the object of their presence either to the Thibetan or Chinese officers on the spot, inspected or reconnoitred the place and returned. Again they advanced from the Domo side, accompanied by an armed force, in spite of the protests made in clear and unequivocal terms by the Thibetan officers stationed at Gnatong, and the said troops, having entered the Phari fort, set fire to the military stores in it or otherwise threw them into water and committed various other violent acts.

In spite of all this the Thibetan officers patiently continued to make representations to them, but they paid no heed to their words; on the contrary, their troops, issuing in large numbers like water from the four corners of a tank, surrounded our troops and killed a large number of them. Proceeding to Gyanchi and entering the fort there, they laid violent hands on or desecrated the old images of gods, the sacred books, and the ground "Parshad" that were in it and flung them away. Moreover, they took the military stores and set fire in the houses of the monks and the villagers, and pillaging the wealth and property of the people there, or shooting down every man, woman, or child they came across, and gave out that they were not going to compromise matters, i.e., behaved like demons bent upon the destruction of the Buddhistic faith, and committed various acts of sacrilege.

Your Highness, who is full of wisdom, will be the best judge of the reason of our shutting out from time immemorial those who differed from us in their religion, whether the religious tenets or practices should be allowed to be honours or not, and which of the two parties was in the right, as we know of no ground for our being treated in the aforesaid manner by their authorized agents.

Although there is a great difference in size and power between the British and the Thibetan Governments, yet no quarrel would have occurred if each of them had minded its proper duty. The British, like a patient intolerant of his disease, have done many indiscreet acts both previously and subsequently, and, instead of properly judging the actions of the Thibetans according to their merits, which they should have done, have committed a great wrong.

On receipt of your Highness' letter under reply, detailing the consequences and considering it jointly in council assembled, we came to the conclusion that a Treaty must finally have to be made, whatever might be the result of the fighting between the two, and fully represented to the Potala Lama the contents of your said letter. We all agreed that the Gurkha Government had given very proper advice to the people of Thibet, moved by a philanthropic spirit.

The British Government were formerly making proposals for a settlement, and the Rajah of Bhutan has also been moving since the last year to bring about a reconciliation. The latter has since come to Gyanchi with the same object, as he could not bear to see his Buddhist co-religionists of Thibet in distress in the quarrel in which they have become entangled. We had two of our regimental officers stationed at Gyanchi, and, owing to the improper conduct of the British officers towards them, the subjects of the two countries are cutting one another's throats there.

As a man of the Newar race, who is quite conversant with the ways and manners of the two Governments, of the mode of business, and the law of nations, like your Representative, the Captain here, intelligent and able to grasp all matters, is required here to bring about a settlement between Thibet and the British, and to carry on the business in a way which would avoid unpleasantness or complications between Gurkha and Thibet and to the mutual advantage of the parties, his Holiness the Potala Lama has addressed your Highness on the subject.

Accordingly, we would beg of your Highness to dispatch at once and without fail a Representative of your Highness, who should be an officer of high rank, experienced in business, and able to report matters and the trend of events regularly and in a straightforward manner, with a view to assist in the negotiations for the demarcation of the boundary established by His Majesty the Emperor of China without parting with a single span of territory found in the old documents, and for avoiding interference with, or promoting the free exercise of, the religion of Buddha.

Your Highness' Representative, the Captain, has regularly conveyed to us the instructions and advice from your Highness. Pressure of business and the consequent confusion have caused a little delay in the acknowledgment of the same, for which we beg to be excused.

With reference to another matter, namely, the comings and goings of men to and from Thibet and Russia, and the exchange of presents or goods between the two countries, we need hardly go into the question of the correctness or otherwise of the reports published by the Indian newspapers. There are idle reports circulated by irresponsible persons, and which have thus gained currency. Had they been true we would never have suppressed them.

We note that it has been stated that 300 camel-loads of goods had been received here the year before the last. If such had been the case, how could your Highness' Representative and others have remained ignorant of the same? This will serve to prove the falsehood of the other reports, and we earnestly beg your Highness not to allow any serious suspicions about these matters to enter your mind. We also hope that your Highness will keep us informed of your health and to continue to write us edifying letters.

A large piece of silk cloth and "khagams" of shellac-coloured cochin (silk) accompany this as tokens of our respect.

(Dated Wednesday, the 8th Agarh Badi, 1961, corresponding with the 6th July, 1904.)

Inclosure 13 in No. 103.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ravenshaw to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Nepal, August 11, 1904.

IN continuation of my letter, dated the 4th August, 1904, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, translations of four letters, dated respectively the 18th, 20th, 29th, and 30th June, 1904, received by the Prime Minister from the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa, regarding Thibetan affairs.

Translation of a Letter from the Representative at Lhasa.

May it please your Highness,

With due respect I beg to submit in the following lines what news I have been able to gather and what rumour reached me since my last respect up till now.

The Khani of Kashal says that the Khambali sepoys of Sotalosong attacked and killed fifteen or twenty British sepoys, who being ill were sent to Phari from the fort of Changlo at Gyantse.

Khanila reports that he had heard that the Potala Lama has sent a "kharkya" (order) to the Bara Kazi Jhamba Jen Jin Lalai, who was sent to Nagarche some time ago and who fled from there to Digarche on the approach of British cavalry, urging him not to stay behind at Digarche but to proceed to Gyantse and take in his hand the command of the troops, and to lead them to battle, failing which he (the Bara Kazi) will be dismissed from his office and will have to bear whatever punishment the Potala Lama may inflict.

The Clerk of Yamén says that it has become difficult to stay at Gyantse on account of the foul breath of the new levies and the effluvium of the dead bodies with which the village is now full; he reports also that there are over 10,000 levies at Gyantse, Rinpon, and Nagarche. He further reports that regarding the subject, viz., that the Amban has got with him one Englishman, the Thibetan Government have sent a "wangsu" (letter) to the Amban in which they had written that report had reached them that there was a rumour current that the Amban had got an Englishman with him; that the Amban, who was well aware that they were led to a war to oppose the ingress of Englishmen, should keep an Englishman with him is a matter beyond their belief, and impossible; that the smell of a sloughing ulcer in the head was sure to reach the nose. In other words, China and Thibet being one, anything done by the Chinese to the prejudice of the Thibetans was sure to have come to the notice of the Thibetans; that as the rumour was current in the bazaar, so they have written to the Amban and expect the Amban will give them a detailed reply to their letter. The Clerk further says that no reply to the above letter has been sent and that the Thibetans are now seeking a cause for a quarrel even in such unworthy pretexts.

Shimponla says:—

1. That the Kazis of Kashal are now holding their sittings at Norbulinka.

2. That as Sirdar Dharkhe, who had got the fourth place of honour and who was intrusted with business which related to the Sikkim frontier, died last year, his papers, amongst his other possessions listed by the Thibet Government, were brought, and from the copies of letters which passed between the said Sirdar and Sethe Kazi and others who are now a prisoner at Norbulinka, such portions were selected as would go to throw a suspicion on the said Kazis, accusing them of complicity with the British, and the said Kazis were minutely examined on the said points. In reply Sethe Kazi, caring naught for their present position, boldly said that, as they were intrusted with business between the two Governments, they had such communications to avoid any misunderstanding between the two; that they (Sethe Kazi and others) should like to know what harm they had done to Thibet or to the Potala Lama, that if they were found guilty of any such harmful act they would admit that they were a worst set of fellows, and would take any punishment dealt out to them, either being thrown into the river or any other; that if they were not guilty they should not be kept prisoner as heretofore, and a representation should be made to Potala Lama on their behalf. That those who are now in power as Kazis being the accusers of Sethe Kazis and others

it was not at all likely that the said reply and representation of the latter will ever reach the ears of Potala Lama.

That because of the suspicion now felt against Sethe Kazi and others, a follower of Dhuikechhemolimba, a retainer of the above Kazi who went to Ghamba, has been taken to the Shewal Office and is being whipped to get out their secret.

3. That the Thibetans who came back from Gyantse report that Ghampro Chokta, who was sent in place of Chan Dhaibun to Gyantse, on his arrival there gave out that those who hold lower office than that of a Dhaibun should come to receive him in Gyantse with proper honours; that the new Dhaibun Tashi-linga sent Dhoptoarka and other Bandas with seven horsemen to welcome Ghampro Chokta; that thirty cavalry soldiers from the fort of Changlo attacked and pursued the said Dhokta and others, when the said Dhoktarka made his horse run as fast as he could, and thus barely saved his life. That nowadays as soon as ever the British force come out of the fort they are fired upon by the Thibetan jingals only, other Thibetan firearms not having a range to allow the shot to go as far as the British camp, that the range of British rifles equals that of the jingals, that the velocity of the shot from the British rifles is very great.

4. That those persons who have come from Gyantse say that as the Bara Kazi, who went to Gyantse from here, had fled to Digarche on the approach of British troops at Nagarche Jhong, the other officers wrote direct to the Kashal for instructions, and this being known to him the Bara Kazi Kaling Lama wrote rather insultingly to the officers at Gyantse to inquire why they had without his knowledge wrote direct to the Kashal Office when he was appointed with full powers in military matters that might transpire on that side. In a suiting reply the officers wrote back that, though he was sent to them to guide them, to protect them, and to advise them in difficulty, and to lead the troops, yet they could not make out his whereabouts, therefore they wrote to Kashal direct. That the said Bara Kazi collected recruits over 16 years and under 60 years of age to the extent of 500 and sent these to Gyantse, and the newly-appointed Dhaibun Tashi-linga wrote back to the Bara Kazi to say that it was no good to the Thibetan Government merely to have lots of men collected on that side, and as the British troops amount to about 700 or 800, whereas the Thibetan troops count over 10,000, thus giving the latter a superiority of 1,000 men for each 100 men of the British, yet making it extremely difficult for them to cope with the British, and as a mere increase of number only introduced confusion and difficulty in the shape of providing ration to the troops of the Thibetan Government, on the arrival of the 500 men sent by him (the Bara Kazi), a lot of 500 men who were serving at Gyantse had been sent off to their homes towards Digarche. That the Bara Kazi got enraged with the Dhaibun and wrote to inquire if the latter had any instruction from the Thibetan Government not to follow his (the Bara Kazi's) advice, as the former had sent back troops which he had sent forward there to fight, and further to say that should the former behave in that way again it will not go well with him (Dhaibun). That upon this Tashi-linga Dhaibun wrote to Kashal to say that up till then he had served the Thibetan Government to the best of his ability and always true to the salt he had eaten, but lately it appeared his intellect had fallen short of the standard, and whether he were to be dismissed or if that were not deemed sufficient he were to be punished otherwise, he was not at all willing to continue his tenure of office, and he requested to be set free or allowed leave to retire; but in reply he was told by the Kashal that he had laboured hard in times past, and that he should labour as hard at that time, and also was told that his would not be a thankless task without reward, and that at a time like the present he could not be allowed to leave, and he should act with his heart and soul. That at Gyantse the officers tried only to pick a quarrel with each other, each thinking that he knew more or best of all things than the rest, and no one cared to go under the advice or order of any one else.

Sandoo Bhote, who followed Itoo Kazi, appointed to go to Nagarche Jhong, and who has come back, reported as follows:—

“After our arrival at Nagarche Jhong the Khamba sepoy from Setalosong arrived there also. The Headman of the village Khangma, lying on the way from Phari to Gyantse, was sent for immediately. When asked what the number of British troops was who were stationed at his village and what procedure would be beneficial to us he said that there were forty or fifty British troops in his village, that they had not erected any entrenchment whatever, and it was quite easy to destroy them. He asked for Khambali sepoy, with whom he promised to go and destroy the British troops.

"The Kazi sent Khambali sepoy to follow the Headman for the destruction of the British troops. The Khangma Headman lead the way and marched day and night by a circuitous path, and reached Khangma when the dawn was broken and the sun was up in the sky. Though it was impossible to maintain one's ground before the volley fire of the British, which came as thick as hail, some seventy or eighty men made a desperate dash towards the enemy and fell into the trenches full of water which the British sepoy have dug around their camp, and what with the fall and the thick fire they expired. The total loss of Khambali sepoy from the fire and the fall in the trench amount to little over 200. The sepoy who fled then have not been collected together since. The Thibetan sepoy so long as they do not come in contact with the British seem uncertain and wavering, but those who have once confronted them lose their presence of mind and through fear become as it were senseless. The recruited sepoy at Gyantse now say that they would not live long and so spend their own earnings in buying whatever food is to their liking; they further talk despondently, and say that instead of sacrificing them with their poor appliances before the superiorly armed British troops, it were perhaps better if the Thibetan Government were to kill them outright."

Shimponla says, in reply to the letter from Pato Penlop and Tuson Penlop of Deva Dharma stating that it would not turn out well for the Thibetan Government to go to war, that the matter should be settled amicably, and that they being of the same religion they will try their best if they were informed what the intention of the Thibetan Government was; the Thibetan Government wrote back to say that they sent the Lama of Deva Dharma, who was then staying at Lhasa, requesting him to proceed to Deva Dharma and to speak to Pato Penlop and Tasong Penlop to see if they can make the British troops who have come up to Phari go back to Gnatong, when the Thibetans will discuss matters with them; that the said Pato Penlop and Tasong Penlop had now written to say that victory would never be on this side in a war against the British, and now it appeared that the British troops were being reinforced, so now was the time to settle quickly the difference, and if they had to say anything they should be glad to have the requisite intimation, and they would do whatever lay in their power, that they have obtained a respite of eighteen days to see if they could bring about a settlement, as twenty-eight guns and 6,000 men have already arrived at Gnatong for reinforcements. That the man who brought the said letter was now going to Norbulinka every day, where the Kashal sits nowadays.

The said Shimponla and the Clerk of Yamén say that two representations to His Majesty the Emperor of China, one from the Amban giving out that the Thibetans were not carrying out His Majesty's orders not to speak of what the Amban says, that they have not allowed time to go to the frontier dispute and talk of a collusion between the Chinese and the British, and another from the Thibetans giving out that the British have acted in a high-handed manner with them and that the Chinese at Lhasa were in league with the British, have been sent the other day.

The Kusho of Dhudu Khansa says that both high and low unanimously give out that, unless the Gurkha Government intervene and settle the matter, Thibet will go to rack and ruin, and they expect much from the said Government.

People say that, should the Thibetan troops have to remain on this footing even for two or three months there, as the ration, &c., collected at Gyantse had fallen in the hands of the British and had been destroyed or spoilt, the whole troop will not be able to maintain themselves.

(Dated Saturday, the 5th Asar, 1961, corresponding to the 18th June, 1904.)

P.S.—Sandoo further says that the Headman of Khangma, who led the Thibetan troops into a trap, had fled, leaving no trace behind.

Khani says that since yesterday three more sepoy were detailed over and above the three who were already on the watch over Sethe Lama.

Translation of a Letter in cypher from the Representative at Lhasa.

May it please your Highness,

With due respect and humble submission I beg to lay before your Highness the following news that I have heard and been able to gather here for your Highness' information.

The Baman Babu Mongrel, who had been sent towards Nagchhukha to gather information, arrived. He reported that no foreigners had come there, nor were there any news of their coming. The inhabitants of that place say that it is reported that the Thibetan troops sent from here have all been annihilated, and it was now the time for them to desert their country and to go elsewhere.

The Interpreter of the Teep Arsenal reports that the Khendechhega is at present residing at Dotay, a place 2 miles north of Lhasa, near Serra Gumba. He is living in a wooden house, and has engaged 200 or 300 workmen in erecting a mint worked by water-wheel. He has with him some nine or ten servants, and also some Russian rifles. He remains there even at night for the same work.

One Chinese Malouse having reported that the British troops are said to come through Dechang, a place towards Yambachen, north of Lhasa, I have sent the Mongrel to collect information towards that side. On receipt of any news from him I shall report the same duly to your Highness.

Chharong Angi Lama reports that it is rumoured that, the British having acted in a high-handed manner, the Thibetan Government have sent a petition to the Russian Government asking for help through Jijoong Dampa Lama, resident at Kharka, a place bordering the Russian frontier. In accordance to the petition, the Russian Government have also written to the British Government to the effect that it is very improper for the British to invade Thibet and harass the Thibetans, who are devoting their time solely to their religious practices; and if they are really inclined to an aggressive policy and capable of doing so, they should measure their strength with them (Russians).

The Chinese and the Thibetans speak in murmur among themselves that they are quite dissatisfied with the mode of working of the Potala Lama. Had he not been the ruling Lama he would have ere long been brought to his senses. He had through his folly brought Thibet almost to ruin.

Dated Monday, the 7th Asar, 1961, corresponding to the 20th June, 1904.

Translation of a Letter from the Representative at Lhasa.

May it please your Highness,

With due respect I beg to say before your Highness in the following lines the news that I have heard and been able to gather here for your Highness' perusal.

750 Khambali sepoy from Chhamdoshe-pau-do-re-uchhunga arrived here between Tuesday, the 8th Asar, and two subsequent days and went towards Gyantse by the 14th idem.

Dhewa says that his men now back from Gyantse reported that the British sepoy were constantly sallying out of their forts and setting fire to the houses and laying mines in the buildings and firing these mines, and thus had destroyed about 100 houses; that the British were sending away crops, wheat, cash, and sundries by mules and other conveyances towards Phari; that about 6,000 British troops and 26 guns had reached Dhomu and would soon start towards Gyantse.

The Interpreter of Teep Arsenal reported that on the 12th Jaistha Badi the Thibetan troops from Gyantse on their way to surround the British troops posted at Gyantse Changlo from all sides (under orders), the troops respectively proceeding from the north and the south mistook each other for the British, and in the encounter from 1,000 to 1,200 men had lost their lives.

The Clerk of Yamén says that the men sent here by Tongsa Penlop of Deva Dharma say that it appeared that the Thibetan Government relied on the Russians through the intervention of Khendechhega; that were the Thibetans wholly and solely given to religious practices and were they not in league with the Russians, then it would not at all have been necessary for Khendechhega to come disguised on his return from far-off countries; further, that the British say that if the Thibetan Government give a written engagement that they would not in future enter into any league with the Russians,

and solemnly affirm in writing that they had nothing to do with the Russians up till now, they (the British) would return back and give up possession of Phari Jhong, otherwise they would reach Lhassa in twenty days' time, and thence proceed up to the Russian frontier; that the British with 10,000 troops and 26 guns have already arrived at Dhomu; that they (the men from Tongsa Penlop) had been sent from Phari to get an answer from the Potala Lama after due deliberation, and that they requested an early reply. That Tongsa Penlop of Deva Dharma said that, should the Thibetan Government desire to make an amicable settlement, he would even meet the Viceroy if necessary. The Clerk of Yamên further says that the Kazis of Kashal are writing such meaningless words as that the British have acted in a very high-handed manner and so forth in reply to their (men of Tongsa Penlop's) persistent representations as set forth above. That news has come to the effect that Tongsa Penlop has now returned.

The Interpreter of the Teep Arsenal says that Dhongair, the officer, secretly ventilates his opinion to the effect that the Khendechhega, having set on foot an utterly useless and mischievous works, had brought such ruin and calamity over the head of the Thibetans, and perhaps more were yet in store; that this Khendechhega was as it were the death of Thibet; that he will never prosper because of this sin.

The Interpreter of the Teep Arsenal further says that a mechanic of Dhote came and reported as follows to the Chitoong Bara:—

"Khendechhega wrote to the officer Dhongai Chitoong Bara of the Teep Arsenal from Dhote, where he (Khendechhega) was stopping to erect a water-wheel power for the mint, to say that twenty to twenty-five men should be sent to him that very day. In reply to this the Dhongai Chetung Bara, in charge of Teep Arsenal, wrote back to Khendechhega that as an urgent order had been received by the Bara from Kashal and Mikhang officer asking him to manufacture Henry cartridges as soon as possible, and as besides in such a time when there was a war going on with the British the Kashal and Mikhang officers were urging him to do such important work, and Khendechhega too was asking him to send out all mechanics to him (Khendechhega), he (the Bara) was at a loss to determine under whose instructions he (the Bara) should act, and under these circumstances he would request Khendechhega to get an order from the Potala Lama on him (the Bara) to act under the instruction of Khendechhega alone, when the Bara would send out all mechanics to Khendechhega, or otherwise at such a critical time the Bara was unable to send the mechanics, throwing all works connected with the army in confusion. The Khendechhega, on receipt of the above reply, got very angry, and said that the Potala Lama had appointed him as the chief officer, and he had sent for the mechanics under orders from the Potala Lama to-day, and the Dhungair Chitung Bara will have to rue for it, and he got up at once and went away, giving out that he was going to the Potala Lama to represent the matter to him."

The Khani of Norpulinka says that Shimpon Khembo, brother of the Potala Lama, who was sent to the frontier war some time ago, when he came to take leave of Potala Lama at Norpulinka went in and sent words to the Potala Lama to say that he has come to take a leave of farewell of him, and though he waited in the inside parlour till nightfall, the Potala Lama did not see him, and he had to go away without any leave-taking.

I have inclosed a letter with this purporting to be the copy of the reply sent by the Amban, and addressed to the Potala Lama, about the matter that the Amban has got with him an Englishman, for your Highness' perusal.

Angila says that Dhinchhum of Phalak, who has recently returned from Gyantse side, said:—

"While we were at Gyantse the British officers sent words to the effect that they have not advanced to Thibet on account of wreaking any vengeance, or because of any ill-feeling, they have come to the frontier to discuss and settle the boundary question as set forth in the Treaty of past time, and that though they have repeatedly written to the Amban and Kazis and Bharadars to come to the frontier, the Thibetan Government sent a Sirdar Dharkai, a man who was serving as an artizan under them (the British), when he was known as Darke Domdui, and informed us to settle the dispute with that man; that the said act was one very disgraceful to the powerful British Government, who had sent such high officials to the Thibet frontier to discuss the question; that even then, on being further requested to send soon duly authorized Bharadars, the Thibetan Government did not pay any heed to the same, thus further bringing them to disgrace and dishonour; that as they had news to the effect that the Thibetans have allied themselves with the Russians through Khendechhega—that for

all the above reasons, singly and conjointly, they were obliged to advance against Thibet; that even now should the Thibetan Government execute a sacred Treaty religiously promising to ally with them, and stating that the Thibetan Government had had no alliance with Russia nor would enter into any such alliance with her, and should they (Thibetans) give opening to British trade into their country, they (British) would yield back whatever territory they have invaded; that if the Thibetans allied with the British the latter would do what would be beneficial to the former; that otherwise if such peaceful methods fail they would get what they want by force of arms."

Pujahari Bara says that a report has been received that the raw Khambali recruits of Sotalosang attacked the British fort at Changlo in Gyantse on the 15th Jaistha Sudi and lost about 100 men, and the remaining Khambalis fled. He further says that the British troops are largely reinforced at Ghamba and Phari.

Dated Wednesday, the 16th Asar, 1961, corresponding to the 29th June, 1904.

Translation of the Thibetan Letter brought by the Chinese Clerks purporting to be the copy of the Letter sent by the Amban to the Potala Lama.

(After compliments.)

I beg to acknowledge your letter of the 30th Jaisth Badi, with a representation sent by the Councillors of Chhongdui Council, wherein they say that 2,419 Khambali sepoy from Dhumnojo, Hrinchneba, Shyopando, Tarjhong, Shojong, Dhaya, and Chhando for the protection of the land who had already been sent for should be provided with transport and horses as customary. In reply to the letter I have to say that though the Chinese subjects, who are poor and weak, represented that they were unable to hold the tenure of land on account of the forced labour, still as the Potala Lama and myself are the two persons to look after the protection of Thibet, so a sanad has been already issued to the said purpose, besides a special order has been sent to the officer at Jhhakuchhesum to issue proper orders on that behalf. With regard to the reference that it appeared that as if I have got in my train some Englishmen, which, if correct, should immediately be sent back, or otherwise a misunderstanding may ensue between China and Thibet, I beg to say that, through the grace of His Majesty the Emperor of China, we arrived in Thibet safely, and that though the civil and military officers and the Chinese sepoy were being carefully examined day to day, yet no Englishman could be found. I now beg to say that there could be little doubt that the Councillors, Baras, and lay members of the Chhongdui Council would be able to prove their assertion to demonstration with evidences, and accordingly if I am told who the Englishman is and what is his name, I shall not only drive him away, but punish him very severely; but if otherwise, then the person amongst the said Councillors, Baras, and lay member who started this topic should be handed over to me.

I am glad to hear that the Potala Lama is sending spies to different outstills in order to reduce intoxication; I have also a mind to serve a notice at different stills prohibiting the sale of Sagang tea and opium, and I request the Potala Lama to take this into consideration, and having passed the necessary orders on the Councillors, &c., of the Chhongdui Council to send me a reply as soon as possible.

Written on the 9th day of the 5th month of the 30th year of the reign of Kwangshu, His Majesty the Emperor of China.

Translation of a Letter in cypher from the Representative at Lhasa.

With due respect I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your Highness' letter, dated the 17th and 28th of Jaisth, Sunday and Thursday respectively, and two letters in cypher and a copy of a letter sent by your Highness to the Potala Lama on the 13th and 14th Asar, Sunday and Monday respectively. I shall act to the best of my ability, according to your Highness' instructions. This foolish Potala Lama had for a long time spoilt or muddled all sorts of business, and besides I am acting here at great distance, so I hope your Highness will be pleased to excuse any shortcoming.

[1762]

Your Highness, dictated by kindness, was pleased to write to the effect that the Thibetans will never act in an unworthy manner towards myself or the traders and Rayats of Nepal; further, if the Thibetans, being foolish enough, act in that way they should make provision beforehand, and, in case of extremity, I should act in such and such a manner.

I beg leave to represent that, unless it be the work of the Potala Lama, the weak and vulnerable point of Thibet, the Thibetans will never act in that manner, as the Kazis, Bharadars, nobility, and gentry, the Chinese Amban, and others all alike think that what your Highness had written was very proper, and that if this business were to terminate, it will be through the intervention of the Gourkha Government; and this was their greatest hope, as is evident from what they say.

I shall be much obliged, and it would facilitate business, if your Highness should issue instructions to me about what I should do if I am requested to proceed and effect an amicable settlement, peacefully at the time when the British have advanced to within two or three days' march of Lhasa, or at the time when the pride of the Potala Lama has a fall.

The Khani of Hashal says that your Highness' letter to the Potala Lama has been handed to the Gourkhali clerk (Khardar) to be translated into the Thibetan language.

According to your Highness' instructions I have written to Ditha Thirman Gurung what your Highness told me to write, and have sent the letter per favour of my friend Dhundukhansar Kusho.

The Thibetan Government are now dealing severely with the persons known as Domohali, who live in the frontier bordering Sikkim and Thibet, and who are now residing at Lhasa, on the suspicion that they, in plying backward and forwards, carry news from here. I shall arrange to send some men towards Digarche from here with Ditha Mahananda, who has been made an Agent of Secret Service (?) (Lamik).

I shall inform your Highness whatever news I may gather when I go next to Kashal.

The Chharaong Kazi, above all others, appears to be very much impressed with what your Highness has written.

A Mongrel was sent to Degain towards Yamachen to ascertain whether any Europeans have appeared on that side, a rumour of which reached here some time ago. On his return he reported that no foreigner was seen on that side.

Dated Thursday, the 17th Asar, 1961, corresponding to the 30th June, 1904.

No. 104.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received September 23.)

(No. 206.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Peking, September 23, 1904.

THIBETAN negotiations: Your Lordship's telegram No. 138.

I have had an interview with Prince Ch'ing, who was attended by Wu T'ing-Fang, to-day.

His Highness stated that the impression of the Chinese Government that Chinese suzerainty is diminished, has been completely removed by two letters from Colonel Younghusband to the Amban, the receipt of which was reported by the latter after the dispatch of the telegram quoted in the Viceroy of India's telegram of the 18th ultimo, and that the telegram would not have been sent had the letters been known of here at the time.

The only objection raised by the Chinese Government to the signature of the Convention with the Thibetans is one in which I recognize my German colleague's cloven hoof, viz., that difficulties are created for China by Article IX (the purport of which, as a safeguard against Russia, is realized), inasmuch as it infringes the rights of other Powers under the most-favoured-nation clause.

The Chinese Government are anxious that the assurances contained in the two letters from Younghusband, together with some explanation of Article IX, by which the difficulties alluded to would be obviated, should be incorporated in the Adhesion Agreement, otherwise they consent to let the Convention stand in its present shape. Two or three days will be necessary to decide the form of this explanation. Prince Ch'ing will then telegraph

it to the Amban, communicating it at the same time to me, for the information of your Lordship. A week's delay, as I pointed out, would be saved by the latter course.

On being asked by Mr. Wu to offer a suggestion as to the wording of the explanation, I observed that it was for China to state her wishes, and I refused to give advice on such a question, as I had no instructions to do so.

His Highness told me that, in view of the great confusion created by the Dalai Lama's conduct, China proposed to dispatch an official of experience to Thibet as quickly as possible to put affairs there on a proper footing; it was also desirable that a suitable basis should be established for commercial relations. Yutai, in whose ability he placed complete confidence, would not, however, be superseded by this officer. Prince Ch'ing's reason for making this proposal known to me in advance was to prevent His Majesty's Government from misconstruing the action contemplated.

I replied that, provided the negotiations respecting the signing of the Adhesion Agreement were not thereby delayed, I did not think His Majesty's Government would raise any objection.

The above has been repeated to the Government of India.

No. 105.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 24.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 23rd instant, relative to the Thibet indemnity.

Copy will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, September 24, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 105.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

September 23, 1904.

WE have received the following telegram, dated Lhasa the 18th instant, from Younghusband, in reply to a telegram which we addressed to him on the 14th instant:—

"I trust indemnity, as now arranged, is not considered by Government to be excessive. In reality an indemnity of 75,00,000 rupees payable in instalments spread over 75 years is equivalent to only about half that amount required to be paid in three years. 36,00,000 rupees is only half the annual revenue of the State of Indore, and Thibet is a country far richer than Indore in everything but cash. It would be unfair on the people of India, who have to pay the balance of expense of the Mission, if any sum less than 36,00,000 rupees were demanded. But had I insisted on this amount being paid by Thibetans in three years they would have been left with a sense of oppression. A nasty racial feeling would have sprung up, as the Thibetan Government, instead of making the rich monasteries disgorge, would have squeezed the money out of the poor peasantry. The arrangement which I adopted was put forward by Thibetans themselves, who preferred it to the various suggestions indicated in your telegram, all of which were put before them by the Nepalese and Bhutanese. The feeling now prevailing here is altogether better, the Thibetans to all appearance being well contented with the settlement which I have concluded. They have acquiesced in proposal to dispatch survey party up to Gartok from Gyantse, and have agreed to depute Thibetan official to accompany the party, without raising a single protest. Indeed so marked is the change of feeling which has taken place that proposal is being mooted by certain people in Lhasa to appeal to us to take them under our protection in preference to China. It was necessary that psychological moment for clinching matters should be seized, for, had further discussion been permitted, the moderate party, who had shown a disposition to conclude settlement, would have been swamped in a sea of argument.

"My view, in which Macdonald fully concurs, is that our responsibility is greatly diminished, and necessity for dispatch of a second expedition a few years hence is

probably obviated, by terms of the Convention, with Chumbi Valley in our occupation and the Thibetans well disposed, our merchants and trade agents at Gyantse and Gartok marts will be secure; whereas their position might have been precarious, after our withdrawal from Chumbi, had Thibetans' resentment been aroused by their having to pay indemnity in a short time. I have, I think, incurred minimum of responsibility, while securing maximum of reparation, and I would deprecate any alteration of terms at present as likely to unsettle minds of the Thibetans who are content with present arrangement. If any different arrangement is required it could be made more conveniently when revision of trade Regulations takes place; it would be impossible to carry out this revision, on scale recommended, in the limited time at my disposal, and I would suggest deferring consideration of further amendment. As regards attitude of Chinese Government, it would be unreasonable for them at this stage, especially after the way in which they have continuously neglected their duty as Suzerain Power, to raise any objection to the Agreement; the final draft had been communicated to Amban before Treaty was signed; Amban was present at signature of Treaty. I furnished him with a copy and he stated that, personally, he saw no objection to it."

Position has been fully explained to Younghusband in a telegram which I sent to him on the 19th instant. His reply is now awaited.

No. 106.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 24, 1904.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to inform you that the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, who called at this Office on the 20th instant, said that he observed that the Secretary of State for India, in a speech which he made at Bramley on the 19th instant, had stated that His Majesty's Government had kept their pledges that they would not "*permanently* occupy Thibetan territory." M. Sazanow added that he had referred to the Memorandum communicated by Lord Lansdowne to the Russian Ambassador on the 2nd June last, and he found that, although the word "*permanently*" occurred in the Memorandum, it was in connection with interference in Thibetan affairs, and he implied that even a temporary occupation of Thibetan territory would be contrary to the assurances which had been given to Russia. There had, of course, been interference, and it still continued.

It was pointed out to M. Sazanow that there had also been temporary occupation, and that in the nature of things this could not well be otherwise.

On the 21st instant M. Sazanow called again in order to confirm, on behalf of the Russian Government, what he had said on his own initiative the day before.

He further stated that, assuming the text of the Agreement with Thibet, as published in the "*Times*," to be practically, if not textually, correct, the Russian Government desired to represent to His Majesty's Government that it did not comply with the assurances given to the Russian Government in Lord Lansdowne's Memorandum of the 2nd June, 1904.

The Russian Government reserved to themselves the right to make their official representations when the Treaty was officially published, but in the meanwhile they considered that Articles VII and IX in the Treaty, as it appeared in the "*Times*," departed from Lord Lansdowne's assurances.

M. Sazanow said that it had been suggested to him that the Chumbi Valley was not part of Thibet proper; geographically, perhaps, it was not, but politically it was.

In the opinion of the Russian Government, even a temporary occupation of any part of Thibet after the signing of the Convention would be contrary to Lord Lansdowne's assurances, and if the Thibetans did not pay the indemnity the occupation might be prolonged, and even become permanent. Article IX was certainly a permanent intervention or interference in Thibetan affairs, and amounted to a kind of protectorate.

It will, no doubt, not have escaped Mr. Brodrick's notice that there are considerable discrepancies between the text of the Treaty as published in the "*Times*" and the text as signed. The following phrases, which occur in the "*Times*" version of the Articles referred to by M. Sazanow, do not, so far as Lord Lansdowne is aware, appear in the Treaty as signed:—

Article VII. "In the event of the indemnity's not being paid England will continue in occupation of Chumbi."

Article IX. "In the event of *Great Britain's* consenting to another Power constructing roads or railways, opening mines, or erecting telegraphs, Great Britain will make a full examination on her own account for carrying out the arrangements proposed.

"No real property or land containing minerals or precious metals in Thibet shall be mortgaged, exchanged, leased, or sold to any foreign Power."

I am to state that the points raised by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires are receiving Lord Lansdowne's careful consideration, but that, in the meanwhile, his Lordship would be glad to be favoured at the earliest possible moment with Mr. Brodrick's observations with regard to them.

I am, &c.
(Signed) F. A. CAMPBELL.

No. 107.

Memorandum by Mr. Montgomery respecting the Agreement with Thibet: Russian Protests.

THE Russian complaints are based on the text of Articles VII and IX of the version published in the "Times" of the 17th September. This version is a translation of the Agreement as published by the native organ of the German Legation at Peking. There are very considerable discrepancies between Articles VII and IX as they therein appear and the same Articles in the Agreement as it was communicated to us by the India Office in its final form.

It is significant that the Peking versions of both Articles contain additions likely to give rise to the idea of permanent occupation and a virtual Protectorate over Thibet. The two versions of the Articles are appended:—

"Times" version.

ARTICLE VII.

For performance of the conditions comprised in Articles II, III, and IV for opening trading stations, and in the sixth clause relative to the indemnity as security for the punctual discharge of its obligations on the part of Thibet, British troops will continue to occupy the Chumbi Valley for three years until the trading places are satisfactorily established and the indemnity liquidated in full. In the event of the indemnity not being paid, England will continue in occupation of Chumbi.

ARTICLE IX.

Without the consent of Great Britain—

(a.) No Thibetan territory shall be sold, leased, or mortgaged to any foreign Power whatsoever;

(b.) No foreign Power whatsoever shall be permitted to concern itself with the administration of the government of Thibet, or any other affairs therewith connected;

[1762]

Version as signed.

ARTICLE VII.

As security for the payment of the above-mentioned indemnity, and for the fulfilment of the provisions relative to trade marts specified in Articles II, III, IV, and V, the British Government shall continue to occupy the Chumbi Valley until the indemnity has been paid, and until the trade marts have been effectively opened for three years, whichever date may be the later.

ARTICLE IX.

The Government of Thibet engages that, without the previous consent of the British Government—

(a.) No portion of Thibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged, or otherwise given for occupation, to any foreign Power;

(b.) No such Power shall be permitted to intervene in Thibetan affairs;

(c.) No foreign Power shall be permitted to send either official or non-official persons to Thibet, no matter in what pursuit they may be engaged, to assist in the conduct of Thibetan affairs;

(d.) No foreign Power shall be permitted to construct roads or railways, or erect telegraphs or open mines anywhere in Thibet. In the event of Great Britain's consenting to another Power constructing roads or railways, opening mines, or erecting telegraphs, Great Britain will make a full examination on her own account for carrying out the arrangements proposed;

(e.) No real property or land containing minerals or precious metals in Thibet shall be mortgaged, exchanged, leased, or sold to any foreign Power.

(c.) No Representatives or Agents of any foreign Power shall be admitted to Thibet;

(d.) No concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining, or other rights shall be granted to any foreign Power, or the subject of any foreign Power. In the event of consent to such concessions being granted, similar or equivalent concessions shall be granted to the British Government;

(e.) No Thibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to any foreign Power, or the subject of any foreign Power.

It will be noticed that the phrase "In the event of the indemnity not being paid, England will continue in occupation of Chumbi" in Article VII ("Times" version) is a gratuitous addition, and that, whereas in the Agreement as signed the payment of the indemnity in three years is contemplated as probable, the addition of these words makes it appear as if we regarded its non-payment and the consequent opportunity for a permanent occupation of the Chumbi Valley as no remote contingency.

In Article IX clause (d.) ("Times" version) the sentence "In the event of Great Britain's consenting to another Power constructing roads or railways, opening mines or erecting telegraphs, Great Britain will make a full examination on her own account for carrying out the arrangements proposed" has no counterpart in the Treaty as signed, and here again the addition is calculated to lend colour to the Protectorate idea.

As a matter of fact, the very insertion in the real Treaty of the words "In the event of consent to such concessions being granted, similar or equivalent concessions shall be granted to the British Government" shows that it is intended that Great Britain shall be placed on the same footing as other Powers with regard to concessions; the imaginary clause puts, therefore, a construction on the Article the opposite of what was intended.

These discrepancies would, at any rate, seem to be sufficiently important to render unprofitable a discussion with Russia of the terms of the Agreement as it was published in the "Times."

The Russian Government have stated that they reserve their right to make official representations when the Treaty appears officially. It may be assumed that these representations will take very much the same form as those now made.

The Russian Government say—

1. That even a temporary occupation of any part of Thibet after the signing of the Convention would be contrary to the assurances given by Lord Lansdowne on the 2nd June, and that if the Thibetans did not pay the indemnity the occupation might be prolonged and even become permanent;

2. That Article IX is a permanent intervention or interference in Thibetan affairs, and amounts to a kind of Protectorate.

The assurances referred to are appended:—

"The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. Hardinge.

"(No. 224 A.)

"Sir,

"Foreign Office, June 2, 1904.

"I addressed to Count Benckendorff to-day in writing a communication to the following effect in regard to Thibet, his Excellency having upon several occasions expressed a hope that our policy towards that country would not be altered by recent events:—

"Your Excellency has inquired, in the course of recent conversation, whether the opposition which has been offered to the British Mission to Thibet has in any way modified the policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to that country, as described in their telegram to the Government of India of the 6th November, 1903.

"His Majesty's Government announced in that telegram that, in sanctioning the advance of

Colonel Younghusband's Mission to Gyantse, they were clearly of opinion that this step should not be allowed to lead to the occupation of Thibet, or to permanent intervention in Thibetan affairs. They stated that the advance was to be made for the sole purpose of obtaining satisfaction, and that, as soon as reparation had been obtained, withdrawal would be effected. They added that they were not prepared to establish a permanent Mission in Thibet, and that the question of enforcing trade facilities in that country was to be considered in the light of the decision conveyed in the telegram.

"I am now able to tell you that His Majesty's Government still adhere to the policy thus described, though it is obvious that their action must, to some extent, depend upon the conduct of the Thibetans themselves, and that His Majesty's Government cannot undertake that they will not depart in any eventuality from the policy which now commends itself to them. They desire, however, to state in the most emphatic terms that, so long as no other Power endeavours to intervene in the affairs of Thibet, they will not attempt either to annex it, to establish a Protectorate over it, or in any way to control its internal administration."

"I am, &c.
(Signed) "LANSDOWNE."

With regard to (1), the words "as soon as reparation had been obtained withdrawal would be effected" in Lord Lansdowne's assurances clearly contemplate a temporary occupation of part of Thibet until such reparation, which would naturally include the payment of an indemnity, had been obtained; the words therefore qualify those which occur in the preceding sentence with regard to "occupation."

With regard to (2) as to intervention in Thibetan affairs, the assurance was obviously intended to refer to the internal administration of the country only, as is shown by the words "they will not attempt . . . or in any way to control its internal administration" at the end of the communication made to Count Benckendorff. Article 9 of the Agreement, on the other hand, is throughout only intended as a safeguard against interference by foreign Powers, and in no way as an interference in the internal affairs of Thibet. It is no more than the logical outcome of the policy laid down by His Majesty's Government in 1901, when Sir C. Scott informed Count Lamsdorff, in accordance with instructions, that "His Majesty's Government could not regard with indifference any proceedings that might have a tendency to alter or disturb the existing status of Thibet" (Thibet, B.B., p. 124, No. 40); and to talk of its constituting a Protectorate is childish.

There has, therefore, been no departure from the assurances given by Lord Lansdowne on the 2nd June. Had there been any, our position would even then have been covered by the provision in the Memorandum communicated by Lord Lansdowne to Count Benckendorff on that day, to the effect that it was "obvious that the action of His Majesty's Government must to some extent depend upon the conduct of the Thibetans themselves, and that His Majesty's Government could not undertake that they would not depart in any eventuality from the policy which then commended itself to them."

His Majesty's Government throughout the discussions on the subject of the assurances to be given to Russia in return for her adhesion to the Khedivial Decree attached great importance to this reservation, and it is clear, from the efforts made by the Russian Government to induce Lord Lansdowne to abandon it (see passages marked B in accompanying print),* that they regarded the provision as one to which His Majesty's Government could resort in order to cover any slight divergence, which might subsequently be found necessary, from the line of policy laid down in the telegram to the Viceroy of the 6th November, 1903. It could no doubt be used at the present juncture as a second line of defence.

September 25, 1904.

(Signed) C. H. MONTGOMERY.

No. 108.

Sir C. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne. — (Received September 26.)

(No. 471. Confidential.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, September 23, 1904.

COUNT LAMSDORFF mentioned to me yesterday, though expressly stating that he spoke unofficially, that the publication in the "Times" of the Treaty which His Majesty's Government had concluded with Thibet had made a generally bad im-

* To Sir C. Hardinge, No. 194 B, May 17; Sir C. Hardinge, No. 256, May 18, 1904.

pression, since its terms were inconsistent with the assurances contained in the Memorandum given to Count Benckendorff and constituted a virtual protectorate over Thibet. To my remark that it was quite impossible to satisfy people in Russia who were always predisposed to be discontented, however sincere or honest England might be in her actions, he replied that it was not so much in Russia as from abroad that he had received this impression. He understood that His Majesty's Government had imposed an indemnity which it would be impossible for the Thibetans to pay, and that the occupation of the Chumbi Valley would thus be indefinitely prolonged. Particular exception was taken to Article IX, by which no commercial concessions of any kind were to be granted to foreigners in Thibet without the consent of Great Britain, and such a clause could only be regarded as an interference in internal affairs and as a virtual protectorate. Count Lamsdorff at the same time stated that he had not yet had time to study the question.

I told Count Lamsdorff that I had not yet received from your Lordship the text of the Treaty, and was not, therefore, in a position to express an opinion, but that it seemed to me absurd to talk of a Protectorate of Thibet when there would not be a single political Agent in the country nor any British troops except for the temporary presence of small detachments in a very distant corner of the country. The indemnity of 500,000*l.* could hardly be smaller, and if the Thibetans observed their other Treaty obligations I did not imagine that His Majesty's Government would be hard on them. As for foreign concessions, whether commercial or otherwise, in Thibet, His Majesty's Government fully realized the danger, from past experience in other semi-civilized and barbarous States, of not hermetically closing the door to them, and that such a measure was only in accordance with your Lordship's declaration to Count Benckendorff of the determination of His Majesty's Government to oppose the intervention of any foreign Power in Thibet. I added that it was useless to prolong the discussion of a Treaty of which neither of us knew the authentic text.

The French Ambassador alluded to this question in conversation with me this morning, and stated that it was Article IX of the text of the Treaty telegraphed from Peking which had specially irritated Russian public opinion, and that from the Russian point of view the test of whether the present Treaty establishes a Protectorate over Thibet will be decided according to whether that country is to be reserved to British enterprise, to the exclusion of foreigners, or whether concessions are to be equally denied to British subjects.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES HARDINGE.

No. 109.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 26.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of two telegrams from the Viceroy, dated the 24th September, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copies will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, September 26, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 109.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

September 24, 1904.

THIBET. On the 15th September Younghusband telegraphed to us the text of two telegrams which Amban stated he had received from the Wai-wu Pu:—

1. "We have duly read your telegram forwarding the Convention, in ten Articles, which the British official has sent you. On no account are you to sign it, as it robs China of her suzerainty over Thibet.

"This point you should discuss (with British Commissioner), and you should reply by telegraph."

The above was received on the 12th September.

2. "Thibet is a Chinese dependency. The negotiations of 1890 and 1893 were carried on by officers appointed by Great Britain and China, and the Treaties concluded in those years were Treaties between Great Britain and China. The present Treaty also should be one between Great Britain and China, while the Thibetan Government should be instructed to agree to it and sign it. The British should not make a Treaty with Thibet direct, as such an arrangement robs China of her suzerainty; and Chinese admonitions to the Thibetans will be unavailing, once her suzerainty is lost.

"This is the consideration of paramount importance, and it should be carefully explained by you to the British Commissioner; in the event of his agreeing to this point, it will then be possible to discuss the Treaty. You are to telegraph reply speedily."

This second telegram was received on the 13th September.

We have thought it well to repeat the above for your information, in amplification of Younghusband's message of the 18th September. (See my telegram of the 23rd September.)

(Repeated to Peking.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 109.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

September 24, 1904.

TELEGRAPHING on the 20th September, Younghusband reports that he paid ceremonial visits to Depung and Sera Monasteries and met with good reception from Abbot, who promised to assist Thibetan Government in carrying out settlement which has been effected. Abbot expressed himself completely satisfied with it.

It is believed that Dalai Lama is a few marches beyond Nagchuka, and that he will return to Lhassa after departure of Mission. In that case Amban's position will probably be unpleasant, as the feeling of the people is hostile to Chinese.

(Repeated to Peking.)

No. 110.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 207.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Peking, September 26, 1904.

THIBET. My telegram No. 206.

The Wai-wu Pu have sent the following telegram to the Amban:—

"Careful consideration of the ten Articles composing the Convention with Thibet is still required. Special difficulties are presented by Article IX. Separate despatches have been received by you with regard to those points in which Chinese prerogatives are affected by the Article. The principle stated in these letters, that no appropriation of Thibetan territory or infringement of Chinese suzerainty is intended, should be adhered to and, in order to avoid misunderstanding and afford full evidence of sincerity, it should be plainly stated in the principal Convention.

"Circumstances preclude China's acceptance of the sections 'no matter what foreign Power.' In the first place, there is a stipulation for most-favoured-nation treatment in all China's Commercial Treaties with foreign Powers, and Thibet alone cannot be placed in a differential position, since Thibet is under Chinese authority, and we shall not be able to stop the mouths of foreign Powers.

"In the second place, the Press gave early publicity to the present Thibetan Treaty and the Board has already received inquiries on the subject from the foreign Powers, one after the other. If the assent of China were lightly given, no advantage would be gained by Great Britain, and China herself would be in an impossible position, for the various Powers would certainly come forward *en masse* to raise objections and disputes.

"It is absolutely necessary to persuade Colonel Younghusband to make satisfactory alterations in this Article before it can be acted upon, and, in view of the twofold difficulties

set forth above, he will certainly be able to make allowances, in order to avoid giving a pretext to other Powers, and you should not sign in a hurry.

"Please address Colonel Younghusband frankly in the sense of the above and negotiate for modifications in a firm and decided tone. You should telegraph any alterations that you may succeed in arranging, and await the decision of the Board."

The "Principal Convention" referred to in this telegram evidently means the "Adhesion Agreement."

I have expressed no opinion on these instructions sent to the Amban.

The instruction to negotiate for satisfactory alterations in Article IX is contrary to the assurance given to me by Prince Ch'ing that they would be ready to let the Convention stand in its present form.

I am informed by a Secretary of the Foreign Board that four foreign Representatives have made observations regarding this Article, but that M. Lessar is not among them.

I think it almost certain that the Chinese Government, in face of the action of the foreign Representatives, will refuse to concur, but, even without their assent, our position is a strong one.

(Repeated to India.)

No. 111.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. Hardinge.

(No. 343.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 26, 1904.

THE Russian Chargé d'Affaires, who called at this Office on the 20th instant, said that he observed that the Secretary of State for India, in a speech which he made at Bramley on the 19th instant, had stated that His Majesty's Government had kept their pledges that they would not "permanently occupy Thibetan territory." M. Sazanow added that he had referred to the Memorandum which I communicated to the Russian Ambassador on the 2nd June last, and he found that although the word "permanently" occurred in the Memorandum, it was in connection with interference in Thibetan affairs, and he implied that even a temporary occupation of Thibetan territory would be contrary to the assurances which had been given to Russia. There had of course, he observed, been interference in Thibetan affairs, and this still continued.

It was pointed out to M. Sazanow that there had also been temporary occupation, and that in the nature of things this could not well be otherwise.

On the 21st instant M. Sazanow called again in order to confirm, on behalf of the Russian Government, what he had said on his own initiative the day before.

He further stated that, assuming the text of the Agreement with Thibet as published in the "Times" to be practically, if not textually, correct, the Russian Government desired to represent to His Majesty's Government that it did not comply with the assurances given to the Russian Government in the Memorandum of the 2nd June, 1904.

The Russian Government reserved to themselves the right to make their official representations when the Treaty was officially published, but in the meantime they considered that Articles VII and IX in the Treaty, as given in the "Times," constituted a departure from the assurances we had given.

M. Sazanow said that it had been suggested to him that the Chumbi Valley was not part of Thibet proper; geographically perhaps it was not, but politically it was.

In the opinion of the Russian Government, even a temporary occupation of any part of Thibet after the signing of the Convention would be contrary to our assurances, and if the Thibetans did not pay the indemnity, the occupation might be prolonged, and even become permanent. Article IX was certainly a permanent intervention or interference in Thibetan affairs, and amounted to a kind of protectorate.

I am in communication with His Majesty's Secretary of State for India on the subject of the representation of the Russian Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 112.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 27.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 24th instant, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copy will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, September 27, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 112.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, September 24, 1904.

THIBET. Your telegram of the 23rd.

In explaining situation to Younghusband, you have doubtless informed him that provisions respecting indemnity are regarded by His Majesty's Government as contravening the instructions conveyed in my telegram of the 26th July last. Those instructions were subjected to careful consideration by the Cabinet, who are not prepared to modify them in regard to any of the more important provisions. As signed, the Treaty involves the collection for seventy-five years of an annual tribute; this might give rise to difficulties, and might also give occasion for interference in the affairs of Thibet, which the orders contained in my telegram of the 26th July were designed to avoid. His Majesty's Government are not prepared to consent to the occupation of Thibetan territory for an indefinite period, and we cannot rely on the good feeling which the Thibetans are at present displaying, for this may be only temporary, as indeed Younghusband's own Report indicates.

No. 113.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received September 27.)

(No. 208.)

Telegraphic.) P.

Peking, September 27, 1904.

MY telegram No. 206 to your Lordship, paragraph 7: Thibet.

It is announced in the "Peking Gazette" that Customs Taotai T'ang, of Tien-tsin, is granted the rank of Deputy Lieutenant-General, and is appointed to proceed to Thibet, where he is to investigate and conduct affairs.

I will report date of his departure.

(Above repeated to Simla.)

No. 114.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. Hardinge.

(No. 344.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 27, 1904.

THE Russian Chargé d'Affaires called upon me to-day, and said that he had been instructed to speak to me upon the subject of the recently-concluded Agreement between Great Britain and Thibet, the text of which had appeared in the "Times" newspaper. The Convention had created an unfavourable impression at St. Petersburg, and seemed to the Russian Government to contain provisions inconsistent with the assurances which I had given to the Russian Ambassador with regard to Thibet upon the 2nd June. M. Sazonow referred particularly to Article VII, under which it was stipulated that, in order to secure the punctual discharge of the obligations contracted by Thibet, British troops were to remain in occupation of the Chumbi Valley for three years at least, or possibly a longer period. As to this, M. Sazonow pointed out that I had told Count Benckendorff that Colonel Younghusband's Mission was not to be allowed to lead to the occupation of Thibet, and, as Chumbi was Thibetan

territory, the Russian Government were at a loss to understand how we could justify the Article in question.

I told him that I adhered to everything which I had said to Count Benckendorff in the communication to which he referred, and that I believed that the recently-concluded Arrangement contained nothing inconsistent with it. I called his attention to the fact that my pledge as to the occupation of Thibet was qualified by words in which I had explained that our action must, to some extent, depend upon the conduct of the Thibetans themselves, and I said that, as the Thibetans had subsequently misconducted themselves in the most serious manner—so much so that we had been compelled to advance, to Lhasa itself in order to obtain reasonable terms—it would have been easy for us to claim for ourselves the right to reconsider our proposals, and to modify them materially. We had, however, remained faithful to our original policy, and the temporary occupation of Thibetan territory which was now proposed was resorted to only for the purpose of obtaining a guarantee for that reparation which we had, from the first, announced our intention of obtaining. I had not yet had time to confer with the Secretary of State for India, but I understood that discussions were still proceeding as to the amount of the indemnity and the length of the period over which its payment was to be spread. M. Sazonow might, however, take it from me that nothing was further from our intentions than to name a sum which it would be altogether beyond the power of the Thibetans to provide, or so to arrange matters as to give ourselves a pretext for the permanent annexation of Thibetan territory.

M. Sazonow went on to say that Article IX of the "Times" version appeared to be also contrary to our pledges, because it gave us a virtual protectorate over the country and a control over its internal administration. I said that, although the account given by the "Times" of the Convention was no doubt in the main correct, it was, I believed, slightly misleading in one or two passages, particularly in the case of Article IX. Article IX, as I understood it, was a kind of self-denying Ordinance which affected ourselves as well as other Powers. We had no desire to annex Thibetan territory or to intervene in Thibetan affairs, or to have political Representatives in the country, but it must be clearly understood that other Powers were to be placed under a similar disability. I made, however, no secret of the fact that, owing to the geographical position of Thibet, it was absolutely necessary that Great Britain should be the tutelary Power, and should occupy as such a predominant position with regard to Thibetan affairs. M. Sazonow said that he quite understood that we should desire to exclude political Representatives of other Powers, but did we also desire to exclude the commerce of those Powers? What would, *e.g.*, happen if a foreigner were to apply for a Concession to make a road or to open a mine in the country? I said that if there was any question of making roads in the neighbourhood of the Indian frontier, it was obvious that we could not allow the intervention of foreigners. Without having the actual words of the Convention before me, I could not say how foreign merchants would be dealt with, but we certainly could not permit the appearance of foreign Representatives in the guise of commercial agents. I asked M. Sazonow whether I was to understand that Russia had any desire to establish such agencies. He said that he believed she had no intention of doing anything of the kind, but that he had been instructed to question me upon the point.

As he appeared inclined to insist that the Convention was open to criticism because it gave us a predominant position with reference to Thibet, I begged him to compare the extreme moderation of our present proposals with the arrangements which had actually been made in other parts of the Far East, *e.g.*, by Germany in regard to Shantung and by Russia in the case of Manchuria. I said that if he would be good enough to refer to the Agreement finally concluded in the latter case, he would find that the terms insisted upon were of a very different character from those with which we had been content.

I ended the conversation by repeating that we had every intention of loyally carrying out the assurances which I had given on behalf of His Majesty's Government, but that those assurances must be interpreted in a reasonable manner. We should never have given them if we could have imagined that they could have been interpreted as precluding us from requiring from a barbarous adversary the very modest securities which we were taking for the fulfilment of the obligations which that adversary had assumed.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 115.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 27, 1904.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, a copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Peking on the subject of the delay of the Chinese Government in signing the Thibetan Agreement.*

Sir E. Satow states that he is unable to concur in the proposals of the Viceroy of India contained in his telegram of the 20th September. He is of the opinion that force would have to be employed to compel the Chinese to pay an indemnity as suggested, and he points out that a delay must naturally ensue before the signing of the Agreement, as it appears but reasonable that the Chinese Government should discuss the terms of the Agreement which they are asked to accept.

As to laying stress on the approval of the terms by the Amban, Sir E. Satow states that this step would probably lead to the recall of that official in disgrace, as he certainly had not his Government's authority to commit them to assent.

I am to request that Lord Lansdowne may be favoured at the earliest possible moment with Mr. Brodrick's views on the points raised by Sir E. Satow.

I am, &c.
(Signed) F. A. CAMPBELL.

No. 116.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 29.)

Sir,

India Office, September 28, 1904.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Brodrick to acknowledge receipt of Mr. Campbell's letter of the 24th instant, informing him of certain representations which have been made by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires respecting the Agreement with Thibet.

In reply I am to observe that the Memorandum of the 2nd June, to which reference is made by M. Sazanow, expressly stated that withdrawal from Thibet would be effected as soon as reparation had been obtained. The indemnity provided for in Article 6 of the Agreement is the natural form for such reparation to take, having regard to the heavy expenditure which has been thrown upon the Indian Government by the conduct of the Thibetans; and Article 7 provides that the Chumbi Valley shall be occupied until the indemnity has been paid, or the trade-marts have been opened to traffic for three years, whichever date may be the later.

As Lord Lansdowne is aware, the Government of India have been informed that His Majesty's Government do not approve the arrangement whereby the amount of the indemnity has been fixed at 75 lakhs of rupees, to be paid by annual instalments of 1 lakh; and the Viceroy has been authorized to reduce the total amount to 25 lakhs and to make the occupation of the Chumbi Valley terminable in three years, provided the arrangements as to the trade-marts and as to the collection of the customs at the Indo-Thibetan frontier posts by our officers in payment of the indemnity have been in effective working order for that period, and provided one-fifth part of the indemnity has by that time been paid. In this connection I am to inclose a copy of a further telegram which has been sent to the Viceroy in reply to his telegram of the 23rd instant.

It appears to Mr. Brodrick that it would have been idle to depend upon the performance by the Thibetans of their obligations, whether in regard to the payment of the indemnity or to the provisions for trade, without some security being taken, and the only practicable form of security was the temporary occupation of the Chumbi Valley. Until the indemnity has been paid, the reparation to be exacted from the Thibetans cannot be held to have been obtained, and the retention of the security until complete satisfaction has been received cannot, in Mr. Brodrick's opinion, be regarded as inconsistent with Lord Lansdowne's Memorandum.

With regard to Article 9 the assurance given by Lord Lansdowne was to the effect that, so long as no other Power endeavoured to intervene in the affairs of Thibet, His Majesty's Government would not attempt either to annex it or to establish a

Protectorate over it, or in any way to control its internal administration. It appears to Mr. Brodrick that this assurance is in no way violated by Article 9 of the Agreement, which does not affect the internal administration of Thibet, and which would, in fact, only take effect in the event of another foreign Power endeavouring to intervene in Thibetan affairs, in which case it would be no breach of Lord Lansdowne's assurance if His Majesty's Government were to take any action that might commend itself to them.

I am, &c.
(Signed) HORACE WALPOLE.

Inclosure in No. 116.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

India Office, September 24, 1904.

YOUR telegram of the 23rd instant.

You have no doubt explained to Your husband that His Majesty's Government regard the provisions respecting indemnity as contravening their instructions of the 26th July. We are not prepared to occupy Thibetan territory indefinitely, and present Thibetan good-feeling, which, as his telegram indicates, may be temporary, cannot be relied upon. The Treaty, as signed, involves the annual collection of a tribute for seventy-five years, which could give occasion for difficulties to arise, and for interference in Thibetan affairs which it was the object of the instructions conveyed on the 26th July to avoid. These instructions were carefully considered by the Cabinet, who are not prepared to modify them in regard to any of the more important provisions.

No. 117.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Satow.

(No. 142.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, September 29, 1904.

THIBETAN Convention: your telegram No. 207 of the 26th September.

It should, I think, be possible for you to reassure Chinese Government and convince them that they need have no misgivings that Treaty rights of foreign Powers will be prejudiced by effects of Convention.

It scrupulously respects Chinese suzerainty, and no appropriation of Thibetan territory is involved by temporary occupation of Chumbi Valley pending payment of indemnity, which will be made payable within a short term of years and will be fixed at an extremely moderate amount.

You can say Convention does foreign countries no harm whatever as regards their claims. The new trade marts will be open to all lawful trade, and the same Tariff dues will be levied on all imports and exports, whatever their origin may be.

As regards Article IX, geographical position of Thibet renders British predominance essential.

The objection of foreign Powers to Convention on ground that it infringes most-favoured-nation treatment can be met by referring Chinese Government to instances of similar special arrangements between limitrophe countries. As examples you can call their attention to Article VIII of Burmah Convention of the 1st March, 1894, Article IV of Sikkim Treaty of the 7th March, 1890, and I to VI of Regulations appended thereto, 5th December, 1893.

Above points are not quite accurately represented in version of Convention published by London press.

It would be most unfortunate if further delay were involved by dispatch of Special Envoy, and in the circumstances you should press Chinese Government to give their early adhesion to Convention.

No. 118.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 30.)

Sir,

India Office, September 29, 1904.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Brodrick to acknowledge receipt of Mr. Campbell's letter of the 27th instant asking for his views upon certain points regarding the Agreement with Thibet, which were raised by Sir E. Satow's telegram No. 205 of the 22nd instant.

Two further telegrams from Sir E. Satow (Nos. 206 and 207) have also been received, which show that the situation has altered since the telegram of the 22nd was written.

Mr. Brodrick gathers that the Chinese Government do not object to the Agreement (except as regards Article 9), provided that certain explanations and assurances are added to the Adhesion Agreement, with the view of securing the recognition of Chinese suzerainty over Thibet. Sir E. Satow, however, appears to contemplate the probability of their refusing their concurrence to Article 9, as involving an infringement of the most-favoured-nation treatment, to which other Powers are entitled under Treaty.

His Majesty's Government have throughout these negotiations accepted Chinese suzerainty as a fact, and have acted with the full approval of the Chinese Government, and Mr. Brodrick sees no objection to words expressing recognition of their suzerainty being inserted in the Adhesion Agreement.

With regard to Article 9, Mr. Brodrick understands from a Memorandum received with Mr. Campbell's letter of the 24th instant, that there are strong arguments to be advanced against the contention that the Article in question infringes the most-favoured-nation rights of other Powers. Mr. Brodrick is not, therefore, prepared to accept any modification of its terms. Should, however, the Chinese Government adhere to their refusal to accept it, it might have to be specially reserved. Such reservation would not, in Mr. Brodrick's opinion, affect the validity of Article 9 as between His Majesty's Government and Thibet; and any attempt on the part of the Chinese Government to exercise its suzerain rights in a manner contrary to the spirit of that Article might be dealt with by His Majesty's Government independently.

With regard to the points specifically referred to in your letter under reply, Mr. Brodrick hopes that there will be no occasion to press the threat of claiming an indemnity from China. He thinks also that, in existing circumstances, it might be advisable, as suggested by the Government of India in their telegram of the 25th July, to place the negotiation of the Adhesion Agreement in the hands of His Majesty's Minister at Peking, who would be able to use his own judgment as to the arguments which would be most effective with the Chinese Government.

On this point, however, should Lord Lansdowne concur in this proposal, Mr. Brodrick would address a telegram to the Viceroy, of which a draft is inclosed, asking for the views of the Government of India.

I am, &c.

(Signed) HORACE WALPOLE.

 Inclosure in No. 118.
Draft of telegram from Mr. Brodrick to the Government of India.

(Secret.)

THIBET. (See Satow's telegram No. 207, dated the 26th September.)

I am disposed to think that the negotiation of Adhesion Agreement should now be transferred to Peking, in which case Satow might be instructed to accept addition of clause acknowledging in express terms Chinese suzerainty, and if necessary a reservation as to Article 9. What are your views? What are Younghusband's letters to Amban referred to in Satow's No. 206?

No. 119.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 30.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 29th instant, relative to the Thibet Agreement.

India Office, September 30, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 119.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

September 29, 1904.

THIBET Treaty.

In view of the objections which are now being raised to the Agreement on the ground that rights of China and most-favoured-nation rights are infringed by it, we desire to point out that Thibet is not one of the eighteen provinces of the Chinese Empire, and is not even, like the New Dominion, under the direct administration of the Imperial Government. We venture to think that both history and present experience prove that China does not possess full sovereignty in Thibet. In 1890, having accepted the mediation of China, we concluded a Treaty with her on behalf of Thibetans. Latter, however, have consistently refused to recognize Chinese right to make such a Treaty on their behalf, and the Convention of 1890 has remained inoperative. Our experience proves that China is unable to enforce Treaty made with her as to Thibet, and it is now admitted by the Chinese Government as well as by the Amban that for a Convention to be valid in Thibet it requires to be signed by Thibetan authorities. We understand that China receives no regular revenue from, and levies no taxes in, Thibet, and we gather from what has been admitted to Younghusband by Amban that China does not enjoy full freedom of trade in Thibet; it is even stated that a tax is imposed on Chinese goods when they enter the country. Neither present Amban nor his predecessor had power to leave the capital and go to frontier until our Mission arrived. Treaties with the limitrophe States (Kashmir, Nepal, and, it is believed, Bhutan also) are the only valid Treaties which have, up to the present, been made with Thibet; to none of these was China a signatory, and they were concluded without Chinese intervention. Thibet pays to Nepal compensation of 10,000 rupees annually under the terms of the Nepalese Treaty. As a limitrophe State, we also are entitled to conclude a similar Treaty with Thibet. It was mainly with the view of promoting our friendly relations with China that the Adhesion Agreement was designed, recognizing, as it does, the privileges and predominant position of China in Thibet. That position, while it may be held to amount to an undefined suzerainty, cannot be regarded as comprising the power of preventing or regulating the separate relations of Thibet, commercial and political, with limitrophe States. As regards such States, we submit that Thibet enjoys full contractual power, not only under the conditions actually existing, but on historical precedent also; and the acceptance of Article IX by the Thibetans was, we consider, fully within their competence. As has been pointed out to the authorities at Peking and to the Amban, Article IX in no way infringes any rights actually possessed by China in Thibet; it was, moreover, introduced largely with a view to meeting the wishes of the Thibetans. As to most-favoured-nation treatment, question cannot arise, since Treaties made with China alone are not valid in Thibet, as has been proved by our experience.

(Repeated to Peking.)

No. 120.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 211.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Peking, September 30, 1904.

THIBET. Your Lordship's telegram No. 142 of 29th September.

May I say anything to Prince Ch'ing on 5th October (on which day I hope to see him) as to the wish that he expressed (see my telegram No. 206) that the assurances

given by Younghusband in his two letters should be embodied in the Adhesion Agreement? My hands would be strengthened in urging him to accept clause 9 if I were able to concede this point to him.

Am I authorized to tell his Highness that His Majesty's Government will under no circumstances agree to any modification or explaining away of clause 9? If so, the arguments in telegram from the Indian Government seem very strong in support of the contention that India is entitled to make a Treaty with Thibet direct, and I propose to make use of them.

The Chinese Government have said nothing to me about the spreading of the indemnity over seventy-five years and the prolongation of our occupation of the Chumbi Valley incident thereto, nor have these points been mentioned by the native press, which is usually well informed on the whole subject. It is possible that only the draft of 2nd September was telegraphed by the Resident. If this is so, I think that suspicion might be excited if I were to allude to these points as directed in your Lordship's telegram.

I will do my best to combat the fears of China in regard to the objections of the foreign Powers based on the most-favoured-nation clause. Her difficulty is that she hesitates to run the risk of demands for compensation for its alleged infringement.

With your Lordship's permission I should drop a hint, as coming from myself, that Great Britain will not urge the Chinese Government further to give their adhesion as the Agreement already signed is valid without it, and Chinese adhesion is not indispensable.

(Sent to Simla.)

No. 121.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Secret.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 30, 1904.

WITH reference to your letter of yesterday's date, relative to the Agreement with Thibet, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to inform you that his Lordship concurs in the proposal that a telegram should be addressed to the Government of India asking for their views with regard to the question of transferring to Peking the negotiation of the Adhesion Agreement.

I am to suggest, for the consideration of the Secretary of State for India, that the draft telegram inclosed in your letter should be slightly amended in the manner shown in the accompanying copy.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) P. A. CAMPBELL.

Inclosure in No. 121.

Draft of Telegram from Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

THIBET. See Satow's telegram No. 207, dated 26th September.

I am disposed to think that the negotiation of Adhesion Agreement should now be transferred to Peking, in which case Satow might be instructed to accept addition of clause acknowledging in express terms Chinese suzerainty, and, if necessary, a reservation [as to Article IX] to the effect that Article IX should not be so interpreted as to deprive other Powers of their rights under existing Treaties. What are your views? What are Younghusband's letters to Amban referred to in Satow's No. 206?

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